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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 look	 at	 the	 practical	 impacts	 that	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade-related	
Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 has	 on	 the	 international	 transfer	 of	 technology,	
especially	 to	 China,	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 climate	 change	 technology,	 which	 is	 provided	 for	 by	
international	 agreements	 such	 as	 the	 United	 Nations	 Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	
Change	 and	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol.	 The	 author	 takes	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 developing	 country,	
China,	 focusing	 on	 both	 international	 and	 national	 regulations	 in	 order	 to	 study	 the	
operational	situation	of	the	“pull”	side	of	technology	transfer.	On	the	one	hand,	the	research	
addresses	 the	 positive	 and	 negative	 effect	 of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Trade-related	 Aspects	 of	
Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 by	 looking	 into	 the	 interpretation	 of	 its	 provisions;	 and	 on	 the	
other	 hand	 it	 examines	 how	 individual	 transactions,	 or	 potential	 transactions,	 of	 climate	
change	technology	have	been	affected	by	intellectual	rights	and	surrounding	issues,	especially	
in	projects	coordinated	by	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism.	The	transactions	examined	are	
focused	 upon	 China,	 which	 is	 a	 large	 and	 rapidly	 growing	 developing	 country,	 because	 it	
possesses	certain	features	that	make	the	transfer	of	technology	both	desirable	(major	climate	
change	 and	 related	 problems,	 e.g.	 severe	 air	 pollution)	 and	 at	 times	 problematic	 (e.g.	 its	
capacity	to	become	a	major	manufacturer	of	climate	change	technology,	putting	at	risk	the	IP	
rights	of	the	transferor).	
This	thesis	attempts	to	look	at	the	outlined	subject	by	employing	a	social-legal	methodology	to	
acquire	 information	 through	 an	 interview	 survey	 and	 to	 examine	 empirical	 data	 while	
discussing	literatures	and	laws.	It	provides	a	specific	and	original	angle	from	which	to	look	at	
the	dynamic	of	renewable	energy	technology	being	transferred	to	China.	This	has	enabled	this	
	 iii	
research	 to	 provide	 a	 relatively	 up-to-date	 insight	 into	 whether	 intellectual	 property	 laws	
hinder,	or	are	not	conductive	to,	technology	transfer	as	well	as	the	efficiency	of	mechanisms	
available	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	
The	results	of	the	research	show	that	although	the	patent	data	indicates	a	positive	technology	
growth	 in	 China,	 there	 are	 still	 considerable	 difficulties	 in	 the	 climate	 change	
technology-transfer	 process.	Nevertheless,	 importing	 and	absorbing	 such	 technologies	 could	
be	crucial	to	the	objective	of	protecting	the	global	environment.	Recognizing	this,	the	Chinese	
government	 has	 played	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 promoting	 technology	 transfer	 in	 a	 much	 more	
effective	manner	 than	 intellectual	property	 law	amendments	 required	by	 the	Agreement	on	
Trade-related	Aspects	of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights.	 In	 the	 future,	governments	 in	both	 the	
developed	 and	 developing	 world	 should	 put	 effort	 into	 establishing	 a	 financially	 practical	
framework	 to	 facilitate	 technology	 beyond	 expediency.	 The	 establishment	 of	 such	 should	
enable	developing	countries	 like	China	to	address	their	need	for	environmental	 technologies	
and	 to	play	an	active	 role	as	 a	 transferor.	Given	 the	 significant	differences	 in	 circumstances,	
and	the	various	needs	of	nations,	reforms	towards	a	more	environmental-enabling	intellectual	
property	 legal	 system	 should	 be	 conducted	 in	 several	 stages,	 before	 any	 substantial	
amendments	are	made	to	the	current	international	agreements.	 	
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Introduction	
Climate	change	is	by	nature	an	international	environmental	problem,1	 and,	so	it	“may	well	be	
the	biggest	and	most	complex	environment-related	problem	for	international	cooperation	this	
century	 and	 beyond.”2	 The	 influence	 of	mankind	 has	 unintentionally	 become	 a	 remarkable	
force	 affecting	 the	 Earth’s	 climatic	 system.3	 Such	 anthropogenic	 influences	 are	 caused	 by	
greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions	due	to	energy-use	and	agricultural	activities	with	“the	use	of	
fossil	 carbon4	 as	 combustion	 fuels	 in	 all	 economic	 sectors:	 transport,	 domestic	 heating,	
industrial	production,	electricity	generation,	and	so	on”5	 being	the	biggest	factor.	
This	human-induced	problem	 is	beyond	 the	Earth’s	 self-clean	ability	and	 is	 left	 to	be	 solved	
through	human	effort.	Technological	solutions	are	therefore	seen	to	be	one	of	the	imperative	
aids	 in	 addressing	 this	 issue.6 	 Accordingly,	 every	 relevant	 major	 UN	 General	 Assembly	
resolutions	for	environmental	protection	include	references	to	technology	transfer	(TT).7	 As	a	
result,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 protection,	 TT	 is	 deemed	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 be	 used	 to	
achieve	technological,	social	and	economic	development	in	less	developed	societies	under	the	
condition	that	all	states	participate	in	international	environmental	agreements.8	
																																								 																				
1 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 
Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998) 162. 
2 Benito Müller, ‘The Global Climate Change Regime: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead’ Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Oslo) for the 
Yearbook of International Co-Operation on Environment and Development 2002/2003 (London: Earthscan)  August 2002 
<http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/yiced.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017. 
3 Olav Schram Stokke and Oystein B. Thommessen, Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
2002-03, vol 17 (Routledge 2013) p.27. 
4 E.g. coal, oil and gas. 
5 Müller (n 2). 
6 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD, ‘Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Rights’ Trade and Climate Change Seminar June 18–20, 2008 Copenhagen, Denmark 
<https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cph_trade_climate_tech_transfer_ipr.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017. 
7 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, A/RES/S-6/3201, 1 May 1974. 
8 e.g. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992), Art 4(1)(h), 4(5); The The Kyoto Protocol, Art 3.14, Art 10. 
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At	the	same	time,	intellectual	property	rights	(IPRs)	protection,	as	a	common	“legal	and	policy	
measure,	 are	 potentially	 both	 an	 incentive	 and	 an	 obstacle	 to	 TT.”9	 “IPRs	 have	 been	
established	 and	 conceived	 as	 instruments	 to	 promote	 innovation	 and	 the	 dissemination	 of	
knowledge.”10	 However,	 if	 IPRs	 have	 an	 excessive	 scope	 or	 level	 of	 protection,	 they	might	
stifle	innovation	or	make	access	to	knowledge	more	difficult	or	costly.11	 Hutchison12 suggests	
that	 minimum	 standards	 of	 IPR	 protection	 make	 technologies	 prohibitively	 expensive	 or	
contribute	to	a	failure	to	attract	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI).	This	is	probably	the	case	with	
the	Agreement	on	Trade-related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS),	which	is	by	far	
the	 most	 comprehensive	 international	 agreement	 governing	 IP	 laws	 and	 requires	 each	
member	state	to	establish	a	certain	level	of	IP	protection.13	 	
Therefore, this thesis, while	 considering	 climate	 change	 as	 a	major	 theme,	 the	 importance	
and	countervailing	effect	of	IPR	protection	(patents	in	particular)	over	climate	change	TT	will	
be	 looked	 at	 by	 revisiting	 substantial	 literature	 in	 this	 area.	 By	 reviewing	 studies	 of	 the	
definition	of	TT,	climate	change	TT	in	particular;	differentiated	perspectives	towards	the	effect	
of	 IP	 protection	 in	 the	 context	 of	 knowledge-diffusion	 from	 developed	 to	 developing	
countries;	 the	positive	and	negative	 function	of	TRIPS	working	 together	with	environmental	
agreements;	 and	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 climate	 change	 TT	 to	 China;	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	 able	 to	
identify	gaps	in	the	current	 literature	and	endeavours	to	address	some	of	them.	After	all,	as 
																																								 																				
9 Aaron Cosbey, Trade and Climate Change: Issues in Perspective (Final Report and Synthesis of Discussions 
Trade and Climate Change Seminar, Copenhagen, June 18–20, 2008, 2008). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Sweet and Maxwell, ‘Analysis and Debate of Intellectual Property Issues’ (2011) 3 The WIPO Journal. 
12 Cameron Hutchison, ‘Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing Countries?’ 
(2006) 3 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 517, p.530; see also Keith E. Maskus, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer’ (1998) 9 Duke J Comp & Int'l L 109. 
13 “Under TRIPS, developing countries must adopt minimum standards of protection, meaning 20-year patent terms, and are 
prohibited from favouring domestic innovation industries. This will not be a good bargain for all states, especially those that cannot 
afford to license new technologies or are not attracting the FDI that stronger patent laws promise.” Hutchison (n 12), p.15. 
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suggested by the International	 Centre	 for	 Trade	 and	 Sustainable	 Development	 (ICTSD)14	 in	
any	policy	 context	–	 including	 climate	 change	–	 it	 is	necessary	 to	establish	a	 foundation	 for	
finding	a	balance	between	the	protection	of	IPRs	and	the	promotion	of	public	objectives	such	
as	the	TT.	
	
																																								 																				
14 ICTSD (n 6). 
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Chapter	I:	Literature	review	 	
1.1 Defining technology transfer  
Zhao	and	Reisman1	 observe	that	there	is	more	than	forty	years’	worth	of	studies	into	TT	and	
that	the	“very	definition	of	TT	differs	among	the	various	approaches	and	certainly	across	the	
many	disciplines	addressing	this	subject.”2	 Different	disciplines3	 concentrate	on	the	different	
roles	that	TT	plays:	from	its	economic	input	to	society,	to	its	representation	of	human	creative	
ability,	 to	 its	effect	on	cultural	evolution.	Also,	as	well	 as	different	disciplinary	perspectives,	
other	theorists	identify	differences	in	the	content	of	TT.	For	example,	Sahal’s4	 description	of	
TT	is	significant	for	he	observes	that	“technology	must	rely	on	a	subjectively	determined	but	
specifiable	 set	 of	 processes	 and	 products.”5 Roessner	 defines	 the	 concept	 further	 as	 a	
movement	 of	 know-how,	 of	 technical	 knowledge	 or	 technology	 from	 one	 organizational	
setting	 to	 another. 6	 According	 to	 these	 commentators,	 TT	 is	 a	 complex	 combination	 of	
transferring	both	tangibles	and	intangibles.	Any	policy	governing	such	activity	must	take	both	
aspects	into	consideration.	
																																								 																				
1 L. Zhao and A. Reisman, ‘Toward Meta Research on Technology Transfer’ (1992) 39 IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 13. 
2 They observe that economists Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of Technological 
Knowledge’ (1969) 59 The American Economic Review 29, 244; Harry G. Johnson, ‘The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of 
the International Corporation’ in C Kindleger (ed), International Corporations, vol 35 (Cambridge: CUP,1970 1970); Giovanni 
Dosi, ‘The Nature of the Innovation Process’ in Giovanni Dosi and others (eds), Technical Change and Economic Theory, vol 988 
(Pinter London 1988) tend to define technology on the basis of the properties of generic knowledge, focusing particularly on 
variables that relate to production and design. Sociologists (Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (4 edn, The Free Press, 
New York 2010); Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations; A Cross-Cultural Approach (The 
Free Press, New York 1971) tend to link technology transfer to innovation and to view technology, including social technology, as 
‘a design for instrumental action that reduces the uncertainty of cause–effect relationships involved in achieving a desired 
outcome’. Anthropologists (George M. Foster, Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technological Change (New York & 
Evanston: Harper & Row. 1962); Elman R. Service, Cultural Evolutionism: Theory in Practice (Holt,Rinehart & Winston of 
Canada Ltd; First Printing edition 1971). 
3 For example, Feenstra and Judd have adopted an Economics Discipline to address technology’s role in productivity change and 
economic development. Robert C. Feenstra and Kenneth L. Judd, ‘Tariffs, Technology Transfer, and Welfare’ (1982) 90 Journal of 
Political Economy 1142; and, Rogers takes a Sociology Discipline to look at TT by making distinctions between innovation and 
technology as the former is not always technological. The value of TT lies in its contribution to the welfare of society. Rogers (n 2). 
4 Devendra Sahal, ‘Alternative Conceptions of Technology’ (1981) 10 Research Policy 2. 
5 Sazali Abdul Wahab, Raduan Che Rose and Suzana Idayu Wati Osman, ‘Defining the concepts of technology and technology 
transfer: A literature analysis’ (2012) 5 International business research 61. 
6 J.D Roessner, ‘Technology Transfer’ in C. Hill (ed), Science and Technology Policy in the US A Time of Change (Longman, 
London 2000) p. 1 (Cited by Victoria E. Erosa, ‘Technology Policy Implementation Road: Exploring Firms’ Technology Readiness 
in a Mandatory Vertical Diffusion Environment’ (2013) 6 Journal of Service Science and Management 20). 
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In	 the	 context	 of	 climate	 change,	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (IPCC)	
identifies	this	feature	of	TT	and	defined	the	term	as	a	set	of	processes	covering	“the	flows	of	
know-how,	experience	and	equipment	for	mitigating	and	adapting	to	climate	change	amongst	
different	stakeholders.”7	 This	definition	clearly	indicates	the	importance	of	intangibles	other	
than	 patent	 licences,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 necessity	 of	 hardware	 transfer.	 This	 is	 especially	
meaningful	 for	 developing	 countries,	 as	 Keller8	 points	 out,	 saying	 that	 for	 most	 of	 them	
“foreign	 sources	 of	 technology	 account	 for	 90	 per	 cent	 or	 more	 of	 domestic	 productivity	
growth.”	 Hence,	 in	 many	 developing	 countries	 where	 “domestic	 industry	 is	 far	 from	 the	
technology	frontier,	adoption	of	existing	technologies	has	a	higher	return	than	 innovation.”9	
Domestic	economic	growth	could	be	considered	of	less	importance	from	an	environmentalist	
point	 of	 view,	 as	 a	 greener	 way	 of	 production,	 but	 can	 be	 much	 more	 expensive	 than	
energy-intensive	 and	 more	 polluting	 approaches.	 TT	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 vehicle	 to	
encourage	 parties	 with	 different	 interests	 to	 meet	 in-between	 by	 offering	 either	 an	
environmentally	friendly	manner	of	economic	development,	or	to	bring	incentives	to	promote	
compromise	 and	 collaboration	 among	 countries.	 The	 Special	 Report	 on	Methodological	 and	
Technological	Issues	on	Technology	Transfer10	 defines	TT	in	an	even	broader	way	to	embrace	
wider	 participation.	 It	 expands	 the	 term	 ‘transfer’	 to	 “encompass	 diffusion	 of	 technologies	
and	technology	cooperation	across	and	within	countries	 […]	and	to	comprise	 the	process	of	
																																								 																				
7 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Bert Metz and others eds, Cambridge University Press 2000). 
8 Wolfgang Keller, ‘International Technology Diffusion’ (2004) 42 Journal of economic literature 752. 
9 Calestous Juma and Lee Yee-Cheong, Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development (UN Millennium Project 2005 ed, Task 
Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation. United Nations, New York 2005), quoted by Matthew Littleton, ‘The TRIPS 
Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to Developing Countries’ (2009) 33 Natural Resources Forum 
233. 
10 IPCC (n 7). 
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learning	to	understand,	utilize	and	replicate	the	technology,	including	the	capacity	to	choose	
and	adapt	to	local	conditions	and	integrate	it	with	indigenous	technologies.”11	
This	 definition	 of	 TT	 clearly	 mentions	 factors	 other	 than	 the	 purchase	 and	 acquisition	 of	
equipment.	It	 includes	“the	transfer	of	skills	and	know-how	to	use,	operate,	and	maintain	as	
well	 as	 to	 understand	 the	 technology	 hardware	 so	 that	 further	 independent	 innovation	 is	
possible	by	recipient	 firms.”12	 Not	only	does	 it	emphasize	 the	techniques	directly	 related	to	
the	specific	technology	that	 is	transferred,	but	the	definition	expands	to	building	capacity	to	
enable	 the	 recipient	 to	 innovate	 through	 imitation	 or	 reverse	 engineering.	 It	 also	 includes	
localised	 adaptation	 works	 and	 eventually	 foresees	 the	 establishment	 of	 independent	
development	 abilities.	 Such	 a	 definition	 represents	 an	 environmental	 discipline	 trying	 to	
include	 the	 maximum	 number	 of	 forms	 of	 technology	 that	 can	 address	 climate	 change	
mitigation.	Although	the	role	that	the	IPCC	plays	is	merely	an	international	body	for	assessing	
the	science	related	to	climate	change,	 it	does	provide	policymakers	with	regular	information	
about	 options	 for	 adaptation	 and	mitigation.	 It	 does	 not	 tell	 policymakers	 what	 actions	 to	
take;	 it	 is	 indeed	as	a	basis	 for	governments	at	all	 levels	 to	develop	climate-related	policies.	
The	TT	definition	 adopted	by	 the	 IPCC	 takes	 less	 interest	 in	 the	economic-input	 function	of	
technology	development,	but	adheres	to	its	role	in	diminishing	climate	change	influence	and	
maintaining	 sustainable	 development.	 The	 IPCC	 advocates	 environmental	 discipline	 and	
																																								 																				
11 Ibid (n 7), quoted by IPCC, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, 2007 (B. Metz and others eds, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA 2007)  
12 Third World Network, ‘Climate Change & Technology Transfer: Addressing Intellectual Property Issues’ 
<http://unfccc.int/ttclear/misc_/StaticFiles/gnwoerk_static/TEM_tec_cfi_ee/7843d4ba5e5e459c99deb4e47b972e83/f7d4f254005e4
fb786bd4cf1679e5d1a.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017. 
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encourage	 countries	 to	 value	 the	 widespread	 appliance	 of	 technology	 more	 than	 other	
factors.	
1.2 Transfer of green technology 
The	 transfer	 of	 environmentally	 sound	 technologies	 (ESTs)13	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 an	 extensive	
literature.14	 Noticeably,	 an	 equitable	 argument	 has	 been	 brought	 to	 the	 debate	 under	 the	
environmental	context	in	support	of	TT	as	a	tool	to	achieve	social	and	economic	development	
in	less	developed	countries.15	 Such	concerns	indicate	that	“developed	countries	have	already	
had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 grow	 by	 using	 practices	 that	 caused	 major	 environmental	
degradation.”16	 If	developing	countries	do	not	have	an	equal	chance	to	go	through	the	same	
development	 process,	 their	 growth	 would	 only	 be	 made	 fair	 again	 with	 financial	 and	
technological	 support	 from	 developed	 countries.17	 In	 fact,	 both	 capital	 and	 climate	 change	
technology	 resources	 are	 currently	 unevenly	 located	 in	 a	 few	 countries,	most	 of	which	 are	
developed	countries.	The	Third	World	Network’s	report18	 on	TT	in	different	sectors	of	climate	
change	 has	 incorporated	 several	 quantitative	 research	 projects	 demonstrating	 the	 EST	
																																								 																				
13 United Nations, ‘Glossary of Environment Statistics’ Studies in Methods, Series F, No 67, United Nations, New York US 
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_67E.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017: “Environmentally sound technologies are 
techniques and technologies capable of reducing environmental damage through processes and materials that generate fewer 
potentially damaging substances, recover such substances from emissions prior to discharge, or utilize and recycle production 
residues.”  
14 e.g. Ernst Worrell and others, ‘Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Global Cement Industry’ (2001) 26 Annual Review of 
Energy and the Environment 303; see also Zili Yang and William D. Nordhaus, ‘Magnitude and Direction of Technological 
Transfers for Mitigating GHG Emissions’ (2006) 28 Energy Economics 730 quoted by IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in B. 
Metz and others (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA 2007). 
15 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (n 7). 
16 Gary C. Bryner, ‘Agenda 21: Myth or Reality?’ (1999) 157 The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy 158, quoted 
by Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Defining Sustainable Development after Earth Summit 2002’ (2003) 26 Loy LA Int'l & Comp L Rev 111, 
p.115. 
17 The theories that justify TT from developed to developing countries will not be discussed here but later on in the Chapter of 
Technology Transfer. See also Section 3.4 in this thesis. 
18 Third World Network (n 12). 
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ownership	 structure	 among	 countries.	 The	 report	 included	 Lee	 and	 his	 colleagues’	 study,19	
which	 covers	 six	 sectors	 (photovoltaic,	 wind,	 carbon	 capture,	 concentrating	 solar	 power,	
biomass,	and	cleaner	coal)	with	the	US,	Japan,	and	Germany	owning	the	most	climate	change	
technology,	 followed	by	emerging	economies	 such	as	Brazil,	 China,	 and	 India.	Nevertheless,	
developing	 countries	 “have	no	companies	or	organizations	 in	 the	 top	10	positions	 in	any	of	
the	 sectors	 analysed.”	 In	 the	 area	 of	 renewable	 energy,	 according	 to	OECD	 statistics,20	 the	
EU,21	 the	US,	 and	 Japan	hold	 the	highest	 number	 of	 climate	 change	patents.	 These	 studies	
have	demonstrated	the	disadvantaged	position	of	developing	countries	in	terms	of	preserving	
climate	change	technologies.	Such	disadvantage	perhaps	provides	facts	that	support	the	need	
of	developing	 countries	 for	TT.	 This	means	 that,	 in	order	 to	achieve	a	global	 environmental	
goal	in	time,	pecuniary	aid	and	proactive	TT	is	a	prerequisite.	
Research	 by	 Dechezleprêtre	 and	 colleagues22	 has	 more	 comprehensively	 studied	 climate	
change	TT	trends	based	on	data	collected	from	the	patent	offices	of	different	countries.	The	
targeted	 technologies	 covered	 thirteen	 climate-mitigation	 technologies	 from	 1978	 to	 2008.	
The	authors	used	a	method	of	calculating	the	number	of	technologies	 invented	in	country	A	
and	 then	 patented	 in	 country	 B.	 This	 number	 is	 used	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 amount	 of	
technologies	 transferred	 from	 country	 A	 to	 country	 B.	 The	 researchers	 found	 that	 Japan,	
Germany,	 and	 the	US	 together	 account	 for	 60	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 climate	 change	 inventions,	
while	China	and	Brazil	 together	account	 for	about	10	per	 cent	of	 total	 technologies.	 Such	a	
																																								 																				
19 Bernice Lee, Ilian Iliev and Felix Preston, Who Owns Our Low Carbon Future? Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies 
(A Chatham House Report, September 2009, 2009) 
20 OECD, Compendium of Patent Statistics (2008). 
21 With Germany, Denmark, UK and Spain being the top four patent holders. 
22 Antoine Dechezleprêtre and others, ‘Invention and Transfer of Climate Change–Mitigation Technologies: A Global Analysis’ 
(2011) 5 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 109; Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant and Yann Ménière, 
‘The Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study’ (2008) 36 Energy 
Policy 1273. 
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result	 reaffirms	 an	 impression	 of	 technology	 being	 lacking	 in	 these	 developing	 countries.	
Furthermore,	 Dechezleprêtre	 has	 illustrated	 a	 trend	 of	 international	 transfers	 in	
environmental	 technology,	stating	that	most	TTs	occurred	between	developed	countries	 (73	
per	cent).	Transfers	 from	developed	countries	 to	developing	countries	are	 limited	 to	22	per	
cent	 of	 all	 exported	 technologies,	 at	 least	 before	 2008.	 This	 also	 indicates	 the	 lack	 of	
technology	 support	 given	 from	 developed	 countries	 to	 developing	 countries.	 If	 global	
application	 and	 the	 development	 of	 climate	 change	 technologies	 is	 key	 to	 stabilizing	
greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	 TT	 should	 be	 facilitated	both	 at	 international	 and	national	 level.	
Interestingly,	 the	 period	 studied	 by	 Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.’s	 research23	 happens	 to	 be	 the	
primary	 stage	 of	 sustainable-development	 theory	 becoming	 prevalent.	 Despite	 the	 global	
attention	 given	 to	 environmental	 protection	 and	 transferring	 relevant	 technologies	 to	
developing	 countries,	 the	 vast	majority	of	 TTs	 still	 occur	between	developed	nations.24	 The	
authors	 did	 not	 unscramble	 the	 paradox	 that	 might	 have	 explained	 why	 most	 seemingly	
positive	signs	(such	as	the	rapid	growth	of	TT	to	China	as	well	as	other	emerging	economies)	
did	not	appear	in	more	recent	years.	
According	to	the	IPCC	Climate	Change	2007	–	Mitigation	of	Climate	Change,25	 the	originator	
of	the	transfer,	that	is	the	technology	holders	in	developed	countries,	initially	tend	to	think	of	
TT	from	a	technology	supplier-side	perspective.	A	review26	 of	the	literature	written	from	such	
a	perspective	points	out	that	these	works	tend	to	focus	on	the	initial	choice	and	acquisition	of	
																																								 																				
23 Dechezleprêtre and others (n 22). 
24 until 2003, the number of climate mitigation tecdhnologies transferred between north and north was 5692 as measured by the 
number of inventions that are patented in at least two countries. In contrast north to south TT was only 1719 and Sounth to Sount 
TT was 226. See Dechezleprêtre, Glachant and Ménière, (2008) (n 22). 
25 IPCC, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2007 (n 11). 
26 Brooks, H., 1995: Review of C. Freeman: The economics of hope- essays on technical change, economic growth and the 
environment. Minerva, 33(2), pp. 199-203. Quoted by ibid (n 11). 
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technology	 on	 a	 firm-level.	 Take	 the	 Lee	 et	 al.27	 and	 Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al.28	 studies,	 for	
example	 where	 both	 attempt	 to	 use	 patent	 data	 to	measure	 the	 transfer	 and	 diffusion	 of	
technologies.	The	UNEP	report	states:	“while	Dechezleprêtre	et	al.	use	patents	filed	 in	more	
than	 one	 country	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 technology	 transfer,	 Lee	 et	 al.	 take	 patent	 applications	
where	more	than	one	organization	is	listed	as	an	owner	as	an	indicator	of	diffusion.”29	 Using	
patent	 applications	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 TT	 is	 in	 fact	 subject	 to	 numerous	 limitations.	 For	
example,	patent	application	activity	 represents	 the	decisions	of	 technology	holders,	most	of	
whom	are	located	in,	and	targeted	at,	a	mature	marketplace	in	terms	of	developed	countries.	
Such	 TT	 between	 developed	 countries	 is	 simpler,	 because	 the	 preconditions	 are	 friendlier	
towards	 free	 trade.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 decision-making	 process	 of	 TTs	 that	 involve	 firms	 in	
developing	countries	are	not	as	straightforward	because	these	TTs	are	likely	to	be	affected	by	
the	 policy	 environment,	 finance	 support	 and	 technology-absorptive	 ability	 of	 the	 receiving	
country.30	 Therefore,	 they	 miss	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 enabling	 environment	 of	 developing	
countries	on	TT	from	the	receivers’	perspective.	The	IPCC	has	specifically	listed	barriers	to	TT,	
including	“lack	of	information,	insufficient	human	capabilities,	lack	of	capital,	high	transaction	
costs,	 trade	 and	 policy	 barriers,	 business	 limitations	 such	 as	 risk	 aversion,	 and	 institutional	
limitations	 such	 as	weak	 intellectual	 property	 protection	 laws	 and	 enforcement.”31	 Yet	 the	
effect	of	these	barriers	listed	in	the	technical	summary	of	the	IPCC	report	was	not	addressed	
in	great	detail	by	the	IPCC.	The	IPCC	2000	report	made	an	example	of	analysing	governmental	
																																								 																				
27 Lee, Iliev and Preston (n 19). 
28 Dechezleprêtre and others (n 22). 
29 UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: bridging the gap between evidence and policy: Final report (2010) p.22. 
30 IPCC, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2007 (n 11). 
31 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (n 7). 
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influence	by	citing	an	instance	of	a	government	patent	 licence	arising	out	of	publicly	funded	
efforts	as	a	part	of	their	industrial	policy.32	 As	TT	varies	according	to	specific	context	among	
sectors,	more	specific	studies	are	required	to	clarify	the	role	of	governments	in	initiating	and	
facilitating	 TT.	 In	 fact,	 most	 barriers	 listed	 by	 the	 IPCC33	 –	 ranging	 from	 lack	 of	 physical	
supplies,	 such	 as	 capital	 and	 equipment,	 to	 non-material	 assistance,	 such	 as	 information,	
skills,	 institutional	 mechanisms	 and	 policies	 –	 are	 either	 partly	 or	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	
environment	of	 the	recipient	country. 34	 Each	of	 the	above	sectors	will	at	 least	 in	 the	short	
term	 continue	 to	 be	 an	 important	 driving	 force	 in	 the	 development	 of	 climate	 change	
technologies.	Thus,	we	need	to	exam	them	 in	a	specific	 receiving	country	environment,	and	
further	explore	its	conducive	or	disabling	effect	on	TT.	 	
1.3 Barriers to TT in relation to IPRs	
Another	frequently	mentioned	barrier	concerns	that	of	IPR	regimes	in	recipient	countries	that	
may	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 TT.	 Both	 Sherwood35	 and	Maskus36	 took	 the	 view	 that	 technology	
tends	to	flow	best	where	conductivity	for	its	transfer	is	secured	by	effective	IPR	systems.	They	
fear	that	if	an	invention	can	be	freely	and	easily	gained	and	copied	it	will	deter	the	inventors	
from	 investing	 time	 and	 money	 in	 working	 on	 something	 new	 and	 useful.	 Maskus 37	
emphasizes	that	 IP	protection	gives	 inventors	a	sense	of	safety	by	assuring	a	certain	control	
over	information	in	TT.	It	also	secures	the	rights	holders	a	place	in	the	industry	if	they	are	to	
																																								 																				
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 For example, the report has recognised institutional and administrative difficulties exist to develop technology transfer contracts. 
Such difficulties will incur time and capital cost to contracting parties. In a way, it has increased the threshold of entrance to green 
technology market. See IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation: Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Bert Metz ed, Cambridge University Press 2001). 
35 Robert M. Sherwood, ‘Global Prospects for the Role of Intellectual Property in Technology Transfer’ (2002) 42 Idea 27. 
36 Keith E. Maskus, ‘Transfer of Technology and technological Capacity Building’ (2003) ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd 
Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectual Property. 
37 Ibid. 
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exploit	the	inventions.	Not	only	technology	sellers	but	buyers	also	need	some	assurances	that	
they	will	 recover	 the	costs	of	 their	 investment.	According	 to	Sherwood,	even	 though	“some	
technology	 can	 be	 acquired	 without	 a	 willing	 transfer	 from	 its	 creator,”	 38	 for	 example	
through	reverse	engineering,	 imitation	and	“piracy”,	people	can	acquire	certain	technologies	
they	need,	such	approaches	do	have	distinct	limits	because	the	skills	gained	are	less	valuable	
than	those	received	from	willing	transfers,	as	the	latter	tend	to	offer	greater	learning	for	the	
recipients.39	 Usually	this	 is	because	of	associated	transfer	of	knowledge	rather	than	 just	the	
transfer	of	 technology.	There	 is	also	 the	very	 real	 issue	of	patent	 infringement	 in	 the	above	
circumstances,	 which	 should	 be	 taken	 care	 of	 by	 the	 imitators.	 These	 studies	 imply	 that	 if	
more	 effective	 IPR	 protection	 in	 the	 recipient	 country	 secures	willing	 transfers,	 in	 the	 long	
term	 it	 will	 not	 become	 a	 barrier	 to	 TT	 but	 will	 have	 a	 beneficial	 impact	 on	 the	 country’s	
technology	development.	Maskus	even	made	a	quite	conclusive	argument	pointing	out	 that	
firms	are	“more	willing	 to	 trade,	 license,	and	 invest	 in	 technologies	 in	countries	with	strong	
IPR	regimes.”40	
Detailed	 evidence	 is	 provided	 by	 his	 joint	 research	 together	 with	 Reichman41	 where	 they	
reviewed	 a	 number	 of	 studies	 identifying	 that	 “the	 preponderance	 of	 econometric	 studies	
suggests	that	market-mediated	flows	of	technology	respond	positively	to	the	strengthening	of	
patent	 laws	 across	 countries.”42	 However,	 Smith	has	 found	 that	 such	 trends	only	 appear	 in	
																																								 																				
38 Sherwood (n 35). 
39 Ibid (n 35). 
40 Carsten Fink and Keith E. Maskus, ‘Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights and What We Have Learned’ in Carsten Fink 
and Keith E. Maskus (eds), Intellectual property and development: Lessons from recent economic research (A co-publication of 
the World Bank and Oxford University Press 2005). 
41 Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global 
Public Goods’ (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic Law 279; Pamela J. Smith, ‘How do Foreign Patent Rights affect US 
Exports, Affiliate Sales, and Licenses?’ (2001) 55 Journal of International Economics 411. 
42 Maskus and Reichman (n 41) p.289. 
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patent-sensitive	 industries43	 in	 middle-income	 and	 large	 developing	 countries.44	 This	 has	
revealed	the	limiting	effect	of	strong	IP	protection	on	TT,	because	stronger	IP	protection	will	
not	 encourage	 TT	 where	 the	 receiving	 country	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 to	 adopt	 the	 technology.	
Similarly,	Falvey45	 suggests	that	while	stronger	IPR	protection	can	ultimately	reap	rewards	in	
terms	 of	 greater	 domestic	 innovation	 and	 increased	 technology	 diffusion	 in	 developing	
countries	with	sufficient	capacity	to	innovate,46	 it	has	little	impact	on	innovation	and	diffusion	
in	 those	developing	 countries	without	 such	 capacity,	 and	may	 impose	 additional	 costs.	 This	
has	 also	 been	 argued	 by	 Foray,47	 stating	 that	 “while	 it	 might	 be	 debated	 as	 a	 matter	 of	
equity48	 that	as	beneficiaries	they	should	pay,	or	that	being	poor	they	(developing	countries)	
should	 not	 be	 asked	 to	 pay,	 the	 important	 fact	 remains	 that	 it	 would	 not	 make	 much	
difference	from	an	efficiency	standpoint:	the	world’s	supply	of	such	innovations	would	not	be	
much	diminished	–	 if	at	all	–	by	these	countries	adopting	a	free	riding	policy.”	Nevertheless,	
the	 ethical	 considerations	 of	 a	 free-riding	 policy	 and	 chances	 of	 future	 investment	 in	 such	
jurisdictions	 shall	 be	 considered	 when	 a	 country	 intends	 to	 reform	 towards	 a	 more	
technology-intensive	means	of	development.	 	
Maskus	 and	 Okediji	provide	 a	 reason	 for	 such	 a	 trend	 being	 seen	 only	 in	 large	 emerging	
economics	(for	example	Brazil,	Indian,	and	China):	it	could	be	that	“the	effectiveness	of	IPRs	as	
incentives	 to	 develop	 ESTs	 and	 deploy	 them	 in	 global	 markets	 depends	 on	 how	 well	 the	
																																								 																				
43 such as the pharmaceutical industry. 
44 Smith (n 41); Keith E. Maskus and Mohan Penubarti, ‘How Trade-Related are Intellectual Property Rights?’ (1995) 39 Journal 
of International Economics 227 
45 See, R. Falvey, N. Foster and O. Memedović, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic 
Growth: Theory and Evidence (United Nations Industrial Development Organization, UNIDO 2006) 
46 China is such kind of country. 
47 Dominique Foray, Technology Transfer in the TRIPS Age: The Need for New Types of Partnerships between the Least 
Developed and Most Advanced Economies (ICTSD Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series (May 2009), 2009)  
48 The equity issue will be discussed in the Technology Transfer Chapter. 
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innovation	 policies	 of	 industrialized	 countries	 currently	 function	 and	 whether	 developing	
countries	 and	 least	 developed	 countries	 (LDCs)	 have	 invested	 sufficiently	 in	 domestic	
institution-building	 to	 facilitate	 the	 absorption	 of	 new	 technologies.”49	 Economies	 with	 low	
incomes	normally	have	fewer	resources	invested	in	the	relevant	market	and	therefore	are	not	
attractive	to	technology	transferors,	regardless	of	IP	protection	level	available	in	that	country.	
Although	adopting	a	 rather	general	point	of	 view,	Maskus	and	Okediji50	 have	 identified	 the	
importance	 of	 policies	 and	 the	 enabling	 environment	 in	 the	 developing	 country	working	 as	
prerequisite	 factors	 towards	 the	 actual	 effect	 of	 IP	 protection.	 Matkusen	 and	 Maskus51	
recognised	 that	 with	 limited	 technological	 capacity	 in	 some	 developing	 countries,	 their	
markets	 do	 not	 present	 a	 competitive-imitation	 threat	 to	 the	 transferors.	 For	 this	 reason,	
even	 if	 these	 poor	 countries	 implemented	 their	 IP	 standards	 in	 compliance	 with	
internationally	accepted	 IP	 standards	 (e.g.	TRIPS),	 still	 they	will	not	encourage	additional	TT	
from	 abroad.	 Often,	 even	 without	 the	 threat	 of	 competitive	 imitation,	 the	 above	 research	
suggests	 that	 TT	 will	 still	 not	 occur	 because	 of	 factors	 other	 than	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 IPR	
protection	in	the	receiving	market.	This	issue	will	be	explored	in	this	thesis,	focusing	on	a	few	
industry	sectors	(the	renewable	energies	of	wind	and	biomass	in	particular).	
Traditionally,	 IP	 protection	 is	 believed	 to	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 TT	 when	 the	 receiving	
country	has	high	 incomes	and	technological	capacities:	“IPRs	become	an	 important	 factor	 in	
																																								 																				
49 Keith E. Maskus and Ruth L. Okediji, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and International Technology Transfer to Address Climate 
Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options’ ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No 32 
(December 2010) 
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50 Ibid. 
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Development Issue Paper No. 7 2004) quoted by Maskus and Reichman (n 41). 
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this	regard,	even	though	they	are	only	one	of	a	list	of	variables	that	influence	ITT.”52	 Does	this	
mean	 that	 international	 TT	 to	 large	 developing	 countries	 is	 sufficiently	 facilitated	 by	 the	
current	IP	system	required	under	TRIPS?	Correa	voices	his	fear	that	enhanced	IPR	protection	
will	 not	 effectively	 promote	 the	 development	 process	 and	 will,	 instead,	 limit	 access	 to	
technology.53	 Maskus	and	Reichman54	 also	admit	the	likeliness	that	stronger	global	IPRs	have	
placed	a	limitation	on	the	scope	for	firms	in	developing	countries	to	acquire	new	and	mature	
technologies	 at	 manageable	 costs.	For	 example,	 “the	 natural	 competitive	 disadvantages	 of	
follower	countries	may	become	reinforced	by	a	proliferation	of	legal	monopolies	and	related	
entry	barriers	that	result	from	global	minimum	intellectual	property	standards.	Such	external	
restraints	on	competition	could	consign	the	poorest	countries	to	a	quasi-permanent	status	at	
the	 bottom	 of	 the	 technology	 and	 growth	 ladder.”55	 This	 hypothesis	 about	 the	 potential	
hindering	 effect	 of	 IP	 protection	 for	 firms	 in	 developing	 countries	 to	 break	 into	 the	 global	
market	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 the	 industry	 is	 a	 valid	 point	 in	 dissecting	 the	 actual	 influence	 of	
IPRs.	But	based	on	the	preponderance	of	econometric	studies,	the	article	failed	to	confirm	the	
conjecture	by	providing	firm-level	evidence.	
Existing	literature	has	argued	that	IPRs	could	impose	costs	not	only	on	private	firms	but	also	
on	society.	For	example,	in	order	to	be	the	first	to	file,	R&D	competition	between	competitors	
is	common	and	this	could	cause	the	wasteful	duplication	of	investment	in	industry.56	 Still,	the	
																																								 																				
52 “Other important factors include effective infrastructure, efficient governance, market size and growth, and proximity to 
suppliers and demanders.” Maskus, Encouraging International Technology Transfer (n 51) quoted by Maskus and Reichman (n 41). 
53 Carlos M. Correa, ‘Review of the TRIPS Agreement: Fostering the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries’ TWN 
Trade & Development Series 13 <http://www.twn.my/title2/t&d/tnd13.pdf> . 
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55 Ibid. 
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excessive	 cost	 paid	 for	 keeping	higher	 standards	of	 IP	 protection	may	not	be	 as	 harmful	 as	
public-interest	 losses.	 Public	 concerns	 such	 as	 healthcare,	 biodiversity	 and	 environmental	
protection	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 secondary	 issues	 in	 national	 and	 global	 policymaking,	 in	
comparison	 with	 the	 already	 existing	 proliferation	 of	 exclusive	 rights	 granted	 to	 private	
technology	 owners.57	 If	 IPR	 regimes	 do	 not	 sufficiently	 take	 into	 account	 these	 public	
interests	it	might	hinder	the	use	of	TT	as	a	means	of	dealing	with	climate	change.	Littleton58	
points	out	that	IPR	regimes	can	in	fact	become	barriers	that	affect	climate	change	TT	on	both	
supplier’s	and	receiver’s	side.	He	argues	that	“technology	supply	(firms	may	refuse	to	transfer	
without	asset	protection)	or	technology	demand	(one	of	the	domestic	policies	that	can	affect	
technology	 demand,	 as	 mentioned	 above).”59 	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	 relationship	
between	 stronger	 IP	protection	and	 trade/TT	 flows,	 the	 conclusion	of	 this	 paper	provides	 a	
way	to	look	at	the	current	IPR	regime	as	a	tool	that	fails	its	expected	role	as	a	climate	change	
TT	stimulant.	This	highlights	the	shared	responsibility	of	developed	and	developing	countries	
for	 “overhauling	 TRIPS	 and	 domestic	 IPR	 laws	 to	 address	 climate	 change,	 following	 in	 the	
footsteps	 of	 public-health	 exceptions	 to	 IPR	 regulations.	 Achieving	 this	 goal	 will	 require	
simultaneous	 action	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 WTO.”60	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 empirical	 evidence	
from	TT,	economic	growth	and	IP	protection	 in	developing	nations	 indicates	that	there	 is	no	
positive	correlation	among	the	three.61	 This	has	provided	a	basis	from	which	to	challenge	the	
																																								 																				
57 Maskus and Reichman (n 41). 
58 Littleton (n 9). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 K. R. Srinivas, ‘Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights’ (2009) RIS Discussion Papers No153 
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importance	of	patenting	as	in	many	emerging	economies	it	is	considered	as	a	possible	barrier	
in	the	clean-TT	debate.62	 	
Although	strengthened	IP	standards	have	their	pros	and	cons,	no	commentators	suggest	that	
weak	 IP	protection	 is	 the	only	path	 to	 technology	growth.	Actually	 there	are	examples	of	 a	
now-developed	 nation	 being	 transformed	 from	 a	 less	 developed	 economy	 through	
technological	 advances	 without	 benefiting	 from	 weak	 IP	 protection.	 Countries	 like	 Japan63	
and	 South	 Korea64	 all	 underwent	 a	 period	 of	 policy	 transformation	 and	 therefore	 achieved	
corresponding	 technology	 development.	 Although	 both	 examples	 largely	 occurred	 before	
WTO	 and	 TRIPS,	 when	 global	 IP	 regimes	 were	 weak	 and	 technology	 diffusion	 speed	 and	
patterns	 were	 very	 different	 from	 today,	 these	 precedents	 had	 at	 least	 proved	 that	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 expect	 an	 effective	 environment	 including	 an	 IP	 system	 that	 would	 guarantee	
willing	 transfers,	 encourage	 transferors	 to	 offer	 full	 information	 needed	 by	 recipients,	 and	
protect	 inventors	 from	 being	 infringed	 by	 using	 and	 exploring	 the	 technology.	 It	 can	 be	
“buttressed	by	appropriate	 infrastructures,	governance	and	competition	systems	 in	order	 to	
be	 effective”.65	 In	 this	 case,	 IPRs	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 instrument	 aimed	 at	 facilitating	 the	
transfer	 of	 technology.	 Otherwise,	 it	 remains	 an	 ornament	 in	 terms	 of	 international	 TT	
promotion	in	most	developing	countries.	 	
																																								 																				
62 UNEP, EPO and ICTSD (n 29), suggesting a new patent classification for climate change mitigation technologies” to be 
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63 Janusz A. Ordover, ‘A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion’ (1991) 5 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 43 
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64 Linsu Kim, “Technology transfer and intellectual property rights: lessons from Korea’s experience” UNCTAD/ICTSD working 
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However,	in	the	context	of	climate	change,	we	must	look	into	the	subtle	relationship	between	
IPR	 protection	 and	 TT	 from	 a	 particular	 perspective.	 The	 2007	 Bali	 Road	 Map66 	 has	
emphasised	 the	need	 for	appropriate	policies	 regarding	green	 technology	development	and	
diffusion,	 although	 under	 conditions	 of	 global	 environmental	 deterioration,	 such	 a	 debate	
should	be	considered	case	by	case	in	different	industry	sectors	rather	than	in	general	terms.	
This	 is	 due	 to	 significant	 differences	 between	 industries	 in	 terms	 of	 technology-absorptive	
capability.	 The	 conflict	 between	 the	 urgency	 of	 GHG-mitigation	 requirement	 in	 many	
developing	countries	and	the	fact	that	these	countries	are	either	not	able	to,	or	reluctant	to,	
bear	 all	 the	 financial	 costs	 associated	 with	 acquiring	 technologies	 primarily	 developed	 in	
industrialized	 countries	 varies	 between	 sectors	 and	 among	 countries.	 For	 example,	 the	
situation	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 different	 from	 the	 renewable	 energy	 industry.	
Moreover,	developing	countries	 such	as	China	and	Brazil	have	argued	 for	“the	creation	of	a	
different	 IPR	 regime	 for	 climate-friendly	 technologies	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 diffusion,	
whereas	 industrialized	 countries	 claim	 that	 the	 incentives	 provided	 by	 existing	 IPR	 regimes	
reinforce	 diffusion	 incentives	 by	 ensuring	 patent	 holders	 the	benefits	 that	 result	 from	 their	
inventions.”67	 The	IPCC,	sharing	a	similar	view	with	the	latter,	states	that	“without	an	IPR	law	
that	 is	 effectively	 enforced,	 there	 is	 little	 incentive	 for	 private	 companies	 to	 share	 their	
technology.”68	 It	would	consider	the	cost	of	IPR	as	“usually	quite	small	when	compared	to	the	
capital	investments	and	risks	that	are	involved.”	This	literature	has	made	the	perspective	that	
research	takes	a	crucial	factor	in	reaching	any	conclusions.	A	different	standpoint	(developed	
																																								 																				
66 Participants at the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali developed a road map, known as the Bali Road 
Map, for negotiating a new climate agreement by the end of 2009. 
67 Dechezleprêtre and others (n 22). 
68 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
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or	developing,	economist	or	environmentalist	view)	changes	the	way	a	researcher	looks	at	the	
gravity	of	each	interest:	the	inviolability	of	IPRs	or	the	climate	change	crisis.	
In	a	way,	the	IPCC	provides	a	solution	to	the	conflict	by	encouraging	developing	countries	to	
be	 flexible	 in	 acquiring	 technologies.	 For	 example,	 they	 could	 establish	 an	 IP-sharing	 pool	
based	on	contracts	made	between	nominated	mechanisms	(such	as	state-owned	companies	
or	agents)	and	private	firms,	to	invest	and	share	technology	with	them	in	return	for	a	share	of	
the	 products	 produced.69	 Such	 practice	 has	 proven	 “very	 successful	 in	 the	 international	 oil	
and	gas	sectors,	and	could	be	a	model	for	other	energy	supply	areas”.70	 However,	it	does	not	
resolve	 a	 missing	 driving	 force	 to	 initiate	 and	 maintain	 such	 mechanisms.	 Maskus	 and	
Reichman	 point	 out	 a	 cursory	 solution	 to	 the	 defect	 by	 insisting	 that	 it	 is	 mainly	 the	
responsibility	of	the	developing	governments	to	be	“pro-active	in	ensuring	that	the	net	effect	
of	expanded	IP	protection	is	to	enhance	access	to	technology	and	to	encourage	its	domestic	
adaptation	 and	 diffusion.”	 71	 Still,	 the	 limitation	 of	 the	 standpoint	 is	 that	 it	 gives	 less	
consideration	to	the	financial	and	experiential	shortage	of	the	developing	economies	and	it	is	
unlikely	to	actualize	without	liability	being	placed	on	developed	countries.	
1.4 The TRIPS Agreement 
Before	the	establishment	of	TRIPS,	there	was,	generally,	a	significant	gap	between	levels	of	IP	
protection	 in	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries.72	 But	 in	 the	 1990s,	 views	 towards	 IP	
protection	changed	in	some	developing	countries.	This	change	in	standpoint	was	reflected	in	
																																								 																				
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Sherwood (n 35). 
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the	 IP	 regime	 reform	 in	 these	 countries	 and	 the	 developing	 governments	 believed	 that	
stronger	 IP	protection	would	attract	TT	 in	different	forms,	such	as	FDI.73	 Conforming	to	this	
trend,	 the	WTO	 embodied	minimum	 standards	 of	 IP	 protection	 in	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 as	
part	of	 its	 trade	package.	Many	developing	countries	had	acceded	 to	 these	 requirements	 in	
order	 to	 get	 greater	 market	 access	 to	 international	 trade	 with	 developed	 countries.	 In	
exchange	 for	 developing	 countries’	 compliance	 with	 higher	 IP	 protection,	 TRIPS	 requires	
developed	 countries	 to	 take	 on	 a	 corresponding	 obligation	 to	 facilitate	 TT	 to	 developing	
countries.74	
However,	at	 the	negotiation	stage	 in	 reaching	TRIPS,	 the	 intentions	of	countries	at	different	
development	levels	varied	significantly.	Developed	countries	aimed	at	creating	new	rules	and	
principles	by	craftily	bringing	claims	for	a	proper	place	to	discuss	substantive	 issues	on	 IPRs.	
According	to	Yu,75	 at	that	time	the	US	lobbied	successfully	by	seizing	the	opportunity	that	the	
economic	 crises	 confronting	many	 of	 the	 EU	member	 states	 and	 Japan.	 Together	 with	 “its	
successful	 ‘divide	 and	 conquer’	 tactics	 and	 aggressive	 strategies	 toward	 the	 hardliner	
opposition	countries,”76	 many	developing	countries	believed	that	the	negotiations	 launched	
by	 these	 developed	 countries	 were	 only	 focusing	 on	 counterfeit	 trade	 and	 other	 such	
trade-related	aspects. 	
“By	the	time	Canada	proposed	to	create	a	new	multilateral	trade	organization	in	1990,	its	
proposal,	along	with	the	less	developed	countries’	fears	of	being	excluded	from	such	an	
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organization,	 by	 the	 early	 1990s,	 virtually	 all	 negotiating	 parties	 accepted	 as	 inevitable	
the	inclusion	of	minimum	standards	for	intellectual	property	protection	and	enforcement	
in	the	GATT	framework.”77	 	
Under	 the	 historical	 formation	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	 Peter	 Drahos	 evaluates	 its	
negotiations	using	a	theory	of	democratic	property	rights	with	a	threefold	criteria	to	be	met	in	
order	 to	 efficiently	 define	 property	 rights:	 “Firstly,	 all	 relevant	 interests	 have	 to	 be	
represented	 in	the	negotiating	process	 (the	condition	of	representation).	Secondly,	all	 those	
involved	 in	 the	 negotiation	 must	 have	 full	 information	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 various	
possible	outcomes	(the	condition	of	full	information).	Thirdly,	one	party	must	not	coerce	the	
others	 (the	 condition	 of	 non-domination).”78 	 And	 according	 to	 the	 criteria,	 the	 study	
concludes	that	the	TRIPS	negotiations	did	not	meet	these	conditions	of	democratic	bargaining	
because	not	all	 relevant	 interests	were	considered	 in	the	negotiating	process	and	there	was	
disguised	coercion	involved.	Most	importantly,	many	developing	negotiating	parties	were	not	
aware	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 various	 possible	 outcomes	 of	 the	 Agreement.	 The	 problem	
derived	 from	 the	use	of	 circles	of	 consensus	when	 certain	 “groups	were	 created	within	 the	
TRIPS	negotiations	to	move	the	process	towards	a	final	deal.”79	 And	“it	was	in	these	informal	
groupings	 that	 much	 of	 the	 real	 negotiating	 was	 done	 and	 where	 the	 consensus	 and	
agreement	that	mattered	was	obtained.”80	 Unfortunately	the	US	and	Europe	were	the	main	
force	behind	most	key	groups	which	“allowed	them	to	soak	up	more	information	than	anyone	
																																								 																				
77 Adbulqawi A. Yusuf, ‘TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions’ in Carlos María Correa and Abdulqawi Yusuf 
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78 Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ (2002) 5 The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 765. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
	 22	
else	about	the	overall	negotiations.	Whenever	they	needed	higher	levels	of	secrecy	they	could	
reform	 into	 a	 smaller	 negotiating	 globule.”81	 This	 gave	 the	 TRIPS	 negotiations	 doubtful	
transparency,	making	the	result	difficult	for	less	involved	countries	to	predict.	Although	there	
is	 insufficient	evidence	 to	prove	 that	developing	countries	were	 left	 incapacitated,	Yu82	 has	
given	valuable	insights	into	how	these	countries	are	at	a	disadvantage	in	negotiations.	
Even	so,	the	debate	on	whether	should	we	have	a	minimum	unified	standard	of	IP	protection	
was	 effectively	 ended.	 What	 can	 be	 counted	 on	 now	 is	 the	 operation	 and	 amendment	 of	
TRIPS.	The	“purpose	of	TRIPS	 is	 to	give	adequate	and	effective	protection	to	 IPRs	and,	 in	so	
doing,	encourage	creativity	and	innovation,	promote	the	transfer	of	technology,	and	protect	
consumers.”83	 Putting	 aside	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 expected	 TT-promoting	 function	 of	
TRIPS,	 over	 time,	many	developing	 countries	 started	 to	 feel	 pressure	 from	 some	developed	
countries.	As	stated	by	Kleen	and	Page84	 the	US	and	the	EU	had	been	asking	for	IP	protection	
beyond	the	minimum	standards	required	by	TRIPS.	A	telling	case	given	by	Kleen	and	Page	 is	
“the	attempt	by	the	US	government	and	pharmaceutical	industry	to	block	the	use	of	parallel	
imports	and	compulsory	licenses	by	the	South	African	government	to	obtain	access	to	cheaper	
HIV/AIDS	drugs.”85	 	
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In	 sum,	 despite	 the	 developed	 countries’	 complaints	 that	 the	 implementations	 of	 TRIPS	 in	
many	developing	countries	are	not	satisfactory,	“developing	countries	generally	feel	that	the	
concessions	they	made	during	the	Uruguay	Round	with	respect	to	IPRs	are	not	providing	them	
with	 significant	 benefits.”86	 This	 is	 possibly	 the	 main	 reason	 that	 developing	 countries	
continue	to	“complain	about	the	high	cost	of	TRIPS	and	their	limited	capacity	to	ensure	TRIPS	
protection.”87	 For	 example,	 Hoekman	 et	 al.88	 in	 their	 work	 on	 an	 upper	 middle-income	
(levelled	 by	 the	 World	 Bank)	 developing	 country	 (Jamaica),	 found	 that	 implementing	 the	
additional	TRIPS	rules	would	cost	about	six	million	US	Dollars.	Correa89	 has	studied	research	
work	in	the	area	of	pharmaceuticals,	aimed	at	identifying	the	potential	effect	of	TRIPS.	One	of	
the	studies	undertaken	 in	Thailand	found	that,	 regarding	the	patent	 law	reform	in	and	after	
1992	according	 to	TRIPS	 requirement,	 “there	had	been	no	significant	 increase	 in	 transfer	of	
technology	or	foreign	direct	investment,	and	that	spending	on	pharmaceuticals	had	increased	
at	 a	 higher	 rate	 than	 overall	 health	 care	 spending”90.	 UNCTAD91	 also	 points	 out	 TRIPS’s	
adverse	effect	on	technology	diffusion,	as	it	is	very	likely	to	affect	the	conditions	for	access	to	
and	use	of	technology.	For	example,	imitation	and	similar	activities	that	used	to	be	patterns	of	
technology	acquisition	are	restricted,	 thereby	making	the	utility	and	follow-up	 innovation	of	
technologies	 owned	 by	 developed	 countries	 even	 more	 difficult	 in	 developing	 countries.	
“Strengthened	IPRs	are	also	likely	to	increase	the	negotiating	position	of	right-holders.”92	
																																								 																				
86 Kleen and Page (n 84). 
87 World Bank (n 83). 
88 Bernard M. Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English, Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook, vol 1 (World Bank 
Publications 2002), quoted by Kleen and Page (n 84). 
89 Carlos M. Correa, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries’ in Arthur E. Appleton and Michael G. Plummer (eds), 
The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, vol 2 (Springer Science & Business Media 2007). 
90 Siripen Supakankunti and others, ‘Impact of the World Trade Organization TRIPS Agreement on the pharmaceutical industry in 
Thailand’ (2001) 79 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 461, quoted By Correa (n 89). 
91 Training Tools On The Trips Agreement, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/Misc.17, Geneva, January 2002. 
92 Ibid. 
	 24	
1.5 The TRIPS and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
The	impact	of	TRIPS	TT	on	developing	countries	is	often	reflected	indirectly	through	changes	
made	to	national	IP	law	according	to	requirements	of	the	Agreement.	Relatively	less	empirical	
literature	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 IP	 law	 and	 IP	 environment	 in	 relation	 to	 environmental	
protection	than	on	environmental	regulation	itself,	such	as	water	or	air	pollution	regulation.93	
Many	 studies	 related	 to	 MEAs	 make	 assertions	 regarding	 both	 IP	 protection	 and	 climate	
change	TT.	This	 is	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	MEAs	and	“declarations	are	 replete	with	generalized	
obligations	 of	 states	 to	 cooperate	 in	 transferring	 ESTs	 to	 developing	 countries.”94	 For	
example,	the	Principle	9	of	the	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	Development	encourages	
cooperation	 between	 nations	 “by	 enhancing	 the	 development,	 adaptation,	 diffusion	 and	
transfer	of	technologies,	including	new	and	innovative	technologies.”95	 Agenda	21	specifically	
mentions	 the	 role	 of	 patent	 protection	 in	 EST	 innovation	 and	 transfer.	 In	 Chapter	 34,	 the	
Agenda	 recognizes	 the	 incentive	 function	 of	 patent	 protection,	 with	 such	 incentives	
encouraging	TT	to	developing	countries.96	 Due	to	a	substantial	connection	between	TT	and	IP	
law,	researchers	and	organisations	refer	to	the	latter	constantly.97	 	
However,	 there	 is	 a	 crucial	 difference	 between	 the	 philosophies	 underpinning	 TRIPS	 and	
MEAs.	The	TRIPS	negotiations	were	 launched	and	manipulated	by	developed	countries.	As	a	
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result,	 the	 “attempts	 to	 harmonize	 IPR	 laws	 have	 resulted	 in	 coerced	 conformity	 with	 the	
strictest	 IPR	 regulations	 of	 industrialized	 countries.”98	 In	 contrast,	 the	 special	 needs	 of	
developing	countries	are	given	greater	attention	in	MEAs,	while	corresponding	obligations	are	
imposed	 according	 to	 the	 enhanced	 capacities	 of	 developed	 countries.	 This	 thesis	 will	
highlight	 one	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 MEAs:	 the	 United	 Nations	 Framework	 Convention	 on	
Climate	Change	 (UNFCCC)99	 includes	 specific	obligations	 for	developed	countries	 to	provide	
financial	and	other	resources	to	meet	the	full	incremental	costs	of	utilizing	EST	in	developing	
countries.100	 In	 Article	 4.5,	 the	 Convention	 requires	 the	 developed	 countries	 to	 “take	 all	
practicable	steps	to	promote,	facilitate	and	finance,	as	appropriate,	the	transfer	of,	or	access	
to,	 environmentally	 sound	 technologies	 and	 know-how	 to	 other	 Parties,	 particularly	
developing	 country	 Parties,	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 implement	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
Convention.”101	
The	 favourable	 standpoint	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	 is	 made	 even	 clearer	 in	 Article	 4.7	 where	 the	
provision	 states	 that	 “The	 extent	 to	 which	 developing	 country	 Parties	 will	 effectively	
implement	 their	 commitments	 under	 the	 Convention	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 effective	
implementation	 by	 developed	 country	 Parties	 of	 their	 commitments	 under	 the	 Convention	
related	 to	 financial	 resources	 and	 transfer	 of	 technology.”102 	 This	 provision	 has	 given	
economic	and	social	priority	to	developing	countries,	contradicting	the	previously	mentioned	
view	of	Maskus’s	and	Reichman’s	claim	that	 it	 is	mainly	 the	responsibility	of	 the	developing	
																																								 																				
98 Littleton (n 9). 
99 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid article 4.5 
102 Ibid article 4.7 
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governments	to	believe	and	rely	on	the	“net	effect	of	expanded	 IP	protection	 is	 to	enhance	
access	to	technology	and	to	encourage	its	domestic	adaptation	and	diffusion.” 103	 	
This	highlighting	of	TT	in	the	provisions	of	the	UNFCCC	actually	made	it	more	straightforward	
than	 in	 other	 MEAs;	 and	 the	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 (COP)	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	 has	 been	
continuously	 making	 efforts	 to	 improve	 TT	 facilitating.104	 Despite	 these	 endeavours	 to	
encourage	TT,	the	Role	of	IPRs	has	remained	an	issue	of	disagreement	among	UNFCCC	parties.	
Latif	 and	 others105	 identified	 the	 tension	 from	 negotiations	 that	 began	 in	 Bali	 (2007),	 and	
point	 out	 that	 developing	 countries	 such	 as	 India	 have	 argued	 that	 “many	 of	 the	 [climate	
change]	technologies	that	can	help	it	[improve	environment	protection]	and	other	developing	
countries	 achieve	a	 lower	 carbon	growth	are	out	of	 their	 reach	due	 to	 IPRs	and	prohibitive	
costs”106	 Behind	this	divarication	are	the	different	views	between	developed	and	developing	
countries.	
Except	 for	 the	 above	 differences	 between	 TRIPS	 and	MEAs,	 TT	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	
their	regulatory	conflicts.	For	example,	the	Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	Deplete	the	
Ozone	Layer	had	set	up	limitations	of	production	and	consumption	of	specific	ozone-depleting	
substances.	Therefore	trade	with	non-parties	 relating	to	 these	controlled	substances,	and	 in	
																																								 																				
103 Sherwood (n 35); See also Ahmed Abdel Latif and others, Overcoming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate 
Change at the UNFCCC: A Way Forward (ICTSD Programme on Innovation, Technology and Intellectual Property November, 
Policy Brief No 11, 2011). 
104 For example, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (the Bali Action Plan) agreed to at the 13th COP, reaffirmed the centrality of technology development and 
transfer (Latif and others (n 103)) made it one of the four priority areas to be addressed in discussions aimed at the “full, effective 
and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012”. (Paragraph 
1(d), the Bali Action Plan); It called for “Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support action on mitigation 
and adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of: (i) Effective mechanisms and enhanced means for the removal of obstacles 
to, and provision of financial and other incentives for, scaling up of the development and transfer of technology to developing 
country Parties in order to promote access to affordable environmentally sound technologies (emphasis added).” Ibid (n 103); Later 
on in 2010, at the Cancun conference, “a new Technology Mechanism for enhancing the transfer of climate-friendly technologies 
was created. […] The Mechanism is composed of two main bodies: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).” Ibid (n 103). 
105 Latif and others (n 103). 
106 Proposals by India for inclusion of additional agenda items in the provisional agenda of the seventeenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2011/INF.2/Add.1, 7 October 2011, quoted by Latif and others (n 103). 
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products	that	incorporate	these	substances,	is	prohibited	by	the	Protocol.	Although,	later	on,	
such	restrictions	turned	out	not	to	be	feasible,	the	Protocol	did	advise	parties	to	ban	trade	in	
listed	 substances	 with	 non-members	 when	 possible.107	 By	 analogy,	 any	 technology	 that	
constituted	 ozone	 layer	 depletion	would	be	banned	 by	 the	 Protocol.	 This	 is	 clearly	 a	 trade	
restriction	which	against	WTO	objective.	 “More	 than	 seventy-five	per	 cent	of	 the	parties	 to	
the	 UNFCCC	 are	 also	 members	 of	 the	World	 Trade	 Organization	 (“WTO”).”108	 Despite	 the	
sun-setting	of	 the	Kyoto	Protocol,	 the	UNFCCC	has	provided	no	efficient	 trade	measures	 so	
far.	While	the	Kyoto	Protocol	is	more	specific	 in	obligating	member	states,	 it	has	not	set	out	
specific	prohibitions	on	trade.	Thus	on	the	face	of	it,	there	is	no	apparent	conflict	between	the	
UNFCCC	and	TRIPS.109	 However,	as	the	climate	change	crisis	develops	further,	the	needs	for	
EST	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	 developing	 countries	will	 grow	 and	 the	 expectations	 on	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement	to	promote	and	assist	TT	will	be	higher.	Several	other	trade-related	 issues	might	
arise	“in	the	context	of	energy	taxes,	trade	in	services,	and	subsidies”110	 will	probably	affect	
TT	 as	well.	 Thus,	 “the	 treatment	 of	 environmental	 considerations	 by	 organs	 of	 the	WTO111	
raises	challenging	questions,	including	that	of	the	relationship	between	WTO	agreements	and	
MEAs.”112	 No	 fundamental	 conflict	 between	 the	WTO	 rules	 and	MEA	 provisions	 has	 been	
found	currently	as	these	questions	are	unsolved	by	the	existing	literature.	However,	the	need	
																																								 																				
107 Simon Walker, ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Sustainable Development and the Public Interest’ IUCN Environmental Policy and 
Law Paper No 41 <https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/EPLP-041.pdf> accessed 23 Jun 17. 
108 Of the 164 parties that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 132 (eighty percent) are members of the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (WT/CTE/W/160/Rev4, 
TN/TE/S/5/Rev2, 14 March 2007) (Discussing correlation between WTO members and Kyoto Protocol) p. 32 quoted by Alexander 
Adam, ‘Technology Transfer to Combat Climate Change: Opportunities and Obligations under TRIPS and Kyoto’ (2009) 9 J High 
Tech L 1. 
109 Hutchison (n 74). 
110 World Bank (n 83). 
111 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between 
nations. 
112 Is WTO the appropriate forum to decide questions affecting trade arising under an MEA to which both parties to a dispute are 
signatories? Is the WTO the only appropriate forum by default? What if only one of them is a signatory to the MEA? 
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to	 further	 clarify	 the	 relationship	 between	 TRIPS	 under	 WTO	 rules	 and	 MEA	 provisions	
(UNFCCC	in	particular)	when	both	affect	TT	at	the	same	time	will	matter	in	the	future.113	
Putting	aside	the	future	achievement	of	full	mutual	support	between	MEAs	and	the	WTO	that	
may	affect	both	international	and	national	 laws	ultimately,	some	writers	“focus	on	what	can	
be	accomplished	within	the	existing	IP	rules,	particularly	those	provided	by	TRIPS.”114	 But	as	
discussed	before,	among	legal	scholars,	strong	IPR	protection	has	been	criticized	as	a	possible	
impeding	factor	to	technology	access;	the	same	result	can	be	inferred	with	climate	change	TT.	
For	 example,	 according	 to	Wiener	 the	 existing	 “considerable	 barriers	 to	 the	 development,	
deployment	 and	 marketability	 of	 renewable	 energy”	 are	 largely	 due	 to	 “patent	 schemes	
shield	proprietary	licenses	in	regions	where	capital	is	most	aggregated	and	profits	margins	are	
abundant.” 115 	 Many	 technologies	 that	 have	 “widespread	 applicability	 and	 potentially	
unimaginable	 economic	 and	 environmental	 value”	 are	 protected	 by	 an	 artificial	 and	
non-competitive	monopoly	through	patenting.116	 This	will	continue	deterring	new	enterprises	
from	 starting	 up	 renewable	 energy	 businesses	 and	 costs	 raised	 from	 acquiring	 these	
technologies	will	further	affect	the	regional	deployment	of	such	technologies.	 	
On	 the	other	hand,	Hutchison117	 believes	 that	TRIPS	permits	 “flexibility	 in	 terms	of:	what	 is	
patentable,	and	on	what	basis,	the	interpretation	of	claims,	permitted	exceptions,	compulsory	
																																								 																				
113 Because, up until now, there are no formal dispute involving a measure under a multilateral environmental agreement has so far 
been brought to the WTO.  
114 E.g. Richard G. Tarasofsky, ‘Minimising Conflicts and Enhancing Complementarity between Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and WTO Agreements’ in Legal Aspects of International Trade (The World Bank 2001) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/trade.pdf#page=100> . 
115 Jason R. Wiener, ‘Sharing Potential and the Potential for Sharing: Open Source Licensing as a Legal and Economic Modality 
for the Dissemination of Renewable Energy Technology’ (2005) 18 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 277. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Hutchison (n 74); Bernard Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus and Kamal Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: 
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’ Research Program on Political and Economic Change Working Paper PEC2004-0003 
<http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/pubs/pec/pec2004-0003.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017; see also John Barton and others, ‘Integrating 
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy’ Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
<http://iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf> accessed London September 2002. 
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licensing.” 118 	 Also,	 remedying	 abuses	 and	 anti-competitive	 practices	 will	 be	 useful	 to	
developing	countries	when	they	feel	hampered	in	getting	essential	technologies.	For	example,	
developing	countries	could	grant	compulsory	licensing	to	certain	technologies	on	the	basis	of	
pursuing	climate	mitigation	or	adaptation.	Further,	they	could	interpret	environmental	TT	as	
grounds	 for	public-interest	exception	 in	national	patent	 laws.	 In	 cases	where	 inventions	are	
not	exploited,	or	insufficiently	exploited,	in	a	country,	“measures	could	be	applied	to	restrain	
some	 of	 the	 anti-competitive	 practices	 feared	 as	 potentially	 impeding	 the	 transfer	 of	
climate-related	technologies	to	developing	countries.”119	 If	 these	 ideas	work	as	well	as	 they	
sound,	 developing	 countries	 ought	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 these	 flexibilities.	 But	 it	 is	 what	
happens	 in	 practice	 that	 is	 key,	 where	 significant	 shortages	 of	 these	 flexibilities	 available	
under	TRIPS	still	exist.	
Fortunately,	 “the	 2001	 Doha	 Declaration	 on	 TRIPS	 and	 Public	 Health120	 referred	 to	 the	
flexibility	 afforded	 by	 TRIPS	 to	 member	 countries	 in	 setting	 IP	 protection	 with	 respect	 to	
pharmaceutical	 patents.” 121 	 For	 example,	 the	 Declaration	 reinforced	 member	 states’	
flexibility	to	determine	what	constitute	urgent	circumstances,	stating	that	“each	Member	has	
the	 right	 to	 determine	 what	 constitutes	 a	 national	 emergency	 or	 other	 circumstances	 of	
extreme	 urgency,	 it	 being	 understood	 that	 public-health	 crises...can	 represent	 a	 national	
emergency	 or	 other	 circumstances	 of	 extreme	 urgency.”	 It	 also	 took	 the	 lack	 of	
technology-capability	 concerns	 into	 consideration,	 suggesting	 that	 “countries	 that	 cannot	
																																								 																				
118 Developing countries may implement compulsory licensing provisions to remedy a refusal to deal in situations where the patent 
has been filed in that country. This will be discussed in detail in the IP chapter later on. 
119 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ICTSD, ‘Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Rights’ Trade and Climate Change Seminar June 18–20, 2008 Copenhagen, Denmark 
<https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cph_trade_climate_tech_transfer_ipr.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017. 
120 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL 2001: TRIPS, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 30 
June 2017. 
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produce	pharmaceuticals	themselves	may	import	pharmaceuticals	made	under	a	compulsory	
licence	 according	 to	 TRIPS	 Article	 31.”122	 Littleton123	 mentioned	 that	 such	 emphases	 are	
opening	the	door	to	the	potential	use	of	these	exceptions	in	the	climate	change	context.	The	
ICTSD124	 therefore	 suggests	 that	 the	 “experience	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 public	 health”125	 could	
“become	a	reference	point	for	the	discussion	of	TRIPS	flexibilities,	including	in	the	context	of	
the	 transfer	 of	 climate-related	 technologies,”126	 and	 such	 aims	 seems	 consistent	 with	 the	
objectives	 of	 most	 MEAs.	 However,	 both	 articles	 failed	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 distinctions	
between	different	industry	sectors	and	the	different	applicability	of	these	flexibilities	to	them.	
Adam,127	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 discusses	 some	differences	 between	 ESTs	 and	 pharmaceutical	
products.	He	had	compared	the	different	nature	of	the	problems	solved	by	the	technology	in	
question;	pointing	out	that	the	attention	given	to	pharmaceutical	TT	is	due	to	the	incidence	of	
epidemic	“diseases	(e.g.	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	and	tuberculosis)	in	developing	countries	revealed	
that	 a	 large	 portion	 of	 the	 world’s	 population	 lacked	 access	 to	 pharmaceuticals.”128	 And	
because	 of	 the	 mortality	 factors	 associated	 with	 such	 diseases,	 providing	 drugs	 and	
transferring	 relative	 technologies	 to	 these	 countries	 are	 given	 more	 weight	 during	
international	 negotiations.	 In	 contrast,	 even	 with	 scientific	 evidence	 demonstrating	 that	
																																								 																				
122 Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO Secretariat, ‘TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents’ WTO OMC Fact Sheet 
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unless	 properly	 and	 timely	 dealt	 with,	 climate	 change	 problems	 will	 lead	 to	 detrimental	
consequences	 threatening	 human	 life	 and	 economic	 growth	 in	 many	 countries,	 global	
warming	issues	are	not	considered	as	equally	urgent	as	public-health	emergencies	such	as	the	
spread	 of	 HIV/AIDS.129	 Moreover,	 pharmaceuticals	 treating	 HIV/AIDS	 “are	 protected	 by	
patents	and	sold	by	only	a	few	companies	at	high	prices	in	developed	countries.”130	 The	case	
is	quite	different	in	the	green	technology	area,	where	many	different	companies	hold	climate	
change	technologies	such	as	green	energy	technologies,	and	they	are	actively	offering	“their	
products	and	services	on	the	open	market.”131	 Adam	has	 therefore	argued	that	 the	“WTO's	
past	treatment	of	the	latter	sheds	little	light	on	its	potential	treatment	of	EST	products	in	the	
future.”132	 	
Although	the	reiteration	of	flexibilities133	 by	the	Doha	Declaration	may	not	be	constructive	in	
accelerating	 climate	 change	 TT,	 in	 cases	 where	 countries	 refuse	 to	 become	 signatories	 to	
MEAs	or	current	MEAs	expire,	TRIPS	is	possibly	the	most	appropriate	forum	to	deal	with	such	
issues.	 This	 will	 result	 in	 calls	 for	 measures	 and	 adjustments	 to	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 to	
support	 the	post-Kyoto	climate	regime.	But	considering	the	 long	time	that	might	be	needed	
for	accomplishing	this,	and	the	many	difficulties	facing	it,	this	thesis	will,	meanwhile,	focus	on	
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what	can	be	done	during	the	application	of	TRIPS	and	MEAs	to	enhance	implementation	and	
harmony.	A	detailed	discussion	of	this	issue	will	be	included	in	later	chapters.	 	
1.6 TT to developing countries 
As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 majority	 of	 climate	 change	 technology	 owners	 are	 primarily	 from	
developed	 countries.134	 For	 example,	 in	 both	 the	 wind	 and	 automobile	 pollution	 control	
sectors,	major	developed	countries	dominate	the	ownership	of	more	than	90	per	cent	of	the	
technology	patents.135	 More	recent	research136	 in	the	field	of	agriculture	patents	concluded	
with	 a	 similar	 result	 of	 70	per	 cent.137	 These	 authors	 identify	 the	 leaders	 in	 environmental	
patenting	 and	 prove	 the	 generic	 need	 for	 technology	 transfers	 to	 developing	 countries	 to	
occur.	Moreover,	the	IPCC138	 elaborates	on	problems	due	to	how	companies	have	prevented	
the	exporting	of	 the	most	 advanced	 technologies	 in	order	 to	progress	 and	 retain	 their	 own	
technological	 advantages.139	 Because	 accelerating	 the	 development	 of	 green	 technologies	
and	 promoting	 their	 global	 application	 are	 key	 challenges	 for	 stabilizing	 atmospheric	
greenhouse	 gas	 (GHG)	 emissions,	 in	 order	 to	 combat	 climate	 change,	 transferring	 such	
technologies	 “is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 current	 discussions	 surrounding	 the	 post-Kyoto	 climate	
regime.”140	
In	addition,	international	TT	is	particularly	relevant	in	climate	change	mitigation	in	developing	
countries	because	of	 its	 particular	 importance	during	 the	 initial	 stages	of	 development	of	 a	
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country’s	 economy.	 Many	 developing	 countries	 are	 now	 in	 their	 phase	 of	 infrastructure	
development,	 and	 “delays	 in	 technology	 transfer	 could	 therefore	 lead	 to	 a	 lock-in	 in	
high-emissions	 systems	 for	 decades	 to	 come.”141	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 early	 years	 since	 the	
founding	 of	 a	 commercial	 China,	 the	 Chinese	 manufacturing	 industry	 has	 been	 relying	 on	
high-carbon	 coal-dominated	 energy	 supply.	 According	 to	 Fu	 et	 al.,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 China's	
coal-dominated	energy	structure,	because	the	country	is	rich	in	coal	resources	but	has	lack	of	
natural	gas,	oil	and	other	energy	sources.	China	has	therefore	become	the	world's	largest	coal	
producer	and	consumer,	which	resulted	in	the	infrastructure	construction	of	most	enterprises	
being	 based	 on	 coal-based	 energy.	 Therefore,	 the	 technical	 support	 system	 in	 China	 is	
accordingly	 more	 developed	 in	 the	 high-emission	 area,	 which	 is	 in	 fact	 restricting	 the	
development	of	low-carbon	technologies	and	the	applications	of	those	technologies.142	 	
But	 such	 voices	 are	 mostly	 heard	 from	 technology	 recipients’	 side.	 The	 importance	 of	 the	
transfer	of	clean	technologies	would	be	considered	less	so	from	the	perspective	of	developed	
countries.	 These	 countries	 “are	 seen	 more	 as	 inventors	 of	 clean	 technologies	 whereas	
developing	 nations	 are	 seen	 as	 needing	 those	 inventions	 as	 their	 energy	 production	
increases.”143	 This	difference	in	views	has	led	to	further	discussion	as	to	what	degree	global	
warming	is	a	global	problem,	and	of	the	position	that	international	agreements	should	take	in	
accepting	TT	as	an	important	issue.	In	fact,	the	UNFCCC	parties	had	discussions	on	“whether	
IPRs	are	an	obstacle	that	impedes	effective	TT,	and	if	so,	what	measures	should	be	taken?”144	
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As	a	 forum	for	combatting	 the	climate	change	crisis,	 it	 is	a	 telling	sign	 that	members	of	 the	
UNFCCC	 took	 the	position	 that	 climate	change	 is	a	global	problem,	while	negotiations	are	a	
kind	of	game	between	vested	interests	and	new	players.	Developing	countries	like	China	have	
argued	 that	 “the	 existing	 IPR	 system	 does	 not	match	 the	 increasing	 needs	 for	 accelerating	
development,	 transfer,	 and	 deployment	 of	 ESTs	 to	 meet	 challenges	 of	 climate	 change.”145	
“Countries	 like	Cuba,	 India,	 Indonesia,	Tanzania,	and	China	 indicate	that	patent	protection	is	
an	 obstacle	 to	 clean-TT	 because	 patents	 limit	 a	 country's	 access	 to	 clean	 technologies.”146	
These	 claims	are	probably	due	 to	 the	 fact	 “that	 technical	 information	 is	 costly	 to	 learn	 and	
absorb	 for	 endogenous	 commercialization,”147	 according	 to	 Maskus.	 “Technology	 owners	
with	 IPRs	may	 theoretically	 demand	 prices	 that	 are	 higher	 than	 the	marginal	 cost,	 or	may	
monopolize	markets”148	 because	 they	 have	 the	 power	 to	manipulate	 supply	 demands.	 The	
“high	 concentration	 of	 equivalent	 clean	 technologies	 found	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	
companies”149	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 anti-competitive	 behaviour	 by	 developed	 countries.150	
Based	on	submissions,	 in	 the	2009	United	Nations	climate	treaty	negotiations,	proposals	 for	
weakening	 IPRs	 for	 easier	 access	 to	 green	 technologies	were	 submitted.151	 Conversely,	 the	
US	“has	expressly	opposed	any	weakening	of	IPRs	related	to	clean	technologies.”152	 The	divide	
																																								 																				
145 China, ‘China’s Views on the Fulfillment of the Bali Action Plan and the Components of the Agreed Outcome to be Adopted 
by the Conference of the Parties at its 15th Session’ in UNFCCC (ed), Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention 5th Session (AWG-LCA 5), vol FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1 (Bonn Climate Change Conference - March 
2009, AWG-LCA 5 2009) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca5/eng/misc01.pdf> . 
146 ICTSD (n 119). 
147 Maskus, Encouraging International Technology Transfer (n 51). 
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over	 IPRs	 has	 been	 clearly	 demonstrated	 there	 and	 has	 in	 turn	 delayed	 agreement	 among	
UNFCCC	 parties	 concerning	 clean-TT.153	 A	 clear	 dividing	 line	 exists	 between	 groups	 of	
countries	depending	on	their	economic	development	level	and	different	needs.	And	they	are	
intending	to	protect	the	utmost	interests	of	their	citizens.	
Taking	either	perspective	blindly	–	developed	or	developing	–154	 in	 research	 is	 a	danger.	 In	
fact,	 it	 reflects	 a	 political	 perspective	 rather	 than	 a	 societal	 perspective,	 as	 individual	
enterprises	 in	 most	 developed	 countries	 have	 experienced	 a	 transitional	 period	 in	 history	
when	importing	advanced	foreign	technology,	and	some	developing	countries	are	undergoing	
the	 same	 period.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 there	 are	 not	 just	 two	 perspectives.	
Negotiations	at	international	agreement	forums	represent	the	arguments	from	state	level,	but	
firms	 involved	 in	TT	practice	may	have	their	own	perspectives	and	 it	 is	 the	transferee	firms’	
perspective	 that	 this	 thesis	 is	 looking	at.	Watal155	 has	provided	a	 study,	which	 includes	 the	
experience	 of	 Indian	 companies.	 These	 firms	 sought	 technologies	 under	 the	 Montreal	
Protocol,	 in	 order	 to	 transition	 away	 from	ozone-depleting	 substances.	 According	 to	Watal,	
barriers	such	as	high	costs,	or	the	reluctance	of	proprietors	to	license,	were	found	within	the	
projects	he	examined.	 In	most	cases,	only	where	the	“alternative	technology	exists,	 is	easily	
accessible,	commercially	viable	and	not	covered	by	IPRs,”156	 did	he	find	that	TT	was	smooth.	
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In	other	cases,	where	 technologies	are	“under	 IPRs,	with	only	a	 few	technology	owners,”157	
accessing	 technologies	 was	 comparatively	 difficult.	 As	 inspiring	 as	 this	 study	 is,	 it	 is	
encumbered	by	its	wide	range	of	subjects	and	by	including	many	industrial	sectors	and	their	
status	quo	in	several	countries.	Watal’s	study	informed	the	decision	of	this	thesis	to	focus	on	
the	 obstacles	 to	 TT	 from	 a	 company’s	 perspective.	 A	 firm-level	 perspective	 helps	 to	
demonstrate	obstacles	 that	 an	 IP	 system	 is	 placing	before	 TT.	 Therefore	 it	 has	 enabled	 this	
research	 to	 provide	 ideas	 on	 what	 could	 possibly	 be	 a	 balanced	 level	 of	 IP	 protection	 on	
climate	 change-related	 technologies.	 The	 thesis	 endeavours	 to	 narrow	 the	 target	 to	
renewable	energy	TT	to	China,	considering	 its	 increasing	market	 force	and	being	considered	
by	many	international	private	financiers.	The	bright	side	of	involving	such	a	perspective	is	not	
only	 its	 precision	 but	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 tangible	 nature	 of	 energy	 production	 and	 the	
maturity	 of	 many	 related	 green	 technologies	 “decrease	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 single	 blocking	
patent.”158	 “Even	 in	 the	 biofuel	 sector,	 where	 avoiding	 patented	 micro-organisms	 may	 be	
difficult,	 licensing	of	these	patents	 is	 likely	and	royalties	would	not	remain	high	for	 long.”159	
But	 “other	 factors,	 such	 as	 lack	 of	 capital	 and	 know-how,	 may	 be	 larger	 impediments	 to	
technology	transfer.”160	
However,	TT	in	developing	countries	has	different	potential	to	be	affected	by	IPRs.	There	is	a	
substantial	 literature161	 on	the	subtle	effect	of	IP	protection	on	TT	to	LDCs.162	 With	the	risk	
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159 John H. Barton, ‘Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries’ (2007) ICTSD Issue 
Paper No 2. 
160 See Marilyn A. Brown and others, Carbon Lock-In: Barriers To Deploying Climate Change Mitigation Technologies 
(Engineering Science and Technology Division ORNL/TM-2007/124, 2007) quoted by Consilvio (n 97). 
161 For example, Harvey reports that most patents, especially clean-energy technologies, are not filed in the LDCs. He argues that 
this is due to small market size and small potential in such countries. (Ian Harvey, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: The Catalyst to 
Deliver Low Carbon Technologies’ Breaking the Climate Deadlock, Briefing Paper 
<https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/archive/files/Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf> ) They lack the capacity to 
	 37	
of	leaving	technology	owners	vulnerable	in	the	long	term	in	that	country,	there	is	not	a	strong	
reason	 for	 these	poor	countries	 to	 rush	 to	 implement	 their	 IP	 standards	 in	compliance	with	
internationally	 accepted	 IP	 standards.	 Therefore,	 I	 assume	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 IPRs	 on	 TT	 in	
LDCs	 is	 less	 obvious	 than	 it	 is	 in	middle-income	 developing	 countries.	 This	 study	 therefore	
opts	for	the	latter	part	of	those163	 specified	in	mid-income	developing	countries.	On	the	other	
hand,	 situations	 are	 quite	 different	 in	 large-	 or	 higher-income	 developing	 countries.	
Consilvio’s	 research164	 lists	 a	 group	 of	 countries	 with	 social	 and	 business	 activity	 in	 the	
process	 of	 rapid	 growth	 and	 industrialization.	 He	 classifies	 these	 countries	 as	 emerging	
economies.	 In	 comparison	 with	 LDCs,	 these	 nations	 have	 significantly	 larger	 quantities	 of	
patents	 filed	 under	 IP	 systems.	 Maskus165	 Reichman166	 Falvey167	 and	 other	 researchers	
listed	 in	section	1.3	all	argued	that	strengthened	 IPR	protection	has	a	positive	 impact	on	TT	
into	 a	 large	 developing	 country.	 A	 reason	 for	 such	 a	 dynamic	 being	 seen	 only	 in	 large	
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emerging	economies	could	be	related	to	the	market	size	threshold	in	TT	activities.	Economies	
with	low	incomes	normally	have	less	attractive	markets.	 	
1.7 TT to China  
The	seven	largest	emerging	and	developing	economies	by	GDP	are	China,	Brazil,	Russia,	India,	
Mexico,	 Indonesia,	and	Turkey.	Among	them,	China	 is	deemed	to	be	comparatively	active	 in	
terms	of	technology	absorbing	and	diffusing.	For	example,	 in	the	research	conducted	by	Lee	
et	 al.168	 quantitative	 data	 on	 global	 patent	 ownership	 in	 several	 green	 energy	 sectors	was	
studied.	China	was	found	to	be	the	most	popular	place	for	patent	filings	following	the	US	and	
Japan.	 Dechezleprêtre	 et	 al 169	 also	 show	 that	 China	 is	 an	 emerging	 country	 in	 terms	 of	
patent	ownership	 in	selected	technologies	 (e.g.	solar	energy).	But	the	problem	remains	that	
the	existence	of	significant	quantities	of	patents	in	emerging	economies	does	not	resolve	the	
issue	of	whether	IP	 laws	regulating	these	patents	 is	a	barrier	to	clean	technology	transfer	or	
not.	 	
Over	the	past	few	years,	“investment	in	renewable	energy	has	grown	rapidly	in	China,	due	to	
venture	 capital	 invested	 in	 solar	 power,	 wind	 power	 and	 bioenergy.” 170	 As	 early	 as	 2006,	
China	 accounted	 for	 9	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 global	 renewable	 investment.	 China	 has	 even	
“increased	 its	 share	 of	 global	 renewable	 energy	 investment	 in	 2014	 to	 nearly	 a	 third	
(31%).”171	 Such	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 funding	 was	 mainly	 used	 to	 develop	 its	 domestic	 wind	
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power,	methane	 and	 dust	 burying	 technologies	 and	 applications.172	 However,	 according	 to	
evidence	presented	by	Sascha	Müller-Kraenner,	in	comparison	with	traditional	energy	supply	
sources,	 green	energy	 still	 accounts	 for	only	a	 small	portion	of	 total	energy	 consumption	 in	
the	energy	structure	of	China.173	 This	may	be	due	to	a	delay	in	recognizing	the	importance	of	
sustainable	 development	 and	 implementation	 strategy	 in	 the	 past.	 Given	 the	 rather	 early	
times	 when	 the	 research	 was	 conducted,	 the	 paper	 does	 not	 recognise	 that	 greater	
importance	 was	 attached	 to	 sustainable	 development	 and	 the	 application	 of	 renewable	
energy	in	China	in	more	recent	years.	And	the	lack	of	awareness	of	climate	change	issues	has	
been	solved	to	some	extent.	 It	 is	 the	 IP	 issues,	now	and	 in	the	future,	that	may	still	arise	as	
barriers	to	the	fast	adaptation	to	climate	deterioration	in	China.	
Barton174	 takes	a	 rather	positive	but	 compelling	 view	of	 the	 suspect	 claims	 that,	 even	with	
possible	competition	issues,	 IPRs	would	not	become	a	hindrance	as	“the	availability	of	other	
competing	 technologies	 and	 traditional	 energy	 sources	 may	 only	 permit	 IPR	 holders	 to	
demand	modest	royalties.”	Indeed,	as	found	by	Ockwell	et	al.175	 there	are	some	areas	where	
IPRs	 would	 not	 be	 a	 barrier.	 For	 example,	 although	 subject	 to	 IPRs,	 the	 transfer	 of	
technologies	in	the	hybrid	drive-train	sector	to	China	was	quite	successful	because	the	patent	
holders	 have	been	providing	 information	 and	 training,	 as	well	 as	 equipment,	 for	mechanics	
and	engineers:	“This	passing	on	of	knowledge	and	skills	implies	the	potential	for	companies	in	
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recipient	countries	to	develop	their	own	technological	capabilities.”176	 Yet	the	reality	in	many	
other	 sectors	 is	more	 complex	 and	not	 as	 successful.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 the	 Energy	
and	Resources	Institute’s177	 study	of	local	companies	in	India,	China,	Indonesia,	Malaysia,	and	
Thailand,	there	are	cases	where	developing	country	companies	terminated	negotiations	with	
foreign	 licensors	 due	 to	 the	 high	 royalty	 fees	 they	 required,	 or	 because	 they	 incurred	
additional	 costs	 buying	 non-related	 equipment	 in	 order	 to	 get	 access	 to	 the	 desired	
technology.	 In	 Lewis’s 178 	 research,	 he	 studied	 the	 wind-power	 industry	 development	
strategies	 in	 India,	 China,	 and	 Spain.	 The	 research	 found	 that	 “developing	 country	
manufacturers	 often	 have	 to	 obtain	 technology	 from	 second-	 or	 third-tier	 wind	 power	
companies.”179	 This	is	because	leading	technology	holders	are	unwilling	to	license	to	entities	
that	have	the	capacity	to	become	competitors	in	the	future.	A	summary	by	Mallet,	Ockwell	et	
al.	 is	 relatively	 incisive	 and	 inspiring	 –	 “while	 consumers	 in	 developing	 countries	 may	 not	
experience	specific	IPR-related	barriers	to	accessing	low-carbon	technologies,	they	may	face	a	
cost	 barrier	 because	 of	 IPRs.”180	 This	 research	 provided	 a	 technology	 receiver’s	 view	 to	
identify	difficulties	in	getting	access	to	the	most	advanced	technologies	from	their	holders	in	
developed	countries.	But	their	data	needs	to	be	updated	for	an	economy	that	is	at	a	transition	
stage.	This	brings	an	opportunity	for	this	thesis	to	complement	the	research	from	this	angle.	
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While	many	commentators181	 note	that	IPRs	are	unlikely	to	significantly	affect	access	to	the	
pertinent	 technologies,	 they	 could	 slow	 down	 the	 technology-innovation	 rate	 when	 a	
developing	 country	 is	 able	 to	develop	 commercial	 competitive	 technologies.	Domestic	 firms	
may	find	 it	extremely	difficult	to	develop	 indigenous	technologies	without	 infringing	existing	
international	 patents	 owned	 by	 foreign	 industry	 leaders,	 especially	 when	multiple	 IPRs	 are	
related	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 single	 technology.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	 rapidly	
growing	economy	of	China	that	more	attention	is	paid	to	policy	development	 in	conjunction	
with	 its	 IP	 system.182 	 In	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 according	 to	 Ohshita	 and	 Ortolano,183	
demonstration	 projects	 using	 cleaner	 energy	 technologies	 assisted	 by	 international	
organizations	and	developed	countries	have	been	raising	greater	awareness	of	climate	change	
technologies	 in	 China.	 Accordingly,	 investment	 in	 green	 industry	 increased	 and	 the	
decision-making	process	shifted	to	a	more	market-based	system.	Yet	this	approach	alone	was	
not	 very	 successful	 in	 diffusing	 the	 technologies	 more	 widely	 in	 the	 country.	 Therefore,	
assistance	should	start	to	focus	more	on	policy	improvement	in	China.	Such	assistance	could	
be	associated	with	the	setting	of	“energy-efficiency	standards	or	enabling	an	environment	of	
technology	diffusion.”184	
However,	 Bradsher	 takes	 a	 pessimistic	 view	 of	 China’s	 environmental	 governance,	 arguing	
that	“the	rhetoric	about	China	and	green	technology	seems	as	simplistic	and	overheated	and	
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that	 China's	 push	 to	 develop	 renewables	 is	 short-sighted	 and	 reductionist.”185	 This	 can	 be	
found	 especially	 in	 China's	 efforts	 to	 dominate	 solar	 photovoltaic	 technologies.	 Bradsher	
suspects	the	motivation	behind	it	is	that	China	believes	that	the	“West	may	someday	trade	its	
dependence	on	oil	 from	the	Mideast	 for	a	reliance	on	solar	panels,	wind	turbines	and	other	
gear	 manufactured	 in	 China.” 186 	 Not	 only	 is	 the	 original	 intention	 of	 China’s	 green	
technology	 development	 questioned,	 but	 Kennedy 187 	 argues	 that	 China's	 national	
government	 has	 a	 native	 drawback	 comprising	 a	 dense	 bureaucracy	 with	 redundant	 and	
overlapping	agencies	regulating	environmental	 issues.	Exceedingly	divaricated	authority	over	
China's	 environment,	 and	 protectionism	 in	 China's	 domestic	 green	 technology	 industries’	
trade	 sector	 could	be	a	problem	 in	promoting	TT	 flows.188	 For	example,	 the	operation	of	 a	
power	station	requires	several	permits	and	licences,	which	are	issued	by	different	government	
agencies,	 including	 the	Ministry	 of	 Land	 and	Resources,	 the	Administration	 of	Work	 Safety,	
the	 Administration	 of	 Industry	 and	 Commerce,	 the	 State-Owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	
Administration	 Commission	 (SASAC),	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Environmental	 Protection,	 and	 the	
National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	(NDRC).	Requirements	by	these	agencies	are	
different	and	even	conflict	with	each	other	sometimes.	As	a	result,	overlapping	authority	and	
the	heavy	burden	it	puts	on	enterprises	undermines	the	effectiveness	of	governance.189	
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Panagariya	 referred	 to	 China’s	 notorious	 reputation	 in	 IP	 protection:	 the	 country	 has	 been	
accused	as	being	one	of	the	most	flagrant	violators	of	IPRs.190	 In	fact,	the	prevailing	problem	
of	 IPRs	 infringements	 in	 China	 is	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 number	 of	 software	 firms	 in	 China	 that	
produce	and	sell	pirated	software.	These	technologies	are	easy	to	crack	and	pirate,	with	low	
risks	and	high	returns	 involved,	and	their	market	prices	are	much	cheaper.	Most	consumers	
have	 relatively	 low	 income	 in	 comparison	 with	 developed	 countries	 and	 this	 eventually	
fostered	the	forming	of	a	piracy	market	in	the	country.191	 Therefore,	technologies	transferred	
to	 this	 country	 could	 be	 at	 great	 risk	 of	 infringement	 and	 deter	 investors	 from	 exporting	
technologies	 to	 the	 nation.	 However,	 Panagariya’s	 article	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 China	 is	 a	
dramatic	example,	supporting	the	hypothesis	of	low	response	of	FDI	to	IPRs.192	 This	is	possibly	
due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 China	 offers	 dramatic	 returns	 to	 foreign	 investment	 once	 it	 enters	 the	
market.	FDI	has	grown	significantly	in	recent	years	and	the	country	has	made	great	use	of	the	
mechanisms	 under	 the	 UNFCCC,	 such	 as	 GEF 193 	 and	 CDM,	 to	 import	 TT. 194 	 These	
contradicting	 conclusions	 indicate	 an	 inconclusive	 effect	 of	 such	 ill-conceived	 piracy	
phenomenon	has	on	climate	change	TT	flows	to	China.	More	analysis	based	on	data	collected	
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in	 this	 research	 and	 some	 recent	 litigation195	 regarding	 international	 green	 technology	
infringement	will	be	discussed	in	later	chapters.	
1.8 The purpose and contribution of the research 
As	my	goal	is	to	understand	the	effect	of	IP	law	on	climate	change	TT	to	China,	it	is	inevitable	
that	I	will	engage	with	the	analysis	of	TT	from	different	disciplines	in	terms	of	economic,	legal,	
political,	environmental	and	social	aspects	relating	to	the	issue.	For	example,	I	will	look	at	how	
market	 incentives	 allocate	 the	 capital	 from	 investors	 among	 the	 various	 sectors	 in	 TT	
schemes.	This	 is	to	clarify	the	possible	 impact	of	market	factors	on	TT	flows,	and	to	find	out	
the	 relationship	 they	 have	 with	 IP	 laws.	 Moreover,	 to	 reach	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	
understanding	the	ability	of	IP	systems	to	facilitate	climate	change	TT,	which	is	prominent	in	
addressing	global	environmental	problems,	the	thesis	examines	EST	transfer	to	China,	which	is	
considered	in	various	MEAs	and	the	TRIPS	Agreement.	This	is	also	to	link	TT	trend	conclusions	
back	to	the	general	picture	of	international	IP	systems.	Although	the	aforementioned	studies	
are	relatively	comprehensive	in	many	areas	relating	to	this	research,	most	of	them	are	either	
macro	 studies196	 looking	 at	 national	 or	 international	 IP	 regulations	 from	a	 general	 view,	 or	
they	 are	 based	 on	 quantitative	 data,	 such	 as	 patent	 filing	 numbers.	 Some	 research	 has	
focused	on	LDCs197	 rather	than	middle-income	countries.	This	has	left	a	gap	for	research	with	
a	combined	view	of	IP	and	environmental	protection	in	a	middle-income	developing	country,	
China,	 which	 has	 apparent	 advantages	 in	 technology	 absorption	 capacity	 and	 is	 transiting	
																																								 																				
195 For example, the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (as amended up to the Decision of December 27, 2008, 
regarding the Revision of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China) and the The 13th Five-Year Plan for Environmental 
Protection. 
196 See more e.g, J. Bradford De Long and Lawrence H. Summers, ‘Equipment Investment and Economic Growth’ (1991) 106 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 445; Charles I. Jones, ‘Economic Growth and the Relative Price of Capital’ (1994) 34 Journal of 
Monetary Economics 359; Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, ‘Trade in Capital Goods’ (2001) 45 European Economic Review 
1195 
197 for example Jafarieh (n 163); Moon (n 163). 
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from	 being	 a	 technology	 receiver	 to	 a	 provider.	 Moreover,	 the	 methodology	 applied	 by	
existing	 researchers	 has	 several	 shortcomings,	 including	 the	 technology	 types	 and	
perspectives	chosen.198	 Many	studies	on	the	impact	of	Chinese	IP	protection	are	focused	on	
copyrights,199	 which	are	less	relevant	to	this	research.	Some	other	well-developed	literatures	
are	about	the	transfer	of	pharmaceutical	technologies	instead	of	climate	change	technologies.	
While	this	research	is	innovative,	in	that	it	studies	IP	and	TT	in	a	situation	where	the	recipient	
country	is	also	a	major	developer	of	patented	technology,	it	creates	dynamics	not	necessarily	
at	 play	 in	 many	 of	 the	 other	 studies,	 which	 focus	 on	 recipient	 countries	 incapable	 of	
developing	their	own	technology	to	address	whatever	problems	need	addressing.	
Similarly	 in	 the	 IP	 research	 area,	 because	 most	 literature	 has	 taken	 a	 broader	 perspective	
when	discussing	the	Chinese	national	 legal	system	and	policy	environment, 200	 up	until	now	
no	research	has	been	done	at	a	firm-level,	examining	enterprises	involved	in	CDM	projects.201	
As	a	result,	there	is	currently	not	enough	evidence	confirming	to	what	degree	climate	change	
TT	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 TRIPS	Agreement	 in	 China	 and	what	 specific	measures	 a	 sector	might	
take	to	encourage	such	flows	of	technology.202	 Gregory	Shaffer	has	identified	that	empiricism	
has	not	yet	infused	international	law.203	 But	according	to	Dinwoodie	it	is	necessary	to	tailor	IP	
																																								 																				
198 See details in the Methodology Chapter. 
199 regarding to computer programmes and designs. 
200 Joel B. Eisen, ‘China's Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership’ (2010) 35 Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol'y Rev 
1; And Dong Zhang, ‘2010 Deep Research Report on China Clean Development Mechanism Industry’ 168 Research Group, Nov 
16, 2010 <http://www.168report.com/Report/report0177.html> accessed 26 Jun 2017. 
201 Petersmann has pointed out that the existing literature provides no theoretical deliberation on any empirical insights in the 
matter of climate change TT since the implementation of TRIPS. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘From Negative to Positive 
Integration in the WTO. The TRIPs Agreement and the WTO Constitution’ in Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), 
Intellectual Property: Trade, Competition, and Sustainable Development, vol World Trade Forum Vol. 3 (University of Michigan 
Press 2003) p.32. Although Mansfield’s study provides some persuasive evidence, it is solely based on the U.S. domestic TT 
statistics. See Edwin Mansfield, ‘Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer: Germany, Japan, 
and the United States’ The International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper No 27 (September 1995) 
<https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/0-8213-3442-5> accessed 27 Jul 2017. 
202 ICTSD (n 119). 
203 This due to two reasons (Gregory Shaffer, ‘A New Legal Realism: Method in International Economic Law Scholarship’ in C. 
Picker, I. D. Bunn and D. Arner (eds), International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart Publishing 
2008)): (1) a lack of people trained to conduct the work, (See Thomas S. Ulen, ‘A nobel Prize in legal science: theory, empirical 
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rights	to	fit	the	real	world,204	 and	the	empirical	method	of	examining	the	problem	seems	to	
be	 pragmatic	 and	 feasible	 in	 this	 context.	 Although	 the	 studies	 above	 have	 contributed	
insights	into	trends	in	TT	and	evidence	of	the	influence	of	IP	protection,	gaps	in	the	evidence	
landscape	remain.	It	is	therefore	the	objective	of	this	thesis	to	take	an	important	step	forward	
by	filling	in	at	 least	some	of	these	gaps	in	the	specific	area	of	transferring	renewable	energy	
technologies	 to	 China.	 By	 identifying	 theories	 and	 collecting	 data	at	 firm-level	 this	 research	
will	provide	a	closer	view	of	climate	change	TT	in	practice.	
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
Work, and the scientific method in the study of law’ (2002) Vol. 2002 No.4 U Ill L Rev 875 p.914: "An additional reason that legal 
scholars have not done much empirical work is that they are not adept in it.") and (2) a perception that empiricism is “less 
honoured” within the legal academy than traditional doctrinal analysis and normative scholarship. (Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘The 
Law and Society Movement’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 763) 
204 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘Remarks: ‘One Size’ Fits All Consolidation and Difference in Intellectual Property Law’ in Annette 
Kur and Vytautas Mizaras (eds), The Structure of Intellectual Property Law (ATRIP Intellectual Property Series) (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2011). 
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Chapter	II:	Research	Methodology	 	
2.1 Aims  
This	thesis	 looks	at	the	practical	 impacts	that	the	TRIPS1	 Agreement	has	on	 international	TT	
relating	 to	 climate	 change,	 which	 is	 provided	 by	 international	 agreements	 (e.g.	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol2).	The	author	takes	the	perspective	of	a	developing	country	(China)	focusing	on	both	
external	 (international)	and	 internal	 (national)	 regulations	 to	study	 the	operational	 situation	
of	 the	 “pull”	 side	 of	 TT.3	 The	 research	will	 on	 one	 hand	 address	 the	 relationship	 between	
TRIPS	 and	 UNFCCC,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 examine	 how	 individual	 transactions,	 or	 potential	
transactions,	of	climate	change	TT	have	been	affected	by	IP	rights	and	surrounding	issues.	The	
transactions	examined	will	 focus	upon	China	 (which	 is	a	developing	country)	as	 it	possesses	
certain	features	that	make	TT	both	desirable4	 and	at	times	problematic.5	
2.2 Research questions 
Based	on	the	literature	reviewed	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	thesis	now	turns	to	look	at	the	
research	questions	and	how	the	answers	will	be	found.	As	this	thesis	attempts	to	look	at	the	
practical	 impacts	 that	 the	 TRIPS6	 Agreement	 has	 on	 international	 climate	 change	 TT,	
especially	to	China,	 in	a	general	environment	provided	by	MEAs	(e.g.	the	Kyoto	Protocol7),	 it	
will	focus	on	the	following	research	question:	
																																								 																				
1 The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (unamended version), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
2 The Kyoto Protocol sets binding obligations on industrialised countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 
37 ILM 22 (1998). 
3 the receiving side of TT. 
4 major climate change and related problems, e.g. severe air pollution. 
5 e.g. its capacity to become a major manufacturer of climate change technology, putting at risk the IP rights of the transferor. 
6 The TRIPS Agreement. 
7 The Kyoto Protocol (n 2) sets binding obligations on industrialised countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
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A:	What	is	meant	by	the	concept	of	transfer	technology	and	what	obligations	are	there	under	
international	law	for	the	transfer	of	technology	in	relation	to	climate	change	issues?	
B:	 How	 do	 international	 agreements,	 which	 protect	 intellectual	 property	 rights,	 relate	 to	
green	technologies?	 	
C:	Is	there	a	conflict	between	transfer	of	technology	obligations	in	climate	change	agreements	
and	the	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights	in	TRIPS?	If	so,	how	should	conflicts	between	
the	two	be	resolved,	or	how	can	they	be	avoided?	
D:	In	practice,	does	the	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights	(IPRs),	or	concerns	about	the	
protection	of	 such	 rights,	 have	 any	 impact	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 climate	 change	 technology	 to	
China?	
E:	As	a	consequence	of	the	experience	that	Chinese	entities	have	had	in	getting	overseas	firms	
to	transfer	climate	change	technology,	 is	there	a	need	to	change	either	Chinese	domestic	or	
international	 law?	What	 form	 should	 any	 changes	 take?	Will	 the	 upcoming	 changes	 under	
UNFCCC	(Post-Kyoto,	e.g.	the	Paris	Agreement)	alter	IP	effect	on	climate	change	TT	in	China?	
2.3 Methodology 
This	 research	 adopts	 a	 social-legal	 research	 methodology,	 incorporating	 doctrinal	 and	
empirical	methods.	The	doctrinal	method	will	 include	the	analysis	of	authoritative	texts	that	
consist	of	primary	(legal	documents)	and	secondary	sources	(academic	commentary).	Such	a	
method	 is	 essential	 for	 answering	 research	 questions	 A,	 B	 and	 C	 as	 it	 helps	 identify	 the	
international	legal	context	in	which	climate	change	technology	transfer	is	conducted	and	from	
which	challenges	arise.	 	
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The	research	then	looks	at	the	effects	of	the	current	level	of	IP	protection	and	the	IP	system	
enabled	 by	 TRIPS	 on	 individual	 enterprises	 and	 TT	 transactions.	 Kagan	 notes	 that	 “the	 real	
meaning	 of	 regulatory	 law	 can	 be	 determined	 only	 by	 observing	 what	 occurs	 ‘on	 the	
ground.’”8	 Research	 questions	 D	 and	 E	 directly	 respond	 to	 Kagan’s	 observation	 and	 in	
answering	 them,	 an	 interview	 survey	 was	 administered	 to	 a	 selected	 sample	 of	 specific	
Chinese	 companies	 from	 CDM	 project	 participators	 with	 experience	 of	 receiving	 climate	
change	 technology	 transferred	 from	 developed	 countries.	 An	 examination	 of	 the	 dynamic	
during	the	TT	process	in	these	companies	and	a	study	of	how	China’s	IP	system	was	amended	
according	to	TRIPS	shall	provide	insights	into	whether	IP	laws	hinder	(or	are	inconducive	to)	TT	
in	reality,	especially	when	transferring	technologies	that	address	the	climate	change	problems	
that	China	causes	or	suffers.	 	
2.3.1 Doctrinal method 
This	 study	 is	 designed	 to	 try	 to	 answer	 doctrinal	 questions	 but	 is	 supported	 by	 empirical	
evidence.	 First,	 questions	 A,	 B	 and	 C	will	 be	 investigated	 using	 a	 traditional	 legal,	 doctrinal	
research	method.	Doctrine	can	be	defined	as	“a	synthesis	of	various	rules,	principles,	norms,	
interpretive	 guidelines	 and	values.	 It	 explains,	makes	 coherent	or	 justifies	 a	 segment	of	 the	
law	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 system	 of	 law.”9	 Such	 an	 approach	 relies	 extensively	 on	 court	
judgements	or,	in	this	research,	the	decision	of	a	Dispute	Settlement	Body	and	 legislations10	
to	rectify	and	clarify	the	law.11	 For	example,	 in	research	by	Lianos,12	 by	reviewing	economic	
																																								 																				
8 Robert A. Kagan, ‘Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement’ (1989) 11 Law & Policy 89 p.91. 
9 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin L Rev 
83. 
10 The provisions of international agreements. 
11 Research Methods for Law (Mike McConville ed, Edinburgh University Press 2007) p.3 
12 Ioannis Lianos, ‘A Regulatory Theory of IP: Implications for Competition Law’ CLES Working Paper Series, (1/2008) 
<http://www. ucl. ac. uk/cles/research-paperseries/research-papers/cles-1-2008> accessed Feburary 2017. 
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theories	and	property	right	theories,	including	justifications	for	IPRs	and	decisions	from	the	EU	
court	 of	 justice,	 he	 identifies	 distinct	 characteristics	 of	 IPRs’	 and	 their	 conflicts	 with	
competition	 law.	His	 research	was	 able	 to	 look	 at	 the	 “conceptualisation	of	 IP	 as	 a	 form	of	
regulation	providing	a	useful	 theoretical	basis	 for	a	better	understanding	of	 the	 interactions	
between	competition	law	and	intellectual	property.”13	 In	this	research,	a	doctrinal	method	is	
likewise	employed	to	study	the	law	(e.g.	provisions	in	TRIPS	Agreement)	and	legal	concepts	in	
relation	to	IPRs	and	TT.	 	
Through	a	doctrinal	study,	 the	thesis	 includes	analysis	of	 texts	 that	consist	of	primary14	 and	
secondary	 sources.15	 This	 part	 is	 essential	 for	 it	 will	 identify	 the	 international	 and	 national	
legal	 contexts	 in	 which	 climate	 change	 TT	 arises.	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 many	 academic	
articles	 about	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 and	 the	 refining	 of	 national	 IP	 law	 in	 accordance	 with	
TRIPS.	Studying	 these	provides	a	good	reference	point	 to	 look	at	how	the	current	 IP	system	
was	established	and	its	possible	effect	on	climate	change	TT.	Moreover,	many	efforts	made	to	
fight	 climate	change	materialize	 through	 the	 implementation	of	MEAs.	The	concept	of	TT	 is	
also	commonly	employed	in	these	MEAs	and	corresponding	obligations	for	TT	in	order	to	cope	
with	climate	change	are	assigned.	MEAs	including	TT	provisions	such	as	the	UNFCCC16	 will	be	
considered	 in	 detail,	 especially	 to	 understand	 the	 objectives,	 principles,	 functions,	
mechanisms	and	efficiency,	etc.	of	these	provisions.	 	
																																								 																				
13 Ibid. 
14 i.e. legal documents. 
15 i.e. commentary on conflicts between MEAs and WTO agreements, including TRIPS. 
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992). 
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Studying	 the	mechanisms	 available	 under	MEAs	 will	 also	 help	 recognize	 the	most	 possible	
typical	 situation	 of	 TT	 practice.	 In	 most	 cases	 where	 technology	 is	 transferred,	 IPRs	 are	
involved.	Thus	MEA	is	an	external	cut-through	to	understand	how	international	agreements,	
which	protect	 IPRs,	 relate	 to	 green	TT.	 To	be	more	 specific	 the	 research	will	 look	 at	CDM17	
projects	in	particular,	as	the	mechanism	is	one	of	the	representatives	under	the	UNFCCC	that	
have	 helped	 finance	 emission	 reductions	 and	 further	 commit	 Annex	 I	 Parties	 to	 obligations	
including	TT	aids	to	reduce	emissions.	Although	this	mechanism	does	not	have	an	explicit	TT	
mandate,18	 it	 contributes	 to	 TT	by	 financing	 emission-reduction	projects	 using	 technologies	
currently	not	available	in	the	host	countries.19	 Therefore,	projects	taken	under	CDM	are	great	
places	 to	get	TT	data	and	 information.	The	research	will	use	 the	existing	 literature	on	these	
subjects	 along	 with	 the	 text	 in	 relevant	 international	 agreements	 as	 a	 starting	 point	 from	
which	to	identify	the	context	and	rules	in	which	climate	change	TT	can	occur.	
In	the	context	of	on-going	work	on	IPRs	and	climate	change,	the	objective	of	this	thesis	is	to	
look	 at	 the	 relationship	 between	 IP	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 climate-related	 technologies	 and	 to	
outline	some	of	the	existing	and	prospective	measures,	primarily	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement	that	
could	 be	 considered	 in	 support	 of	 a	 post-Kyoto	 climate	 regime.	 If	 the	 excessive	 cost	 of	
emission	reduction	claimed	by	developing	countries	(e.g.	China)	is	due	to	unbalanced	IPRs	and	
high	standards	of	IP	protection,	it	requires	a	prudent	review	of	the	system	to	see	whether	it	is	
																																								 																				
17 The CDM defined in Article 12 of the Protocol (The Kyoto Protocol article 12) “allows a country with an emission-reduction or 
emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in 
developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of 
CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.” 
18 Further recognizing that the Kyoto Protocol has not created or bestowed any right, title or entitlement to emissions of any kind 
on Parties included in Annex I. See Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December, 2005 FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 
19 Stephen Seres, Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects (Prepared for the UNFCCC Registration & Issuance Unit 
CDM/SDM, 2008). 
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possible	 to	 reduce	 TT	 barriers	 by	 adjusting	 relevant	 laws.	 The	 research	 will	 investigate	
provisions	 employed	 by	 TRIPS	 relative	 to	 international	 TT	 and	 commentaries	 on	 how	 TRIPS	
could	 help	 design	 an	 effective	 and	 self-interested	 approach	 to	 encourage	 environmental	
protection	activities.20	 Understanding	these	issues	will	help	to	provide	possible	resolutions	to	
TT	barriers	under	the	current	available	system	and	also	recognize	limitations	based	on	which	
amendments	 shall	 be	 made.	 This	 thesis	 will	 try	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 view	 as	 to	 what	 is	 the	
appropriate	balance	between	public	interest	concerns	and	the	rights	of	patent	holders,	based	
on	the	observation	of	large-scale	patterns	and	trends	and	of	the	pros	and	cons	of	IPRs.21	 	
In	my	 study,	 the	doctrinal	method	 is	used	 to	 identify	 the	more	general	effect	of	 IP	 law	and	
explore	 possibilities	 to	 maximize	 the	 provisions	 in	 favour	 of	 climate	 change	 mitigation,	 in	
particular,	to	look	for	better	use	of	the	IP	system	to	facilitate	green	TT	to	developing	countries	
like	China.	However,	pure	doctrinal	research	is	unable	to	see	how	these	trends	formulate	and	
vary	 among	 individuals	who	 enact	 them	on	 the	 ground.	 In	 order	 to	 offset	 the	 drawback	 of	
employing	only	doctrinal	methodology	 in	the	research,	 this	 thesis	also	employs	a	socio-legal	
method	to	look	at	firm-level	dynamics	for	on-the-ground	analysis.	
2.3.2 Socio-legal method	
In	the	1960s	and	1970s,	scholars	started	“the	law	and	society	movement,	and	pointed	to	the	
importance	 of	 understanding	 the	 gap	 between	 ‘law	 in	 books’	 and	 ‘law	 in	 action’,	 and	 the	
																																								 																				
20 Such study will clarify the norms and function created by TRIPS, for example what are the “flexibility” options under TRIPS 
and how well did members make use of them? Is it possible to accomplish that goal by providing a compliance record approach as 
well as an environmental soundness standardizing system to encourage countries' corporation in climate change technology 
transfer. The Kyoto Protocol (n 2), Chapter 2, for example the clear energy labelling (now mandatory for many goods in the EU), 
minimum energy standards (as required for some goods in the EU and increasingly in other countries), which overcomes market 
failures. 
21 available from existing literature. 
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operation	 of	 law	 in	 society.”22	 The	 intention	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 legal	 system	 in	 terms	 of	
whether	 it	 actually	 brings	 positive	 effects	 benefiting	 public	 interests.	 Empirical	 evidence	 is	
often	 needed	 to	meet	 this	 goal.23	 In	 addition,	 socio-legal	 scholars	 employ	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
social	science	methodologies,	such	as	qualitative	research	method.24	 	
For	 instance,	 Dave	 Cowan	 and	 his	 colleagues	 employed	 a	 socio-legal	method	 “to	 study	 the	
role	of	adjudication	or	the	decision-making	processes	within	the	local	authority	in	influencing	
the	implementation	of	homelessness	law.”25	 The	study	offers	not	only	rich	detail	on	the	social	
world	of	public	administration	but	also	explores	the	significance	of	adjudicatory	processes	on	
the	 implementation,	 which	 other	 studies	 fail	 to	 do.	 The	 research	 is	 done	 with	 a	 threefold	
method:	 a	 doctrinal	 overview	of	 the	history	 and	 content	 of	 the	 subject	Acts	 and	provisions	
relevant	to	a	so-called	“internal	review”	approach	invoked	by	homelessness	decision-making	
authorities;	 quantitative	 data	 collected	 through	 questionnaire	 on	 trend	 in	 the	 seven	 years	
since	 the	 introduction	 of	 internal	 review;26	 a	 separate	 qualitative	 study	 uses	 an	 existing	
analytical	 framework 27 	 to	 analyze	 the	 “influence	 of	 judicial	 review	 on	 homelessness	
decision-making	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 internal	 review	 is	 likely	 to	
																																								 																				
22 For example, John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (University of North Carolina Press 
1995); Reza Banakar and Max Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Oxford:Hart Publishing 2005) See in Dave 
Cowan, Simon Halliday and Caroline Hunter, ‘Adjudicating the Implementation of Homelessness Law: The Promise of 
Socio-Legal Studies’ 21 Housing Studies 381. 
23 See in Cowan, Halliday and Hunter (n 22), “the so-called ‘gap problem”: Z. Bankowski and D. Nelken, ‘Discretion as a Social 
Problem’ in M. Adler and S. Asquith (eds), Discretion and Welfare (London: Heinemann 1981); “now socio-legal studies has been 
much more sophisticated in trying to understand the operations of law in society” D. J. Galligan, ‘Introduction’ in D. J. Galligan 
(ed), Socio-Legal Studies in Context: The Oxford Centre Past and Future (Wiley 1995). 
24 Tracey E. George, ‘An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools’ (2006) 81 Indiana Law Journal 
141. 
25 Cowan, Halliday and Hunter (n 22). 
26 “There was an absolute increase in the extent to which local authorities were exposed to the process. How many decisions were 
changed as a result of internal review in the six-month period? How many appeals to the County Court were made in the six-month 
period?) The quantitative data also reveals that many local authorities believe that internal review has had a positive ‘impact’ on the 
quality of first instance decision making.” Ibid, (n 22). 
27 “This framework posits that internal review will have greater influence over decision making (1) where initial decision makers 
receive more information about the legal requirements of decision making in light of internal review; (2) where the initial decision 
makers are more conscientious about applying that legal knowledge to their routine tasks; (3) where they have greater competence 
in understanding and applying legal knowledge; and, finally, (4) where law’s strength in the decision-making environment is 
greater.” Ibid (n 22).  
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have	most	 influence	on	the	 implementation	of	homelessness	 law.”28	 The	qualitative	study	 is	
based	on	 a	 case	 study	 conducted	 in	 Southfield	 Council29	 and	 interview	data	 collected	 from	
the	 Brisford	 authority.30	 This	 study	 is	 one	 eligible	 example	 demonstrating	 how	 data	 is	
collected	to	examine	how	a	 legal	 institution	operated	and	whether	 legal	reform	achieved	its	
intended	 outcomes,	 including	what	were	 the	 real	motivating	 factors	 and	 thereby	 providing	
recommendation	on	future	policy	and	legal	reform.	
The	 structure	of	my	 research	questions	are	 similar	 to	Cowan’s	 study	but	 in	a	different	area	
that	 looks	 at	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 international	 agreements	 that	 specifically	 regulate	 IP	
issues,	 in	particular	the	effect	that	current	 levels	of	 IP	protection	and	the	IP	system	have	on	
individual	enterprises	and	TT	transactions.	Therefore,	the	research	employs	a	similar	method	
as	Cowan	 in	 his	 study.	My	research	 takes	a	mixed	method	approach,	 in	 that	 empirical	 legal	
scholarship	 is	 complementary	 to	 the	 previously	 mentioned	 doctrinal	 research.	 Both	
methodologies	are	used	simultaneously31	 to	examine	issues	to	be	address	in	the	thesis.	 	
The	study	is	undertaken	in	the	context	of	China	being	the	workshop	of	the	world.	The	fear	of	
the	 industrial	 growth	 of	 China	 and	 the	 associated	 problem	 of	 the	 country	 being	 a	 major	
economic	competitor	could	also	be	factors	 influencing	whether	overseas	firms	provide	TT	to	
the	country.	These	have	been	reflected	in	the	“one-size-fit-all”	international	IP	regime,	which	
is	 possible	 in	 crippling	 developing	 countries,	 such	 as	 China,	 from	 acquiring	 climate	 change	
technologies.	Dinwoodie	was	successful	making	an	argument	 for	 tailoring	 IP	 rights	 to	 fit	 the	
																																								 																				
28 Ibid. 
29 “that an organisational anxiety over anti-social behaviour sat in tension with legality as an influence over decision making on the 
ground” ibid. 
30 Brisford’s commitment to legality was countered by its commitment to “efficiency”. 
31 J. Baldwin and G. Davis, ‘Empirical Research in Law’ in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies 
(Oxford University Press 2003) p.881. 
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real	 world. 32 	 He	 argues	 that	 although	 the	 international	 legal	 system	 has	 tended	 to	
favour	national	 autonomy	and	keeping	 internationally	 mandated	 levels	 of	 protection	 low;	
seeking	to	establish	a	unitary	body	of	IP	law	on	“certain	 issues”	will	benefit	not	only	current	
rights	holders	but	also	future	users.	But	to	make	sure	that	climate	change	TT	is	counted	as	a	
“certain	 issue”	that	 is	dealt	with	primarily	under	the	 IP	system,	we	have	to	 first	confirm	the	
hypothesis	that	 insufficient	climate	change	TT	 is	to	do	with	the	current	 IP	protection	system	
and	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 IP	 law	 amendments.	 This	 requires	 acquiring	 data	 available	 not	 only	
from:	 international	 organizations’	 web	 pages	 (e.g.	 Project	 Design	 Document	 from	 the	 CDM	
web	 page)33;	 the	 Chinese	 government	 (Chinese	 national	 year	 books)34;	 institutions	 (such	 as	
the	China	CDM	 information	centre35);	but	also,	 importantly,	 individual	experiences	gathered	
from	 professionals	 and	 employees	 in	 the	 industry.	 The	 lack	 of	 international	 facilities	 in	
developing	countries	–	both	materially	and	intellectually	–	needs	to	be	expressed	clearly	and	
convincingly,	 especially	 at	 this	 point	 when	 there	 are	 already	 some	 theorists	 arguing	 that	
enough	 favours	are	given	 to	 technology-receiving	countries	and	 insufficient	attention	 to	 the	
rights	of	IP	owners.	A	socio-legal	methodology	will	provide	direct	evidence	of	the	influence	of	
IP	 law	 on	 climate	 change	 TT	 practice,	 thus	making	 it	 the	most	 feasible	way	 to	 confirm	my	
hypothesis.	However,	the	contention	here	is	that	these	two	dimensions	should	be	seen	not	as	
being	mutually	exclusive	but	as	each	having	value	 that	 cannot	be	neglected.	This	 thesis	has	
																																								 																				
32 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, ‘Remarks: ‘One Size’ Fits All Consolidation and Difference in Intellectual Property Law’ in Annette 
Kur and Vytautas Mizaras (eds), The Structure of Intellectual Property Law (ATRIP Intellectual Property Series) (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2011). 
33 ‘CDM Project Search’ (UNFCCC website)  <http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html> accessed 12 Jul 2017. 
34 ‘Annual Data’ (National Bureau of Statistics of China)  <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/AnnualData/> accessed 
9 Jun 2017. 
35 ‘Clean Development Mechanism in China’ (CDM in China Website)  <http://cdm-en.ccchina.gov.cn> accessed 6 Aug 2017. 
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indeed	offers	a	socio-legal	analysis	of	the	effect	of	IP	on	TT	to	China,	specifically	in	the	context	
of	global	climate	change.	 	
To	be	more	specific,	the	empirical	part	of	my	research	examines	how	Chinese	IP	 law	altered	
according	 to	 TRIPS	 requirements	 and	 how	 it	 works	 in	 international	 TT	 practice,	 including	
which	 laws	will	be	 involved	and	how	will	 they	 influence	TT;	how	and	 to	what	extent	patent	
law	 influences	“the	actions,	attitudes,	and	expectations	of	officials	and	non-officials;”36	 how	
the	 relevant	 policies	 and	 procedures,	 and	 the	 way	 they	 are	 applied,	 affect	 green	 industry	
business.	 Moreover,	 in	 this	 study,	 regulation	 and	 its	 enforcement	 are	 treated	 as	 social	
processes.	 Therefore,	what	might	 be	 regarded	 as	 hindrance	 of	 TT	 resides	 not	 simply	 in	 the	
legal	rules	but	in	social	behaviour,	for	example	how	the	way	that	people	value	application	of	
green	 technologies	and	how	 IP	 is	 respected	 in	a	country	might	affect	 industry	at	 large.	As	a	
successful	TT	is	accomplished	via	a	series	of	human	judgements,	emphasis	is	therefore	given	
to	legal	procedures	and	government	requirements	for	they	are	essentially	stimulus	in	a	firm’s	
decision-making.	This	is	an	attempt	to	find	out	how	strongly	TT	decisions	are	dependent	on	IP	
law	and	in	turn	answer	the	ultimate	question	of	how	effective	the	law	is	supposed	to	be	and	
how	 it	works	 in	 reality.	A	 few	examples	had	 illustrated	 the	 kinds	of	 issues	 investigated	 and	
their	breadth.37	 Through	an	empirical	method,	my	research	examines	patents	and	know-how;	
the	 common	 treatment	 of	 various	 subject	 matters	 within	 environment	 protection	
																																								 																				
36 D.J. Galligan, ‘Legal Theory and Empirical Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research (OUP Oxford 2010) p.978. 
37 Why victims of accidents failed to pursue remedies for damages in the courts. Donald Renshaw Harris, Compensation and 
support for illness and injury (Oxford University Press 1984); How court decisions affect the actions of those to whom they are 
directed. Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat, ‘Justice and power in law and society research: On the contested careers of core 
concepts’ in Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat (eds), Justice and Power in Sociolegal Studies (American Bar Foundation. 1998); 
Why the ranchers of Shasta county ignored the law and adopted their own social rules. Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: 
How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1991) 
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regimes;	and	international	IP	laws	across	borders.	Such	an	approach	to	looking	at	the	problem	
seems	to	be	pragmatic	and	feasible.	
2.3.3 Empirical method 
The	behavioural	impact	of	law	can	be	studied	both	for	its	own	sake	as	well	as	for	insights	into	
the	general	relationship	between	law	and	behaviour.	But	any	behavioural	change	induced	by	
law	also	has	 implications	for	environmental	and	economic	conditions	 in	the	world	at	 large.38	
Existing	empirical	research	has	examined	the	causal	connection	between	law	and	changes	in	
industrial	outcomes	and	economics	costs.	Ultimately,	this	connection	should	matter	greatly	to	
anyone	interested	in	improving	the	design	of	a	law	and	its	enforcement.	The	subject	matter	of	
this	research	 is	strongly	related	to	the	ratification	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	among	countries.	
This	 is	 an	international	 agreement	administered	 by	 the	WTO	 that	 “sets	 down	 minimum	
standards	for	many	forms	of	IP	regulation	as	applied	to	nationals	of	other	WTO	members.”39	
The	 Agreement	 also	 specifies	“enforcement	procedures,	 remedies,	 and	dispute	
resolution	procedures.” 40 	 Under	 TRIPS	 any	 national	 law	 aims	 at	 IPR	 protection	 and	
enforcement	 shall	 meet	 the	 principles	 and	 objectives	 set	 by	 the	 Agreement.	 Empirical	
methodologies	will	be	providing	valuable	 information	 for	making	policy	choices	and	offering	
an	 opportunity	 to	 examine	 the	 effect	 of	 an	 international	 law.	 One	 of	 the	 disadvantages	 of	
using	empiricism	to	explore	an	international	law	is	that	it	appears	not	to	be	well	adopted	by	
most	lawyers.41	 Still,	many	are	adept	at	supporting	“normative	arguments	from	inferences	in	
																																								 																				
38 The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (P. Cane and M. V. Tushnet eds, Oxford University Press 2003). 
39 See TRIPS Art. 1(3) 
40 See TRIPS Art. 1(3) 
41 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Conclusion: International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society’ in Michael Byers (ed), 
The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (reprint edn, Oxford University 
Press 2001); Also Abbott suggests “the critical questions that international relations theory would posit involve: How exactly does 
law affect people's behaviour? How, if at all, do legal rules differ from other norms? What conditions determine the effectiveness 
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existing	 empirical	 social	 science	 literature.”42	 Given	 the	 considerable	 number	 of	 existing	
quantitative43	 and	qualitative44	 researches,	the	empirical	method	has	been	widely	accepted.	 	
Joel	Trachtman	points	out	that	“lawyers	are	generally	good	at	[…]	describing	what	courts	and	
legislatures	have	done.”45	 David	Bederman	even	suggests	 that	 international	 law	scholarship	
has	"become	 lazy"	and	 is	"no	 longer	sufficiently	empirical.”46	 However,	employing	empirical	
methods	 in	 the	 legal	 researches	 creates	 opportunities	 to	 provide	 an	 important	
counter-narrative.	 Such	 scholarship	brings	 researchers	 closer	 to	 the	 facts	 rather	 than	 logics,	
thus	making	policy	makers	able	to	see	the	effect	of	law	in	practice	and	become	more	nuanced	
in	their	future	decisions.	Even	empiricism	may	not	be	suitable	to	study	every	issue	concerning	
international	law,	it	may	be	better	for	some	than	others.	Cases	as	complex	as	climate	change	
TT	 could	 be	 studied	more	 explicitly	 under	 such	methods	 and	 this	 is	 also	 why	 an	 empirical	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
of international legal rules? What explains variations in legalization and compliance?" Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘Commentaries on 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers 14 YALE J. Int'l L. 335 
(1989)’ (2000) 25 Yale J Int'l L 273. 
42 See in Susan D. Franck, ‘Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution’ (2007) 48 Va J 
Int'l L 767: "Empirical political scientists are right that many international law scholars have traditionally been overly sanguine in 
simply assuming the efficacy of international law and then busying themselves with textual analyses of the international law 
instruments themselves." Laura A. Dickinson, ‘Toward a "New" New Haven School of International Law?’ (2007) 32 Yale J Int'l L 
547; "Social science in general has already contributed a great deal of useful theory describing and explaining the two-way causal 
relations between rules and behaviour, but much more remains to be done in applying this work to the theory and empirical study 
of international problems." Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of 
International Law’ (1997) 19 Mich J Int'l L 345; referring to social science literature to argue empirical research demonstrates 
shortcomings in a theoretical framework, Peter L. Lindseth, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 628; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004). 
43 See in Franck (n 42): “quantifying and statistically analyzing variables that affect the probability of legislative repeal of judicial 
statutory interpretation” Robert D. Cooter and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic 
Models’ (1996) 16 International Review of Law and Economics 295; “empirically analyzing human rights treaties” John King 
Gamble, Charlotte Ku and Chris Strayer, ‘Human-Centric International Law: A Model and a Search for Empirical Indicators’ 
(2005) 14 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 61; “empirically analyzing dispute resolution processes at the WTO” Andrew Guzman and Beth A. 
Simmons, ‘To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization’ (2002) 31 
The Journal of Legal Studies S205. 
44 See in Franck (n 42): “gathering empirical literature related to international human rights law” Laura Dickinson, International 
Law and Society: Empirical Approaches to Human Rights (Ashgate Publishing Company 2007); “using the South African 
Constitution as an instructive case study” Heinz Klug, ‘Constitution-Making, Democracy and the Civilizing or Irreconcilable 
Conflict: What Might We Learn from the South African Miracle’ 25 Wis Int'l LJ 269; “conducting interviews with officials and 
using them to tell three transnational law stories” Janet Koven Levit, ‘A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The 
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments’ (2005) 30 Yale J Int'l L 125. 
45 "There is no agreement on the theory and methodology of international law. This lack of consensus challenges the very 
legitimacy of international law as an academic field." Joel P. Trachtman, ‘International Economic Law Research: A Taxonomy’ in 
Colin Picker, Isabella D. Bunn and Douglas Arner (eds), International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2008), quoted by Franck (n 42). 
46 See in Franck (n 42): David J. Bederman, ‘Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law’ (2000) 89 Geo LJ 
469, reviewing Anthony C. Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (Oxford University Press on Demand 1999). 
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method	has	been	selected	for	this	research.	The	increasing	interest	in	how	TRIPS	and	relevant	
domestic	 laws	 function:	whether	 they	achieve	 their	 goals,	 and	at	what	 cost47	 will	be	better	
addressed	with	such	method.	 	
2.3.4 Qualitative way of analysis 
As	 already	 suggested	 in	 the	 previous	 texts,	 law	 can	 affect	 the	 performance	 of	 individual	
business	operations.	 In	 the	environmental	 law	area,48	 qualitative	studies	become	a	possible	
way	 of	 assessing	 the	 effect	 of	 environmental	 laws	 on	 the	 environment.	 Interviews	 enable	
researchers	to	get	access	to	people’s	experiences	and	perceptions.	“Individual	interviews	are	
used	 extensively	 by	 qualitative	 researchers	 examining	 legal	 phenomena	 and	 perceptions	 of	
law	and	the	 legal	profession.”49	 Enforcement	style	may	vary	both	 internationally	and	across	
different	agencies	and	sectors	within	an	individual	country.50	 Therefore,	it	is	crucial	to	select	a	
narrow	 environment	 or	 a	 specific	 subject	 to	 simplify	 analytical	 conditions.	 Many	 prefer	 to	
report	 the	 “day-to-day	 activities	 of	 regulators	 and	 the	 regulated	 by	 using	 techniques	 of	
participant	 observation.”51	 For	 example,	 Keith	 Hawkins52	 uses	 this	 empirical	 method	 of	
research	to	study	the	relationship	between	social	behaviour	and	enforcement	of	regulation	by	
reporting	 in	 the	 arena	 of	 control	 of	 pollution	 discharged	 directly	 to	 watercourses.	 The	
																																								 																				
47 See for example Matthew Littleton, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to 
Developing Countries’ (2009) 33 Natural Resources Forum 233; Peter M. Gerhart, ‘Reflections: Beyond Compliance 
Theory--TRIPS as a Substantive Issue’ (2000) 32 Case W Res J Int'l L 357; Yoshifumi Fukunaga, ‘Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges 
of Adjudicating Minimum Standards Agreements’ (2008) 23 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 867. 
48 The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer eds, OUP Oxford 2010). 
49 See for example: Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Researching and Theorizing the Processes of Professional Identity Formation’ (2007) 34 
Journal of Law and Society 190; Margaret Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Oxford University 
Press 1997); See, e.g. William W. Burke-White, ‘Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a 
System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 
557 (n 44). 
50 Marco Verweij, ‘Why Is the River Rhine Cleaner than the Great Lakes (Despite Looser Regulation)?’ (2000) 34 Law & Society 
Review 1007;Peter J. May and Søren Winter, ‘Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-Environmental 
Policy’ (1999) 18 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 625. 
51 , The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (n 48). 
52 Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (Clarendon Press, New York, 
NY 1984). 
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researcher’s	 field	work	was	 carried	 out	 in	 two	 selected	 regional	water	 authorities	who	had	
experiences	 in	 pollution	 control	 when	 the	 targeted	 environmental	 legislation	 was	 awaiting	
implementation,	 and	 they	 were	 still	 actively	 engaged	 in	 developing	 and	 refining	 their	
administrative	 practice.	 To	 learn	 how	 field	 staff	 did	 their	 job,	 Hawkins	 acquired	 consent	 to	
accompany	them	during	their	daily	work.	Data	was	then	collected	by	extensive	participation,	
observation	and	casual	conversation	in	36	field	officers’	routine	work.	
Lange	 demonstrates	 a	more	 social-scientific	method	of	 assessing	 law.	Her	 thesis	 deals	with	
the	 concept	 of	 legal	 compliance	 in	 the	waste	management	 industry,	with	 regulators	 of	 the	
day-to-day	 life	of	handling	waste,	which	describes	 the	relationship	between	rules	and	social	
practices.	Her	main	argument	is	that	“the	concept	of	formal	compliance	has	shortcomings	and	
therefore	needed	 to	be	complemented	with	a	 concept	of	empirical	 compliance.”53	 People’s	
daily	 practice	 changes	 their	 understanding	 of	 legal	 concepts,	 therefore	 “formal	 concepts	 of	
law	 which	 are	 based	 on	 formal	 legal	 rules	 have	 to	 be	 modified	 in	 order	 to	 understand	
empirical	 compliance.” 54 	 For	 this,	 enforcement	 officers'	 and	 regulated	 companies'	
understanding	 of	 the	 definitions	 is	 important.	 In	 order	 to	 establish	 an	 empirical	 concept	 of	
law,	 Lange	 adopts	 “a	 social-construction	 approach	 by	 exploring	 how	 actors	 in	 the	 field	
establish	and	manipulate	the	various	normative	constraints	under	which	they	work.”55	 Thus	
she	 recruited	 staff	 on	 the	 lowest	 level	 of	 the	 organizations	 involved,	 and	 observation	 and	
participant	observed	their	everyday	work	during	participation.	 	
																																								 																				
53 Bettina Lange, ‘Empirical Compliance: A Study of Waste Management Regulation in the UK and Germany’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Warwick 1996). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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These	researchers	have	all	proved	in	some	area	that	empirical	method	and	qualitative	analysis	
is	an	option	for	assessing	the	relationship	between	law	and	performance.	But	their	discussions	
during	observation	are	usually	very	 loosely	 structured	 to	preserve	as	natural	and	 informal	a	
setting	as	possible.	This	is	to	avoid	even	the	hint	of	a	contrived	formal	interview.56	 This	thesis	
is,	on	the	other	hand,	based	on	people’s	experience	of	TT	during	past	projects,	thus,	it	is	not	
possible	 to	 go	 back	 in	 time	 and	 discover	 their	 behaviour	 by	 observation.	 Although	 the	
technique	is	less	beneficial	to	the	topic	of	this	research	as	compared	to	direct	observation	of	
each	TT	process,	people’s	choice	of	 individuals/agencies	 is	worth	 looking	at	to	construct	the	
sampling	method	used	 in	 this	 thesis.	“Regulation	must	operate	 in	 the	real	world,	and	 in	 the	
real	 world	 regulation	 is	 only	 one	 of	 many	 interrelated	 factors	 that	 affect	 a	 business	 firm's	
behaviour.”57	 It	is	assumed	that	the	more	closely	people	experienced	the	TT	process	(a	typical	
TT	process	includes	patent	register,	staff	training,	innovation	and	investment)	then	the	more	
valuable	 their	 opinions	 are	 in	 a	 company’s	 design	 or	 use	 of	 TT	 in	 future.	 Moreover,	
identity/position	 of	 participants	 will	 influence	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 TT	 and	 IPR	 laws	 in	
different	Chinese	companies	and	 further	affect	compliance	of	 legal	 requirements.	There	are	
well-developed	 theoretical	arguments58	 as	 to	why	 the	effectiveness	of	 legal	 systems	should	
be	a	determinant	of	 FDI,59	 though	with	 little	convincing	empirical	evidence.	And	as	 for	how	
																																								 																				
56 Leonard Schatzman and Anselm Leonard Strauss, Field Research: Strategies for a Natural Sociology (Prentice Hall 1973) 71. 
57 Timothy F. Malloy and Peter Sinsheimer, ‘Innovation, Regulation and the Selection Environment’ (2004) 57 Rutgers L Rev 183. 
58 “This assistance is based upon the argument that investors are attracted to States which have effective legal systems; that an 
effective legal system is one which implements laws efficiently and predictably; and that reform of an inefficient and unpredictable 
(i.e. ineffective) legal system can help a State to attract FDI.” Amanda Perry, ‘Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct 
Investment: In Search of the Evidence’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 779. 
59 “One commentator argued that Sri Lanka's failure to attract FDI ‘can only be explained’ by the ‘relative conduciveness (sic) of 
the investment climate,’ which is made unattractive by a lack of certainty, transparency and stability.” Premachandra Athukorala, 
‘Foreign Direct Investment and Manufacturing for Export in a New Exporting Country: The Case of Sri Lanka’ (1995) 18 World 
Economy 543, pp 544-548; in addition, “the former general counsel of the World Bank argued in 1995 that a legal and regulatory 
framework ... is a fundamental element in the stability and flexibility needed for the investment environment.” Ibrahim F. I. 
Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures, vol 2 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) 234; the 
1997 World Development Report concludes that “perhaps the worst damage that a State can do to its prospects of investment is to 
cultivate an air of uncertainty.” World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (1997) 43; and the 
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people’s	 reaction	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 legal	 system,	 it	 would	 be	
feasible	 to	 investigate	 impressions	of	 IP	 law	among	practitioners,	which	might	 continuously	
affect,	from	a	receiver’s	perspective,	on-going	and	potential	TT.	 	
2.3.5 Research using similar methods 
There	 are	 studies	 that	 have	 successfully	 demonstrated	 the	 function	 of	 the	
empirical-qualitative	 method.	 For	 example,	 Malloy	 and	 Sinsheimer’s	 research60	 adopted	
interviews	 to	 collect	 data	 from	 people	 who	 worked	 in	 the	 dry-cleaning	 industry.61	 And	
through	interviewing	informants	selected	from	key	categories	of	people	relying	on	a	model	of	
the	"professional	cleaning"	system	constructed,	researchers	were	able	to	capture	a	full	range	
of	views	among	practitioners	in	the	profession.	Data	was	then	used	to	identify	the	barriers	to	
the	diffusion	of	wet-cleaning	technology,	and	to	identify	the	way	that	policy	tool	might	affect	
these	barriers.	Mann62	 also	used	 interview	data	 to	 conduct	his	 research,	 assessing	whether	
patent	 law	deters	small	software	firms	from	innovating.	Specific	questions	were	designed	to	
identify	the	perception	that	firms	have	of	patent	law	and	whether	the	law	discourages	them	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of the World Bank Group argues that ineffective legal systems "increase the 
withdrawal of investors who may have made a preliminary decision to commit to a country. (Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
(FIAS), Administrative Barriers at <http://www.fias.net/services/barriers.htm> on 31 August 1999.)" quoted by Perry (n 58). 
60 Malloy and Sinsheimer (n 57). 
61 See in ibid (n 57): The study focused on a small set of selected socio-economic factors that affect the innovative behaviour of 
business firms. The “selection environment” consists of the regulatory obligations and prohibitions that relate to a firm’s everyday 
business. This is worth studying for it gives a specific lens to look at subject and it is more feasible. A firm's technology choices are 
certainly influenced by the selected factors. The selected factors also included the “mechanisms by which information about the 
innovation flows to potential adopters; the attributes of the innovation and its value to the potential adopters (i.e. the benefits and 
costs of adoption) Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Harvard Business 
School Press, Cambridge 1982); and the strength of pre-existing routines and behaviours exhibited by relevant individuals and 
organizations.” For a broader discussion on “a range of technical, economic and institutional relationships that influence the 
decision of whether to adopt new technology,” look at R. Kemp, Environmental Policy and Technical Change: A Comparison of 
the Technological Impact of Policy Instruments (Edward Elgar 1997) p.275-77.  
62 Ronald J. Mann, ‘Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry’ 83 Tex L Rev 961. 
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in	competition.	This	literature63	 has	tested	the	use	of	interview	technique	in	investigating	the	
role	of	regulations	and	their	effect	on	companies’	behaviour.	
Some	 researchers	 have	 used	 interviews	 to	 study	 CDM	 projects	 in	 China.	 In	 Pei-Fei	 Chang’s	
study64	 of	 the	 major	 driving	 forces	 behind	 China's	 wind	 energy	 policy	 change,65	 data	 was	
collected	 from	 “interviews	 with	 senior	 officials	 in	 the	 NDRC,	 large	 state-owned	 enterprises	
(SOEs),	 and	other	 influential	public	 and	private	actors	 in	 the	Chinese	wind	energy	 sector.”66	
These	are	mostly	people	who	have	a	general	overview	of	the	reform	of	Chinese	wind	policy	
and	the	role	that	central	government	 is	playing.	The	study	concluded	with	the	direct	 impact	
that	Chinese	energy	regulation	has	on	the	renewable	energy	sector67 and	the	 importance	of	
CDM68	 in	 achieving	 China's	 considerable	 strategic	 targets.	 Interviews	 provided	 information	
about	governmental	organization	changes,	successful	examples	of	wind	projects,	and	barriers	
created	 by	 current	 policy. 69 	 Although	 Pei-Fei’s	 research	 had	 only	 20	 informants’	
participation 70 	 and	 all	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 off-the-record	 and	 maintained	
confidentially	as	unofficial	transcripts,	it	showed	that	access	was	conditional	but	possible.	
																																								 																				
63 Jessica M. Silbey, ‘Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and'Work-Makes-Work,'Two Stages in the Creative 
Processes of Artists and Innovators’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame Law Review 2091. 
64 Pei-Fei Chang and Hans Bruyninckx, ‘Wind Energy in China: From Ad hoc Projects to Strategic Policy’ (2011) 1 Renewable 
Energy L & Pol'y Rev 17. 
65 Including Chinese law that governs energy sector as well as international cooperation such as the CDM. 
66 Chang and Bruyninckx (n 64). 
67 Without the Renewable Energy Law (2005) and its Amendment 2009 Chinese energy policy would likely still focus on 
coal-fired energy, while environmental pollution would be worse and market investments in renewable energy would not be 
stimulated, Renewable Energy Law of P.R.C. (promulgated by the Standing Commission. National People’s Congress, Feb. 28, 
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
68 without the CDM as a baseline, renewable energy projects would likely not be economically competitive. 
69 For example the interview data indicated that “without the CDM as a baseline, renewable energy projects would likely not be 
economically competitive, (e.g. high costs prevent wind power development from being competitive with conventional power 
generation (e.g., coal-based or hydro). If wind power projects are developed as CDM projects, their initial CO 2 reduction can be 
traded to UNFCCC Annex I countries (as emission reduction credits). That increases the revenue of wind power generation.) and 
the internal rate of return (IRR) would be lower (5 %) than the benchmark price (the lowest acceptable price set by the National 
Development and Reform Committee). In contrast, with the CDM, the IRR can be larger (25 %) than the benchmark (bolstered by 
revenue transferred from the expected CO2 emission reduction), making it economically feasible.” Interviews done by Pei-Fei with 
a central organization in Beijing (2 June 2009) see footnote 66. 
70 Interviews with central government officials and SOE employees revealed information on internal rate of return (IRR) difference 
due to introduction of CDM in practice, such data illustrating how much the CDM contributes to profits for renewable energy 
development would not be gather in any other currently available resources (neither the CDM nor the government requires 
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Bo	 Wang71	 considered	 TT	 in	 CDM	 projects	 in	 China,	 focusing	 on	 the	 way	 foreign	 TT	 is	
promoted	 or	 hindered	 by	 the	 economic	 sector,	 such	 as	 the	 incentives	 created	 by	 Certified	
Emission	 Reductions	 (CERs),	 transaction	 costs,	 relative	 policies	 in	 the	 host	 country	 and	 the	
role	of	CDM	participants.	The	study	invited	“more	than	20”	interviewees72	 and	most	of	them	
attributed	 the	 inefficiency	 in	 TT	 or	 CDM	 projects	 to	 lack	 of	 incentives.	 But	 the	 author	 also	
learned	in	his	interviews	that	“half	of	them	believed	participating	in	TT	was	an	effective	tool	
for	securing	CER	contracts;	 they	called	 it	a	 trend	 in	 the	CDM	market.”73	 The	relatively	small	
number	 of	 respondents	 participating	 in	 the	 above	 Chinese	 research	 identifies	 potential	
difficulties	 in	getting	access	to	 interviewees	in	that	country,	which	had	affected	my	research	
as	well.	Wang	did	not	explain	any	difficulties	in	accessing	participants	but	he	did	indicate	using	
non-official	ways	to	approach	interviewees.	Such	a	choice	is	understandable,	as	also	found	in	
this	 research,	 for	 that	 Chinese	 participants	 lack	 experience	 in	 cooperating	 with	
non-governmental	 researchers.	 And	 they	 are	 afraid	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 blemishing	 their	 personal	
reputation	 if	 they	 reveal	 anything	 improper	 during	 interviews.	 Insufficient	 motivation	 to	
cooperate	 in	 academic	 research	 is	 another	 possible	 reason	 to	 cause	 difficulties	 in	 data	
collecting.	Christmann-Budian	Fan74	 shows	that	research	projects	in	China	are	well	conducted	
only	in	certain	subject	areas	constrained	by	national	policy	plans	and	political	stakeholders.	A	
"top-down"	 pattern	 is	 common	 from	 initiation	 to	 implementation	 of	 researches.	 Every	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
enterprises to submit document in relation to the effect of CDM) unless the government initiates research specifically on this factor. 
Although the study shows the wind power project operation pattern change in China, it remained at a rather broad level of viewing 
the industry sector. This is due to the sensitive economic and political context of its research topic and the status of interviewees. 
71 Bo Wang, ‘Can CDM Bring Technology Transfer to China?—An Empirical Study of Technology Transfer in China’s CDM 
Projects’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 2572. 
72 Such as carbon traders, CDM project consultants, etc. According to his language I assume it indicates that he had engaged less 
than 30 respondents in the research. 
73 Wang (n 71). 
74 Cheng Fan, Stephanie Christmann-Budian and Sarah Seus, Evaluation and Innovation Cooperation between the EU and China. 
(Study for the European Commission DG RTD by Fraunhofer ISI, 2014) 
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Five-Year-Plan	points	out	several	priority	areas	in	which	researches	are	promoted	and	funded	
by	the	government.75	 Research	that	falls	outside	the	priority	areas	would	face	comparatively	
more	difficulties	in	progressing,	including	access	to	funds,	resources	and	participants.	Various	
other	 hindering	 factors	 could	 be	 found	 in	 conducting	 non-official	 research	 in	 China.	 For	
example,	 the	 undervaluing	 of	 research,	 the	 low	 respect	 for	 research	 ethics	 in	 the	 country	
(sparking	participants’	 fear	of	 the	 risks	of	 technology	and	 information-leakages),	 the	 lack	of	
effective	 and	 efficient	 administration	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 research	 on	 both	 the	
researcher	and	the	participant	sides,	and	so	on.	
2.4 Research design 
2.4.1 Qualitative research data collection 
In	 order	 to	 identify	 how	 relevant	 legal	 provisions	are	 in	 applying	 to	 a	 community,	 and	how	
useful	a	 legal	 framework	 is	as	a	foundation	for	encouraging	climate	change	TT,	the	doctrinal	
study	 is	 supported	 by	 data	 collected	 from	 TT	 cases	 completed	 already.	 It	 was	 the	 initial	
intention	of	 this	research	to	review	TT	agreements	between	Chinese	and	foreign	companies	
but	 this	 proved	 impossible	 as	 all	 companies	 refused	 access	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 commercial	
confidentiality.	 Consequently,	 I	 tried	 to	 get	 an	 understanding	 of	what	 the	 content	 of	 these	
documents	were	in	the	interviews	I	undertook.	And	each	 interview	was	 long	enough	for	 the	
participants	to	relax	and	for	me	to	find	out	what	goes	on	behind	the	scenes.	More	preparation	
work	 was	 done	 beforehand,	 including	 the	 analysis	 of	 documentation	 either	 publically	
available	 (e.g.	 CDM76)	 or	 to	 which	 access	 had	 been	 gained,	 and	 a	 pilot	 interview	with	 one	
																																								 																				
75 The Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development’s overall role in current Chinese research 
development strategies is unique because it still constitutes the dominant basis for all detailed periodical, sectoral and institutional 
sub-plans, programs, funding schemes, priority setting etc. Ibid. 
76 ‘Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)’ (UNFCCC)  <http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html> accessed 2 Jul 2017. 
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company	 involved	 in	 the	 TT	 project	 was	 not	 smooth-going	 but	 helped	 modify	 in	 what	
questions	should	be	asked	and	in	what	way	they	should	be	asked	in	subsequent	interviews.	 	
The	 existing	 literature	 on	 the	 subject	 focuses	 mostly	 at	 a	 general	 level	 on	 the	 nature	 and	
effects	of	environmental	policy	and	IP	law.77	 Most	writers	proceed	by	identifying	IP	protection	
obligations	that	fall	within	the	TRIPS	clauses.78	 Some	focus	on	assessing	the	economic	factors	
that	 explain	 the	 current	 pattern	 of	 emission	 in	 trade.79	 Other	 studies	 focus	 upon	 national	
policy	 and	 international	 frameworks	 and	 have	 not	 addressed	 practical	 issues	 or	 gathered	
information	 about	 individual	 TT	 agreements.80	 Such	 approach	 is	 better	 in	 examining	 the	
nature	 of	 IP	 regime	 and	 the	 framework	 of	 international	 mechanisms.	 However,	 it	 has	 two	
major	 disadvantages	 in	 evaluating	 the	 effects	 of	 IP	 law.	 First,	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 research	
depends	entirely	on	the	legitimate	nature	of	"IP	protection".	The	global	environmental	crisis	
has	become	an	obvious	 challenge	 in	 the	 last	 few	decades	and	climate	change	 technology	 is	
																																								 																				
77 Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips and Ying Chen, ‘China's Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade: Approaches to Measurement 
and Allocating International Responsibility’ (2008) 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 354 edited; See also Bin Shui and 
Robert C. Harriss, ‘The Role of CO2 Embodiment in US–China Trade’ (2006) 34 Energy Policy 4063; Tao Wang and Jim Watson, 
‘Who Owns China’s Carbon Emissions’ (2007) 23 Tyndall Briefing Note. 
78 see Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global 
Public Goods’ in Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman (eds), Maskus and Reichman, International Public Goods and Transfer 
of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University Press 2005) for articles on TRIPS and TT); 
Some authors are sceptical about the positive role of TRIPS in facilitating TT, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement 
Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?’ (2005) International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 227. It is argued that “TRIPS may impede the 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTS) to developing countries.” Alexander Adam, ‘Technology Transfer to 
Combat Climate Change: Opportunities and Obligations under TRIPS and Kyoto’ (2009) 9 J High Tech L 1. Cameron Hutchison 
points out “that countries can take advantage of the flexibilities of TRIPS.” Cameron Hutchison, ‘Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede 
Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing Countries?’ (2006) 3 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 517. 
On the other hand, “while IPR is a hurdle in TT to developing countries, it can be overcome by various means.” Cecily Anne 
O'Regan, ‘Is Intellectual Property a Hurdle for Transferring Technology to Developing Countries-If so, How High or a Hurdle’ 
(2009) 1 Hastings Sci & Tech LJ 1. This footnote was quoted by Krishna Ravi Srinivas, ‘Role of Open Innovafion Models and IPR 
in Technology Transfer in the Context of Climate Change Mifigafion’ Diffusion of renewable energy technologies 
<http://environmentportal.in/files/file/DiffusionRenewableEnergyTechnologies.pdf#page=163> . 
79 Tim Laing and others, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System’ Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy Working Paper No 126, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working 
Paper No 106 (2013) <http://www.academia.edu/download/31211123/WP106-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-system.pdf> 
accessed 23 Aug 2017; Pan, Phillips and Chen (n 77); Tim Everett and others, ‘Economic Growth and the Environment’ Defra 
Evidence and Analysis Series Paper 2 (March 2010) <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23585/1/MPRA_paper_23585.pdf> . 
80 Joel B. Eisen, ‘China's Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership’ (2010) 35 Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol'y Rev 
1; Dong Zhang, ‘2009 Deep Research Report on China Clean Development Mechanism Industry’ 168 Research Group, Sep 30, 
2009 
<https://www.slideshare.net/168report/2009-deep-research-report-on-china-clean-development-mechanism-cdm-industry-5576375> 
accessed 26 Jun 2017. 
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the	 key	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	 issue.	 IP	 related	 to	 climate	 change	 technologies	 forms	 a	
comparatively	new	type	of	 IP	and	 it	 is	questionable	whether	 it	should	be	treated	commonly	
under	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 IP	 protection	 designed	 for	 earlier	 times.	 In	 other	words,	 any	
rule	that	is	designed	for	regulating	green-techs	could	be	treated	differently	from	patents	that	
have	no	direct	contribution	 to	environmental	protection,	as	an	exception	or	granted	special	
privileges.	Thus,	issues	relating	to	ESTs	must	be	discussed	in	a	special	context,	which	shall	be	
understood	 better	 through	 the	 economic	 environment	 as	 well	 as	 companies’	 green	 TT	
behaviour.	 Secondly,	by	 far,	 the	best	 general	picture	of	 the	TT	process	and	 its	environment	
can	be	 generated	 from	economic	 data	 reported	 from	outside	 of	 the	 green	 industry.81	 Such	
literature	 is	 indeed	 making	 drawing	 comprehensive	 conclusions	 from	 all	 relevant	 factors.82	
However,	these	kinds	of	empirical	results	lack	focus	on	the	effects	of	IP	law	in	particular.	This	
research	 recognizes	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 particular	 angle,	 as	 such	 effects	 are	 critical	 in	
directing	 firms	 to	make	 the	 choice	of	 joining	environmental	 projects	or	making	use	of	 their	
IPRs.83	 In	 other	words,	 there	 is	 conjecture	 on	 the	 possible	 effects	 that	 laws	 could	 have	 on	
companies’	 behaviour,	 but	 lack	 of	 research	 to	 identify	 people’s	 real	 understanding	 and	
struggle	with	IP	law,	out	of	which	they	make	decisions.	Therefore,	by	listening	to	real	people	
in	practice,	this	research	will	testify	to	the	contribution	made	by	previous	literatures	in	order	
to	revisit	the	legality,	rationality	and	feasibility	of	the	law.	
																																								 																				
81 Jill Chopyak and Peter Levesque, ‘Public Participation in Science and Technology Decision Making: Trends for the Future’ 
(2002) 24 Technology in Society 155; Howard Rush, John Bessant and Mike Hobday, ‘Assessing the Technological Capabilities of 
Firms: Developing a Policy Tool’ (2007) 37 R&D Management 221; Robert McDonald and George Teather, ‘Science and 
Technology Evaluation Practices in the Government of Canada’ in OECD (ed), Policy Evaluation in Innovation and Technology: 
Towards Best Practices (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1997). 
82 including technical capacity, decision-making ability and governmental policy efficiency. 
83 i.e. file patent application for independent developed technologies, protect competitive advantages by preventing IP 
infringement. 
	 68	
Accordingly,	I	take	firms	in	China	as	the	subject	matter	of	the	research	for	that	“the	country	is	
currently	 the	world’s	biggest	emitter	of	GHGs”84	 and	a	 large	amount	of	CDM	 funding	 flows	
into	the	country	each	year.	This	study	has	selected	eight	Chinese	projects	and	the	researcher	
has	 attempted	 to	 get	 access	 to	 people	 experienced	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 TT	 process.	 By	
interviewing	the	participants,	the	researcher	had	them	provide	oral	 information	on	a	variety	
of	 issues. 85 	 Valuable	 data	 was	 collected	 by	 asking	 pre-provided	 and	 extemporaneous	
questions	 and	 gave	 the	 research	 interesting	 insights	 into	 the	 dynamics	 of	 TT	 processed	 in	
these	 companies.	 According	 to	 scholars,86	 the	 TT	 contracts	 sometimes	 include	 restricting	
clauses	and	other	limitations	to	fulfil	strategic	purpose	of	the	transferor.	Although	I	intended	
to	find	direct	evidence	within	transaction	contracts	demonstrating	the	uneven	distribution	of	
bargaining	power	between	transferor	and	transferee	that	could	have	been	affected	by	the	IP	
laws,	I	was	only	able	to	gather	circumstantial	evidence.	Fortunately,	it	is	enough	to	imply	the	
need	 for	assistance	 for	Chinese	companies	 in	 respect	 to	contract	bargaining	and	minimizing	
the	abuse	of	IPRs	in	TT.	Such	information	is	not	currently	available	from	the	existing	literature,	
especially	 data	 that	 reveals	 individual	 employees	 and	 officers’	 understanding	 and	 feelings	
about	 IP	regulation	on	green-tech.	Although	 in	 this	 research	only	 the	receiver-half	of	 the	TT	
chain	 is	 studied,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 deduce	 some	 actions	 that	 reflect	 the	 considerations	 of	
transferors.	 	
																																								 																				
84 John Vidal and David Adam, ‘China Overtakes US as World’s Biggest CO2 Emitter’ (The Guardian, 19 June 2007)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews> accessed 14 Aug 2017 
85 for example on what kind of technology is actually transferred, in what form is it transferred, the price and quality of those 
technologies, what procedures the TT had gone through, and were there any clauses that would hinder future TT to China or 
impede following replication and innovation. See detail in Appendix I. 
86 Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri and Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate 
Strategy (MIT Press 2004); Nagesh Kumar, Globalization, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfers: Impacts on and 
Prospects for Developing Countries (Routledge 2003). 
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2.4.2 Population 
In	 getting	 close	 to	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 IP	 under	 TRIPS	 requirements	 on	
international	green	TT	flows,	the	primary	focus	is	on	firms	that	have	engaged	in CDM	or	GEF	
projects.87	 Several	 related	 considerations	 support	 this	 choice.	 Some scholars88 have showed 
great confidence in these mechanisms because they	 are	 innovative	 instruments	 providing	
platforms	for	achieving	committed	reduction	goals.	The	research	thus	approached	informants	
from	those	entities	involved	with	CDM	projects	for	interviews.	 	
The	research	is	intended	to	target	companies	that	have	participated	in	CDM	projects	so	that	
we	can	 investigate	TT	 in	practice.	Up	until	 the	19th	of	December	2012,	4,971	CDM	projects	
were	hosted	in	China.	980	projects	already	have	CER	Issuance,89	 which	means	that	more	than	
980	Chinese	firms	have	experiences	with	CDM.	Eight	of	these	companies’	CDM	projects	were	
selected	 for	 study	 and	each	of	 them	was	 launched	between	2006	and	2012.90	 Firstly,	 eight	
companies	 will	 be	 analyzed	 in-depth,	 including	 the	 real	 process	 and	 dynamic	 between	
transferors	and	transferees	as	well	as	understanding	the	expectations	pertaining	to	IP	and	TT	
from	 company	 staff.	We	expect	 data	 obtained	 from	 these	 sources	 to	 be	much	more	useful	
than	 that	 obtained	 from	 a	 broader	 type	 of	 survey.	 Therefore,	 the	 research	 only	 involves	 a	
																																								 																				
87 Although GEF is a mechanism with equal importance, it does not have as many projects as CDM has in China. Moreover, after 
further research into these projects, it was discovered that most GEF projects are less straightforward for the purpose of this 
research, as each GEF project usually involves more than one host company, and in most cases they are located in different 
provinces. That means that one project is operating simultaneously in different provinces with different political conditions. The 
experience of individuals may vary due to this policy difference, making our analysis difficult. Although a cross-province project 
might offer a more comprehensive view (i.e. considering the complexity caused by schemes being undertaken in different 
provinces), it creates greater practical difficulties in obtaining information for the researcher. Conducting research with companies 
outside of Shandong requires a wider social network and much more funding (e.g. for travel expenses), which is rather impractical. 
Consequently, the research will use data collected from CDM projects in Shandong alone. 
88 Zhang (n 80). 
89 “It is important for a project to get CER issuance, The clean development mechanism (CDM) allows emission-reduction projects 
in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can 
be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol.” What is the CDM’ (UNFCCC website)  <http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html> accessed 25th Sep 2012; for more 
detail see chapter IV discussion on the CDM mechanism. 
90 According to Project Design Documents (PDD) available from UNFCCC website 
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limited	 number	 of	 companies	 and	 carefully	 selected	 interviewees	 who	 were	 willing	 to	
cooperate	with	their	time	and	patience.	All	of	them	are	located	in	Shandong	Province	as	it	is	
geographically	 easier	 for	 gaining	 access	 to	 relevant	 individuals.	 Secondly,	 the	 researcher	
secured	 approval	 from	 the	 provincial	 DRC91	 to	 launch	 the	 research,92	 and	 such	 approval	
enabled	the	author	to	get	access	to	the	interviewees.	Thirdly,	the	province	ranks	first	among	
other	Chinese	provinces	in	the	production	of	a	variety	of	products	and	it	 is	one	of	the	richer	
provinces	of	China.	Shandong	 is	one	of	the	biggest	 industrial	areas93	 in	China	and	 it	 is	quite	
actively	 involved	 in	 emission	 reduction	 activities,	 including	 CDM	 projects.94	 Structurally,	
energy	 consumption	 in	 Shandong	 Province	 is	 dominated	 by	 energy-intensive	 heavy	
industries.95	 That	 means	 that	 it	 has	 great	 potential	 in	 emission	 reduction	 activities	 and	
enough	data	about	absorbing	energy	technology	available.	The	eight	firms	were	approached	
and	 three	of	 them	directly	gave	 their	consent	 to	participate	 in	 the	 research.	The	researcher	
then	 used	 government	 contacts	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 and	 successfully	 persuaded	 the	 rest	 to	
participate.	All	eight	companies	claimed	 in	Project	Design	Documents	 (PDDs)	 that	 they	have	
participated	in	CDM	projects	involved	with	international	TT.	
Pathways	for	TT	vary	according	to	sectors,	 types	technology,	how	mature	 is	 that	technology	
and	 political	 environment	 of	 the	 receiver-country.	 Given	 this	 variety	 and	 complexity,	 the	
																																								 																				
91 The National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic of China (NDRC), is a macroeconomic 
management agency under the Chinese State Council. It has great planning control over the Chinese economy on almost every 
important industry sector. The provincial development and reform commission reports to the provincial government as well as the 
national DRC. By gathering local statistics and studying provincial economy, it helps the national DRC formulating policies 
regarding China's economic system. It is virtually one of the most important departments of government. 
92 This approval letter can be used at a recommendation reference when approaching the firms as the provincial government as 
strong power over those firms and public authority equipped the researcher with a proof of good faith and reliability. 
93 Shandong Statistics Bureau, Shandong Statistics Yearbook (Beijing: Chinese Statistics Press 2009 and 2010). 
94 By 2008, ADB’s energy sector had given to China “non-lending support of about $50 million has evolved from tariff reforms, 
sector restructuring, establishment of the electricity regulator, and mainstreaming environment evaluation, to innovative 
technologies and mechanisms in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and to capacity building for CDM.” Allan Zhang, ESD 
China Limited and People’s Republic of China Shanghai, PRC: Energy Efficiency and Emission Reduction Project in Shandong 
Province (Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report TA 7295, Asian Development Bank, 19 April 2011). 
95 See ibid 
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research	 involves	 the	 study	 of	 eight	 projects,	 and	 they	 can	 be	 roughly	 divided	 into	
sub-categories:	 wind	 power	 and	 biomass	 (there	 is	 only	 one	 project	 related	 to	 fluoride	
chemical	 decomposition).	 Generally,	 according	 to	 a	 UNFCCC	 report, 96 	 factors	 such	 as	
agriculture,	 Hydrofluorocarbons	 (HFC)97	 and	 wind	 energy	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 involve	 TT	 in	
projects.	Conversely,	biomass,98	 […]	and	transport	projects	are	less	likely	to	involve	TT.99	 For	
example,	 in	 the	 wind	 sector,	 about	 18	 GW	 of	 installed	 capacity	 is	 seen	 in	 2011.	 This	 has	
indicated	 an	 opportunity	 for	 wind	 power	 manufacturers	 to	 expand	 globally.	 Despite	 most	
wind	facilities	being	locally	built	and	credited	as	a	local	industry,	in	practice,	production	relies	
mostly	 on	 technology	 transferred	 from	 Western	 countries.	 An	 illustrative	 example	 is	
technology	 transferred	 in	 manufacturing	 bearings:	 a	 prevailing	 problem	 for	 wind	 turbine	
manufacturers	 is	 the	production	of	quality	bearings	–	 the	wheels	at	 the	back	of	 the	 turbine	
that	enable	it	to	turn.	This	patented	technology	is	still	controlled	by	foreign	investors.100	 But	
wind	 power	 projects	 are	 still	 considered	 as	 “easy	 projects”	 because	 the	 technology	
transferred	largely	falls	into	a	form	of	equipment	selling.	The	declining	rate	of	TT	for	the	most	
common	project	type	(wind	project)	in	China	also	indicates	a	TT	“beyond	the	individual	CDM	
projects	that	allows	later	projects	to	rely	more	on	local	knowledge	and	equipment.”101	 While	
																																								 																				
96 Stephen Seres, Erik Haites and Kevin Murphy, ‘Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects: An Update’ (2009) 37 
Energy Policy 4919 
97 “Hydrofluorocarbons, commonly used in refrigerators and air conditioning systems, could add 0.5C to global temperatures by 
the end of the century.” Oliver Milman, ‘100 countries push to phase out potentially disastrous greenhouse gas’ (The Guardian, 
22nd September, 2016)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/22/100-countries-phase-out-hydrofluorocarbons-greenhouse-gas> accessed 
December 2016. 
98 “Biomass is biological material derived from living, or recently living organisms. In the context of biomass for energy this is 
often used to mean plant based material, but biomass can equally apply to both animal and vegetable derived material. 
Biomass-derived energy holds the promise of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, a significant contributor to global warming, as 
carbon dioxide acts as a “greenhouse” gas by trapping heat absorbed by the earth from the sun. Although the burning of biomass 
energy releases as much carbon dioxide as fossil fuels, biomass burning does not release “new carbon” into the atmosphere while 
burning fossil fuels does.” NREL, ‘Biomass Energy Basics’ (NREL)  <http://www.nrel.gov/learning/re_biomass.html> accessed 
2017-June-15. 
99 Seres (n 19). 
100 Key players include those from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the US. 
101 Seres (n 19). 
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more	wind	projects	established,	a	declining	rates	of	TT	starts	to	show	over	time,	yet	biomass	
showed	 no	 such	 trend.	 This	 suggests	 that	 modern	 biomass	 technology	 in	 China	 remains	
immature	and	has	to	depend	on	international	transaction	or	technologies	derived	abroad.102	
For	 this	 reason,	 I	 included	 biomass	 projects	 as	 a	 comparative	 group	 to	 the	 study	 in	 wind	
projects.	 A	 rapid	 growth	 in	 biomass	 energy	 sector	 is	 also	 discovered	 due	 to	 favourable	
policies.103	 This	indicated	that	the	selected	types	of	industry	were	not	hindered	by	economic	
policy	resistance.	Therefore,	having	them	as	the	subject	of	selected	projects	will	enable	us	to	
exclude	barriers	created	by	a	restraining	policy	environment.104	 	
2.4.3 Sampling 
The	 informants	 (samples)	of	 this	 research	 include	people	 from	all	 relevant	 key	 categories105	
of	 the	 recipient	 party	 of	 the	 TT.	As	 the	 study	 concerns	 the	 views	of	 technology	 transferees	
towards	the	current	 IP	system	in	China,	the	sample	includes	a	range	of	technicians,	 lawyers,	
company	 managers,	 and	 decision-makers	 outside	 of	 the	 transferee	 company	 (e.g.	 local	
government	officials)	in	order	to	capture	a	full	range	of	views	among	a	recipient	enterprise.	A	
similar	approach	has	been	employed	successfully	 in	other	socio-legal	 researches.106	 There	 is	
an	obvious	model	in	the	Texas	research	for	this	approach,	and	it	has	worked	for	analyzing	the	
effect	that	patent	laws	have	on	small	software	firms’	behaviour.107	 That	research	studied	the	
role	 of	 IP	 in	 the	 software	 industry.	 Relying	 on	 interviews	 that	 Mann	 conducted,	 and	 on	
																																								 																				
102 Li Jingjing and others, ‘Biomass Energy in China and Its Potential’ (2001) 5 Energy for Sustainable Development 66. 
103 Detail of these policies will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
104 More detail will be seen in Chapter. VI. 
105 , The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (n 48) p.934. 
106 For example, if the research concerns the views of legal professionals, the sample may include a certain number of judges, a 
certain number of advocates, and a certain number of transactional lawyers in order to capture a full range of views among legal 
professionals. Perhaps the best-known contemporary example of how qualitative social scientific research may have practical 
organizational applications is the analysis on five qualitative studies of apprenticeships. Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated 
Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge University Press 1991).  
107 Mann (n 62). 
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publicly	 available	 information,	 he	 showed	 that	 “the	 development	 of	 young	 firms	 in	 the	
software	 industry	 is	 not	 significantly	 constrained	 by	 large	 patent	 portfolios	 in	 the	 hands	 of	
incumbent	 firms.”108	 Malloy	 and	 Sinsheimer’s109	 research	 similarly	 gathered	 information	
through	 a	 series	 of	 semi-structured	 interviews	 to	 collect	 data	 from	 equipment	 vendors,	
professional	 cleaners,	 and	 government	 officials	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 local	 energy	 industry.	
Opinions	 from	 these	 three	 types	 of	 interviewees	 comprise	 a	 comprehensive	 view	 of	 the	
impact	that	patent	laws	in	Los	Angeles	have	on	the	innovation	activities	of	firms.	The	survey	
specifically	assessed	the	attitudes	of	dry-cleaners	towards	technology	choice	affected	by	the	
law.110	 	
My	 research	 selects	 four	 different	 categories	 of	 people	 respectively:	 from	 Chinese	 firms’	
technology	department,	 legal	department	 (or	external	 lawyer),	managerial	department,	and	
local	government.	I	approached	at	least	two	persons	from	departments	of	each	targeted	firm	
and	one	from	the	local	government	to	participate	in	interviews.111	 This	is	to	ensure	that	there	
is	 feedback	 from	most	 important	 individuals	 involved	 in	 the	 TT	process.112	 Employees	 from	
the	technology	department	will	be	expert	in	assessing,	implementing	and,	they	are	beneficial	
as	 interviewees	due	to	their	knowledge	and	 information	directly	gained	from	their	 technical	
practices.	 Lawyers	 are	 clearer	 with	 licences,	 limitations	 and	 restrictions	 contend	 in	 TT	
contracts	 and	 preparing	 legal	 documents	 in	 project	 application.	 People	 from	 managerial	
																																								 																				
108 Ibid. 
109 Malloy and Sinsheimer (n 57). 
110 “Topics covered in the survey included: experience as a professional cleaner, familiarity of different garment care technologies, 
knowledge of professional wet cleaning, factors influencing a decision to purchase professional wet clean equipment, and interest 
in programs which would reduce the cost of purchasing wet clean equipment.” Ibid (n 57). 
111 In case there is no legal department in the company. 
112 namely assessment, transfer contract, implementation, evaluation and adjustment, and replication. See Charikleia Karakosta, 
Haris Doukas and John Psarras, ‘Technology transfer through climate change: Setting a sustainable energy pattern’ (2010) 14 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1546. 
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positions	are	more	experienced	with	difficulties	 in	agreement	bargaining	and	administrative	
procedures	 in	 preparation	 for	 TT,	 and	 they	 have	 decisive	 power	 over	 selecting	 appropriate	
technology	 and	 over	 replication	 of	 the	 technology	 absorbed	 afterwards.	 Interviewees	 from	
local	government	undoubtedly	have	a	broader	view	of	the	development	of	the	industry	in	the	
local	area,	and	their	opinions	are	especially	crucial	regarding	starting	up	a	project	and	offering	
favourable	policies	to	attract	TT.	Analysis	of	the	views	from	different	departments	will	give	a	
comprehensive	 understanding	of	 the	 TT	 process	 and	 a	 realistic	 view	of	 the	 role	 that	 IP	 law	
played	 at	 the	 firm	 level.	 According	 to	 the	 bottom-up113	 operating	 model	 of	 CDM,	 most	
projects	are	initiated	by	the	private	sector.	So	any	factor	that	would	influence	individual	firms’	
in	 their	TT	action	will	ultimately	 result	 in	a	declining	TT	 trend	at	 large.	 In	other	words,	each	
one	 of	 the	 practitioners	 in	 the	 field	 will	 be	 part	 of	 an	 enterprise’s	 motivations,	 fears	 and	
strategy.	And	all	of	 them	are	accountable	 for	a	potentially	successful	project.	This	has	given	
strong	grounds	for	conducting	an	in-depth	study	of	individual	enterprises.	
In	addition,	the	researcher	also	employs	a	snowball	sampling	technique,114	 meaning	that	she	
began	with	some	participants	recruited	in	the	first	place;	in	particular,	interviewees	from	the	
firms	 identified.	 She	 then	 asked	 them	 to	 provide,	 if	 agreed,	 details	 of	 someone	 else	whom	
they	consider	to	be	a	good	participant	for	the	purposes	of	the	study.	The	nominated	person	
would	 be	 classified	 within	 one	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 groups,	 or	 placed	 in	 an	 additional	
reference	class.115	 The	benefit	of	this	kind	of	sampling	method	enables	the	researcher	to	get	
																																								 																				
113 Kevin A. Baumert, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism: Understanding Additionality’ The Clean Development Mechanism 
Draft Working Paper <https://www.scribd.com/document/249159556/CDM-Understanding-Additionality> accessed 21 Aug 2017 
114 Patton describes this as “purposeful sampling” (2002:45). See Jan E. Trost, ‘Statistically Nonrepresentative Stratified Sampling: 
A Sampling Technique for Qualitative Studies’ (1986) 9 Qualitative Sociology 54. 
115 For example if the nominated person is from domestic “like-technology” providers they have considered, lawyers they 
employed during the project or institutions/government department they have contacted to get approvals. 
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access	to	technical	experts,	outside	consultants	and	business	partners	who	also	had	detailed	
experience	 in	 the	 TT	 process.	 And	 in	 that	 way	 she	 built	 up	 a	 slightly	 larger	 but	 more	
comprehensive	sample	of	participants.	The	weakness	of	this	approach	is	that	it	contains	many	
uncertainties,	not	only	in	regard	to	the	number	of	interviewees	but	also	due	to	confidentiality	
issues.116	 This	 is	due	to	the	fact	that	most	of	the	nominated	interviewees	specialize	 in	fields	
directly	 related	 to	 a	 company’s	 trade	 secrets	 or	 a	 governmental	 department’s	 confidential	
works.	 Fortunately,	 at	 the	end	of	 field	work	 the	 researcher	managed	 to	 seek	out	two	other	
key	 people	 that	 were	 likely	 to	 provide	 richer	 sources	 of	 information	 or	 data	 based	 on	 the	
recommendations	of	people	interviewed.	 	
Although	 eight	 is	 not	 a	 large	 sample	 in	 comparison	 with	 thousands	 of	 climate	 change	 TT	
projects	established	under	or	outside	CDM,	Shandong	is	a	representative	province	in	terms	of	
not	 only	 size	 and	 population	 but	 also	 its	 level	 of	 development	 in	 both	 revenue	 and	
technology.	 For	 example,	 the	 selected	 samples	 included	 the	 very	 first	 biomass	 electricity	
generation	 TT	 project	 and	 also	 those	 ones	 that	 are	 still	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 process.	 The	
interviewees	are	very	representative	samples	of	practitioners	in	the	Chinese	biomass	industry	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 experience	 and	 knowledge.	 Their	 views	 are	 down-to-earth,	 authentic	 and	
valuable.	
2.4.4 Interviews 
A	company's	 technology	absorption117	 and	 its	 response	to	regulations	and	policies	 intended	
to	shape	the	TT	behaviour.	Moreover,	technology	choice	is	also	influenced	by	practitioners	in	
																																								 																				
116 for that it shall not against a nominated person’s will to be referred to or accessed by interviewers. 
117 Technology absorption describes the ability to understand, deploy and improve upon the imported technology. Sanjaya Lall, 
Learning to Industrialize: The Acquisition of Technological Capability by India (Springer 1987). 
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the	industry;118	 by	the	firm's	internal	structure;119	 and	its	intention	in	attracting	TT.120	 Thus,	
any	law	reform	seeking	to	encourage	climate	change	TT	in	a	given	industry	sector	must	fully	
understand	 the	process	of	 TT	 in	practice	 and	how	each	 relative	 actors	 affects	 it.	 Policy	 and	
regulation	designed	without	this	understanding	will	often	fail	to	produce	the	outcome	it	seeks	
in	the	first	place.121	
“Interviews,	 of	 course,	 hold	 no	monopoly	 over	 interpretive	 practice.	 Nor	 are	 they	 the	 only	
occasions	when	 subjects	and	 their	opinions,	emotions,	 and	 reports	are	 socially	 constructed.	
[…]	 but	 interviews	 expressly	 put	 whats	 and	 hows	 of	 interpretive	 practice	 to	 work.”122	
Qualitative	 interviewing	 is	 better	 at	 providing	 the	 opportunity	 to	 “collect	 and	 rigorously	
examine	 narrative	 accounts	 of	 social	 worlds.”123	 Many	 socio-legal	 studies	 thus	 rely	 on	
interviews	 and/or	 documentary	 evidence.124	 However,	 any	 effort	 to	 address	 the	 relation	
between	IP	and	TT	must	proceed	with	modest	goals.	It	 is	not	plausible	to	expect	impeccable	
evidence	comprehensively	enough	to	determine	whether	strengthened	IP	protection	cause	a	
higher	 TT	 rate	 in	 an	 industry	 to	 an	 absolute	 level.	 Thus,	my	 goal	 is	 only	 to	provide	 a	 richer	
understanding	 of	 the	 possible	 effects	 that	 current	 IP	 protection	 under	 the	 requirement	 of	
TRIPS	might	have	on	climate	change	TT.	Using	this	mixed	methodology,	I	can	only	rely	on	what	
																																								 																				
118 Such as suppliers, customers, and competitors; and by external social and legal factors like patent registration polices, project 
application procedures, industry standards and environmental protection requirement. 
119 Such as internal research and development funding policies. 
120 Imitation or concerns about the climate. 
121 Malloy and Sinsheimer (n 57). 
122 James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, ‘The Active Interview’ in David Silverman (ed), Qualitative Research: Theory, 
Method and Practice (Sage 2004). 
123 Jean M. Converse and Howard Schuman, Conversations at Random (Wiley 1974). 
124 analysis ("White Collar Crime" studies, see for example Peter Cleary Yeager, The Limits of Law: The Public Regulation of 
Private Pollution (Cambridge University Press 1993); Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Law and American Business: Dilemmas 
of Compliance (Springer Science & Business Media 1986); Diane Vaughan, Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior: Social 
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Illegal Corporate Behavior (US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1979); Renate Mayntz and Eberhard Bohne, Vollzugsprobleme der Umweltpolitik: empir. 
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we	should	expect	from	the	law	and	interpretations	that	are	consistent	with	limited	accessible	
events	"on	the	ground."	I	cannot	hope	to	provide	a	definitive	account	of	the	effects	of	IP	law	
on	TT.125	 Although	the	number	of	30	interviews	conducted	by	this	research	seems	to	be	small	
in	 comparison	 with	 the	 size	 of	 the	 population,	 they	 are	 practitioners	 with	 strong	
representation	 in	 the	 industry.	 An	 intensive	 interview	“permits	an	 in-depth	exploration	of	a	
particular	topic	with	a	person	who	has	had	the	relevant	experiences.”126	 In	accordance	with	
this	research,	 informants	are	gathered	 from	a	group	of	 selected	companies	actively	 running	
businesses	 in	 the	 green	 energy	 sector	 and,	 based	 on	 their	 experiences,	 the	 interviewees	
provide	 in-depth	 insights	 on	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 TT	 to	 Chinese	 wind	 and	 biomass	 energy	
generation.	A	sample	 is	adequate	as	 it	 is	precisely	selected	for	studying	small-scale	research	
projects.127	 Precedents	 can	be	 found	 in	 some	of	 the	 reviewed	studies,	which	have	 involved	
only	20	 to	60	 interviewees.128	 Therefore,	 I	primarily	assume	that	30	 informants	will	provide	
enough	data	 to	 be	 analyzed.	 This	 is	 not	 because	 the	 number	 has	 credibility	 because	 it	was	
statistically	significant,	given	the	size	of	the	population,	but	because	it	would	provide	in-depth	
information	 contributing	 to	 a	 deep	 understanding	 of	 IP	 influence	 over	 TT.	 The	 data	 from	
interviews	 are	 generally	 rich	 in	 quality,	 and	 can	 be	 studied	 by	 identifying	 the	 phenomenon	
and	bringing	it	to	life	through	the	interpretative	skills	of	the	researcher.129	 	
In	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 sampling,	 I	 intended	 to	 invite	 at	 least	 three	 informants	 from	 each	
company,	 ideal	 one	 from	 the	 three	 different	 departments	 of	 a	 company	 and	 one	 from	 the	
																																								 																				
125 Texas law review  
126 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (Sage 2014) quoted by Liana Müller, Theoretical and Practical Challenges 
using Qualitative Interviews as Data Gathering (2013). 
127 A good guide for small-scale research 
128 For example, Mann (n 62); Chang and Bruyninckx (n 64); Wang (n 71); Fan, Christmann-Budian and Seus (n 74). 
129 Consumer Correspondent, Susan Quilliam and Shelley Mehigan, ‘Faculty Awards’ (2008) 34 Journal of Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Care 206. 
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local	government.	In	fact,	eight	identified	firms	had	provided	at	only	28	interviewees,	for	four	
of	 them	 have	 no	 legal	 department	 or	 a	 person	 in	 charge	 of	 CDM	 project	 available	 for	
interview.	In	stage	two	of	sampling,	two	more	interviewees	were	nominated	with	one	working	
for	 a	well-known	 consultant	 company	 in	 the	 industry	 –	 the	 Electric	 Power	Design	 Institute,	
and	another	working	 in	the	R&D	department	of	a	world	 leading	wind	turbine	manufacturer.	
Each	 interview	 was	 intended	 to	 take	 one	 hour	 with	 fewer	 than	 seven	 broad	 questions	 to	
eliminate	 the	 sense	 of	 tension	 that	 comes	with	 being	 interviewed;	 these	were	 followed	 by	
proper	 open-ended	 questions	 to	 promote	 discussion	 with	 the	 interviewees.	 It	 took	
significantly	 longer	 time	 (than	 the	 interviews)	 to	 transcribe	 the	 interviews	 for	 subsequent	
analysis.	
As	long	as	rich	information	is	gathered	and	it	sufficiently	reflects	the	effect	that	IP	law	has	on	
climate	 change	 TT,	 the	 rather	 small	 number	 of	 interviewees	 should	 not	 be	 a	 big	 issue	 for	
conducting	the	research.	In	addition,	the	choice	of	sample	is	based	on	practical	issues	such	as	
cost,	which	justify	choosing	Shandong	Province	(the	researcher’s	home	province)	as	the	site	of	
the	sample.	And	as	 the	“push”	side	of	 the	 transaction	will	not	be	addressed	 in	 this	study,	 it	
was	not	necessary	to	interview	transferor	companies.	
2.4.5 Access 
This	 research	 sought	 access	 initially	 through	 e-invitation	 letters	 sent130	 to	 the	 identified	
companies,	and	the	responses	turned	out	to	be	unsatisfactory.	The	use	of	emails	proved	to	be	
highly	 unproductive	 and	 no	 companies	 committed	 to	 the	 project	 by	 email.	 Therefore,	 I	
decided	to	use	personal	contacts	to	get	 in	touch	with	the	companies.	Only	three	companies	
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were	 interested	 in	 participating	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 I	 then	 also	made	 use	 of	 third	 parties,	 in	
particular	I	approached	the	Shandong	Provincial	DRC	to	get	approval	and	a	recommendation	
letter	 to	 promote	 my	 research.	 An	 approval	 letter	 was	 issued131	 and	 a	 scanned	 version	 is	
available	to	be	printed.	This	provided	a	positive	impetus	for	pursuing	access	to	the	remaining	
five	companies,	and	nominated	people,	as	the	commission	plays	is	an	important	authority	in	
both	industry	and	local	government.	Later	on,	I	contacted	the	selected	companies	tentatively	
in	person,	 to	 give	 them	confidence	 in	 the	 research	and	 show	my	 good	will.	 This	 included	 a	
travelling	to	China	in	the	second	year	of	the	PhD	programme.	
Nevertheless,	 difficulties	 occurred	 when	 getting	 access	 to	 interviewees.	 The	 very	 first	
interviewee	 was	 a	 manager	 from	 a	 biomass	 energy	 station.	 A	 local	 governmental	 officer	
introduced	the	research	and	me	to	the	manager.	Although	an	invitation	letter	explaining	my	
purpose,	along	with	a	consent	form	and	a	list	of	interview	questions	were	sent	to	him	a	week	
before	 the	 pilot	 interview,	 the	 interviewee	 showed	 great	 hesitation	 in	 answering	 questions	
straightforwardly.	 It	 is	 a	 known	 fact	 that	 before	 an	 interview,	 some	 interviewees	 may	 be	
unwilling	to	cooperate	with	researchers:	it	may	be	hard	to	fix	an	agreed	time;	or	people	may	
be	slow	to	reply;	there	may	be	a	fear	of	authorities	and	anxiety	about	potential	commercial	
confidentiality	 issues.	 And	 this	 is	 why	 a	 confidentiality	 agreement	 was	 provided	 for	 the	
interviewee	 beforehand.	 But	 the	 actual	 result	 of	 the	 first	 meeting	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
surprisingly	 disappointing.	 For	 example,	my	 expectation	was	 to	have	 access	 to	 the	 contract	
signed	during	the	TT	project,	and	to	be	able	to	ask	questions	about	the	details	of	the	business	
(such	as	profits	and	rates	of	return	on	 investment),	but	 instead	the	 interviewee	did	not	give	
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me	permission	 to	 look	at	 the	agreement	nor	did	he	answer	 the	questions	directly.	 This	 is	 a	
challenge	 for	 all	 qualitative	 research.	 It	 requires	 the	 researcher	 to	 be	 “a	 master	 of	
dramaturgy”	 and	 he	 or	 she	 “should	 be	 able	 to	 create	 the	 right	 atmosphere	 for	 the	
interview”.132	 In	my	case,	although	I	planned	ahead	and	chose	the	interviewee’s	office	as	the	
best	place	to	make	him	feel	comfortable,	according	to	the	interviewee,	he	and	his	colleagues	
were	 “not	 used	 to	 signing	 official	 documents	 which	 seem	 fearful.”	 Therefore,	 this	 access	
approach	was	revised	after	the	pilot	interview.	Printed	paperwork	was	then	presented	during	
interviews	rather	than	before.	Only	after	the	interviewer	explained	the	aims	and	methods	of	
the	research	and	the	rights	of	the	participants	orally,	a	consent	form	was	casually	and	politely	
handed	to	the	interviewees	for	signature.	And	after	interviews	when	the	interviewee	knew	for	
sure	that	any	information	released	was	appropriate	they	were	allowed	to	check	the	consent	
forms	again.	I	did	not	repeat	my	request	for	access	to	the	TT	agreement	but	used	questions	to	
get	information	about	contractual	limitations.	Such	revisions	proved	to	be	significantly	helpful	
for	 the	 remaining	 interviews	 and	 there	 was	 no	 subsequent	 hesitation	 like	 that	 in	 the	 pilot	
interview.	
During	four	months	of	preparation	and	practical	work	conducted	by	the	researcher	in	China,	
all	 eight	 companies	 she	 intended	 to	 target	 were	 visited,	 and	 30	 people	 in	 total	 were	
interviewed.	Such	a	number	 included	interviews	with	 individuals	who	work	for	the	company	
(including	technical	directors,	plant	managers,	CDM	project	managers	and	in-house	lawyers);	
people	 who	 directly	 influence	 decision-making	 within	 the	 company	 (government	 officer	 in	
relation	 to	energy	 industry);	 as	well	 as	 those	who	could	provide	background	 information	 to	
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Müller (n 126). 
	 81	
the	use	of	TT	and	 IPR	 issues	 in	China.133	 The	number	of	 interviews	actually	undertaken	was	
fewer	 than	 expected.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 people	 did	 not	 nominate	 potential	
interviewees	outside	their	company.	For	example,	most	companies	have	no	independent	legal	
department	and	they	claimed	to	have	had	no	involvement	with	any	IP	disputes	so	far,	so	they	
were	not	able	to	refer	us	to	a	lawyer	helping	them	with	their	contract.	
2.4.6 Semi-structured interviews  
Semi-structured	interviews	“in	which	the	interviewer	sets	up	a	general	structure	by	deciding	
in	advance	the	ground	to	be	covered	and	the	main	questions	to	be	asked”134	 will	be	used	in	
this	research.	The	questions	asked	are	open-ended	rather	than	closed,	with	a	core	of	standard	
questions	that	may	be	expanded	upon	to	explore	a	given	response	in	greater	depth	during	the	
interviews.	 It	means	 that	extemporaneous	questions	can	be	added	to	standard	questions	at	
any	 time	when	some	 interesting	or	unexpected	 topics	 show	up	during	 interviews.	The	need	
for	 extemporaneous	 questions	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 interviewer	 does	 not	 know	 what	
information	 the	 interviewees	 will	 possess	 and	 what	 they	 may	 reveal.	 Extemporaneously	
formulated	 questions	 are	 to	 discover	 more	 crucial	 information	 based	 on	 interviewees’	
voluntary	 elaborations.	 However,	 their	 benefits	 could	 be	 outweighed	 by	 two	 major	
disadvantages.	 “First,	 data	 from	 the	 follow-up	 questions	 are	 difficult	 to	 interpret	 because	
different	 participants	 are	 asked	 different	 questions.”135	 It	 is	 made	 difficult	 to	 compare	 or	
generalize	common	issues	from	answers	responding	to	different	questions.	“Second,	even	the	
answers	for	the	standard	questions	are	difficult	 to	 interpret	because	the	standard	questions	
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engineering corporation. 
134 Eric Drever, Using Semi-Structured Interviews in Small-Scale Research. A Teacher's Guide (ERIC 1995). 
135 Mark L. Mitchell and Janina M. Jolley, Research Design Explained (Cengage Learning 2012) p.302. 
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were	not	asked	in	the	same	standard	way	to	all	participants	the	interviewer	may	affect	what	
participants	 say	 in	 response	 to	 the	 standard	questions.”136	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 carefully	
decide	 which	 answers	 to	 probe	 and	 how	 to	 probe	 them	 by	 designing	 proper	 questions.	
Regardless	 of	 the	 disadvantages,	 “a	 semi-structured	 qualitative	 interview	 is	 more	 like	 a	
‘guided	 conversation’	with	 a	 purpose.	 Themes	 are	 explored	 using	 open-ended	 questions	 to	
elicit	 a	 response	 from	 the	 interviewee	 in	 their	own	words.”137	 The	 loose	way	of	 structuring	
interview	 questions	 enables	 the	 interviewer	 to	 divert	 from	 any	 comment	 made	 by	 the	
interviewee	 for	 more	 details	 at	 each	 time.138	 Semi-structured	 interviews	 are	 used	 in	 this	
research	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	 it	 is	difficult	to	get	 information	to	ascertain	what	to	
ask	 at	 a	 preliminary	 stage	 in	 terms	 of	 IP-related	 procedures	 and	 TT	 contract	 negotiation	
because	 such	 information	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 confidential	 by	 companies.	 Therefore,	
semi-structured	 pilot	 interviews	 or	 discussions	may	 provide	 some	 ideas	 for	 other	 questions	
that	 could	 be	 used	 in	 later	 interviews.	 Second,	 from	 the	 data	 collected	 from	 the	 follow-up	
questions,	 the	 researcher	 should	 get	 inspiration	 that	 will	 help	 in	 conducting	 the	 theory.	 A	
third	 reason	 is	 that	 experiences	 vary	 among	 interviewees	 according	 to	 their	 different	
company	 positions.	 This	 is	meaningful	 to	 identify	 the	 different	 perceptions	 of	 each	 type	 of	
interviewee,	 based	on	 the	way	 they	 provide	 information.	 This	 is	 also	 the	 reason	why	 some	
questions	 are	 asked	 in	 one	 set	 of	 questions	 and	 others	 are	 not	 in	 particular	 interviews.139	
Therefore,	 the	 same	semi-structured	standard	 interview	questions	will	not	be	used	for	each	
																																								 																				
136 Ibid. 
137 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (SAGE Publications, inc 1990) p.295. 
138 Nicky Britten, ‘Qualitative Research: Qualitative Interviews in Medical Research’ (1995) 311 BMJ 251; See also Edwin van 
Teijlingen and Karen Forrest, ‘The range of qualitative research methods in family planning and reproductive health care’ (2004) 
30 Journal of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care 171. 
139 Teijlingen and Forrest (n 138) 
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type	of	interviewee.140	 This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	not	all	interviewees	understand	IP	issues	or	
understand	 them	 in	 the	 same	 way,	 especially	 technicians.	 Their	 perception	 of	 IP	 law	 may	
depend	on	second-hand	experience	(e.g.	the	responses	of	their	manager).	Certain	questions	
are	designed	to	identify	levels	of	understanding.141	 	
Mechanisms	under	international	regulatory	framework	for	enforcing	environmental	standards	
are	 of	 equal	 importance	 with	 environmental	 legislation	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 TT	 context,	
first-hand	experience	from	practitioners	provides	more	convincing	data	in	understanding	the	
rationality	 of	 current	 legislation	 and	 the	 efficiency	 of	 available	mechanisms.	 The	 responses	
from	 the	 interviewees	 are	 likely	 to	 show	 that	 IP	 does	 affect	 TT	 in	 an	 indirect	 way,	 and	 to	
identify	 how	 influential	 this	 is	 in	 the	 factors	 that	 determine	 firms’	 engagement	with	 the	 TT	
process.	 One	 of	 the	 aims	 of	 including	 firm-level	 study	 in	 my	 research	 is	 therefore	 to	
demonstrate	 the	 distinctive	 problems	 and	 special	 opportunities	 that	 practitioners	 and	
implementers	are	likely	to	encounter	in	dealing	with	climate	change	TT.	 	
2.4.7 Data recording and analysis  
All	 interviews	were	 tape	 recorded142	 with	 the	consent	of	 the	participant	because	 this	 is	 the	
best	way	to	keep	the	original	data.	This	mission	was	successful	at	the	end	of	the	day.	Notes	
were	 taken	during	 interviews	 for	 the	 convenience	of	 coding	work	 in	 subsequent	 analysis.	 A	
high	 level	of	confidentiality	was	maintained	throughout	the	collection,	handling	and	analysis	
of	data.	The	trust	of	the	interviewees	was	gained	by	promising	them	anonymity	and	the	right	
to	review	and	correct	the	transcript.	A	confidential	agreement	signed	by	both	interviewer	and	
																																								 																				
140 See details in Appendix I. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Phone interviews will be done with the speaker phone switched on, and recorded by another recording machine. 
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interviewee	 required	 that	 unless	 otherwise	 agreed	 the	 interviewee’s	 identity	 would	 be	
concealed	by	an	alias.	Only	a	general	title	and	the	name	of	the	CDM	project	will	be	mentioned	
when	referring	to	any	specific	 interviewees.	A	copy	of	the	interview	transcript	was	delivered	
to	each	interviewee	for	his	or	her	information	and	they	were	able	to	correct	the	information	
they	gave	and	be	reassured	that	it	was	ready	to	be	authorized	to	the	researcher	for	academic	
use.	This	improved	integration	and	authentication	of	the	data	and	avoided	misunderstandings	
between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	 participant	 over	 ethical	 concerns.	 In	 fact,	 none	 of	 the	
interviewees	corrected	anything	sent	to	them	from	which	I	understand	as	an	approve	of	the	
contents.	 	
After	 an	 agreed	 transcript	 has	 been	 made,	 analysis	 was	 undertaken	 in	 the	 form	 of	
systematically	 grouping	 and	 summarizing	 the	 descriptions	 of	 experiences.143	 Primary	 data	
were	input	to	NVivo	10	and	the	code	categorized	into	different	themes.144	
As	this	socio-legal	research	is	based	on	interviews,	it	is	highly	dependent	on	an	understanding	
of	the	interviewees’	cultural	backgrounds	and	ways	of	expression	to	get	relatively	valid	data.	
The	human	element	of	qualitative	inquiry	is	both	is	strength	and	weakness	–	its	strength	
is	 fully	using	human	 insight	and	experience,	 its	weakness	 is	being	so	heavily	dependent	
on	the	researcher’s	skill,	training,	intellect,	discipline,	and	creativity.	The	researcher	is	the	
instrument	of	qualitative	 inquiry,	 so	 the	quality	of	 the	research	depends	heavily	on	 the	
qualities	of	that	human	being.145	 	
																																								 																				
143 Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, The New Language of Qualitative Method (Oxford University Press on Demand 
1997) ch.2. 
144 Dee detail in Appendix I. 
145 M. Q. Patton, Paradigms and Pragmatism in Fetterman, DM (ed.): Qualitative Approaches to Evaluation in Education: The 
Silent Scientific Revolution (New York: Praeger 1988) p. 89-115. 
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Therefore,	I	checked	closely	whether	each	statement	follows	reasonable	logic	based	on	what	
was	 found	 in	 previous	 interviews	 and	 carefully	 dealt	 with	 flaws	 in	 the	 evidence	 and	 how	
conclusions	were	 reached.	 This	was	 to	 check	 the	 authentication	of	 the	 data	 and	 to	 try	 and	
avoid	 any	 bias	 from	 interviewees.	 Comparisons	 will	 be	 made	 of	 the	 same	 issues	 from	 the	
point	 of	 view	 of	 different	 interviewees	 and	 scholars	 to	 try	 to	 minimize	 effect	 of	 different	
conclusions	on	analyzing.	
2.4.8 Problems 
The	 success	 of	 a	 research	 based	 on	 interview	 method	 is	 depended	 on	 the	 premise	 and	
authentic	 answer	 of	 interviewees.	 This	 is	 unlikely	 because	 most	 participants	 are	 to	 some	
degree	 scared	 of	 formal	 interviews.146	 Thus,	 the	 interview	 situation	 is	 to	 some	 extent	
“unreal”	 and	 words	 should	 often	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 solid	 proof.	 International	 political	
sensitivities	 may	 have	 inhibited	 access	 to	 data.	 For	 example,	 it	 was	 challenging	 to	 get	 the	
authentic	 opinion	 from	 a	 government	 officer	 on	 the	 approach	 employed	 to	 the	
encouragement	 of	 technology	 duplication	 (including	 illegal	 duplications).	 A	 government	
officer	 would	 never	 reveal	 information	 such	 as	 weak	 IP	 implementation	 is	 acquiescently	
approved	to	stimulate	endogenous	 independent	technology	development.	This	 is	one	of	the	
difficulties	of	accessing	officials	for	interviews.	Some	people	in	certain	positions,147	 especially	
in	state-owned	enterprises,	tended	to	take	a	political	standpoint	rather	than	provide	neutral	
opinions,	due	to	the	fear	of	losing	their	jobs.	Moreover,	obtaining	candid	answers	on	business	
sensitive	issues	was	relatively	difficult.	Some	interviewees	were	suspected	of	bias	in	taking	a	
																																								 																				
146 Juha Laurila, ‘Promoting Research Access and Informant Rapport in Corporate Settings: Notes from Research on a Crisis 
Company’ 13 Scandinavian Journal of Management 407; Andrea Fontana and Anastasia H. Prokos, The Interview: From Formal to 
Postmodern (Left Coast Press 2007). 
147 E.g. communist party secretaries of state-owned enterprises. 
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“company	 line”	 and	 avoiding	 releasing	 any	 business	 secrets.	 Some	 interviewees	 may	 have	
provided	the	answers	that	they	believed	the	interviewer	wanted	to	hear,	rather	than	the	most	
accurate	answer.	Beyond	these	issues,	there	were	different	understandings	of	the	meaning	of	
basic	 definitions,	 such	 as	 the	 meaning	 and	 source	 of	 IP	 law.	 Misunderstandings	 between	
interviewer	 and	 interviewee	 also	 created	 problems.	 This	 was	 mostly	 settled	 by	 asking	
follow-up	 questions	 to	 clarify	 any	 points	 made	 during	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews	 and	
further	clarified	by	sending	 transcripts	back	 to	 interviewees	 for	correction.	Other	difficulties	
derived	 from	time	management	and	 lack	of	 funding	 (i.e.	delays	 in	conducting	 field	work).	 In	
dealing	 with	 these	 difficulties,	 the	 researcher	 tried	 to	 make	 herself	 seem	 less	 official	 or	
ambitious	 to	 the	 interviewees,	 showing	 her	 well-developed	 knowledge	 of	 the	 subject	 and	
providing	 ethical	 assurance,	 declaring	 that	 the	 data	 was	 only	 for	 academic	 use,	 and	 by	
promising	anonymity	to	respondents.	A	personal	visit	of	the	interviewer	back	in	China	helped	
to	 develop	 relationships	 with	 the	 companies	 and	 had	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 promoting	 the	
research.	 	
In	 the	 following	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 will	 identify	 the	 special	 features	 of	 international	
climate	 change	 TT	 in	 Chapter	 III.	 Chapter	 IV	 will	 examine	 how	 TT	 is	 promoted	 within	
international	environmental	agreements;	Chapter	V	will	 revisit	how	IP	theory	and	regulation	
could	affect	TT	under	the	current	international	IP	system	(TRIPS	Agreement);	and	Chapter	VI	
will	provide	empirical	findings	in	regard	to	climate	change	TT	to	China.	
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Chapter	III:	Overview	of	Technology	Transfer	
3.1 Introduction 
Most	 environmental	 concerns	 are	 multifaceted	 problems	 “requiring	 highly	 integrated	
answers,	which	will	 undoubtedly	 require	 substantial	measures	 implemented	within	multiple	
sectors	 and	 at	 many	 different	 levels.”1	 For	 example,	 developing	 countries	 with	 different	
needs	from	developed	countries	might	 find	 it	difficult	 to	deal	with	climate	change	problems	
without	external	help.	The	use	of	TT	is	in	fact	a	positive	aid	to	help	developing	countries	in	a	
way	 they	need.	Many	developing	 countries	 are	 ex-colonies	 (though	not	 China),	which	were	
used	to	enjoying	technologies	provided	by	the	colonizers.	Now,	when	there	arises	the	need	to	
get	developing	countries	to	agree	to	MEAs,	TT	is	required	instead.	Especially	after	the	historic	
moment	of	finalizing	the	19722	 Stockholm	Declaration	and	alongside	the	establishment	of	the	
New	International	Economic	Order	(NIEO),3	 TT	has	been	gradually	accepted	worldwide	as	an	
important	 tool.	 It	 is	 widely	 used	 among	 environmental	 agreements	 to	 help	 environmental	
protection,	enhance	international	cooperation	and	accelerate	technological	development	not	
only	within	developed	nations	but	also	 in	many	less	developed	countries.	Accordingly,	many	
MEAs	are	ratified	with	the	developed	countries	taking	most	responsibility	for	climate	change	
in	 the	 first	 place	 and	 look	 forward	 to	 gain	more	 developing	 countries’	 participation	 in	 the	
future	using	TT	as	a	tool	to	get	them	involved.	
																																								 																				
1 Duncan A. French, ‘Managing Global Change for Sustainable Development: Technology, Community and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 209. 
2 Decolonization largely took place before this. It was only the Portuguese and a few British colonies in the Caribbean and Middle 
East which gained independence thereafter. 
3 The NIEO focused on “restructuring of the world's economy to permit greater participation by and benefits to developing 
countries.” Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, A/RES/S-6/3201, 1 May 1974. 
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TT	is	mainly	about	enabling	a	receiving	country	to	use	new	technology	in	manufacturing.	It	is	a	
process	consisting	of	acquiring	and	learning	knowledge	and	methods;	about	skills	training	and	
transferring	 facilities	 among	 companies,	 governments,	 universities	 and	 other	 institutions.	
However,	 studying	 TT	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 context	 is	 more	 complex,	 as	 the	 problem	 is	
caused	 by	 many	 “interactions	 among	 physical,	 biological,	 political,	 social,	 cultural	 and	
economic	 factors.”4	 The	 highly	 interconnected	 nature	 of	 the	 issue	 cannot	 be	 handled	with	
only	 one-dimensional	 political	 solutions.	 Just	 as	 it	 is	 clearly	 incorrect	 to	 categorize	 climate	
change	 TT	 as	 purely	 commercial	 or	 environmental,	 “appropriate	 responses	must	 equally	 be	
premised	 on	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 considerations.”5	 Given	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	
especially	 important	 to	 look	 at	 TT	 as	 a	 concept	 with	 its	meaning	 and	 development	 history	
clarified.	Different	 attitudes	 towards	 TT	 and	 climate	 change	must	 also	be	 considered,	 along	
with	 measures	 related	 to	 TT	 available	 for	 countries	 and	 organizations	 encountering	 the	
climate	change	crisis.	
3.2 Background of technology transfer 
For	 a	 long	 time,	 technology	has	been	 considered	 important	 to	 the	modern	development	of	
any	 economy.	 Adam	 Smith	 was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 to	 look	 at	 manufacturing	 technology	
systematically.6	 His	 work	 has	 provided	 the	 foundation	 for	 analyzing	 the	 development	 of	
economies.	Smith	did	not	examine	technology	and	innovation	as	an	individual	issue	but	“the	
relevance	of	his	reading	of	the	creative	human	nature	and	how	it	affects	social	and	economic	
																																								 																				
4 French (n 1). 
5 Ibid. 
6 As early as in 1776. Kwangsu Kim, ‘Adam Smith's Theory of Economic History and Economic Development’ (2009) 16 The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 41. 
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processes	 has	 endured.”7	 Smith	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 “underlying	 forces	 of	 the	 growth	 of	
technology	 and	 productivity	 had	 been	 inducing	 economic	 development.” 8 	 Later,	
technological	 determinism	 theory	 was	 coined.	 It	 presumes	 that	 a	 society's	 technology	 is	 so	
decisive	for	it	is	a	driving	force	of	the	development	in	social	and	cultural	aspects	of	a	society.	
The	 first	 major	 elaboration	 of	 technological	 determinism	 was	 provided	 by	 Karl	 Marx	 who	
elaborated	 his	 theory	 based	 upon	 the	 idea	 that	 technology	 advancement	 is	 the	 primary	
influences	on	the	structure	of	social	relations,	“and	that	social	relations	and	cultural	practices	
ultimately	 revolve	around	 the	 technological	and	economic	base	of	a	 society.”9	 His	view	has	
been	 embedded	 in	 the	 contemporary	 understanding,	 which	 claims	 “fast-changing	
technologies	alter	human	lives	in	a	positive	way.”10	 These	studies	were	looking	at	technology	
from	 a	 country’s	 economic	 and	 social	 development	 point	 of	 view.	 Schumpeter	 adopts	 an	
evolutionary	version	of	economics,	which	differs	from	Marx	and	claims	that	a	monopoly	over	
property	as	well	as	technology	is	essential	for	short-term	purpose.11	
The	rich	literature	on	technological	change	has	pointed	out	the	vital	role	that	technology	plays	
in	productivity	change	and	economic	development,	and	therefore	provides	a	very	 important	
justification	 for	 TT.12	 As	 technology	 is	 key	 to	 development,	 it	 explains	 to	 some	 extent	why	
																																								 																				
7 Iqbal Z. Quadir, ‘Adam Smith, Economic Development, and the Global Spread of Cell Phones’ (2013) 157 Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 67. 
8 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. (R. H. Campbell and A. S. 
Skinner eds, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976). 
9 Bruce Bimber, ‘Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism’ (1990) 20 Social Studies of Science 333. 
10 Gerald Allan Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2000). 
11 “technological innovation often creates temporary monopolies, allowing abnormal profits that would soon be competed away by 
rivals and imitators, these temporary monopolies were necessary to provide the incentive for firms to develop new products and 
processes for the whole of society.” Joseph Schumpeter, ‘The Instability of Capitalism’ (1928) 38 The Economic Journal 361. 
12 F. H. Hahn and R. C. O. Matthews, ‘The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey’ (1964) 74 The Economic Journal 779; Edwin 
Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change (Longmans 1969); Edward Fulton Denison, Accounting for United States 
Economic Growth, 1929-1969 (Brookings Institution 1974); Nathan Rosenberg, ‘The Impact of Technological Innovation: A 
Historical View’ in Ralph Landau and Nathan Rosenberg (eds), The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic 
Growth (reprint edn, National Academy Press 1986) p.17. 
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countries	 long	 for	 access	 to	 new	 technologies	 either	 through	 domestic	 independent	
innovation	or	through	international	transfer.	 	
3.2.1 Technology transfer in colonial times 
Most	 of	 history	 countries	 have	 sought	 to	 protect	 knowledge	 of	 their	 technologies	 because	
knowledge	is	seen	as	power	(both	military	and	economic).13	 However,	international	TT	is	not	
a	 new	 activity.	 Historically,	 according	 to	 Daniel	 Headrick,14	 especially	 after	 the	 Industrial	
Revolution,	TT	actually	accelerated	 the	 receiver	country’s	productivity	and	 in	 turn	benefited	
the	transferor	nations,	which	were	the	colonizers	at	the	time.	Some	technologies	served	the	
interests	 of	 the	 native	 populations:	 public	 health	 services,	 railways and irrigations	 systems.	
These	 technologies	 received	 official	 approval	 when	 transferred	 into	 the	 colony,	 but	 only	
within	 the	 narrow	 limitations	 of	 tightened	 colonial	 budgets.	 Nevertheless,	 when	 a	 new	
technology15	 was	 introduced	 into	 a	 colony,	 experts	 from	 western	 countries	 would	 came	
along	work	on	equipment	settings	and	help	with	operation,	and	sometimes	pass	their	jobs	on	
to	their	heirs.	This	established	a	long-term	and	comprehensive	TT	pattern	with	generations	of	
skilled	persons	working	as	trainers	and	living	examples	of	trades,	etc.	in	the	colonial	countries.	
This	 meant	 that	 not	 only	 equipment	 but	 also	 know-how	 was	 transferred	 successfully.	
Nonetheless,	such	TT	 formed	between	colonizer	and	the	colonized	bred	 the	risk	of	crippling	
the	receiver	countries’	independent	technology-development	capability.16 	
																																								 																				
13 Sergio C. Trindade and others, ‘Section 1.3 Background in Charpter 1 Managing Technological Change in Support of the 
Climate Change Convention’ in Bert Metz and others (eds), Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer 
(Cambridge University Press 2000). 
14 “The Europeans who ruled the colonies were in an ambiguous position. They represented a conquering civilization which 
obtained its power from ingenious innovations, and they certainly shared the Western love of new devices and the urge to 
proselytize their techno-mania among the ‘backward races’ of the world.” Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: 
Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 (Oxford University Press 1990). 
15 it could be either new process or new sets of equipment. 
16 Headrick (n 14). 
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From	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 onwards,17	 many	 Asian	 and	 African	 colonies	 “saw	Western	
technology	 as	 their	 key	 to	 power	 and	 prosperity	 and	 they	 sought	 more	 machinery	 and	
knowledge	than	the	Europeans	offered	them	locally.”18	 However,	those	TTs	that	might	have	
led	to	the	growth	of	import-substitution	industries19	 (e.g.	textiles,	natural	colourants,	rubber,	
metal	 machinery	 parts,	 and	 so	 on)	 were	 generally	 viewed	 with	 suspicion	 within	 transferor	
countries.	Once	they	lost	support	from	Western	countries	these	businesses	became	unable	to	
compete,	 and	 had	 to	 adjust	 their	 production	 and	 operation	 in	 an	 independent	 way	 by	
providing	inferior	goods.	For	instance,	after	the	independence	of	sub-Saharan	Africa,	factories	
in	 the	 country	 started	 to	 produce	 cheaper	 textiles,	 which	 was	 a	 step	 backwards	 from	 its	
colonial	time	because	“they	began	to	make	thinner	clothing	instead	of	finer	materials.”20	 At	
the	same	time	they	made	best	use	of	their	comparative	advantage	in	having	cheaper	labour.	
Thus,	they	competed	with	European	manufactures	in	a	way	that	“challenged	the	authority	of	
the	colonial	regimes.”21	 	
Even	 under	 the	 best	 of	 circumstances,	 when	 technologies	 were	 accessible,	 importing	
technology	 could	 have	 been	 hazardous.	 For	 example,	 small	 businesses	 like	 the	 Chinese	 tin	
mines	of	Malaya	 could	not	 afford	 to	 keep	up	with	 the	 rising	 cost	of	Western	machines.	 Tin	
was	 the	 most	 important	 trade	 in	 Malaya	 and	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 industry	 was	 “shared	
primarily	 between	 the	 British	 and	 the	 Chinese.”22	 Before	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 merely	 a	
																																								 																				
17 In the period from about 1760 to sometime between 1820 
18 Suvobrata Sarkar, ‘Technological Momentum: Bengal in the Nineteenth Century’ (2010) 37 Indian Historical Review 89. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ana Paula F. Mendes, Mário A. Bertella and Rudolph F. A. P. Teixeira, ‘Industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa and Import 
Substitution Policy’ Rev Econ Polit vol34 no1 São Paulo Jan/Mar 2014 <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rep/v34n1/v34n1a08.pdf> 
accessed 2 Mar 2017. 
21 “Many colonial officials would have gave them a harsh time to development domestic industry as they were from the English 
gentry and the French petite bourgeoisie, which had lost ground and assets to industrialists.” Headrick (n 14). 
22 Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and after the Japanese Occupation, 
1941-1946 (NUS Press 2012). 
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quarter	of	global	tin	production	was	under	control	of	Britain	companies.23	 But	after	the	war,	
British	 share	 increased	 steeply	 as	 a	 result	 of	 introducing	 colossal	 dredging	machine	 among	
mines.	Even	more	so,	“towards	the	end	of	the	last	century	the	British	began	breaking	in	on	the	
monopoly	of	tin	by	the	Chinese	and	the	trend	had	been	increasingly	toward	British	control.”24	
Therefore,	 “the	 hand-worked	 open-cast	 Chinese	 mines	 were	 unable	 to	 compete	 with	 the	
British	 dredges.	Under	 the	 spur	 of	 competition	 the	 Chinese	made	 considerable	 advances	 in	
selling	 their	 mines	 but	 they	 lacked	 capital	 for	 the	 installation	 of	 dredges.”25	 After	 all,	
entrepreneurs	 with	 both	 business	 skills	 and	 capital	 were	 rare,	 and	 those	 who	 understood	
Western	machines	were	rarer.26	 In	fact,	 international	TT	at	the	time	was	 initially	used	as	an	
approach	 to	 maximize	 colonial	 benefits.27	 This	 could	 explain	 why	 technology	 given	 to	
colonies	 had	 restrictions	 attached.	 Gradually,	 the	 role	 of	 TT	 changed,	 but	 the	 advantage	
difference	 between	 technology	 owners	 and	 manufacturers	 remained	 and	 the	 flow	 of	
technology	that	originated	in	colonial	times	continues.	
3.2.2 Technology transfer in the postcolonial era 
After	 World	 War	 II	 and	 until	 the	 1970s	 –	 a	 time	 of	 decolonization	 –	 “most	 developing	
countries	 in	 Latin	 America	 and	 Africa,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 countries	 in	 Asia	 (like	 India	 and	
Thailand),	 depended	 heavily	 on	 agricultural	 production	 to	 support	 their	 economies.”28	 The	
debate	on	TT	between	colonizer	and	colonial	has	shifted	 to	TT	 from	developed	countries	 to	
																																								 																				
23 Ibid. 
24‘TED Case Studies: Tin Mining In Malaysia - Present And Future’ (14 Dec 2012)  
<http://archive.is/syKM#selection-11.0-11.61> accessed 20 Aug 2017. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Otto Ullrich, ‘Technology’ in Wolfgang Sachs (ed), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (2 edn, Zed 
Books Ltd. 2010) p.275: A short paper discussing the relationships between technology and production. He then relates the topic to 
colonialism and neocolonialism. 
27 See John Weiler, ‘Colonial Connections: Royal Engineers and Building Technology Transfer in the Nineteenth Century’ (1996) 
12 Construction History 3. 
28 Martín Piñeiro, ‘Agricultural Technology Transfer to Developing Countries and the Public Sector’ Science and Development 
Network Policy Briefs, Jan 2007 <http://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/file/cogem/cogem_t477e4c16_001.pdf> . 
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developing	countries.	The	topic,	therefore,	finds	its	roots	in	the	call	for	development	needs	of	
the	newly	independent	nations	in	the	later	era	of	decolonization.29	 These	countries	realized	
that	technological	advance	was	critical	to	a	country’s	development.	As	food	scarcity	was	a	key	
issue	 to	 many	 less	 developed	 countries,	 lots	 of	 development	 activities	 were	 aimed	 at	
modernizing	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 in	 these	 countries.30	 During	 this	 period,	 most	 TT	 from	
developed	 countries	 focused	 on	 transferring	 agricultural	 technologies	 to	 developing	
countries.31	 But	 since	 the	 late	 1970s,	 technologies	 “have	 become	 embodied	 in	 physical	
products,	 like	 farm	 machinery	 or	 agrochemicals,	 exponential	 growth	 in	 such	 industries.”32	
Such	change	in	trend	has	“led	to	a	rapid	expansion	of	private	firms	that	create,	manufacture	
and	sell	technology.”33	 And	so	the	role	of	the	public	sector	diminished.	More	recently,	from	a	
time	 in	 the	mid-1990s,	 globalization	has	 resulted	 in	more	production	of	 consumer	 goods	 in	
developing	 countries	 (Indonesia,	Malaysia,	 and	 Thailand).	 These	 East	 Asian	 economies	 have	
benefited	from	a	strategy	of	absorbing	 imported	technology	to	 increase	their	export	growth	
since	then.34	 	
In	the	1960s,	the	 international	community	had	to	discuss	the	 issue	of	TT	 in	this	postcolonial	
era	for	the	first	time:	 	
																																								 																				
29 Jérôme de Meeûs and Alain Strowel, ‘Climate Change and the Debate around Green Technology Transfer and Patent Rules: 
History, Prospect and Unresolved Issues’ 3 WIPOJ 178. 
30 Piñeiro (n 28). 
31“However, such activities relied on public institutions and universities since many of the agricultural technologies and much of 
the knowledge being created had little market value. Physical products were not being produced, and those technologies were 
considered 'public goods', which anyone could use without diminishing the value. Examples include improved seeding rates, 
pasture management or crop rotation practices.” Nádia Solange Schmidt Bassi and others, ‘Controversies about the Process of 
Technology Transfer from Public Research Institutions in Brazil: The Case of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation - 
Embrapa.’ (2014) 9 J Technol Manag Innov 2014, Volume 9, Issue 3 182 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Carl Dahlman, ‘Technology, Globalization, and International Competitiveness: Challenges for Developing Countries’ in United 
Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ed), Industrial Development for the 21st Century: Sustainable Development 
Perspectives (United Nations Publications 2007). 
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TT	was	first	tabled	as	an	international	issue	in	1961,	with	a	request	to	the	United	Nations	
Secretary	 General	 by	 some	 developing	 countries	 that	 studies	 be	 commissioned	 to	
ascertain	 the	 role	 of	 international	 treaties	 in	 promoting	 IPRs	 protection	 in	 developing	
countries.35	
In	 the	 first	 session	 of	 the	UNCTAD	 in	 1964,	 the	meeting	 defined	 technology	 as	 “systematic	
knowledge	 for	 the	 manufacture	 of	 a	 product,	 for	 the	 application	 of	 a	 process	 or	 for	 the	
rendering	of	a	service”,	which	“does	not	extend	to	the	transactions	involving	the	mere	sale	or	
mere	 lease	of	 goods”36	 This	 definition	 clearly	 identifies	 that	 “the	 knowledge	 that	 goes	 into	
the	 creation	 and	 provision	 of	 the	 product	 or	 service”	 is	 the	 essence	 that	 constitutes	
technology,	 and	 excludes	 foods	 that	 are	 a	 finished	 product	 or	 service	 from	 the	 ambit	 of	
technology.37	 Accordingly,	it	described	the	input	and	output	of	technologies	among	countries	
as	TT	and	provided	a	way	for	understanding	TT	which	was	not	the	physical	transfer	from	one	
place	to	another.	 	
The	 UN	 made	 its	 first	 prominent	 use	 of	 TT	 under	 its	 Article	 IV	 2	 of	 the	 1968	 Nuclear	
Non-Proliferation	 Treaty	 (NNPT).38	 Even	 so,	 the	main	purpose	of	 the	 treaty	was	 to	prevent	
the	spread	of	nuclear	weapons	and	relative	technology.	TT	was	only	employed	as	an	incentive	
																																								 																				
35 Padmashree Gehl Sampath and Pedro Roffe, ‘Unpacking the International Technology Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and 
Beyond’ ICTSD Programme on Innovation, Technology and Intellectual Property Issue Paper No 36 
<http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2012/11/unpacking-the-international-technology-transfer-debate-fifty-years-and-beyond.pdf> 
accessed 17 Jul 2017. 
36 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology as at the close of the 6th session of the Conference on 5 June 
1985, TD/CODE TOT/47, Geneva : UN, 20 June 1985. ch.1, para.1.2. 
37 UNCTAD, ‘Transfer of Technology’ UNCTAD Issue Paper Series UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/28, New York and Geneva, 2001 
<http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd28.en.pdf> accessed 2 Sep 2017 
38 “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a 
position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.” UNODA, ‘Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’ (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs)  
<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text> accessed 2 Sep 2017. 
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for	developing	countries	 to	participate	 in	 the	 international	 regime.	 In	 the	1980s,	discussions	
and	deliberations	over	TT	reached	a	peak	with	the	UNCTAD	negotiations	on	an	International	
Code	of	Conduct	on	TT.39	 Although	efforts	made	by	the	Code	did	not	make	much	difference,	
TT	 has	 become	 a	 essential	 topic	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 international	 forums.40	 In	 fact,	 developing	
countries	were	 ‘bought	off’	by	TT	provisions	 to	sign	particular	 treaties,	especially	MEAs.	For	
instance,	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 (GATS)41	 and	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreements	
both	refer	to	TT	in	provisions.42	 The	Montreal	Protocol43	 and	the	Kyoto	Protocol44	 are	more	
clearly	include	TT	for	environmental	protection	objectives.	 	
3.3 Defining of technology transfer 
3.3.1 Technology transfer from different perspectives 
It	 is	 widely	 recognized	 that	 TT	 from	 developed	 countries	 to	 developing	 countries	 has	 “an	
important	 impact	on	 the	pattern	of	 trade	and	relative	 incomes	across	countries.”45	 Positive	
descriptions	of	TT	can	be	found	in	comparatively	early	literature	on	the	topic.46	 According	to	
Zhoa	 and	 Reisman,47	 the	 definition	 of	 TT	 differs	 substantially	 among	 disciplines.48	 TT	 has	
																																								 																				
39 See detail discussion of the Code in Section 3.7 
40 Sampath and Roffe (n 35). 
41 The GATS contains an obligation in Article 4 para 2: “developed countries to establish contact points to facilitate the access of 
developing country members' service suppliers to information related to their respective markets concerning the availability of 
services technology.” General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). 
42 See for example, TRIPS article 7 and article 66.2 
43 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, TD/CODE TOT/47, Geneva : UN, 20 June 1985. Article 10A   
44 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998), article 10, 11 and 12. 
45 Robert C. Feenstra and Kenneth L. Judd, ‘Tariffs, Technology Transfer, and Welfare’ (1982) 90 Journal of Political Economy 
1142. 
46 Gaetan Verhoosel, ‘Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: Transferring Environmentally Sound 
Technologies’ (1998) 11 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 49. 
47 L. Zhao and A. Reisman, ‘Toward Meta Research on Technology Transfer’ (1992) 39 IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 13 p.14. 
48 They observe that economists such as the Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of 
Technological Knowledge’ (1969) 59 The American Economic Review 29; Harry G. Johnson, ‘The Efficiency and Welfare 
Implications of the International Corporation’ in C Kindleger (ed), International Corporations, vol 35 (Cambridge: CUP,1970 
1970); Giovanni Dosi, ‘The Nature of the Innovation Process’ in Giovanni Dosi and others (eds), Technical Change and Economic 
Theory, vol 988 (Pinter London 1988), tend to define technology as part of the society’s IP therefore focuses are made on factors 
that matter to production and design.  
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been	used	by	many	 firms	 to	 improve	 their	 competitive	advantage.49	 By	 introducing	mature	
technology	from	the	external	(another	country)	and	innovating	with	and	upon	it,	 latecomers	
are	 able	 to	 erode	 the	 “competitive	 advantage	 of	 the	 well-entrenched	 firms	 and	 propel	
themselves	to	the	forefront.”50	 Thus	it	has	been	a	great	equalizer	of	the	market	and	has	been	
“used	as	a	strategy	for	enhancing	the	competitive	position	of	an	entire	industry,	a	region	and,	
indeed,	of	an	entire	nation.”51	 Also,	it	has	then	been	a	tool	in	improving	“economic	progress,	
social	 development,	 improvements	 in	 quality	 of	 life,	 and	 even	 of	 culture	 and	 of	 value	
systems.”52	 In	 order	 to	 clarify	 the	 systematization	 and	 complexity	 of	 TT,	 studies	 on	 the	
subject	 have	 attracted	 increasing	 interest	 in	 academia.	 In	 the	 respective	 literatures,	 TT	 has	
been	studied	from	many	lens:	“economists,	sociologists,	anthropologists,	engineers,	and	both	
behavioural	and	quantitative	management	theorists.”53	 These	scholars	provided	a	variety	of	
definition	of	TT	attributing	to	the	different	approaches	and	disciplines	adopted.54	
In	 this	 thesis,	 TT	 is	 looked	 at	 through	 a	 social-legal	 lens	 by	 identifying	 the	 responsibility	 to	
provide	 technologies	 as	 the	 legal	 obligation	 of	more	 developed	 countries.	 And	 at	 the	 same	
time,	TT	is	recognized	as	a	need	for	human	society	to	improve	the	natural	environment	of	the	
planet.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
Sociologists (such as Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (4 edn, The Free Press, New York 2010); Everett M. Rogers and 
F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations; A Cross-Cultural Approach (The Free Press, New York 1971)) tend to link 
TT to innovation activities which is considered as a type of social behaviour. 
Anthropologists (such as George M. Foster, Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technological Change (New York & 
Evanston: Harper & Row. 1962); Elman R. Service, Cultural Evolutionism: Theory in Practice (Holt,Rinehart & Winston of 
Canada Ltd; First Printing edition 1971); Robert S. Merrill, ‘The Role of Technology in Cultural Evolution’ (1972) 19 Social 
Biology 240) tend to view TT broadly within the cultural environment and focus on how TT will affected when the cultural context 
changes; See also literature review chapter. 
49 C. Christopher Baughn and Richard N. Osborne, ‘Strategies for Successful Technological Development’ (1989) 14 The Journal 
of Technology Transfer 5. 
50 Michael E. Porter, ‘Technology and Competitive Advantage’ (1985) 5 Journal of business strategy 60. 
51 Arnold Reisman, ‘Technology Transfer: A Taxonomic View’ (1989) 14 The Journal of Technology Transfer 31. 
52 N. Mohan Reddy and Liming Zhao, ‘International Technology Transfer: A Review’ (1990) 19 Research Policy 285. 
53 Zhao and Reisman (n 47). 
54 Ibid (n 47); A discussion of TT definitions across disciplines, see Appendix II.  
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3.3.2 Contents of technology transfer 
According	to	Rubens	Ricupero	and	Carlos	Correa:	 	
There	are	two	relevant	categories	of	knowledge	that	are	essential	for	economic	progress	
and	 competitiveness.	 The	 first	 consists	 of	 knowledge	 embodied	 in	 machines	 and	
equipment	that	makes	it	possible	to	control	sophisticated	processes	for	producing	goods	
and	 services	 and	marketing	 them	 at	 a	 profit.	 The	 other	 category,	 to	 some	 extent	 still	
elusive,	 consists	 of	 tacit	 knowledge,	 that	 is,	 knowledge	 embodied	 in	 the	 organizational	
routines	and	 collective	expertise	or	 skills	 of	 specific	production,	management,	 research	
and	development	and	marketing.	 It	 is	 the	 first	 type	of	knowledge	that	people	generally	
have	in	mind	when	discussing	today’s	knowledge-intensive	economy	and	the	transfer	and	
diffusion	of	 technology.	However,	as	knowledge	becomes	a	more	decisive	 factor,	and	a	
more	critical	commodity,	its	acquisition	and	diffusion	will	require	that	the	two	aspects	of	
knowledge	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 knowledge	 transfer.	 This	 makes	 the	
process	of	TT	more	than	ever	a	continuous	and	uninterrupted	learning	process.55	 	
Generally	 speaking,	 successful	 TT	 consists	 of	 both	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 aspects.	 Sahal’s	
description	of	TT	 is	 significant	among	 the	 literature	as	he	observes	 that	“technology	 [as	 the	
object	 of	 TT]	 must	 rely	 on	 a	 subjectively	 determined	 but	 specifiable	 set	 of	 processes	 and	
products.”56	 Roessner,	 in	 his	 overview	 of	 TT,	 points	 out	 the	 specific	 importance	 of	 “the	
																																								 																				
55 Rubens Ricupero and Carlos Correa, ‘Preface’ in Surendra J. Patel, Pedro Roffe and Abdulqawi A. Yusef (eds), International 
Technology Transfer: The Origin and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 2001). This broad definition of “technology transfer” draws inspiration from the IPCC vision on TT 
unanimously recognized by the international community: Technology Transfer is “a broad set of processes covering the flows of 
know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as 
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations and research/education institutions” 
IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Bert Metz and others (eds), Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology 
Transfer: A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
56 Devendra Sahal, ‘Alternative Conceptions of Technology’ (1981) 10 Research Policy 2. 
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movement	of	know-how,	technical	knowledge,	or	technology	from	one	organizational	setting	
to	 another.”57	 This	 further	 articulates	 the	 specified	 process	 that	 Sahal	 has	 put	 forward	 by	
identifying	the	particular	contents	of	the	processes.	A	research	on	TT	simply	focusing	on	the	
final	 product	 is	 not	 sufficient.	 TT	 “is	 not	 merely	 the	 product	 that	 is	 transferred	 but	 also	
knowledge	 of	 its	 use	 and	 application.”58	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 successful	 TT	 should	 always	 be	
considered	alongside	“obtaining	certain	result,	resolving	certain	problems,	completing	certain	
tasks	using	particular	 skills,	employing	knowledge	and	exploiting	assets.”59	 If	missing	any	of	
the	 factors	 above,	 it	 would	 have	 failed	 the	 very	 comprehensive	 process	 of	 TT.	 Yet,	 in	 real	
practice,	 it	 is	usually	easier	 to	access	 the	 tangible	 type	of	knowledge/technologies,	with	 the	
intangible	 category	 remaining	 less	available	 to	developing	countries.	This	 is	because	on	one	
hand	 investment	 in	capital	 such	as	machinery	and	equipment	 is	 the	most	 traditional	way	of	
investing	that	provides	instant	result	in	increased	productivity	in	developing	countries;	and	on	
the	other,	 it	 is	 the	 less	 risky	approach	 to	get	direct	 returns	 from	 investment	as	 increases	 in	
physical	 capital,	 employment,	 and	usage	of	 advanced	machinery	 and	equipment	often	bear	
fruit.60	 	
The	 transfer	 of	 environmental	 sound	 technologies	 (ESTs)61	 has	 been	 raised	 in	more	 recent	
years,	and	is	the	subject	of	an	extensive	literature.62 Similarly,	this	looks	at	TT	from	all	the	
																																								 																				
57 J.D Roessner, ‘Technology Transfer’ in C. Hill (ed), Science and Technology Policy in the US A Time of Change (Longman, 
London 2000) p.1. 
58 Barry Bozeman, ‘Technology Transfer and Public Policy: A Review of Research and Theory’ (2000) 29 Research Policy 627 
59 Ping Lan and Stephen Young, ‘International Technology Transfer Examined at Technology Component Level: A Case Study in 
China’ (1996) 16 Technovation 277. 
60 Alper Sönmez, Multinational Companies, Knowledge and Technology Transfer (Springer, Cham 2013). 
61United Nations, ‘Glossary of Environment Statistics’ Studies in Methods, Series F, No 67, United Nations, New York US 
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_67E.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017: “Environmentally sound technologies are 
techniques and technologies capable of reducing environmental damage through processes and materials that generate fewer 
potentially damaging substances, recover such substances from emissions prior to discharge, or utilize and recycle production 
residues.” 
62 E.g. Ernst Worrell and others, ‘Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Global Cement Industry’ (2001) 26 Annual Review of 
Energy and the Environment 303; see also Zili Yang and William D. Nordhaus, ‘Magnitude and Direction of Technological 
Transfers for Mitigating GHG Emissions’ (2006) 28 Energy Economics 730. 
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different	perspectives	mentioned	earlier,	 but	discussions	 revolve	around	 technology	
that	 benefits	 environmental	 protection	 and	 TT	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 climate	 change	
mitigation.63	 Indeed,	 successful	 TT	 should	 involve	 a	 technology	 transferor	 that	 makes	 its	
technology	 applicable	 to	 a	 transferee	 under	 certain	 processes	 reaching	 technical	
achievement.	 Such	 achievement	 is	 depending	 on	 the	 utilization	 of	 certain	 information,	
knowledge	and	experience	relating	to	all	aspects	of	production	(i.e.	processes,	materials	and	
operation	management).	This	definition	is	broad	enough	to	include	patents,	technical	secrets	
(know-how)	and	ancillary	support	needed	for	application	of	the	technology.64	 	
It	has	been	argued	that	TT	is	a	tool	that	helps	to	achieve	social	and	economic	development	in	
less	 developed	 societies	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 all	 states	 participate	 in	 international	
cooperation.65	 But	we	also	need	to	understand	that	the	TT	process	 is	a	two-way	 interactive	
process.66	 The	 economies	 in	 some	 large	 developing	 countries	 are	 now	growing	 rapidly	 and	
these	countries	are	experiencing	a	transition	period	from	being	pure	receiver	to	becoming	a	
provider.	 This	 can	 change	 traditional	 views	 in	 which	 TT	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 means	 of	 ensuring	
equity	between	developed	and	developing	countries.	 	
3.4 Fairness, equity and cooperation 
The	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 ESTT	 aid	 roots	 in	 “multilateral	 obligations	 and	 state	
commitments”	 which	 are	 therefore	 important	 “because	 the	 private sector	 does	 not	 have	
																																								 																				
63 See detail discussion on EST in Chapter IV 
64 Including almost everything supporting means ranging from computer software, integrated circuit layouts and new varieties of 
plants, etc. 
65 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Bert Metz and others eds, Cambridge University Press 2000) p.131. 
66 developing countries will be benefited from technology development while developed country which provides the technology in 
the transfer gains royalties or equipment sales. See UNEP-IETC, Technology Transfer: The Seven ‘C’s for the Successful Transfer 
and Uptake of Environmentally Sound Technologies (Osaka, Japan: The UNEP International Environmental Technology Centre, 
January 2004). 
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automatic	 incentives	 to	TT	to	developing	countries.”67	 One	of	 the	main	viewpoints	 taken	to	
justify	such	a	commitment	to	MEAs	of	developed	countries	is	a	concern	about	fairness	stating	
that	“developed	countries	have	already	had	the	opportunity	to	grow	by	using	practices	that	
caused	 major	 environmental	 degradation.	 If	 developing	 countries	 cannot	 go	 through	 that	
same	process,	 their	growth	would	be	unfairly	 impaired.”68	 Therefore,	 in	consideration	of	an	
equal	 development	 opportunity	 among	 all	 nations,	 developed	 countries	 should	 take	 some	
action	 to	ensure	 less	developed	 countries	do	not	 achieve	growth	 in	a	manner	 that	 leads	 to	
pollution.	Such	an	obligation	applies	not	only	to	environmental	damage	that	has	been	caused	
but	also	extends	 to	preventing	more	damage	being	 caused.	Moreover,	 the	emissions	 in	 the	
past	 gave	 the	 developed	 nations	 a	 chance	 to	 gain	 wealth	 earlier	 that	 can	 be	 used	 for	
compensation	 today.	 Virtually	 every	 country	 agrees	 that	 economic	 growth	 in	 developing	
countries	 “cannot	 take	place	with	 the	 same	disregard	 for	 the	environment	as	did	economic	
growth	in	the	now-developed	countries.”69	 But	they	fear	that	environmental	protections	will	
slow	 down	 the	 economies	 of	 developing	 states.	 While	 developing	 nations	 advocate	 their	
sincerity	 to	 a	 more	 sustainable	 and	 environmentally	 friendly	 way	 of	 development,	 in	 fact	
some	developing	countries	are	not	substantially	using	environmentally	friendly	measures.	As	
indicated	by	 their	 actions	 these	developing	 countries	 are	 either	 unable	 to	 afford,	 or	 decide	
not	 to,	 employ	 green	 productivity	 because	 the	majority	 of	 their	 funds	 go	 towards	 building	
their	 economy	 in	 energy-intensive	 ways.	 For	 example,	 “in	 2014,	 a	 UN	 Intergovernmental	
Committee	of	 Experts	 estimated	 the	 total	 cost	of	 the	 Sustainable	Development	Goals	 to	be	
																																								 																				
67 Sampath and Roffe (n 35). 
68 Gary C. Bryner, ‘Agenda 21: Myth or Reality?’ (1999) 157 The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy 158. 
69 Patrick Doherty, ‘The Transfer of Environmentally Sustainable Technologies to Asia’ (1995) 4 Review of European Community 
& International Environmental Law 33. 
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trillions	of	dollars	a	year”;70	 on	the	other	hand	“some	550	million	people	are	still	living	on	less	
than	 $1.25	 a	 day,	 most	 of	 them	 in	 sub-Saharan	 Africa.”71	 Yet	 mid-income	 developing	
countries	 (such	 as	 China)	 are	 in	 a	 better	 position,	 so	 their	 unwillingness	 in	 taking	
environmental	action	is	not	due	to	poverty	in	the	main.	While	the	ex-Premier	of	China,	Wen	
Jiabao,	 stated	 that	 “China	 will	 take	 a	 more	 active	 part	 in	 pushing	 forward	 international	
cooperation	 on	 sustainable	 development,”72	 more	 people	 from	 private	 sector	 view	 the	
responsibility	 to	 achieve	 sustainable	 development	 in	 a	 subtle	 way	 by	 emphasizing	 that	
“developing	 countries,	which	 are	 experiencing	 a	 key	 period	 of	 transition	 and	 development,	
usually	prioritize	development	but	 still	 value	 sustainability.”73	 Companies	 in	 these	countries	
are	 simply	 disinclined	 to	 switch	 to	 greener	 production	 notwithstanding	 that	 their	 emission	
volume	is	increasing.	For	example,	in	2016	the	Chinese	Ministry	of	Environmental	Protection	
visited	1,019	steel	 companies	across	 the	country	and	 found	 that	 “173	 firms	had	broken	 the	
rules	[in	environmental	protection	laws],	with	62	firms	involved	in	illegal	construction	and	35	
exceeding	state	emission	limits.”74	 All	in	all,	such	reluctance	is	due	to	expense	that	damps	the	
zest	 of	 firms.	 Until	 these	 firms	 in	 developing	 countries	 have	 enough	 economic	 incentives	
made	 available	 to	 them,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 they	 will	 continue	 engage	 with	
non-environmentally	friendly	production. 
																																								 																				
70 United Nations, Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (United Nations 
General Assembly Sixty-ninth session, UN Doc A/69/315, 15 August 2014). 
71 Romilly Greenhill and others, Financing the Future: How International Public Finance Should Fund a Global Social Compact 
to Eradicate Poverty (Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Reports, April 2015) 
72 Lan Lan and Jize Qin, ‘Rio ‘Reflects Efforts of Developing Nations'’ China Daily (2012-06-22) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/22/content_15518010.htm>  
73 As said by Chi Fulin, the president of China Institute for Reform and Development, during his speech at the Rio+20 conference. 
74 This proves that industry does not want to comply with the costs of being environmentally friendly. See China Environmental 
News according to the ministry's official publication. 
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A	second	standpoint	represents	the	idea	of	the	“polluter	pays”.	In	2009,	Prime	Minister	Meles	
Zalawi	 of	 Ethiopia	 spoke	 on	 behalf	 of	 many	 African	 nations	 claimed	 that	 the	 developed	
countries	 such	 as	 the	 US	 and	 the	 UK	 are	 responsible	 for	 most	 historic	 global	 emissions.75	
These	developed	countries	should	therefore	compensate	developing	nations	for	the	damage	
they	 have	 caused	 in	 history	 attributing	 to	 the	 global	 climate	 change.	 This	 argument	
emphasized	the	historical	responsibility	of	developed	countries	for	their	GHG	emissions.	Such	
voices	 raise	 the	 basic	 question	 of	who	 should	 pay	 for	 environmental	 damages.	 As	much	 as	
most	developing	countries	view	climate	change	as	a	considerable	issue,	they	also	believe	that	
efforts	 on	 mitigation	 should	 start	 in	 the	 developed	 countries	 that	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
majority	amount	of	emissions	in	history.	The	ecological	footprints	thesis	allows	the	historical	
justice	 argument	 to	 be	made:	 as	 damage	 caused	will	 endure	 into	 the	 future	with	 negative	
impacts	 for	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 global	 community,	 a	 nation	 shall	 pay	 for	 its	 contributions	 to	
environmental	 damage	 in	 the	 past.	 Such	 a	 concept	 was	 circulated	 well	 before	 the	 Rio	
conference76	 and	further	established	by	William	Rees77	 and	others.78	  
																																								 																				
75 Quote from Development Challenges in a Post-crisis World: (Claudia Sepúlveda, Ann Harrison and Justin Yifu Lin eds, World 
Bank Publications 2013); “See, for instance, Meles Zenawi, ‘Climate Change will Hit Africa Hardest’ (TheGuardian, 28 November 
2009)  <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/nov/28/africa-climate-change> accessed 11 Jul 2017 or 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agSY4tVL.oOw. Similar views are expressed by Blaise Compaoré 
of Burkina Faso, http://www.afrik.com/article17747.html. For additional quotes from heads of state, see 
http://www.unep.org/climateneutral/Resources/Quotes/tabid/362/Default.aspx, http://allafrica.com/stories/201009201379.html, 
http://www.ethjournal.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2155:ethiopia-pushes-for-more-financing-to-mitigat
e-and-adopt-climate-change&catid=13:headlines&Itemid=19,Brazil, The World Bank, ‘Low Carbon Growth in Brazil’ (The World 
Bank, June 17, 2010)  <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2010/06/17/low-carbon-growth-brazil> and 
‘Copenhagen Accord Not Legally Binding: Basic Countries’ (Hindustan Times, Jan 25, 2010)  
<http://sustainabilityoutlook.in/news/copenhagen-accord-not-legally-binding-basic-countries-2389> accessed 15 Sep 2017 
76 David William Pearce, Anil Markandya and Edward Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy, vol 1 (Earthscan 1989). 
77 William E. Rees, ‘Ecological Footprints and Appropriated Carrying Capacity: What Urban Economics Leaves Out’ (1992) 4 
Environment and Urbanization 121. 
78 Mathis Wackernagel, ‘Ecological Footprint and Appropriated Carrying Capacity: A Tool for Planning Toward Sustainability’ 
(PhD, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia 1994); Wackernagel, Mathis, 1991. "Land 
Use: Measuring a Community's Appropriated Carrying Capacity as an Indicator for Sustainability"; and "Using Appropriated 
Carrying Capacity as an Indicator, Measuring the Sustainability of a Community." Report I & II to the UBC Task Force on Healthy 
and Sustainable Communities, Vancouver; William Safire, ‘Footprint’ The New York Times Magazine (Feb. 17, 2008) On 
Language <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/magazine/17wwln-safire-t.html> ; Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, Our 
Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth (New Society Publishers 1998). 
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There	are	also	 two	 important	 factors	 among	 the	many	 that	 cause	environmental	problems:	
population	 and	 consumption.	 Populations	 of	 developed	 countries	 are	 stable,	 but	 the	 per	
capita	consumption	is	relatively	high.	On	the	other	hand,	“developing	countries	have	low	per	
capita	 consumption	but	 rapidly	expanding	populations.”79	 There	 is	 a	 clear	division	between	
developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 over	 the	 question	 of	 which	 factor	 is	 the	 main	 force	
causes	environmental	problems.	The	idea	that	all	countries	should	reduce	their	emissions	by	
similar	 percentages	 clearly	 favours	 the	 countries	 that	 have	more	 per	 capita	 emissions	 and	
green-tech	 capability	 today	 and	 therefore	 is	 not	 acceptable	 for	most	 developing	 countries.	
Large	 emitters	 do	 not	 necessarily	 have	 higher	 energy	 consumption	 per	 capita.	 Some	
developing	 countries	 with	 large	 populations	 and	 ranking	 world’s	 top	 subtotal	 energy	
consumption	 could	 fall	 in	 the	 low	 consumption	 per	 capita	 category.	 Therefore,	 they	 would	
surely	 favour	 an	 argument	 that	 lower	 consumption	 per	 capita	 countries	 deserve	 donation	
from	 higher	 consumption	 per	 capita	 countries,	 for	 the	 density	 of	 energy	 and	 resource	
provided	to	the	later	would	have	had	brought	the	standard	of	living	in	those	countries	higher.	
For	example,	China	in	2005	emitted	7,225.4	megatons	making	its	emissions	the	highest	in	the	
world.	However,	its	GHG	emission	per	capita	was	only	5.5	tons	(almost	five	times	lower	than	
the	U.S.).	Thus,	less	developed	countries	are	more	likely	to	prefer	a	model	in	which	emissions	
allowances	are	distributed	according	to	the	level	of	per	capita	emissions.80 
Another	argument	involving	equity	is	not	based	upon	the	historic	benefits	of	emissions	which	
led	to	climate	change	but	on	the	possible	adverse	effects.	For	example,	Hsiang	and	colleagues	
																																								 																				
79 Michael Jacobs, ‘Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept’ in Andrew Dobson (ed), Fairness and Futurity: Essays on 
Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (Oxford University Press 1999) p.33. 
80 “The obvious result would be massive financial transfers from countries with actual per capita emissions above this allocated 
level, to countries with actual per capita emissions below it.” Cédric Philibert, ‘How Could Emissions Trading Benefit Developing 
Countries’ (2000) 28 Energy Policy 947. 
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identify	that	“for	rich	countries	an	additional	degree	of	warming	results	in	little	effect,	but	for	
poor	 countries	 the	 same	 change	 leads	 to	 very	 significant	 costs	 in	 the	 form	 of	 reduced	
economic	growth	and	increased	costs	of	military	and	other	conflicts.”81	 This	is	pointing	to	the	
heterogeneous	between	countries.	Some	countries	are	rich	in	oil	and	coal	recourses,82	 some	
are	low-lying	lands	at	low-latitudes	in	risk	of	inundation.83	 From	a	climate	change	perspective,	
such	 differences	 are	 meaningful	 in	 assessing	 damages	 referred	 as	 vulnerable	 sectors	
(agriculture,	coastal	zones,	human	mortality,	and	natural	ecosystems).84	 The	current	situation	
is	that	there	exists	a	higher	vulnerability	to	climate	change	for	developing	countries	than	for	
developed	 countries;	 hence	 climate	 change	 risks	 are	 different	 across	 countries.	 Some	
developing	 countries	 have	more	 to	 lose	 if	 they	 are	 unable	 to	 cope	with	 the	 effects85	 while	
others	are	more	concerned	about	the	costs	of	 international	agreements	that	“will	 limit	their	
markets	 for	 fossil	 fuel	 or	 hamper	 their	 perceived	 chances	 of	 development.”86	 Finally,	 the	
causes	 of	 environmental	 degradation	 and	 lack	 of	 local	 R	 &	 D	 improvement	 are	 most	
significantly	 caused	 by	 financial	 factors	 occurring	 in	 developing	 countries.87	 As	 a	 result,	
																																								 																				
81 Solomon M. Hsiang, Kyle C. Meng and Mark A. Cane, ‘Civil Conflicts are Associated with the Global Climate’ (2011) 476 
Nature 438. 
82 For example, China, India and Africa 
83 Subtropical arid and semi-arid regions will likely experience less precipitation than high latitude places. Over wet tropical 
regions, extreme precipitation events will very likely be more intense and more frequent in a warmer world. See IPCC Working 
Group III Technical Support Unit, IPCC Special Report on Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land 
Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse Gas Fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems (SR2) (SR2 Scoping Meeting, Dublin, 
February 2017, 2017). 
84 Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee and Erik F. Haites 
eds, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1996). 
85 For example, “East Africa can expect to experience increased short rains, while west Africa should expect heavier monsoons. 
Burma, Bangladesh and India can expect stronger cyclones; elsewhere in southern Asia, heavier summer rains are anticipated. 
Indonesia may receive less rainfall between July and October.” IPCC Working Group III Technical Support Unit (n 83). 
86 Thomas Sterner, ‘Climate Change & Developing Countries: Considerations for Rio+20’ Resources for the Future Issue 180 
Spring/Summer 2012, (Jun 8, 2012) 
<http://www.rff.org/research/publications/climate-change-developing-countries-considerations-rio20> accessed 14 Jul 2017 
87 United Nations, The Road from Johannesburg: World Submit on Sustainable Development: What was Achieved and the Way 
Forward (2003) quoted by Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Defining Sustainable Development after Earth Summit 2002’ (2003) 26 Loy LA Int'l 
& Comp L Rev 111. 
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without	 any	 incentives,	 reaching	 consensus	 in	 negotiating	 international	 environment	
protection	and	corresponding	obligations	among	developing	countries	is	very	difficult.	  
This	phenomenon	has	 led	 some	 to	believe	erroneously	 that	developing	countries88	 have	no	
interest	 in	 contributing	 to	 the	 mitigation	 of	 climate	 change.	 Such	 misunderstanding	 might	
have	 based	 on	 views	 of	 developing	 countries	 on	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 burden	 to	 combat	
climate	change.	In	fact,	such	views	do	not	necessarily	proof	non-interest	overall.	A	developing	
country	 that	 rejects	MEA	proposals	 for	equal	 reductions	 in	emissions	could	have	valued	 the	
issue	 no	 less	 than	 other	 countries.	 The	 ‘growth	 economies’	 of	 developing	 countries	 are	
unwilling	to	accede	to	the	request	of	developed	countries	 to	slow	their	economic	growth	 in	
order	to	solve	the	planet’s	environmental	problems	because	such	problems	are	seen	by	these	
developing	 countries	 as	 primarily	 the	 result	 of	 years	 of	 unrestrained	 economic	 growth	 in	
developed	countries.89	 If	more	advanced	technologies	are	made	cheap	and	available	so	they	
can	produce	energy	 in	a	 less	polluting	way,	economically	these	countries	may	then	be	more	
willing	and	able	to	reduce	emissions.	
All	 in	 all,	 climate	 change	 is	 inherently	 a	 global	 issue	 and	 the	 risk	 is	 globally	 distributed.	
Accordingly	responsibility	for	addressing	the	problem	should	be	shared	by	all	countries.90	 To	
be	 successful	 in	addressing	climate	change,	we	cannot	 ignore	 issues	of	 fairness,	equity,	and	
environment	 protection.	 In	 fact,	 some	 developing	 countries	 have	 been	 initiating	 actions	 in	
																																								 																				
88 There were apparently different ‘blocs’ within the Rio / UNFCCC negotiations in the developing world including the BRICS, 
the Association of Island States, Least Developing Countries. During the creation of G77 (the group of developing countries) the 
division of interests between developing countries in the UNFCC negotiations are noted by a substantial literature. See for example 
Adil Najam, Saleemul Huq and Youba Sokona, ‘Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto: developing countries concerns and interests’ 
(2003) 3 Climate Policy 221; See also NGO diplomacy: the influence of nongovernmental organizations in international 
environmental negotiations (Michele Merrill Betsill and Elisabeth Corell eds, Mit Press 2008). 
89 Doherty (n 69). 
90 Henry D. Jacoby and others, ‘CO2 Emissions Limits: Economic Adjustments and the Distribution of Burdens’ (1997) 18 The 
Energy Journal 31. 
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dealing	with	 the	climate	change	crisis.91	 More	positive	and	active	attitudes	 towards	climate	
change	 are	 reflected	 in	 decision-	 and	 policy-making	 in	 these	 countries.92	 As	 a	 reflection	 of	
this,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	has	been	ratified	by	192	parties	and	states	that:	
developed	 countries	 are	 principally	 responsible	 for	 the	 current	 high	 levels	 of	 GHG	
emissions	in	the	atmosphere	as	a	result	of	more	than	150	years	of	industrial	activity,	and	
places	 a	 heavier	 burden	 on	 developed	 nations	 under	 the	 principle	 of	 “common	 but	
differentiated	responsibilities.”93	
Challenges	remain	for	developing	countries	because	those	that	are	most	vulnerable	in	climate	
change	are	also	 the	ones	 lack	environmentally	 friendly	 technologies	and	human	 resource	 in	
green	 production	 area.	 Unfortunately	 these	 countries	 are	 less	 able	 in	 making	 their	 voice	
accountable	in	international	negotiations	as	well.	From	a	fair	philosophy,	assistance	should	be	
made	available	to	these	countries	regarding	knowledge	and	finance.	Based	on	these	reasons,	
it	falls	to	the	developed	countries	to	take	the	greater	burden	and	TT	is	a	key	pillar	in	impelling	
global	 environmental	 protection.	 Moreover,	 utilizing	 resources	 is	 imperative	 to	 economic	
development	 and,	 as	 such,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 cripple	 developing	 countries	 with	
burdensome	emissions-cutting	requirements.	This	is	why	
there	is	generally	a	high	degree	of	ambition	and	political	support	for green	growth	across	
the	 developing	 world,	 but	 only	 where	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 poverty	 reduction,	 higher	 social 
																																								 																				
91 “Quite a few development programs motivated by national and local economic goals (in developing countries) are also good for 
climate, such as energy efficiency or sustainable water resource management. A lot of countries have energy efficiency programs 
which are not driven by climate change considerations, but by concerns about energy security.” World Bank, Development and 
Climate Change: A Strategic Framework for the World Bank Group (Completion Report FY09–11, World Bank Washington DC 
2012). 
92 G. E. Skorov and otnosheniĭ Institut mirovoĭ ėkonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh, Science, Technology, and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries (G. E. Skorov ed, Pergamon Press 1978). 
93 Environmental Protection Agency, ‘The Kyoto Protocol’   <http://www.epa.ie/climate/thekyotoprotocol/> accessed May 2017. 
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welfare	and	job	creation.	In	addition,	it	must	support	the	structural	transformation	of	the	
economy	to achieve	higher	productivity	and	more	value	added.94	
Thus,	the	transfer	of	new	technologies	needs	to	allow	developing	countries	to	continue	using	
resource	 and	 developing	 economies	 in	 a	 more	 environmentally	 sound	 manner95 that	 is	
meaningful	both	for	their	national	welfare	and	the	world's	future	in	the	long	term.	
3.5 Defining developing countries  
TT	 aid	 can	be	 seen	 as	 a	 possible	way	of	 paying	back	 less	 developed	 countries	 for	what	has	
been	 taken	 from	 them	 or	 as	 an	 incentive	 to	 gain	 their	 participation	 in	 international	
agreements.	 Such	 views	 became	 popular	 among	 decolonized	 countries	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	
1960s.	With	the	fading	of	the	old	colonial	powers,	and	in	the	initial	discussion	of	TT	in	NIEO,	it	
was	an	attempt	by	the	ex-colonies	to	get	some	payback	 from	their	 former	colonial	masters.	
From	the	1970s	onwards	the	issue	has	been	how	global	environmental	problems	can	be	dealt	
with	 in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 overly	 burden	 developing	 countries.	 Therefore,	 the	 differing	
viewpoints	of	countries	are	no	longer	divided	between	the	colonizer	and	the	colonized	but	the	
developed	 and	 developing	 countries.	 Together	with	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 “sustainable	
development,”96	 the	 question	 of	 technology	 distribution	 triggered	 further	 debates.	 One	 of	
the	 difficult	 questions	 is	 how	 to	 separate	 countries	 into	 different	 categories	 because,	
according	to	some	less	developed	countries,	the	poor	group	(developing	countries)	deserves	
payback	or	assistance	from	the	richer	one	(developed	countries).	
																																								 																				
94 OECD, Green Growth and Developing Countries (Consultation Draft, June 2012, 2012). 
95 Lorelyn Hall, ‘Technology Tranfers under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (2005-2006) 17 Colo 
J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 59. 
96 Marina V. Cazorla and Michael A. Toman, ‘International Equity and Climate Change Policy’ in Michael A. Toman (ed), 
Climate change economics and policy: An RFF anthology (Resource for the Future Washington, DC 2001). 
	 108	
Nations	 in	the	world	are	 in	different	stages	of	economic	and	technological	development	but	
there	 is	 no	 absolute	 way	 to	 classify	 them.	 Generally	 speaking,	 developing	 countries	 are	
countries	that	have	not	reached	a	high	degree	of	industrialization	and	keep	a	medium	to	low	
standard	 of	 living	 within	 their	 population.	 But	 to	 further	 define	 the	 concept,	 various	
definitions	of	‘developing	countries’	are	available	for	countries	to	classify	themselves	because	
the	most	 recognized	 international	organizations	 (such	as	 the	WTO)	did	not	give	any	specific	
definitions	 of	 “developed”	 and	 “developing”	 countries,	 meaning	 that	 member	 states	 can	
announce	themselves	as	“developed”	or	“developing”	countries.	This	has	provided	a	chance	
for	 countries	 to	 classify	 themselves	 according	 to	 different	 variables	 to	 meet	 their	 specific	
needs.	Even	so,	there	are	some	frequently	used	classifications.	For	example,	some	institutions	
produce	lists	of	"developed	countries"	which	can	be	used	as	a	counter	concept	to	“developing	
countries”.97	 There	 is	 yet	 a	 unified	 convention	 for	 determining	 developed	 and	 developing	
countries	 thus	 the	 UN	 list	 has	 to	 be	 designed	 mostly	 according	 to	 trade	 practice.98	 Many	
other	institutions	have	made	lists	that	are	referred	to	occasionally	when	discussing	developed	
countries.	 For	 example,	 the	 34	 members	 of	 OECD	 are	 often	 considered	 as	 a	 group	 of	
developed	 countries 99 	 and	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 lists	 35	 "advanced	
economies"	 which	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 developed	 countries.100.	 The	 66	 "high	 income	
																																								 																				
97 E.g. The International Monetary Fund (IMF); The OECD; The World Bank 
98 “In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania 
and Europe are considered developed regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also 
treated as developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as 
developing countries; and countries of Eastern Europe and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics countries in Europe are 
not included under either developed or developing regions” Statistics Division United Nations, ‘Standard Country or Area Codes 
for Statistical Use (M49)’ (United Nations)  <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> accessed 22 Aug 2017. 
99 Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and Government of Japan Cabinet Office, ‘Minutes of Forum #26: Global 
Strategy Series 2 - Japan as It Should Be (Outline)’ (ESRI Economic Policy Forum, December 2006)  
<http://www.esri.go.jp/en/workshop/forum/minute/minute26-e.html> accessed 2013-07-12. 
100 IMF Advanced Economies List. I. M. F. Research, World Economic Outlook, October 2012: Coping with High Debt and 
Sluggish Growth (International Monetary Fund 2012) p.180; I. M. F. Research, World Economic Outlook, April 2011: Tensions 
from the Two-Speed Recovery: Unemployment, Commodities, and Capital Flows (International Monetary Fund 2011) p.165. 
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countries"	classified	by	the	World	Bank	are	also	helpful	 in	understanding	developed	country	
from	a	gross	national	income	(GNI)	per	capita	aspect.101	 	
The	 OECD	 Development	 Assistance	 Committee	 (DAC)	 has	 established	 a	 list	 of	 official	
development	assistance	(ODA)	Recipients.	Countries	included	in	the	list	can	be	considered	in	
some	way	as	developing	countries.	This	list	consists	of	“all	low-	and	middle-income	countries	
based	on	GNI	per	capita	as	published	by	the	World	Bank,	with	the	exception	of	G8	members,	
EU	members,	and	countries	with	a	firm	date	for	entry	into	the	EU.”102	 The	list	also	includes	all	
of	the	least	developed	countries	(LDCs)	as	defined	by	the	UN.103	 The	list	of	ODA	recipients	is	
designed	 to	 identify	 countries	 and	 economies	 that	 are	 eligible	 to	 receive	 resource	 flows	
originating	 in	 donor	 countries.104	 The	 OECD	 claims	 that	 for	 a	 country	 to	 be	 considered	 as	
qualifying	 for	 the	developing	country	 list,	decisions	have	 to	be	agreed	by	 the	ODA	between	
the	 governments	 of	 22	 OECD	member	 countries.	While	 the	 OECD	 definition	 holds	 a	 lot	 of	
weight	 among	 classification	 sets,	most	 of	 its	member	 states	 are	 richer	 or	 better-developed	
nations.	This	definition	clearly	 takes	economic	development	or	 income	variables	to	be	more	
important	than	other	factors	in	defining	“developing”.	
The	 World	 Bank	 employs	 analytical	 income	 categories105	 based	 on	 the	 Bank's	 operational	
lending	categories.	The	definition	is	provided	for	operational	and	analytical	purposes,	and	the	
																																								 																				
101World Bank DataBank, ‘World Bank List of Economies ’ (World Bank, July 2016)  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS> . 
102 ESRC, ‘GCRF Strategic Networks call 2016 Frequently asked questions’ Economic and Social Research Council updated 24 
June 2016 <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/files/funding/funding-opportunities/gcrf-strategic-networks-call-2016-faqs/> accessed Feburary 
2017. 
103 The list of LDCs includes: African, Asian and Island LDCs. “The list is reviewed every three years by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in the light of recommendations by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP). The 
following three criteria were used by the CDP in the latest review of the list, in March 2012.” UNCTAD, The Least Developed 
Countries Report 2012 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/LDC/2012, 2012) 
104 DAC List of ODA Recipients’ (OECD website, 1st Janurary 2015)  <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm> accessed 
Feburary 2017 
105 According to the World Bank classification, China ($4,382-International Monetary Fund; $4,393-World Bank), with its 2010 
GDP (nominal) per capita, is an upper middle income country; In 2010, 391000 patent has been granted ranking second of the 
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main	 criterion	 for	 classifying	 economies	 is	 GNI	 per	 capita.	 Three	 categories	 were	 created	
based	on	countries’	GNI	per	capita:	low	income,	middle	income	(subdivided	into	lower	middle	
and	 upper	 middle),	 and	 high	 income.	 The	 low-income	 and	 middle-income	 countries	 are	
sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 developing	 economies.106	 The	 intention	 of	 using	 these	 terms	 is	
merely	for	convenience	“not	to	imply	that	all	economies	in	the	group	are	experiencing	similar	
development	 or	 that	 other	 economies	 have	 reached	 a	 preferred	 or	 final	 stage	 of	
development.” 107 	 Such	 classification	 by	 GNI	 does	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	 a	 country’s	
development	 level,	 but	 it	 does	 affect	 the	 countries’	 eligibility	 in	 getting	 loans	 from	 the	
International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	(IBRD).	While	among	institutions,	GNI	
per	capita	is	often	used	to	identify	a	country’s	development	status.	And	the	most	important,	
GNI	per	capita,	does	not	reflect	 real	welfare	 levels	of	 the	society,	which	requires	a	 focus	on	
the	 importance	 of	 public	 health,	 degree	 of	 civilization,	 environmental	 conditions,	 and	 the	
social	and	cultural	needs	of	citizens.	This	is	particularly	important	when	“developing	country”	
is	employed	as	a	concept	in	agreements	dealing	with	environmental	issues.108	
Classification	by	 income	establishes	a	conventional	 (and	probably	the	most	common)	means	
of	 understanding	 the	 phrase	 “developing	 country”,	 yet	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	 ever	
aspect	 of	 development	 status.	 Different	 classification	 of	 nations	 can	 be	 found	 in	 numerous	
theoretical	 systems	 that	 in	 fact	 have	 diverse	 orientations.	 There	 are	 theories	 of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
world. 
106 “Economies are divided according to 2012 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low 
income, $1,035 or less; lower middle income, $1,036–$4,085; upper middle income, $4,086–$12,615; and high income, $12,616 or 
more.” World Bank, ‘World Bank Country and Lending Groups’ (The World Bank Website)  
<https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519> accessed 7 Jul 2017 
107 Global Economic Prospects: Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda (The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank, 2004) 
108 See for example: The Kyoto Protocol Article 2 (3) and Article 3 (14). 
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decolonization, 109 	 anti-imperialism, 110 	 liberation	 theology, 111 	 political	 economy 112 	 and	
Marxism. 113 	 However,	 these	 theories	 cannot	 be	 simply	 applied	 to	 development	
classifications.	 Take	 political	 economy	 as	 an	 example:	 studies	 on	 political	 economy	 mainly	
focus	on	a	country’s	production	and	trade.	Therefore,	employing	such	a	theory	might	classify	
countries	that	have	 large	export	volumes	 like	China	as	developed	countries.	However,	when	
considering	 the	excessive	 labour	 resources	and	 the	 labour-intensive	means	of	production	 in	
the	 country,	 it	 becomes	 problematic.	 Another	 important	 factor	 that	 indicates	 level	 of	
development	 in	 a	 country	 is	 changes	 in	 different	 sectors	 attributing	 to	 the	 development.	
Some	 researchers	 emphasize	 the	 increased	 awareness	 and	 knowledge	 of	 investment	 in	
human	 capital	 (education,	 health,	 etc.)	 as	 indictor	 of	 identifying	 development	 status.	 For	
example,	 Schultz’s	 research114	 into	 economic	 development,	with	 particular	 consideration	of	
the	 problems	 of	 developing	 countries,	 discovered	 that	well	 educated	 farmers	 can	 be	more	
productive	than	the	under-educated	ones.	Mohammed	Tamim,115	 concludes	that	developing	
countries	 are	 in	 the	 transition	phase	 from	 a	 traditional	way	of	 living	 to	 the	modern	way	of	
living	ever	 since	 the	 Industrial	Revolution	 in	 the	nineteenth	century;	They	are	developing	 in	
different	 aspects	 such	 as	 social,	 economic,	 demographic,	 cultural	 transition,	 etc.	 and	 the	
importance	of	education	levels	in	relation	to	development	is	highlighted.	
																																								 																				
109 David Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World: trade, colonialism, dependence and development (Wiley-Blackwell 1999). 
110 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’ (1953) 6 The Economic History Review 1. 
111 Eddy Muskus, ‘Liberation Theology: Its Origins And Early Development’ in Rev Dr Eryl Davies MA BD (ed), Foundations: A 
Journal of Evangelical Theology (British Evangelical Council 2015) 
112 Erik Gartzke and Dominic Rohner, ‘The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development’ (2011) 41 
British Journal of Political Science 525. 
113 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy, vol 2 (Cambridge University Press 1979). 
114 Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Value of Education (Columbia University Press 1963). 
115 Mohammed Tamim, Le Spectre du Tiers-monde: L’éducation Pour le Développement (Editions L'Harmattan 2002). 
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Relatively	 recently,	 a	 set	 of	 new	 measurements	 was	 included	 in	 a	 UN	 Development	
Programme's	Human	Development	Report:	the	Human	Development	Index.116	 This	is	a	fresh	
means	 of	measuring	well-being,	 including	 “life	 expectancy,	 literacy,	 education,	 standards	 of	
living,	and	quality	of	life	for	countries	worldwide.”117	 This	is	useful	to	measure	the	impact	of	
economic	policies	on	quality	of	 life.	The	 Index	was	established	to	shift	 the	focus	on	“human	
well-being	 rather	 than	 popular	 income-centric	 measures	 like	 GDP	 per	 capita.”118 	 Four	
categories	were	 developed	 to	 divide	 countries	 according	 to	 human	development:	 very	 high	
human	 development,	 high	 human	 development,	 medium	 human	 development	 and	 low	
human	 development.119	 The	 later	 three	 categories	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 developing	 groups	
and	 the	 “very	 high	 human	 development”	 represents	 developed	 countries	 in	 some	 way.	
Interestingly,	32	countries120	 classified	as	high	income	by	the	World	Bank,	such	as	Russia,	fall	
outside	 the	 very	 high	 Human	 Development	 list.	 This	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 human	well-being	
perspective	taken	by	the	Index.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 TT,	 indicators	 to	 be	 used	 when	 defining	 developing	 countries	 could	 be	
further	differentiated	from	the	aforementioned	ways	of	interpreting.	For	example,	when	the	
Montreal	 Protocol	 deals	 with	 parties’	 application	 to	 be	 listed	 as	 a	 developing	 country	
																																								 																				
116 United Nations, 2013 Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 2013, 2013). 
117 Golam Kibira, ‘Mining: Friend or Foe? Economic, Environmental and Social Impacts- An Overview’ Science & Technology 
Article 35, 13 March 2013 
<http://www.sydneybashi-bangla.com/Articles/GolamKibria_Mining_Friend%20or%20Foe.%20Economic_Environmental%20and
%20Social%20impacts_An%20overview_11%20March%202013%20%5Bsent%5D.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
118 “The Human Development Index is calculated using various indicators for quality of life, such as health indicators and access to 
healthcare services, life expectancy at birth, nutrition levels, education and literacy levels, access to basic needs such as water and 
sanitation, and so on. It also takes into account GDP per capita in terms of Purchasing Power Parity and percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line.” Ian Graham, ‘Human Development Index’ (NationMaster Website, 23 Feb 2005)  
<http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/Human-Development-Index> accessed 7 Jun 2017. 
119 “Countries high on the Human Development Index tend to have annual population growth rates of 1 percent or less, high urban 
population percentages (65 percent and up) and balanced percentages of people under 15 and over 65 years of age. Those low on 
the index tend to have annual population growth rates of 1.5 percent or higher, less than 35 percent of the population in urban areas, 
and an under-15 population that greatly outnumbers those above 65 years (in most cases, more than 10 times as many.)” See ibid. 
120 Aruba, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrian, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Curaçao, Faroe Islands, 
French Polynesia, Greenland, Guam, Isle of Man, Kuwait, Latvia, Monaco, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana, Islands, Oman, 
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operating	under	Article	5	of	the	Protocol,	as	well	as	considering	the	countries’	classification	as	
a	developing	country	by	the	World	Bank	and	the	UN	Development	Program,	the	Meeting	of	
the	 Parties	 also	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 difficulty	 of	 its	 economic	 situation	 and	 its	 low	 per	
capita	consumption	of	ozone-depleting	substances	listed	under	Annex	A.121	 The	UNFCCC,	as	
by	 far	 the	 most	 successful	 environmental	 agreement	 “divides	 countries	 into	 three	 main	
groups122 	 according	 to	 differing	 commitments.”123 	 Countries	 listed	 under	 Annex	 II	 are	
generally	industrialized	countries	included	by	the	OECD,	leaving	out	the	members	that	are	in	
their	 transition	 period.124	 The	 Annex	 II	 countries	 are	 imposed	 on	 with	 more	 obligations	
requiring	 them	“to	provide	 financial	 resources	 to	 enable	developing	 countries	 to	undertake	
emissions	 reduction	 activities	 under	 the	 Convention	 and	 to	 help	 them	 adapt	 to	 adverse	
effects	 of	 climate	 change.”125	 Such	 requirements	 include	 the	 responsibility	 to	 promote	 TT	
regarding	environmental	protection	as	well,	through	capital	donations	and	other	actions.	In	a	
sense,	it	represents	the	way	that	the	UNFCCC’s	definition	of	a	developing	country	consists	of	
their	economic	development	level	and	their	vulnerability126	 to	climate	change.	 	
So	 far,	 the	 most	 commonly	 employed	 criterion	 relies	 basically	 on	 the	 countries’	 economic	
level,	 classifying	 states	 into	 developed	 or	 developing	 countries.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	 take	
account	of	technological	capacities.	If	based	on	empirical	evidence,	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	
																																								 																				
121 See for example Decision XIV/2: Application by Armenia for developing country status under the Montreal Protocol, adopted 
at the14th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29th November, 2002 
122 Annex I, Annex II and non-Annex Countries 
123 UNFCCC, ‘Parties and Observers’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Website)  
<http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php> accessed Feburary 2017 
124 Including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. 
125 UNFCCC (n 123). 
126 for example Non-Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC “are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries 
are recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with 
low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others (such as countries that rely heavily on income from 
fossil fuel production and commerce) feel more vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response measures. 
The Convention emphasizes activities that promise to answer the special needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as 
investment, insurance and technology transfer.” Ibid 
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between	nations	that	have	substantial	scientific	and	technological	capability	from	those	which	
have	 not.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 level	 of	 development	 of	 a	 country’s	
independent	 technological	 capability	 as	 a	 parameter	 when	 classifying	 countries	 a	 research	
that	studies	 justification	for	 international	TT.	Patent	growth	seems	the	most	straightforward	
mechanism	 to	 be	 used	 as	 a	 variable	 to	 examine	 the	 technology	 capacity	 development	 of	 a	
country.	 For	 example,	 the	 number	 of	 patent	 holders	 in	 the	 “BRIC”	 countries	 (Brazil,	 Russia,	
India	 and	 China)	 grew	 by	 33	 per	 cent	 from	 1998	 to	 2008,	 with	 almost	 all	 of	 that	 growth	
occurring	 in	China.127	 Growth	 in	the	number	of	patents	registered,	 in	theory,	could	 indicate	
better	 technological	 development	 in	 a	 country	 with	 a	 greater	 capacity	 of	 receiving	
international	TT	as	well	as	 in	 independent	 technology	development.	For	example,	China	has	
predicted	 that	 the	number	of	Patent	Cooperation	Treaty	 (PCT)128	 patent	applications	 in	 the	
country	will	increase	to	60,000	by	2020.129	 Accordingly,	the	export	volume	of	IP	royalties	will	
rise	 to	 10	 billion	 USD	 during	 the	 period	 of	 2016–2020.130	 In	 three	 years,	 the	 amount	 of	
IP-pledge	financing	for	one	year	will	 increase	to	180	billion	Yuan.131	 In	fact,	 in	2014	Chinese	
patent	office	“received	928,000	invention	patent	applications,	began	ranking	top	in	the	world,	
accounting	 for	 34	 per	 cent	 of	 total	 world	 applications.”132	 From	 this	 aspect,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	
identify	China	as	a	developing	country,	technology-wise.	
																																								 																				
127 Copenhagen Economics and The IPR Company, Are IPR a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology 
(Copenhagen Economics Informed Decisions, 2009). Quoted by Kiel Downey, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Renewable Energy 
Technology Transfer in China’ (2012) 9 SCJ Int'l L & Bus 89. 
128 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
129 PTI, ‘China to strengthen protection of intellectual property rights’ The Economic Times (Bejing, Jan 17, 2017) 
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/56619524.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campai
gn=cppst> . 
130 Ibid. 
131 SIPO, ‘Indexes of IP Protection and Utilization in the 13th Five-year Plan Period’ (State Intellectual Property Office of The 
P.R.C 2017-01-25)  <http://english.sipo.gov.cn/specialtopic/number/201701/t20170125_1308117.html> . 
132 China IP News, ‘WIPO Report: China Driving Growth in Global Patent Filings Rise’ (China Council for the Promotion and 
International Trade, 01/07/2016)  <http://en.ccpit.org/info/info_40288117521acbb801521b46c1f10010.html> . 
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Interestingly,	 in	 the	 thirteenth	 five-year	 plan	 index,	 China	 revealed	 that	 invention	 patent	
ownership	 will	 increase	 to	 12	 per	 10,000	 people. 133 	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	 Chinese	
government	has	taken	patent	applications	by	population	together	as	a	parameter	to	analyze	
its	technology	capacity.	Based	on	the	2012	data	provided	by	the	European	Patent	Office,	Joff	
Wild	 has	made	 a	 table	 based	 on	 population	 and	 number	 of	 patent	 applications	 that	 shows	
how	ranking	has	changed	among	countries	 from	the	 top	50	countries	of	origin	according	 to	
their	 total	number	of	applications.134	 Ranking	 fourth	 in	 the	 top	50	 list,	China’s	position	has	
dropped	to	the	nineteenth,	adding	the	population	variable.	This	reminds	us	of	the	limitations	
of	using	patent	application	numbers	as	a	 criterion	 to	 classify	 countries’	development	 levels.	
More	factors	need	to	be	taken	into	consideration.	For	example,	countries	that	have	well-built	
R	 &	 D	 systems135	 and	 produce	 technologies	 on	 a	 regular	 basis,	 independently,	 are	 to	 be	
considered	as	developed.	Countries	that	have	the	potential	 to	attract	R	&	D	 investment	and	
product	 availability,	with	 significant	 innovative/imitative/duplicative	 capacities	 but	with	 less	
most	 advanced	 technologies	 such	 as	 Brazil,	 China,	 India	 and	 South	 Africa,	 are	 in	 a	
less-developed	class.	Those	who	have	no	such	strengths	at	all	and	thus	entirely	depending	on	
foreign	 assistance	 fall	 into	 a	 third	 group	 of	 the	 least	 developed.	 In	 addition,	 a	 country’s	
economic	 development	 status	 as	 a	 whole	 does	 not	 represent	 the	 technology-development	
level	of	each	 industry	 in	 that	country.136	 Recognizing	what	technology-development	stage	a	
country	is	at	will	help	in	developing	a	new	criterion	enabling	nations	to	be	properly	defined	as	
																																								 																				
133 Xinhua, ‘China Issues Plan to Develop Intellectual Property’ China Daily (Beijing, Jan 13, 2017) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-01/13/content_27950209.htm> . 
134 Joff Wild, ‘Forget the US, When it Comes to Patents per Person Switzerland Rules the Roost in Europe’ (IAM, Jan-13, 2017)  
<http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=3cadcdf9-c6e7-47a2-84b0-7ca8f4e884ea> accessed 9 Mar 2017. 
135 See data provided by Oecd Publishing, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2010 (OECD Pub. 2010). 
 
136 See detail discussion in later chapter on Climate Change Technology Transfer to China  
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developing	countries	in	specific	TT-related	cases.	The	most	widely	used	development	criteria	
are	based	on	 income	of	 citizen,	which	do	not	 look	 at	 the	 technology	 capacity	 of	 a	 country.	
Therefore	 they	 do	 not	 distinguish	 between	 countries	 that	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 receive	 and	
output	technologies	from	those	that	do	not.	In	fact,	countries	classified	differently	according	
to	 their	 technology-development	 level	 should	not	 theoretically	have	 the	 same	 responsibility	
for	 promoting	 TT.	 The	 upper	 class	 should	 engage	 themselves	 in	 attracting	 TT	 as	 well	 as	
exporting	 technologies	 and	 experience	 to	 others.	 The	 lower	 class	 should	 be	 given	 more	
assistance	related	to	capacity	building	with	institutional	and	management	guidance	provided	
at	an	 international	 level.	This	 is	practically	 feasible	now,	according	to	recent	research.137	 At	
the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 no	matter	 what	means	 of	 classification	 is	 applied,	 where	 a	 nation	 lies	
along	the	spectrum	of	“development”	does	have	an	effect	on	determining	 its	sense	of	what	
responsibility	is	to	be	borne	and	how	to	achieve	sustainable	development	in	the	future.	 	
3.6 Sustainable development  
As	 environmental	 derogation	 accelerates,	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 more	 balanced	 way	 of	
development	magnifies.	This	originated	from	decolonization,	beginning	in	earnest	in	the	late	
1950s	 and	 reaching	 its	 high	 point	 in	 the	 1960s.138	 It	 occurred	 at	 the	 same	 point	 from	 the	
1960s	 onwards	 as	 an	 increasing	 perception	 that	 the	 efforts	 of	 developing	 countries	 for	
sustained	 economic	 growth	 threatened	 both	 to	 exacerbate	 the	 environmental	 damage	
already	 being	 wrought	 by	 developed	 nations'	 activities	 and	 to	 conflict	 with	 the	 desire	 for	
environmental	protection	that	has	emerged	as	a	major	political	issue	globally	in	the	past	five	
																																								 																				
137 OECD, Measuring R&D in Developing Countries: Annex to the Frascati Manual (An Annex to the Frascati Manual, OECD 
DSTI/EAS/STP/NESTI(2011)5/FINAL, 2011). 
138 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Wiley-Blackwell 1991). 
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decades.139	 Although	 some	 concerns	 for	 environmental	 protection	 in	 developing	 countries	
are	 generated	 by	 developed	 countries	 either	 through	 altruistic	 motives	 or	 to	 hinder	 the	
development	 path	 of	 developing	 countries,	 it	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 strong	 call	 for	 a	 sustainable	
way	of	development,	as	it	 is	now	widely	believed	that	adverse	effects	will	occur	if	nothing	is	
done	today.	
There	are	many	definitions	of	sustainable	development,	some	in	the	narrow	sense	are	directly	
linked	 to	 increasing	 household	 income 140 	 and	 more	 comprehensive	 ones	 are	 about	
“achieving	 a	 group	 of	 objectives	 for	 poor	 people	 including	 better	 educational	 and	 job	
opportunities,	 greater	 gender	 equality,	 better	 health	 and	 nutrition,	 the	 protection	 of	 the	
environment,	 natural	 resources	 and	 biodiversity.”141	 The	 most	 famous	 is	 the	 Brundtland's	
definition,	 which	 stated	 “development	 that	 meets	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 present	 without	
compromising	 the	ability	of	 future	generations	 to	meet	 their	own	needs.”142	 This	definition	
emphasized	 the	needs	of	 the	poorer	 countries	 to	which	overriding	priority	 should	be	given.	
Moreover,	the	concept	of	needs	includes	needs	of	the	present	and	future	which	are	also	to	be	
assessed	 and	 valued	 by	 any	 international	 cooperation.	 It	 is,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 extent,	 a	
progression	in	identifying	the	special	needs	of	developing	countries	but	is	still	vague	because	
it	is	far	from	enough	to	answer	further	related	questions.	For	example,	what	are	the	needs	of	
the	present?	Are	there	any	needs	that	conflict	with	one	another?	If	clean	air	is	required,	might	
it	 conflict	 with	 the	 growth	 of	 some	 industry	 that	 is	 still	 depending	 on	 an	 energy-intensive	
																																								 																				
139 Colin M. Alberts, ‘Technology Transfer and Its Role in International Environmental Law: A Structural Dilemma’ (1992) 6 
Harv JL & Tech 63. 
140	 Vinod	Thomas	and	others,	The	Quality	of	Growth	(Washington,	D.C.	:	The	World	Bank.	2000)	p.23.	
141 D. Narayan-Parker and R. Patel, Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?, vol 1 (Oxford University Press for the World Bank 
2000) Chapter 2 Definiation of Poverty. 
142 The Brundtaland's definition, United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (General 
Assembly 96th plenary meeting, 11 December 1987, UN Doc A/RES/42/187, 1987). 
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approach	 to	 manufacturing?	 How	 would	 decisions	 made	 by	 a	 community	 or	 government	
about	these	conflicts	reflect	how	they	value	these	different	interests?	The	situation	gets	even	
more	 complex	 when	 one	 country’s	 needs	 conflict	 with	 another’s:	 for	 example,	 when	 one	
country’s	need	for	energy	results	in	acid	rain	that	damages	another	country's	water	recourses.	
Such	a	situation	raises	another	question	about	how	to	decide	whose	needs	are	met?	Is	it	more	
important	to	meet	the	needs	of	 the	poor	or	 the	rich,	 the	people	 in	one	country	or	another,	
this	generation	or	the	next	generation?	Whose	needs	should	be	prioritized	when	there	has	to	
be	a	trade-off?	With	all	of	the	unanswered	questions,	the	Brundtland's	definition	is	argued	to	
be	unclear.	But	the	Brundtland	definition	is	only	a	starting	point	for	a	principle	to	guide	action.	
Therefore	 it	 is	 too	 much	 to	 ask	 for	 it	 to	 articulated	 further.	 Policymakers	 at	 the	 global,	
national	and	 local	 level	use	sustainable	development	 to	establish	more	specific	policy	goals,	
targets	and	projects.	No	matter	what	context	it	is	used	in,	meeting	the	needs	of	the	future	is	
essential	and	it	possibly	depends	on	how	well	objectives	are	balanced	when	making	decisions	
today.	Such	objectives	consist	of	social,	economic,	environmental	goals,	and	so	on,	 involving	
factors	 that	 conflict	 with	 one	 and	 another.	 For	 instance,	 a	 need	 to	 improve	 people’s	 living	
standard	 by	 pursuing	 industrial	 growth	 might	 conflict	 with	 preserving	 natural	 resources.	
However,	 in	 considering	 the	 future	 growth	 in	 industries,	 a	 responsible	 use	 of	 natural	
resources	is	needed	from	the	present	leaving	enough	for	the	later	decades.	The	only	difficulty	
is	taking	reasonable	consideration	of	conflicts	into	planning. 
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In	 2002,	 the	 Johannesburg	 Declaration	 on	 Sustainable	 Development143	 was	 adopted	 at	 the	
World	 Summit	 on	 Sustainable	 Development	 (WSSD).	 The	 Declaration	 made	 clear	 that	
“achieving	 the	 goal	 of	 sustainable	 development	 would	 require	 addressing	 the	 significant	
differences	among	the	participating	countries,	with	sensitivity	to	equity,	poverty,	and	stages	
of	 development.”144	 Article	 11	 of	 the	 Declaration145	 recognizes	 that	 “poverty	 eradication,	
changing	 consumption	 and	 production	 patterns	 and	 protecting	 and	 managing	 the	 natural	
resource	 base	 for	 economic	 and	 social	 development	 are	 overarching	 objectives	 of	 and	
essential	 requirements	 for	 sustainable	 development.”	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Article	 18	 of	 the	
Declaration	calls	for	cooperative	work	
to	help	one	(country)	another	gain	access	to	financial	resources,	benefit	from	the	opening	
of	 markets,	 ensure	 capacity-	 building,	 use	 modern	 technology	 to	 bring	 about	
development	 and	 make	 sure	 that	 there	 is	 technology	 transfer,	 human	 resource	
development,	education	and	training	to	banish	underdevelopment	forever.	
This	Article	makes	 direct	 reference	 to	 TT	 in	 pursuing	 sustainable	 development.	 The	 summit	
agrees	 that	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	 climate	 change	 are	 already	 evident146	 and	 encourages	
developed	 countries	 to	 offer	 all	 kinds	 of	 assistance	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 sustainable	
development.147	 With	 the	 sustainable	 development	 goal	 adopted	 widely	 by	 countries	 in	
making	 national	 policies	 and	 negotiating	 in	 international	 agreements,	 TT	 is	 justified	 as	 an	
effective	aid	to	the	achievement	of	such	a	goal.	 	
																																								 																				
143 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, World Summit on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002, UN 
Doc A/CONF.199/20 
144 United Nations, The Road from Johannesburg: World Submit on Sustainable Development: What was Achieved and the Way 
Forward, quoted by Osofsky (n 87). 
145 The Johannesburg Declaration (n 143), Chapter 1, Resolution 1. 
146 Ibid Article 13. 
147 Ibid Article 22. 
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3.7 Technology transfer impediments 
There	still	exist	many	impediments	that	may	hinder	TT.	In	the	1970s,	based	on	the	awareness	
of	 the	 importance	of	 technology,	developing	countries	 launches	a	series	of	actions	aimed	at	
rebalancing	 the	 gap	 that	 led	 to	 the	 old	 colonies	 falling	 behind	Western	 economies.148	 And	
that	 is	when	 TT	 impediments	 started	 to	 become	 serious.	 During	 that	 time,	 in	 line	with	 the	
Declaration	 for	 the	 Establishment	 of	 the	 NIEO149	 adopted	 by	 the	 UN	 General	 Assembly	 in	
1974,	the	International	Code	of	Conduct	on	the	Transfer	of	Technology150	 was	established	in	
1977	of	and	under	 the	guidance	of	 the	UNCTAD.	The	 intention	of	 the	Code	was	 to	 regulate	
international	 TTs	 by	 eliminating	 the	 problematic	 clauses	 in	 TT	 contracts	 that	 will	 harm	
economic	development	of	developing	countries.	 For	example,	during	 the	 licensing	period,	 if	
grant-back	provisions	are	employed	in	a	licensing	agreement,	they	will	require	the	licensee	to	
disclose	 and	 transfer	 all	 improvements	 made	 to	 the	 licensed	 technology.	 Such	 a	 provision	
deprived	 the	 transferee	 parties	 from	 enjoying	 the	 fruits	 of	 their	 independent	 innovations.	
Other	 resorts	 like	 exclusive	 dealing151	 are	 frequently	 used	 in	 TT	 contracts.	 It	 requires	 a	
supplier	 to	 sell	 their	 goods	 only	 through	 a	 particular	 retail	 or	 wholesale	 outlet	 within	 a	
particular	region.	Thus	the	transferor	company	is	able	to	directly	or	indirectly	manipulate	the	
price	 and	 sales	 volumes.	 Likewise,	 there	 was	 collusion	 among	 competitors	 to	 control	 the	
market,	called	price-fixing.152	 Such	behaviour	will	affect	product	selling	by	unifying	price	and	
discounts	according	to	order	quantities,	qualities,	or	types.	Every	change	made	to	the	sale	will	
																																								 																				
148 Peter K. Yu, ‘A Tale of Two Development Agendas’ (2009) 35 Ohio NUL Rev 465. 
149 The New International Economic Order (n 3). For a retrospective analysis of the effects of the Declaration, see UNCTAD, 
‘Transfer of Technology’ (n 37). 
150 International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, United Nations General Assembly, 17 December 1985, UN Doc 
A/RES/40/184. 
151 ‘Exclusive Dealing’ (BusinessDictionary)  <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/exclusive-dealing.html> accessed 
11 Jun 2017. 
152 ‘Price Fixing’ (BusinessDictionary)  <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/price-fixing.html> accessed 11 Jun 2017. 
	 121	
have	to	be	agreed	among	colluders.153	 The	appearance	of	such	harmful	clauses	that	needed	
to	be	regulated	or	forbidden	revealed	the	fears	of	technology	owners	and	the	tense	relations	
between	transferor	and	transferee.	Unfortunately,	 the	 late	1970s	and	early	1980s	economic	
recession	has	diminished	support	for	the	Code	and	in	1985,	negotiations	over	the	issue	finally	
stopped.154	 But	these	harmful	clauses	could	impede	green	TT	nowadays	and	still	have	to	be	
considered	in	everyday	business	and	future	MEA	practice.	
3.8 Concluding and bridging  
A	historical	view	recognizes	that	TT	has	been	an	important	need	in	the	past	and	it	remains	so	
today,	as	it	is	a	crucial	aid	for	developing	countries	to	improve	the	welfare	of	citizens	and	to	
narrow	the	technology	gap	between	them	and	the	more	developed	nations.	Having	reviewed	
the	different	definitions	of	TT,	this	thesis	took	a	lens	to	look	at	it	with	full	consideration	of	the	
crisis	of	climate	change,	therefore,	focus	on	technologies	that	are	environmentally	sound.	In	
such	 a	 context,	 where	 climate	 change	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 global	 issue,	 the	 responsibility	 for	
resolving	 the	 problem	 must	 also	 be	 globally	 distributed.	 In	 deciding	 on	 differentiated	
responsibilities,	 and	 what	 exactly	 is	 meant	 by	 developing	 countries,	 the	 author	 choses	 the	
definition	 employed	 by	 MEAs	 and	 suggests	 that	 such	 decision	 should	 reflect	 a	 country’s	
technology	 level	 as	 well.	 As	 ideal	 as	 this	 idea	 is,	 the	 actualization	 of	 it	 depends	 on	 the	
prominence	of	international	cooperation.	In	the	following	chapter,	MEAs,	especially	the	most	
important,	UNFCCC,	will	 be	 studied	 and	 its	 function	 and	 future	will	 be	 looked	 at	 in	 a	more	
detail.
																																								 																				
153 Walter B. Erickson, ‘Economics of price fixing’ (1968) 2 Antitrust L & Econ Rev 83. 
154 “The activist developing countries’ legislation, which had inspired numerous provisions in the draft code, was called into 
question by the countries’ own lawmakers and subsequently amended to reflect new economic realities. These trends, which 
became evident in the early eighties, led most developing countries to lose interest in the code effort.” Susan K. Sell, Power and 
Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (SUNY Press 1998). 
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Chapter	IV:	Climate	Change	TT	and	International	Cooperation	
4.1 Introduction  
The	need	 for	 TT	has	never	been	more	 important	 than	now	as	a	 result	of	 the	global	 goal	 to	
confront	 the	 crisis	 of	 climate	 change.	 There	 has	 been	 an	 increasing	 amount	 of	 evidence	 of	
climate	change	and	its	damage	confirmed	in	the	last	two	decades,	such	as	the	shrinking	of	the	
ice	 sheets	 in	 the	 Arctic	 and	 increases	 in	 extreme	weather.1	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	
awareness	 that	 the	 increasing	national	 and	 international	environmental	problems,	 including	
global	 warming,	 are	 anthropogenic.2	 Fortunately,	 some	 argue	 that	 the	 advancement	 of	
technology	 is	 limitless	 and	 can	 solve	 all	 the	 consequences	 of	 manmade	 environmental	
damage.3	 Some	 even	 believe	 that	 there	 are	 already	 enough	 technologies	 now	 to	 confront	
climate	change.4	 This	is	overly	optimistic,	as	it	is	almost	impossible	to	estimate	the	damage	of	
climate	change	precisely	due	to	the	difficulties	in	finding	counterfactuals	during	assessment	in	
the	 first	 place.5	 Ideally,	 it	 should	 offset	 environmental	 deterioration	 at	 some	 point	 with	
green-tech	 –	 the	 primary	 means	 of	 addressing	 these	 problems	 –	 being	 adopted	 by	 the	
majority	of	countries.	Turning	that	vision	into	a	practical	reality	is	not	easy	and	requires	lots	of	
effort	 and	 international	 cooperation.	 There	 is	 a	 growing	 realization	 that	 the	 distinction	
between	national	and	international	environmental	problems	is	more	and	more	blurred;6	 and	
																																								 																				
1 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report, 
approved at the 10th Session of Working Group I of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Paris, February 2007, 
2007). 
2 Peter H. Sand, ‘Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance’ (1990) 18 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 213. 
3 James E. Krier and Clayton P. Gillette, ‘The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism’ (1985) 84 Michigan Law Review 405. 
4 For example, Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant and Yann Ménière, ‘What Drives the International Transfer of Climate 
Change Mitigation Technologies? Empirical Evidence from Patent Data’ (2013) 54 Environmental and Resource Economics 161. 
5 Even if a counterfactual is found, to fully account for the possibilities that may develop in the future is difficult. The progress of 
adaptation to climate change is unpredictable, and it is also difficult to fully understand new future global states because adapting 
to climate change requires a long time perspective. Thomas Sterner, ‘Climate Change & Developing Countries: Considerations for 
Rio+20’ Resources for the Future Issue 180 Spring/Summer 2012, (Jun 8, 2012) 
<http://www.rff.org/research/publications/climate-change-developing-countries-considerations-rio20> accessed 14 Jul 2017. 
6 Sand (n 2). 
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a	reluctance	to	transfer	climate	change	technologies	could	result	in	climate	change	problems	
being	 suffered	 by	 the	 whole	 world.	 Thus,	 to	 address	 the	 global	 import	 of	 environmental	
challenges	 and	 this	 global	 warming	 crisis,	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 limitless7	
technological	 advances	 but	 also	 a	 disinterested	 and	 radical	 attitude	 towards	 TT	 without	
reservation.	 	
4.2 Climate change related technology transfer 
Green	 technology	 is	 a	 general	 term	 used	 in	 describing	 climate-change-related	 technologies	
and	 referring	 to	 “technology	 whose	 use	 is	 intended	 to	 mitigate	 or	 reverse	 the	 effects	 of	
human	activity	on	the	environment.”8	 This	definition	indicates	that	it	goes	back	in	the	history	
and	will	continue	being	a	significant	subject	in	the	future.	For	example,	as	far	back	as	1000	BC,	
“Asia	and	Europe	began	harnessing	and	advancing	wind	energy,	developing	more	efficient	and	
newer	windmills.”9	 Such	idea	was	introduced	to	the	America	in	the	1850s	and	widely	applied	
to	 irrigation	 and	 providing	water	 for	 livestock.	 During	 the	 late-nineteenth	 century,	 the	 first	
wind	 power	 turbine	 that	 generated	 electricity	was	 invented	 in	 the	US.10	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	
early	cases	that	can	be	referred	to	as	a	green	technology	example.	Nowadays	it	 is	seemingly	
beyond	doubt	that	the	 issue	of	TT	 is	 taken	seriously	within	the	 international	climate	change	
debate.	 However,	 this	 term	 is	 mostly	 used	 in	 a	 colloquial	 way	 by	 commentators	 and	
policymakers	 and	 results	 in	 the	 problem	 that	 there	 exists	 no	 unified	 definition	 of	 green	
																																								 																				
7 We do not know if there are ‘limitless’ technologies. Not every problem can be solved by technology. There are many who 
believe the ‘belief’ in scientific fixes prevents nations addressing the problems which cause the environmental problems in the first 
place (e.g. consumption). See also Yoon-Suk Baik, ‘An Empirical Study of Patent Disclosure’ KAIST Business School Working 
Paper Series No 2006-003 (May 2006) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=903689> accessed 9 Jun 2017. 
8 ‘Definition of green technology in English’ (The Oxford Dictionaries Website)  
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/green_technology> accessed 2 Sep 2017. 
9 ‘Green Technology – Past, Present, Future’ (StudyModeResearch Website)  
<http://www.studymode.com/essays/Green-Technology-Past-Present-Future-472128.html> accessed 8 Sep 2017. 
10 Robert W. Righter, Wind energy in America: A history (University of Oklahoma Press 1996). 
	 124	
technology.	Therefore	in	actual	TT,	the	term	“green	technology”	is	rarely	used	due	to	the	lack	
of	a	common	and	precise	understanding	of	the	length	and	breadth	of	the	concepts.	
4.2.1 The Meaning of EST 
The	most	 commonly	used	definition	of	 climate	 change	 technology	 is	 that	of	ESTs.	 The	 term	
was	coined	in	Agenda	21,	Chapter	34,11	 which	was	written	at	the	Earth	Summit.	Since	then,	
no	undisputed	contribution	has	been	made	to	develop	the	outlines	of	this	concept	further.12	
A	Special	Report	of	the	IPCC13	 defines	ESTs	as	 	
technologies	 which	 protect	 the	 environment,	 are	 less	 polluting,	 use	 all	 resources	 in	 a	
more	 sustainable	manner,	 recycle	 more	 of	 their	 wastes	 and	 products,	 handle	 residual	
wastes	 in	 a	 more	 acceptable	 manner	 than	 the	 technologies	 for	 which	 they	 were	
substitutes,	and	are	compatible	with	nationally	determined	socio-economic,	cultural	and	
environmental	priorities.14	 	
Moreover,	 “ESTs	 are	 not	 just	 individual	 technologies.	 They	 can	 also	 be	 defined	 as	 total	
systems	 that	 include	know-how,	procedures,	goods	and	services,	and	equipment,	as	well	 as	
organizational	and	managerial	procedures	for	promoting	environmental	sustainability.”15	 The	
concept	 is	 broad	 enough	 to	 cover	 the	 types	 of	 technology	 considered	 in	 this	 research.	
																																								 																				
11 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, UN Doc 
A/Conf.151/26 (1992). Earth Summit: “ESTs as technologies which ‘protect the environment; are less polluting; use all resources 
in a more sustainable manner; recycle more of their wastes and products; and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner 
than the technologies for which they are substitutes’”  
12 Jérôme de Meeûs and Alain Strowel, ‘Climate Change and the Debate around Green Technology Transfer and Patent Rules: 
History, Prospect and Unresolved Issues’ 3 WIPOJ 178. 
13 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Bert Metz and others (eds), Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology 
Transfer: A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III (Cambridge University Press 2000) 432. 
14 UNFCCC, Application of Environmentally Sound Technologies for Adaptation to Climate Change (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Technical Paper, FCCC/TP/2006/2, 10 May 2006). 
15 Agenda 21. 
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However,	 the	 problem	 remains	 at	 the	 outset	 in	 finding	 out	 what	 technologies	 should	 be	
included	by	the	definition.	
4.2.2 Environmental or economic motivations for TT 
Typically,	 it	 is	 thought	 that	 technologies	 that	 are	 irrelevant	 to	 environmental	 protection	
should	not	go	into	the	definition.	However,	in	practice,	distinguishing	between	them	is	not	a	
straightforward	job.	In	order	to	include	as	many	types	of	green	technology	as	possible	and	to	
promote	the	widest	application	of	these	technologies,	it	is	better	not	to	exclude	the	seemingly	
“less	 green”	 technologies	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 EST.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 more	 practical	 to	 avoid	
distinguishing	 ESTs	 according	 to	 the	motivation	 behind	 them	because	 environmental	 goods	
and	 services	 can	 be	 dual-motivated	 by	 environmental	 concerns	 as	well	 as	 economic	 profit.	
This	characteristic	is	intrinsic	to	many	kinds	of	cleaner	technologies.	For	example,	unlike	many	
expensive	 green	 technologies, 16 	 employing	 certain	 technologies	 can	 be	 cheaper	 than	
following	more	polluting	ways.	Such	as	in	the	chemical	industry,	“the	use	of	mixers	to	reduce	
sludge	formation	in	storage	vessels;	leak	detection;	cleaning	heat	exchange	tubes;	and	better	
reaction	control	to	eliminate	hot	and	cold	spots	or	to	speed	reaction	can	be	more	economical	
than	the	traditional	end-of-pipe	measures.”17	 Moreover,	“since	pollution	is	managed	here	as	
another	 kind	of	 resource	use,	 reducing	 the	 costs	of	 (polluting)	 resources	will	 be	 factored	 in	
along	with	the	costs	of	other	resources.”18	 Another	more	straightforward	example	is	that	the	
“Brazilian	production	of	biofuel	from	sugarcane	is	already	cheaper	than	other	existing	energy	
																																								 																				
16 For example, the application of smart-grid technologies requires a considerable amount of investment in acquiring technology, 
get access to ancillary technologies and significant construction accomplished (i.e. cable laying)  
17 Cristina Tébar Less and Steven McMillan, ‘Achieving the Successful Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: 
Trade-Related Aspects’ OECD Trade and Environment Working Paper No 2005-02, COM/ENV/TD(2004)33/FINAL 
<http://www.oecd.org/trade/envtrade/35837552.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
18 OECD, Environmental Goods and Services (OECD Publishing, Paris 2001). 
	 126	
sources	 such	 as	 petroleum.”19	 In	 cases	 like	 this,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 environmentally	
motivated	 efforts	 from	 the	 economically	 motivated	 ones.20	 Accordingly,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	
those	governing	TT	and	those	seeking	TT	agreements	to	exclude	the	use	of	more	economically	
motivated	technology	from	any	favourable	policy	made	primarily	to	facilitate	usage	of	ESTs	in	
order	 to	 offset	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 often	more	 costly	 green	 productivity.	 In	 theory,	 if	 the	
application	of	a	greener	technology	were	cheaper	than	the	more	polluting	ones,	transferring	
of	 such	 technology	 would	 benefit	 the	 transferor	 as	 well.	 Thus,	 the	 issue	 is	 perhaps	 not	
whether	we	can	distinguish	economic	or	environmental	motives,	but	whether	TT	motivated	
by	 economic	 benefits	 to	 the	 transferor	 or	 even	 the	 transferee	 should	 be	wrapped	up	 in	 TT	
designed	 to	 improve	 the	 environment	 or	 reduce	 environmental	 ill	 effects.	 The	 answer	 is	
positive.	 It	 does	 not	 really	 matter	 if	 the	 transferor	 gets	 financial	 benefits	 as	 long	 as	 the	
transferee	 is	 able	 to	 address	 their	 environmental	 problems	 or	 their	 contribution	 to	
environmental	 problems.	 But	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 if	 the	 transferors	 are	 gaining	 reasonable	
profits,	it	is	feasible	to	ask	them	to	sacrifice	part	of	their	IPRs	for	returns.	
4.2.3 A pollutant standard 
Second	 of	 all,	 although	 green	 technology	 conserves	 traditional	 resources,	 some	 can	 still	 be	
pollutant	to	the	environment.	Therefore,	it	is	better	not	to	deny	a	technology	rashly	because	
of	 its	minor	polluting	character.	For	example,	the	 innovation	and	widespread	use	of	ethanol	
fuels	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 gasoline	 in	 recent	 years	 is	 an	 effort	 to	 reduce	 reliance	 on	
																																								 																				
19 Although it might have other environmental costs; see John H Barton, ‘Mitigating Climate Change Through Technology 
Transfer: Addressing the Needs of Developing Countries’ Energy, Environment and Development Programme: Programme Paper 
08/02, (October 2008) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/100
8barton.pdf> accessed 22 Aug 2017. 
20 Less and McMillan (n 17) 
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non-renewable	natural	resources.	While	these	fuels	are	intended	to	reduce	carbon	emissions	
caused	by	 the	gasoline	used	 in	vehicles,	 they	may	have	unintentionally	caused	 the	opposite	
effect.21	 For	 example,	 the	 most	 debatable	 ethanol	 fuel	 –	 E85	 could	 release	 more	 toxic	
substances22	 into	 the	 atmosphere	 than	 traditional	 fuel,	which	 can,	 in	 turn,	 impact	health.23	
Another	 example	 is	 wind	 power	 technology:	 although	 seen	 as	 clean	 and	 renewable,	 wind	
farms	are	believed	to	have	an	adverse	impact	on	the	local	environment.24	 For	example,	wind	
turbines	generate	a	 low-frequency	noise	similar	to	a	family	car	travelling	at	70	mph,	causing	
noise	pollution.25	 Countries	are	therefore	requiring	wind	farms	to	be	built	far	from	residential	
areas.	While	 remote	 site-selecting	 can	 solve	 noise	 pollution,	 the	 location	 of	 wind	 farms	 in	
rural	 areas	 can	 create	 a	 threat	 to	 wildlife.	 “Birds26	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 fly	 into	 the	 wind	
blades,”	 with	 studies27	 showing	 that	 “about	 45,000	 birds	 having	 perished	 over	 the	 last	 20	
years	due	to	these	turbines.”28	 Also,	the	foundations	of	a	wind	turbine	that	go	deep	into	the	
Earth	could	have	a	negative	effect	on	underground	water.29	 However,	most	ethanol	fuels	and	
wind	energy	are	ultimately	less	polluting	and	many	countries	are	still	showing	keen	interest	in	
these	technologies	irrespective	of	negative	perceptions.	They	believe,	at	least	for	now,	that	it	
is	the	option	that	delivers	most	good	(or	least	harm)	to	the	environment.	 	
																																								 																				
21 Their environmental damage is different to gasoline (e.g. development of monocultures in previous biodiverse environments). 
Rebecca Lake, ‘What Are the Disadvantages of Going Green?’ (LiveStrong.com, Jun 13, 2017)  
<http://www.livestrong.com/article/148998-ten-reasons-why-we-should-go-green/> . 
22 “The statistical analysis suggests that the use of E85 results in statistically significant decreases in emissions of NOX (−45%), 
NMHC (−48%), 1,3-butadiene (−77%), and benzene (−76%); statistically significant increases in emissions of formaldehyde (73%) 
and acetaldehyde (2540%), and no statistically significant change in CO, CO2, and NMOG emissions.” Lisa A. Graham, Sheri L. 
Belisle and Cara-Lynn Baas, ‘Emissions from Light Duty Gasoline Vehicles Operating on Low blend Ethanol Gasoline and E85’ 
(2008) 42 Atmospheric Environment 4498. 
23 Mark Z. Jacobson, ‘Effects of Ethanol (E85) versus Gasoline Vehicles on Cancer and Mortality in the United States’ (2007) 41 
Environmental Science & Technology 4150. 
24 See generally, R. Saidur and others, ‘Environmental Impact of Wind Energy’ (2011) 15 Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 2423. 
25 Rinkesh, ‘Various Disadvantages of Wind Energy’ (Conserve Energy Future)  
<http://www.conserve-energy-future.com/Disadvantages_WindEnergy.php> . 
26 Especially the migrating breeds such as gold eagles and tailed hawks. 
27 See generally, Saidur and others (n 24). 
28 Rinkesh (n 25). 
29 Information gathered from research interviewees. 
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4.2.4 Adaptation and mitigation technology  
In	 addition,	 climate	 change	 technology	 also	 encompasses	 technologies	 for	 promoting	
mitigation	and	adaptation30	 to	climate	change.	While	such	a	dichotomy	demonstrates	a	clear	
difference	 between	 them.	 Mitigation	 focuses	 on	 slowing	 climate	 change	 while	 adaptation	
deals	 with	 the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change.31	 Both	 types	 of	 measures	 are	 considered	 to	 be	
complementary	and	critical	to	technological	improvement.32	 First,	climate	change	mitigation	
technology	refers	to:	 	
technological	change	and	substitution	that	reduce	energy	resource	inputs	and	emissions	
per	 unit	 of	 output.	 Although	 several	 social,	 economic	 and	 technological	 policies	would	
also	 lead	 to	 an	 emissions	 reduction,	 for	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 encompasses	
implementing	policies	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	and	to	enhance	sinks.33	 	
This	 technology	 type	 covers	 a	 vast	 range	 of	 sectors	 including	 “energy	 supply,	 transport,	
buildings,	 agriculture,	 forestry,	 and	 waste	 management.”34 	 Renewable	 technologies	 for	
electricity	production	have	been	the	typical	examples	of	the	mitigation	type.35	
																																								 																				
30 Meeûs and Strowel (n 12). 
31 Preeti Soni and others, ‘Technological Cooperation and Climate Change Issues and Perspectives’ Working papers presented at 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India-UNDP Consiltation on Technology Cooperation for Addressing 
Climate Change, 24th September, 2011 
<http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/Climate%20Change/climate_change_report_30-
11-2011.pdf> accessed August, 2017. 
32 The definitions is given by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC, Contribution of Working Group III 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007 (B. Metz and others eds, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA 2007). 
33 Ibid. 
34 For a list of key mitigation technologies see IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in B. Metz and others (eds), Climate Change 
2007: Mitigation Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA 2007). 
35 Moreover, based on a long history of TT, there are now major industries producing both wind and photovoltaic electricity that 
have firms from developing countries competing head-to-head with the traditional industrial leaders from developed countries. See 
John H. Barton, ‘Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries’ (2007) ICTSD Issue 
Paper No 2. 
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Adaptation,	according	to	a	UNFCCC	paper,	shall	not	be	considered	as	an	alternative	to	climate	
change	 mitigation	 as	 both	 need	 to	 be	 pursued	 actively	 and	 in	 parallel.36	 Mitigation	 is	
obviously	 essential	 because,	 “without	 firm	 action	 now,	 future	 generations	 could	 be	
confronted	 with	 climate	 change	 consequences.”37	 If	 climate	 change	 is	 not	 controlled	 here	
and	now,	 the	magnitude	of	 its	effects	could	be	so	severe	 that	no	adaptation	will	be	able	 to	
make	 a	 difference.	 But	 due	 to	 the	 temporal	 hysteresis	 in	 the	 response	 of	 environment	
pollution	to	climate	change,	 it	 is	hard	to	predict	precisely	the	result	of	today’s	mitigation.	 In	
case	the	efforts	made	are	not	enough	on	their	own,	adaptation	will	be	needed	inevitably.	That	
is	the	main	reason	why	mitigation	is	essential	and	why	adaptation	is	inevitable.	 	
Adaptation	technology	concerns:	
Adjustment	 in	 natural	 or	 human	 systems	 in	 response	 to	 actual	 or	 expected	 climatic	
stimuli	 or	 their	 effects,	 which	 moderates	 harm	 or	 exploits	 beneficial	 opportunities.	
Various	 types	 of	 adaptation	 can	 be	 distinguished,38	 including	 anticipatory	 and	 reactive	
adaptation.39	 	
For	 example,	 building	 up	 a	 climate	 change	 early-warning	 system40	 could	 be	 classified	 as	
anticipatory	 adaptation,	 and	 technology	 for	 enhancing	 gas-pipeline	 efficiency	 is	 a	 reactive	
adaptation.	 The	 problem	 with	 the	 reactive	 type	 is	 that	 it	 only	 starts	 after	 the	 impacts	 of	
																																								 																				
36 UNFCCC, Technologies for Adaptation To Climate Change (Peter Stalker ed, Climate Change Secretariat (UNFCCC) Bonn, 
germany 2006). 
37 Ibid. 
38 IPCC, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2007 (n 32). 
39 Ibid (n 32), 
40 Such Systems are generally aiming at improving capacity for predicting climate hazard and warning people live in the local area. 
“These systems effectively generate and communicate impact-based early warnings, delivering risk information for hazardous 
hydro-meteorological and climate events. They protect lives, livelihoods, and property in more than 50 Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).” Lima-Paris Action Agenda, ‘Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems 
Initiative Strengthening Systems at the Heart of Resilience’ (UNFCCC newsroom)  
<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/resilience/climate-risk-and-early-warning-systems-initiative-strengthening-the-systems-at-the-hea
rt-of-resilience/> accessed July 2017. 
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climate	change	have	been	felt.	Therefore,	 the	shortcoming	of	such	technologies	 is	 that	 they	
are	 normally	 slow	 in	 effect	 on	 climate	 change	 mitigation.	 However,	 they	 are	 particularly	
valuable	when	reacting	to	extreme	events	and	disasters.	For	example,	the	flood	control	plan	
to	relocate	settlements	to	higher	ground	is	the	reaction	by	the	government	to	the	2000	flood,	
which	 effectively	 prevented	 the	 2008	 flooding	 of	 the	 same	 areas	 along	 the	 Limpopo	 River	
floodplains	in	Southern	Africa.	Such	measures	and	corresponding	techniques	based	on	climate	
change	 experiences	 can	 reduce	 the	 impact	 of	 events	 and	 disasters	 in	 the	 future. 41	
Technologies	 such	 as	 new	 irrigation	 systems	 or	 drought-resistant	 seeds,	 or	 even	 more	
intangible	measures	 such	as	 insurance	 schemes	or	 crop	 rotation	patterns	 could	be	of	 equal	
importance	to	renewable	energy	technologies	in	different	scenarios.42	
4.2.5 Hard and soft technology 
The	 term	 EST	 shall	 also	 be	 interpreted	 with	 no	 prejudice	 shown	 to	 either	 hard	 or	 soft	
technologies	 as	 they	are	 the	 integral	parts	of	 the	 commercialization	and	 industrialization	of	
climate	 change	 technologies.43	 According	 to	 Jin,	 “hard	 refers	 to	 the	 tangible	 entity	 upon	
which	an	operation	is	conducted.	Soft	refers	to	an	entity	without	physical	form.”44	 "Examples	
of	 hard	 technologies	 include	 equipment	 and	 products	 to	 control,	 reduce	 or	 prevent	
anthropogenic	 emissions	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 in	 the	 energy,	 transportation,	 forestry,	
agriculture,	 industry	 and	waste	management	 sectors,	 to	 enhance	 removals	 by	 sinks	 and	 to	
																																								 																				
41 The Climate System Analysis Group, ‘Climate Change Adaptation’ (University of Cape Website)  
<http://media.csag.uct.ac.za/faq/qa_5adaptation.html> accessed 2 Jul 2017.  
42 UNFCCC, Technologies for Adaptation To Climate Change (n 36). 
43 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Bert Metz and others eds, Cambridge University Press 2000) ch.1.2. 
44 Zhouying Jin, ‘Technological Progress in History: A Survey of Evolution and Shift of Research Emphasis from ‘Hard-tech’ to 
‘Soft-tech’ Development’ (2004) 3 International Journal of Technology Management & Sustainable Development 133; See also 
Zhouying Jin, ‘Soft Technology: The Essential of Innovation’ Futures Research Quarterly 
<http://millennium-project.org/millennium/beijing-0702.PDF>  
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facilitate	 adaptation,” 45 	 while	 soft	 technologies	 include	 things	 like	 “capacity	 building,	
information	networks,	training	and	research."46	 According	to	this	definition,	it	is	hard	to	turn	
an	 acquired	 blueprint47	 into	 products	 and	 to	 occupy	 market	 share	 without	 employing	 a	
combination	 of	 hard	 and	 soft	 technologies.	 The	 process	 of	 TT	 receiving:	 from	
patent/technology	acquisition	 to	conversion,	 commercialization,	and	 finally	 industrialization,	
requires	 a	 serious	 amount	 of	 equipment	 to	 be	 purchased	 and	 services	 provided.	 Thus	 to	
facilitate	TT	until	the	subject	technology	is	well	adopted	by	the	receiving	market	and	society,	
soft	technologies	should	be	"injected	and	infused"	into	products	and	services	imported	from	
abroad	in	the	first	place.48	 Moreover,	follow-on	works	including	standardization,	processing,	
and	 regularization	 during	 subsequent	 enterprise	 operation,	 strategizing	 and	 R	 &	 D	
investments	 to	 remain	 competitive	 shall	 be	 considered	as	examples	of	 soft	 EST.49	 Even	 the	
softness	 of	 technology	 varies,	 as	 it	 depends	 on	 “the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 orchestration	 of	
phenomena	 is	 actively	 performed	 by	 a	 human	 or	 humans.” 50 	 As	 the	 percentage	 of	
unbreakable	 processes	 imposed	 decreases,	 either	 within	 human	 organizations	 or	
physical/virtual	 machines,	 the	 technology	 becomes	 softener.	 So,	 for	 example,	 some	
prescriptive	 industry	 standards	 are	 harder	 technologies	 compared	 with	 the	 assistance	
provided	by	transferors	based	on	their	practical	experiences.	TT	is	actually	a	continuum	of	the	
																																								 																				
45 René van Berkel and Erik Arkesteijn, Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies and Practices under the Climate 
Convention: Survey of Experiences, Needs and Opportunities among Non-Annex II Countries (IVAM Environmental Research 
1998). 
46 Ibid 
47 Which is often available from patent registry office. 
48 Jin, ‘Technological Progress in History: A Survey of Evolution and Shift of Research Emphasis from ‘Hard-tech’ to ‘Soft-tech’ 
Development’ (n 44); See also Jin, ‘Soft Technology: The Essential of Innovation’ (n 44). 
49 Jin, ‘Technological Progress in History: A Survey of Evolution and Shift of Research Emphasis from ‘Hard-tech’ to ‘Soft-tech’ 
Development’ (n 44); See also Jin, ‘Soft Technology: The Essential of Innovation’ (n 44). 
50 Jon Dron, ‘The Nature of Technologies’ (MOOC.CA, Nov 21, 2011)  <http://change.mooc.ca/post/367> . 
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transaction	of	hard	and	soft	technologies.	Very	few	TTs	are	reliant	on	the	transaction	of	purely	
hard	or	purely	soft	technologies.	 	
4.2.6 The broadest definition 
The	 intention	 of	 drawing	 a	 line	 between	 ESTs	 and	 non-ESTs	 is	 in	 fact	 to	 clarify	 which	
technologies	 can	 be	 promoted	 by	 MEAs	 and	 be	 transferred	 under	 favourable	 terms.	
Therefore,	regardless	of	the	variety	and	the	contradictory	characteristics,	the	definition	of	EST	
should	endeavours	to	embrace	technologies	that	become:	
more	environmentally	sound;	captures	the	full	life	cycle	flow	of	the	material,	energy	and	
water	 in	 the	 production	 and	 consumption	 system;	 covers	 the	 full	 spectrum	 from	basic	
technologies	 that	 are	 adjunct	 to	 the	 production	 and	 consumption	 system,	 to	 fully	
integrated	 technologies	 where	 the	 environmental	 technology	 is	 the	 production	 or	
consumption	 technology	 itself;	 includes	 closed	 system	 technologies	 (where	 the	 goal	 is	
zero	 waste	 and/or	 significant	 reductions	 in	 resource	 use),	 as	 well	 as	 environmental	
technologies	that	may	result	in	emissions;	and	considers	technology	development	within	
both	the	ecological	and	social	context.51	
These	 ESTs	 encompass	 technologies	 ranging	 from	 techniques	 for	 generating	 energy	 to	
establishing	 pollution	 management	 which	 will	 also	 evolve	 continuously.	 Methods	 that	
available	 for	 building	 industrial	 standards	 and	 environmental	 governance	 should	 also	 be	
considered	as	EST.	 Technologies	 that	 fall	 into	 the	area	of	 energy,52	 green	building,53	 green	
																																								 																				
51  Agenda 21. 
52 “This includes the development of alternative fuels, new means of generating energy and energy efficiency.” ‘Green 
Technology- What is it?’ (Green Technology Atrategy and Leadership for Clean and Sustainable Communities, 2015)  
<https://www.green-technology.org/what.htm> accessed July 2017. 
53 “Green building encompasses everything from the choice of building materials to where a building is located.” Ibid. 
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chemistry,54	 and	green	nanotechnology55	 are	ESTs	in	a	more	obvious	way.	And	policies	that	
regulate	 transferring	 these	 technologies	 should	 show	 respect	 and	 adapt	 to	 the	 particular	
needs	 of	 climate	 change	 TT	 irrespectively.56	 In	 my	 research,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 one	 type	 of	
technology	 targeting	 the	 reduction	 of	 global	 carbon	 dioxide	 emissions	 –	 renewable	 energy	
technology.	 So,	 although	 there	are	many	 factors,57	 which	are	equally	encountered	by	ESTs,	
they	will	not	be	discussed	in	this	thesis	with	detail.	 	
4.3 Methods of transfer  
Regarding	 transferring	 ESTs,	 the	 WTO	 Committee	 on	 Trade	 and	 the	 Environment	 (CTE)	
identified	four	different	methods:	 	
(1)	a	transaction	involving	only	the	supplier	of	technology,	e.g.	foreign	direct	investment	
in	a	wholly	owned	subsidiary;	 (2)	a	 transaction	 involving	only	 those	 in	 the	host	country	
who	 use	 the	 technology,	 e.g.	 the	 situation	where	 the	 host	 country	 national	 copies	 the	
technology,	 including	 through	 reverse	 engineering;	 (3)	 a	 transaction	 involving	 both	 the	
supplier	and	user	of	technology,	where	specific	commercial	conditions	are	stipulated	with	
regard	 to	 the	 use	 of	 the	 technology,	 and/or	 the	 sales	 or	 distribution	 of	 profits	 by	 the	
enterprise	 in	 the	 host	 country,	 e.g.	 technology	 licensing	 or	 a	 joint	 venture	 involving	
foreign	 direct	 investment;	 (4)	 a	 transaction	 involving	 both	 the	 supplier	 and	 user	 of	
technology,	but	without	any	commercial	conditions	stipulated	regarding	the	operations,	
																																								 																				
54 “The invention, design and application of chemical products and processes to reduce or to eliminate the use and generation of 
hazardous substances.” Ibid. 
55 “Nanotechnology involves the manipulation of materials at the scale of the nanometre, one billionth of a meter. Some scientists 
believe that mastery of this subject is forthcoming that will transform the way that everything in the world is manufactured. "Green 
nanotechnology" is the application of green chemistry and green engineering principles to this field.”Ibid. 
56 In terms of the motivation of TT, the impact on the environment of the technology, and their softness.  
57 For example, the biotechnology, agricultural and medicinal exploitation factors. Daniel Alexander, ‘Some Schemes in 
Intellectual Property and the Environment’ (1993) 2 Intellectal Property and Environment. 
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sale	or	distribution	of	profits	by	the	enterprise	using	the	technology	(e.g.	purchase	of	a	
machine	in	the	market,	which	embodies	the	technology).58	 	
However,	not	all	of	the	listed	methods	are	legally	acceptable	under	the	current	IP	law	system.	
For	example,	the	second	type	of	transaction	happens	in	the	situation	where	the	host	country	
duplicates	 the	 technology,	 such	 as	 through	 reverse-engineering,	 regardless	 of	 legal	 rights	
acquired	from	the	technology	owner,	is	currently	considered	as	IP	infringement	under	most	IP	
laws.59	 In	 practice,	 TT	 to	 developing	 countries	 with	 a	 certain	 absorptive	 capacity	 often	
involves	different	levels	of	illegal	technology	duplication	concealed	beneath	a	combination	of	
legal	 types	of	 transaction.	Patent	 licensing	 is	where	a	patentee	has	a	 legal	 right	 to	“exclude	
others	 from	 making,	 using,	 offering	 for	 sale,	 or	 selling,	 or	 importing	 the	 invention.”60	
However,	 in	 practice,	 “a	 patent	 licensing	 agreement	 is	 in	 essence	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	
promise	by	the	licensor	not	to	sue	the	licensee”61	 for	using	the	technology.	The	actual	result	
of	adoption	of	the	technology	 is	not	guaranteed.	Therefore,	 in	order	to	offset	the	crudity	of	
the	 license	by	pursuing	 technology	with	 full	 know-how	related	 to	 its	proper	application	and	
future	 innovation,	 technology	acquisition	through	takeovers	 is	becoming	a	common	method	
																																								 																				
58 WTO Council for Trade in Services, ‘Environmental Services’ World Trade Organization, S/C/W/46, 6 July 1998 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/w46.doc> , para. 19. 
59 For example, “in the U.S., Section 103(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) (17 USC § 1201 (f) states that that 
it is legal to reverse engineer and circumvent the protection to achieve interoperability between computer programs.” The law is 
similar in India and UK. “The UK's Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1998 expressly permits reverse-engineering in certain 
limited circumstances to encourage competition and better engineering among many other important things - not least of legally 
permitting UK small companies to produce products which can interoperate with other more established products.” On the other 
hand the Chinese law is looser on such activities. “Article 12 of Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application 
of Laws in Trial of Civil Cases of Unfair Competition (Interpretations), which entered into force on February 1st, 2007, provides 
that trade secrets gain from independent development and reverse-engineering should not be deemed as a violation of the 
provisions of Article 10 (a), (b) of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. “Reverse engineering” in the preceding paragraph refers 
relevant technical information obtain from demolishing, mapping and analyzing of a product gain from public sources by technical 
means. Parties that obtain trade secrets by improper means and then defend themselves with reverse engineering will not be 
supported.” Anne Zhang, ‘IP mysteries in reverse engineering’ (China Intellectual Property, 27th August, 2013)  
<http://ipr.chinadaily.com.cn/2013-08/27/content_16961368.htm> accessed July 2017. 
60 For example, Chapter 14 Issue of Patent, Section 154 (a) (1) of U.S. Patents Law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (Public Law 103–465, 
as amended up to December 8, 1994) para.19. 
61 Fiona Macmillan, ‘The World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property and the Transfer of Environmentally Sound 
Technologies’ (2001) 7 International Trade Law & Regulation, Int TLR 178. 
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among	technology-receiving	countries.	This	is	currently	the	most	efficient	method	to	transfer	
technological	know-how.	 	
4.4 Technology transfer cooperation  
Knowing	the	contents	of	climate	change	technology	and	how	they	can	be	transferred,	extra	
effort	needs	to	be	put	into	enacting	policies	that	lower	costs	and	stimulate	the	dissemination	
of	those	technologies.	Such	actions	are	based	on	an	epistemic	assumption	maintained	by	the	
global	community	–	a	basic	faith	and	confidence	in	the	ability	of	science	and	engineering	to	fix	
climate	change	problems.	A	passive	argument	made	by	Chow	says	that	“we	need	to	emit	no	
more	 than	 one	 trillion	 tons	 of	 carbon	 in	 order	 to	 stand	 a	 good	 chance	 of	 limiting	 global	
warming	to	2°C.	Only	the	problem	is	that	technology	is	not	progressing	fast	enough	to	make	
this	happen.”62	 Another	difficulty	 is	that	firms	in	the	developed	countries	that	produce	such	
technologies	may	not	wish	to	TT,	as	it	may	undermine	the	return	on	their	R	&	D	investment.	
However,	 equity63	 imposes	 an	 ethical	 duty	 on	 developed	 countries	 to	 promote	 transfer	 of	
these	technologies.	Slow	technology	development	compared	with	environmental	derogation	
is	making	 climate	 change	 situation	 severe	 enough,	 and	 reluctant	 attitudes	 from	 technology	
holders	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 an	 excuse	 for	 not	 making	 such	 efforts	 of	 TT.64	 Technology	
advances	 and	 TT	 were	 and	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 two	 of	 the	 most	 important	 issues	 in	 the	
international	 environmental	 order	 when	 the	 means	 to	 sustainable	 growth	 is	 considered.	
Indeed,	 all	 of	 the	 major	 UN	 General	 Assembly	 resolutions	 related	 to	 demands	 for	 a	 New	
																																								 																				
62 Denise Chow, ‘IPCC Report: Strongest Case Yet for Human-Caused Global Warming’ (LiveScience, September 27, 2013)  
<http://www.livescience.com/39998-ipcc-climate-change-report.html> . 
63 See Chapter, section 3.4 
64 Indeed developing countries need to go beyond this at some point and encourage climate change technology rather than ralying 
on assistance from developed countries. Otherwise it might be a risk discourage private companies from developing the climate 
change combatting technology. 
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International	 Economic	 Order	 include	 references	 to	 the	 TT.65	 In	 implementing	 such	 an	
objective,	there	are	numerous	types	of	interactions	through	which	stakeholders	may	work	in	
order	 to	 TT	 including,	 among	 others:	 direct	 purchases,	 licensing	 franchising,	 direct	 foreign	
investment,	 subcontracting,	 exchanging	 scientific	 and	 technical	 personnel,	 science	 and	
technology	 conferences,	 and	 the	 education	 and	 training	 of	 nationals	 and	 foreigners.66	
Accelerating	 TT	 also	 requires	 external67	 and	 internal68	 participation	 in	 the	 decision-making	
process	 regarding	 strategy,	 investment,	 international	 trade,	market	 opportunities,69	 and	 so	
on,	to	cooperate	with	society	in	legal,	social,	political,	economic	and	technological	factors.	
4.4.1 The development of TT promotion  
Regarding	 the	 scientific	 aspects	 of	 the	 complex	 TT	 issue,	 “despite	 the	 very	 significant	
socio-economic	 problem	 antique	 that	 lies	 behind	 the	 environmental	 crises,	 it	 is	 the	
development	 of	 new	 technology	 that	 is	 often	 perceived	 to	 be	 pivotal	 in	 the	 design	 and	
implementation	 of	 effective	 response	 and	 adaptation	 strategies.”70	 As	 early	 as	 1972	 the	
international	 community	 realized	 that	 “science	 and	 technology...	 must	 be	 applied	 to	 the	
identification,	avoidance	and	control	of	environmental	risks	and	the	solution	of	environmental	
problems”.71	 This	principle	has	evolved	to	become	a	critical	component	of	many	MEAs.	 	
																																								 																				
65 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, A/RES/S-6/3201, 1 May 1974. 
66 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (n 43). ch. 1.6. 
67 International cooperations and agreements 
68 participation of domestic industries and efforts of national/regional governments 
69 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer: A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (n 43). 
70 Duncan A. French, ‘Managing Global Change for Sustainable Development: Technology, Community and Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 209. 
71 Principle 18 of United Nations, ‘Chapter 1 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’ in Report 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 5-16 June 1972 (UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 1972). 
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The	formation	of	international	TT	derives	from	“the	context	of	NIEO	in	the	early	1970s,	which	
aimed	 to	 restructure	 economic	 and	 political	 relations	 between	 North	 and	 South.”72	 Most	
nations,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 economic	 level,	 had	 come	 to	 recognize	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 a	
sustainable	 means	 of	 development	 for	 environmental	 protection	 was	 the	 ideal	 for	 a	 new	
World	 Economic	 Order.73	 The	 Declaration	 on	 the	 Establishment	 of	 a	 New	 International	
Economic	 Order	 points	 out	 that	 “the	 benefits	 of	 technological	 progress	 are	 not	 shared	
equitably	 by	 all	 members	 of	 the	 international	 community.”74	 Therefore	 the	 NIEO	 tried	 to	
found	itself	on	full	respect	for	the	principles.	These	principles	include:	 	
giving	 to	 the	 developing	 countries	 access	 to	 the	 achievements	 of	modern	 science	 and	
technology,	 and	 promoting	 the	 transfer	 of	 technology	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 indigenous	
technology	 for	 the	benefit	of	 the	developing	countries	 in	 forms	and	 in	accordance	with	
procedures	which	are	suited	to	their	economies. 75	 	
In	 order	 to	 pursue	 an	 even	 and	 balanced	 development	 of	 the	 global	 economy,	 developing	
countries,	 which	 constitute	 70	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 world's	 population,	 started	 to	 devote	 their	
efforts	to	closing	the	gap	between	the	developed	and	the	developing	countries	by	advocating	
active	promotion	by	developed	countries	to	facilitate	TT,	instead	of	leaving	TT	to	develop	only	
at	business-to-business	level.76	
																																								 																				
72 Gary Cox, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism as a Vehicle for Technology Transfer and Sustainable Development-Myth of 
Reality’ (2010) 6 Law Env't & Dev J 179. 
73 Robert D. Munro, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and Recommendations (Experts 
Group on Environmental Law, Springer Netherlands, 30 Oct 1987 1987). 
74 The New International Economic Order (n 65). 
75 Article 4 (p) of ibid (n 65). 
76 C. J. Hamelink and B. Pavliè, The New International Economic Order: Links between Economics and Communications, vol 
Volume 98 of Prominent Figures of Slav Culture (Paris: UNESCO 1985). 
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TT	 as	 a	 tool	 with	 which	 to	 address	 environmental	 issues	 was	 raised	 at	 the	 United	 Nations	
Conference	 on	 the	 Human	 Environment	 in	 Stockholm	 in	 1972.	 The	 most	 significant	
achievement	 of	 the	 conference	 was	 that	 it	 has	 conceived	 the	 idea	 of	 developing	 in	 a	
sustainable	 way77 	 and	 pointed	 out	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 issue	 to	 the	 international	
community.	 Such	 a	 goal	 towards	 sustainable	 growth	 generated	 the	 need	 to	 widely	 spread	
technologies,	supporting	a	long-term	projected	manufacturing	approach.	However,	it	seemed	
like	a	ruse	to	shed	non-differential	environmental	protection	obligations	on	every	country,	a	
ruse	by	which	the	Third	World's	aspirations	to	economic	growth	and	development	would	have	
been	 impinged	while	developed	nations	maintained	a	disproportionate	 share	of	 the	world's	
industrial	wealth.78	 Nevertheless,	in	Principle	18	of	the	Stockholm	Declaration79,	science	and	
technology	are	considered	to	be	an	inevitable	contribution	to	climate	change	mitigation	and	
in	turn,	“must	be	applied	to	the	 identification,	avoidance	and	control	of	environmental	risks	
and	the	solution	of	environmental	problems	and	for	the	common	good	of	mankind.”	Principle	
9	 further	 points	 out	 the	 importance	 and	 necessity	 of	 transferring	 these	 technologies	 to	
developing	 countries	 to	 help	 solving	 the	 environmental	 problems.	 “The	 free	 flow	 of	
up-to-date	 scientific	 information	 and	 transfer	 of	 experience”	 highlighted	 by Principle	 20,	
reinforced	 the	 importance	 of	 soft	 technologies,	 and	 requires	 that	 they	 “must	 be	 supported	
and	 assisted,	 to	 facilitate	 the	 solution	of	 environmental	 problems.”	 The	 same	principle	 also	
gives	 full	 respect	 to	 the	different	 situation	of	developing	countries,	 thus	 requiring	 the	more	
																																								 																				
77 Although many of the clauses, especially 1 and 2 describe approaches which are now encompassed in the concept of sustainable 
development, the term was not used there. It is not really until the Brandt Report that ‘sustainable development’ is developed as a 
concept. See Duncan French, International law and policy of sustainable development (Manchester University Press 2005). 
78 United Nations Environment Programme, “Review of the Areas of Environment and Development and Environmental 
Management”, UNEP Report No.3, 1978 quoted by Colin M. Alberts, ‘Technology Transfer and Its Role in International 
Environmental Law: A Structural Dilemma’ (1992) 6 Harv JL & Tech 63. 
79 United Nations, ‘Chapter 1 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’ (n 71). 
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developed	 countries	 to	 make	 an	 effort	 for	 environmental	 technologies	 to	 be	 “available	 to	
developing	 countries	 on	 terms	 which	 would	 encourage	 their	 wide	 dissemination	 without	
constituting	an	economic	burden	on	the	developing	countries.”	The	1989	resolution	of	the	UN	
General	Assembly	 in	preparation	 for	 the	Rio	Conference	 reiterated	 the	needs	of	developing	
countries	and	confirmed	the	essential	role	of	EST	transfer.80	 More	recently,	Principle	9	of	the	
1992	 Rio	 Declaration	 on	 Environment	 and	 Development81	 has	 reaffirmed	 the	 belief	 in	 the	
function	of	TT	and	put	forward	that	scientific	advances	could	improve	economic	development	
in	developing	countries	as	well	as	climate	change	issues	globally.	Chapter	34	of	Agenda	2182	
further	elaborated	the	need	 for	 international	cooperation	 in	capacity	building	on	top	of	EST	
transfer.	“This	stresses	the	'soft'	side	of	technology	transfer”	again	with	specific	reference	to,	
“encompassing	 the	 transfer	 of	 technological	 know-how	 and	 local	managerial	 capabilities	 in	
the	context	of	long-term	collaborative	partnerships.”83	 More	worth	notice	is	that	in	Principle	
784	 of	the	Rio	Declaration85	 the	“common	and	differentiated	principle”	was	laid.	This	concept	
consists	 of	 two	 parts:	 common	 responsibilities	 and	 differentiated	 responsibilities.86	 The	
former	 can	 be	 defined	 according	 to	 the	 preamble	 of	 the	 Rio	 Declaration,87	 which	 aims	 at	
establishing	 partnerships	 between	 countries	 to	work	 on	 a	 type	 of	 growth	 that	 respects	 the	
																																								 																				
80 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, United Nations General Assembly 85th plenary meeting, 22 
December 1989, UN Doc A/RES/44/228. 
81 The Agenda 21 
82 Ibid, Chapter 34, in United Nations, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT (United Nations General Assembly, 14 August 1992, UN Doc A/CONF151/26 (Vol III), 1992). 
83 Cox (n 72). 
84 “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's 
ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable 
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.” The Agenda 21 Annex 1 principle 7. 
85 Annex I Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 
86 Nico J. Schrijver and Friedl Weiss, International law and sustainable development: principles and practice, vol 51 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2004). 
87 “With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among 
States, key sectors of societies and people, Working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and protect 
the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system, Recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the 
Earth, our home …” Rio Declaration. 
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welfare	of	people	and	 the	environment.	The	 later	element	of	differentiated	 responsibility	 is	
mainly	 interpreted	as	being	in	favour	of	developing	countries	and	seems	to	be	based	on	the	
theory	 of	 equity	 discussed	 in	 the	 earlier	 chapter.88	 To	 many	 it	 is	 recognition	 that	 the	
developed	world	 takes	 responsibility	 both	 for	 its	 past	 contribution	 to	 global	 environmental	
harms	 and	 its	 need	 to	 help	 developing	 nations	 deal	with	 these	 problems.	 This	 is	where	 TT	
comes	into	play.	Other	than	that,	the	subsequent	World	Summit	on	Sustainable	Development	
(WSSD)	in	Johannesburg	2002	also	helped	to	define	terms,	establishing	rules,	objectives,	and	a	
framework	 in	which	 to	 address	 global	 environmental	 problems.	 These	 key	 footprints	 in	 the	
history	of	the	world	effort	to	mitigate	climate	change	show	respect	to	the	needs	of	developing	
countries	 with	 no	 exception.	 Such	 early	 references	 already	 included	 both	 financial	 and	
technical	assistance	institutions	as	key	to	actualizing	the	aims.	
The	 development	 and	 dissemination	 of	 green	 technology	was	 thus	 increasingly	 becoming	 a	
major	feature	of	any	serious	approach	to	tackling	climate	change	problems	and	consolidating	
environmental	 cooperation.	 Therefore,	 climate	 change	 technology	 and	 transfer	 are	 treated	
with	relatively	high	prioritization	within	MEAs.89	 Such	a	preference	 is	based	on	a	belief	 that	
“countries	 and	 international	 organizations	 may	 be	 best	 served	 by	 applying	 pragmatic	
approaches	 that	 enhance	 long-term	 commitment	 to	 collaboration	 through	 existing	 bilateral	
and	 multilateral	 partnerships	 and	 demonstrate	 a	 commitment	 to	 rapid	 scaling	 up	 of	
technology	 cooperation	 and	 financing.”90	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 international	 efforts91	 were	
made	to	accomplish	this	goal.	These	include,	as	well	as	the	UNFCCC,	international	agreements	
																																								 																				
88 See Chapter III Section 3.4 
89 R. Benioff and others, Strengthening Clean Energy Technology Cooperation under the UNFCCC: Steps toward Implementation 
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) NREL/TP-6A0-48596, August 2010, Boulder, Colorado, 2010). 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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such	as	 the	Vienna	Convention	 for	 the	Protection	of	 the	Ozone	 Layer,92	 the	Convention	on	
Biological	 Diversity,93	 the	 Major	 Economies	 Forum,94	 the	 Climate	 Technology	 Initiative,95	
indeed	they	are	too	numerous	to	discuss	in	detail	here.	
In	accordance	with	the	special	needs	of	developing	countries	addressed	by	the	Stockholm	and	
Rio	 Declarations,	 many	 multilateral	 and	 bilateral	 programmes	 encourage	 cooperation	
between	developed	and	developing	countries	regarding	development	and	diffusion	of	climate	
change	 technology	 development	 were	 established	 in	 support	 of	 the	 most	 effective	 and	
comprehensive	MEA	to	date	–	the	UNFCCC.	For	example,	in	2001	the	Special	Climate	Change	
Fund	(SCCF)96	 was	established	under	the	UNFCCC	to	finance	projects	relating	to	TT	as	well	as	
other	 aims. 97 	 The	 GEF	 operates	 the	 SCCF	 through	 project.98 	 Most	 GEF	 projects	 are	
“implemented	by	 the	World	Bank	and	other	multilateral	 development	banks	 and	by	United	
Nations	 agencies.”99	 For	 example,	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 Partnership	 on	 Clean	 Development	 and	
																																								 																				
92 UNEP, Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1986). 
93 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
94 The “Major Economies Forum (MEF), comprised of the 17 countries with the largest economies, has developed a portfolio of 10 
Technology Action Plans (TAPs) to advance global cooperation on clean energy technologies.” Benioff and others (n 89); more 
examples such as the Climate Technology Initiative, the International Energy Agency, the International Partnership for Energy 
Efficiency Cooperation and the International Renewable Energy Agent see ibid (n 89). 
95 The Climate Technology Initiative (CTI; www.climatetech.net) is a multilateral partnership that supports international 
cooperation to advance adoption and diffusion of climate friendly technologies; The International Energy Agency (IEA) includes 
24 member countries from the developed world working together to advance energy security, economic growth, and environmental 
protection; The International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation: The G8 countries plus Brazil, China, India, Korea, 
Mexico, and the European Commission are working together to accelerate the implementation of energy efficiency through the 
recently established International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC; http://ipeecshare.org); The International 
Renewable Energy Agency: As of October 2009, 138 countries are members of the new International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA; www.irena.org). IRENA’s mandate is to accelerate the global transition to widespread and sustainable renewable energy 
use. IRENA seeks to improve access, especially for developing countries, to renewable energy information and data, policy and 
program best practices, financing mechanisms, and technology expertise. 
96 UNFCCC, ‘Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention’ in PART TWO: ACTION TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF 
THE PARTIES (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 7th session, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 
2002 2002). 
97 Such as “adaptation; capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management; and economic 
diversification.” ‘The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)’ (UNFCCC website, 28th Ocboter, 2013)  
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/special_climate_change_fund/items/3657.php> accessed May, 
2017. 
98 The United Nations Environment Program and United Nations Development Program support the preparation of technology 
needs assessments required by the UNFCCC.  
99 These banks and organizations also have their own sets of green-tech cooperation programmes. Benioff and others (n 89). 
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Climate 100 	 promotes	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 cooperation	 through	 TT	 by	 involving	
government,	 private,	 and	 technical	 institute	 representatives	 from	 seven	 countries.101	 The	
CDM	 as	 another	 important	mechanism	 provides	 flexibility	 to	 countries	 ratified	 to	 emission	
reduction	targets	to	achieve	the	goal	through	projects	development	in	developing	countries.	
CDM	is	also	a	way	of	encouraging	TT.	Seres	and	Haites102	 point	out	that	at	least	39	per	cent	of	
the	 registered	 and	 proposed	 CDM	 projects	 claim	 TT	 in	 their	 PDDs.	 These	 TTs	 includes	
equipment	transfer	and	knowledge	transfer	from	sponsor	to	host	countries.	As	CDM	projects	
are	 the	 subjects	 of	 this	 thesis,	 more	 discussion	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 will	 be	 laid	 out	 in	 the	
following	sections.	 	
4.4.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
UNFCCC	is	one	of	the	most	significant	MEAs	as	it	provides	a	vital	mechanism	for	multilateral	
action	 to	 combat	 climate	 change	 and	 its	 impacts	 on	 humanity	 and	 ecosystems.103	 The	
Convention	aims	to	achieve	the	“stabilization	of	GHG	concentrations	 in	the	atmosphere	at	a	
level	that	would	prevent	dangerous	anthropogenic	 interference	with	the	climate	system.”104	
Such	an	objective	is	to	be	achieved	through	the	specified	framework	of	general	principles	and	
																																								 																				
100 Ibid (n 89). 
101 Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. 
102 Kevin Murphy and others, ‘Technology Transfer in the CDM: An Updated Analysis’ (2015) 15 Climate Policy 127: “The 
prevalence of technology transfer (TT) for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects is analysed, based on information in 
the project design documents (PDDs) of 3949 projects registered as of 31 March 2012. Responses to a follow-up survey indicate 
that the PDD statements that concern TT are reasonably accurate and at least 39% of the related projects are expected to involve it. 
It also usually involves both knowledge and equipment and differs significantly by host country. Technology transfer has declined 
over time in China, India, and Brazil, the countries that host most of the CDM projects, but it has remained high for other host 
countries. A host country's existing capacity specific to the technology, the scope for economic deployment of the technology, and 
complementary policies to build capacity and promote TT, increase the frequency of TT by CDM projects. The technology used by 
CDM projects originates mostly from Germany, the US, Japan, Denmark, and China, with multiple suppliers of the technology for 
all project types.” 
103 UNFCCC, ‘Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention’ (n 96) 
104 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992) Article 2. 
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institutions	 with	 ratified	 parties	 meeting	 regularly	 and	 agreeing	 to	 certain	 climate	 change	
actions	over	time.	
The	 Convention	 is	 based	 on	 a	 belief	 that	 human	 activities	 are	 the	 main	 source	 of	 GHG	
emissions,	 which	 lead	 to	 severe	 climate	 change	 problems.	 In	 addition,	 it	 recognizes	 that	
climate	 change	 is	 inherently	 global	 in	 nature	 due	 to	 emissions	 “into	 the	 atmosphere	 from	
sources	 anywhere	 on	 the	 globe	 will	 affect	 atmospheric	 concentrations.”105	 Thus,	 with	 the	
composition	of	 the	 atmosphere	being	determined	by	 the	 aggregating	 actions	of	 all	 nations,	
the	 UNFCCC	 is	 motivated	 to	 push	 collective	 and	 global	 action	 to	 cope	 with	 environmental	
issues	 to	 the	 globally	 integrated	 climate	 system.	 The	 Convention	 focuses	 on	 facilitating	
cooperation	 under	 more	 comprehensive	 treatment	 of	 principles	 and	 more	 specific	
commitments	from	all	signatories.106	
Principle	7	of	the	Rio	Declaration107	 sets	out	that	“states	shall	cooperate	in	a	spirit	of	global	
partnership	 […]	 In	 view	 of	 the	 different	 contributions	 to	 global	 environmental	 degradation,	
States	 have	 common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities.”	 This	 provides	 a	 fundamental	
justification	 for	 the	 obligations	 regarding	 TT	 forwarded	 by	 Article	 4	 of	 UNFCCC	 –	 the	
Commitments;	 and	 more	 importantly,	 Principle	 7	 ratification	 from	 developed	 countries	 of	
such	obligations	 as	 they	 “acknowledge	 the	 responsibility	 that	 they	bear	 in	 the	 international	
pursuit	to	sustainable	development	in	view	of	the	pressures	their	societies	place	on	the	global	
environment	and	of	the	technologies	and	financial	resources	they	command.”	Consequently,	
																																								 																				
105 UNFCCC, ‘What does the UN Climate Change Regime Do?’ (“Understanding Technology Developmentand Transfer” page in 
UNFCCC)  <http://bigpicture.unfccc.int/content/technology-transfer.html> accessed 6 Jun 2017. 
106 The establishment of the Convention has a well-developed foundation based on the preparation and experience of the 1985 
Vienna Convention and the Rio Declaration. The former provides instrument structure and the later consolidates several guiding 
principles. See Cox (n 72). 
107 Agenda 21. 
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later	 in	 the	 UNFCCC,	 developed	 countries	 are	 committed	 to	 accelerate	 and	 facilitate	 TT	 to	
developing	 countries	 and	 to	 view	 differently	 the	 rights	 and	 duties	 between	Annex	 I	 parties	
and	Non-Annex	I	parties	under	the	Convention.108	
The	main	provisions	on	TT	are	 included	 in	Article	4	of	 the	UNFCCC.	Article	4.1(c)	 sets	out	a	
range	 of	 ESTs,	 the	 transferring	 of	 which	 need	 to	 be	 promoted	 by	 the	 Convention.	 The	
provision	requires	all	parties	to	“promote	and	cooperate	in	the	development,	application	and	
diffusion,	including	transfer,	of	technologies,	practices,	and	processes	that	control,	reduce	or	
prevent	 anthropogenic	 emissions	 of	 greenhouse	 gases”.	 And	by	 stating	 “control,	 reduce,	 or	
prevent,”	the	article	indicates	that	“its	application	relates	to	mitigation	technologies	only	and	
does	not	encompass	adaptation	technologies.”109	 This	is	a	rather	narrow	definition	of	climate	
change	technology	in	comparison	with	the	meaning	of	EST	discussed	earlier,	but	it	 is	ratified	
and	executed	 in	 the	supplementary	subsequent	agreements	such	as	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	and	
the	Paris	Agreement.110	 	
Article	 4.3	 sets	 up	 obligations	 on	 the	 Annex	 II	 countries111	 to	 help	 developing	 countries	
overcome	 difficulties	 in	 implementing	 the	 Convention.112	 This	 provision	 requires	 the	more	
developed	countries	to	provide	financial	resources	within	and	outside	of	financial	mechanism	
																																								 																				
108 Annex I of the UNFCCC has listed 40 developed countries/economies in transition parties and the European Economic 
Community. ‘Guide to the Climate Change Negotiation Process’ (UNFCCC Website)  
<http://unfccc.int/not_assigned/b/items/2555.php> accessed Feburary, 2017. Annex II has 23 developed country parties, all OECD 
members, plus the European Economic Community. Non-Annex I parties are not separately listed but are developing country 
parties to the Convention. 
109 Cox (n 72). 
110 This means that there can be funding under Kyoto mechanisms for adaption as well. 
111 See Chapter III Section 3.5 
112 “The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial 
resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, 
paragraph 1. They shall also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing 
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by paragraph 1 of this Article 
and that are agreed between a developing country party and the international entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in 
accordance with that Article. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and 
predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties.” Cox (n 
72). 
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established	 under	 Article	 11.113	 More	 importantly,	 the	 article	 makes	 a	 clear	 link	 between	
these	financial	resources	and	TT	implementation	by	specifically	mandating	Annex	II	countries	
to	offer	 financial	 resources	 for	TT	needed	by	a	developing	country.114	 This	provides	a	basic	
structure	for	effective	mechanisms	to	be	established	under	the	Convention	to	help	undertake	
the	commitments	applicable	to	all	parties	under	Article	4.1.115	 In	order	to	facilitate	TT,	Article	
4.5	 further	 prescribes	 the	 obligations	 of	 Annex	 II	 parties.	 The	 Article	 stipulates	 that	 these	
countries	are	to	“take	all	practicable	steps	to	promote,	facilitate	and	finance,	as	appropriate,	
the	 transfer	 of,	 or	 access	 to,	 environmentally	 sound	 technologies	 and	 know-how	 to	 other	
Parties,	particularly	developing	country	Parties.”	However,	there	are	inadequate	measures	to	
determine	 whether	 Annex	 I/II	 countries	 have	 complied	 with	 their	 TT	 commitments.	 The	
implementation	of	UNFCCC	is	assessed	by	the	COP116	 and	the	subsidiary	bodies.117	 However,	
these	bodies	function	subject	to	the	political	relationships	between	member	states.	Therefore	
if	a	country	failed	to	implement	their	obligations,	there	are	often	failures	in	dealing	with	the	
problem.118	 Moreover,	the	Article	mandates	developed	parties	to	assist	developing	countries	
in	 the	 development	 and	 enhancement	 of	 their	 endogenous	 technological	 capacities.	 This	
																																								 																				
113 “The operation of the Financial Mechanism is partly entrusted to the Global Environment Facility (GEF). At COP 17 Parties 
decided to designate the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, in 
accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. The Financial Mechanism is accountable to the COP, which decides on its climate 
change policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria for funding. The Kyoto Protocol also recognizes, under Article 11, the 
need for the Financial Mechanism to fund activities by developing country Parties. In addition to providing guidance to the GEF, 
Parties have established four special funds: the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF), both managed by the GEF, and the GCF under the Convention; and the Adaptation Fund (AF) under the Kyoto Protocol.” 
UNFCCC, ‘Climate Finance’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)  
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/2807.php> accessed Feburary 2017. 
114 Cox (n 72). 
115 “Including promotion of sustainable management, cooperation in preparing for adaptation to climate change impacts, and 
scientific and technological cooperation and exchange.” Ibid (n 72).. See respectively Articles 4.1(d), 4.1(e), and 4.1(,) and (h) 
116 “the COP is the supreme body of the UNFCCC comprised of all the states that have ratified or acceded to the Convention” 
Xueman Wang and Glenn Wiser, ‘The implementation and compliance regimes under the Climate Change Convention and its 
Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 181. 
117 The Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Technological Advice. 
118 Wang and Wiser (n 116). 
	 146	
expands	 the	 scope	 of	 TT	 adopted	 by	 the	 Convention	 to	 encompass	 transferring	 soft	
technologies,	such	as	know-how	and	management	experience.	 	
In	order	to	be	well	informed	about	the	most	up-to-date	climate	change	situation	and	to	have	
technologies	 available	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 issues,	 the	 subsidiary	 body	 for	 Scientific	 and	
Technological	 Advice	 established	 under	 Article	 9	 is	 required.	 It	 was	 intended	 to	 advise	 on	
conducting	broader	international	scientific	cooperation	between	member	states.	However,	in	
practice	 the	 subsidiary	 involves	 experts	 nominated	 by	 governments	 representing	 their	 own	
national	 interests.	 Thus	 the	 role	 of	 the	 subsidiary	 body	was	 perceived	 to	 be	more	 political	
than	neutral.119	 As	 a	 result,	 after	 six	 years,	 the	 IPCC	–	 the	 scientific	 and	 intergovernmental	
body	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 United	 Nations–	 finally	 became	 the	 primary	 source	 of	
scientific,	technical	and	socio-economic	advice	that	supports	the	UNFCCC.120	 IPCC	reports	are	
conveniently	available	at	the	request	of	the	COP	on	climate	change	issues	and	the	reports	are	
considered	to	be	more	objectively	conducted.121	 	
Other	 than	offering	 proposals	 and	 general	 guidance,	 the	Convention	 failed	 to	 contribute	 to	
the	 promotion	 of	 TT	 in	 practice.122	 According	 to	 the	 Convention,	 the	 ratified	 governments	
“have	 met	 annually	 at	 the	 COPs	 since	 1995	 to	 take	 stock	 of	 their	 progress,	 monitor	 the	
implementation	 of	 their	 obligations	 and	 continue	 talks	 on	 how	 best	 to	 tackle.” 123	
Consequently,	 more	 difficult	 works	 have	 been	 accomplished	 within	 these	 meetings	 to	
facilitate	 TT.	 For	 example,	 to	 enhance	 the	 implementation	of	Article	 4.5	of	 the	Convention,	
																																								 																				
119 Ibid (n 116). 
120 Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and 
Procedures (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
121 Spencer R. Weart, ‘International Cooperation: Democracy and Policy Advice (1980s)’ in The Discovery of Global Warming 
(Harvard University Press 2008). 
122 Yamin and Depledge (n 120). 
123 R.A.P. and CHANGCE, Research on the Reform of China 's On-Grid Tariff Mechanism (The Regulatory Assistance Project, 
Feburary 2016). 
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the	“technology	transfer	framework”	was	established	at	COP	7.124	 The	framework	is	meant	to	
take	 effective	 actions	 within	 five	 key	 themes:	 “technology	 needs	 assessments,	 technology	
information,	enabling	environments,	capacity	building,	and	mechanisms	for	TT.”125	 	
4.4.3 The Kyoto Protocol and CDM 
One	of	the	most	significant	achievements	during	the	implementation	of	the	UNFCCC	was	the	
Kyoto	 Protocol	 adopted	 at	 COP	 3	 in	 December	 1997.126	 This	 is	 due	 to	 recognition	 of	 the	
inadequacy	of	the	insular	commitments	contained	in	Article	4	of	UNFCCC.	In	Article	10(c),	the	
Kyoto	Protocol	echoed	the	objective	sets	out	by	the	Convention	which	requires	the	parties	to:	
cooperate	in	the	promotion	of	effective	modalities	for	the	development,	application	and	
diffusion	 of,	 and	 take	 all	 practicable	 steps	 to	 promote,	 facilitate	 and	 finance,	 as	
appropriate,	 the	 transfer	 of,	 or	 access	 to,	 environmentally	 sound	 technologies,	
know-how,	 practices	 and	 processes	 pertinent	 to	 climate	 change,	 in	 particular	 to	
developing	countries.	
This	 provision,	 specifically	 referring	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 development	 and	 transfer	 of	
ESTs,	extends	the	1992	UNFCCC	to	commit	parties	to	TT	and	in	turn	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	
based	 on	 more	 specific	 obligations.	 For	 example,	 the	 negotiations	 endeavoured	 to	 “set	
quantified	 limitation	 and	 reduction	 objectives	 within	 specified	 timeframes,	 such	 as	 2005,	
2010,	 and	 2020,	 for	 their	 anthropogenic	 emissions.” 127 	 Moreover,	 it	 highlighted	 the	
																																								 																				
124 Five key themes, see UNFCCC, ‘Decision 4/CP.7 Development and transfer of technologies (decisions 4/CP.4 and 9/CP.5)’. 
125 Joëlle De Sépibus, ‘Reforming the clean development mechanism to accelerate technology transfer’ Working Paper No 
2009/42, November 2009 
<http://www.nccr-trade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/wp5/WP%202009_42_de%20Sepibus_Reforming%20the%20CD
M%20to%20acc%20TT.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
126 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
127 United Nations, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 1st Session (UNFCCC 5th session Berlin, 28 
March - 7 April 1995, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add1, 6 June 1995, 1995). 
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importance	 of	 TT	 by	 stating	 that	 “among	 the	 issues	 to	 be	 considered	 shall	 be	 the	
establishment	 of	 funding,	 insurance	 and	 transfer	 of	 technology.”128	 More	 details,	 such	 as	
promotion	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 soft	 technologies	 that	 are	 “are	 publicly	 owned	 or	 in	 the	
public	domain”129	 are	included	in	the	provisions.	However,	due	to	the	tremendous	difficulties	
of	reaching	consensus	among	numerous	issues,130	 much	of	the	detailed	rules	and	guidelines	
were	left	to	later	meetings.131	 	
Article	10	is	a	significant	provision.	Firstly,	it	recognizes	the	difference	between	developed	and	
developing	 countries,	 requiring	 all	 parties	 to	 take	 “into	 account	 their	 common	 but	
differentiated	responsibilities	and	their	specific	national	and	regional	development	priorities,	
objectives	 and	 circumstances”	 while	 complying	 with	 the	 commitments	 in	 the	 Convention.	
Secondly,	 it	 clarifies	 the	meaning	of	 climate	 change	 technology	 referred	by	 the	UNFCCC.	By	
using	EST	instead	of	simply	referring	to	“technology”	as	the	UNFCCC	does,	this	article	is	more	
in	 accord	 with	 the	 language	 of	 Chapter	 34	 of	 Agenda	 21	 and	 makes	 it	 easier	 to	 identify	
subsequently	 invented	 technologies	 through	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 improved	 environmental	
performance	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 EST.132	 Furthermore,	 the	 same	 provision	 particularly	
requires	 cooperation	 among	parties	 to	 “promote,	 facilitate	 and	 finance”	 any	 “promotion	of	
effective	modalities	for	the	development,	application	and	diffusion”	of	ESTs	through	practical	
steps	 to	 developing	 countries.	 This	 is	 only	 one	 of	 the	 many	 references	 in	 the	 Protocol	 to	
special	assistance	that	should	be	made	available	to	developing	countries,	which	includes	the	
																																								 																				
128 The Kyoto Protocol Article 3 (14). 
129 Ibid Article 10. 
130 See Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press 2012), 
quoted by Cox (n 72).  
131 “These later agreements on implementation modalities and methodologies, known as the Marrakesh Accords, were endorsed by 
COP-7 in 2001.” Cox (n 72). 
132 Yamin and Depledge (n 120). 
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transfer	of	ESTs.	The	Protocol	clearly	recognizes	the	responsibility	of	developed	countries	to	
TT	 to	 developing	 countries	 so	 they	 and	 the	 global	 community	 can	 cope	 with	 the	 risks	 of	
climate	change.	 	
Article	11	states	“the	implementation	of	these	existing	commitments	shall	take	into	account	
the	 need	 for	 adequacy	 and	 predictability	 in	 the	 flow	 of	 funds	 and	 the	 importance	 of	
appropriate	 burden	 sharing	 among	 developed	 country	 Parties.”	 This	 is	 reaffirming	 the	
obligation	of	developed	countries	to	provide	financial	resources	in	support	of	environmental	
mitigation	 and	 TTs	 to	developing	 countries.	More	 importantly,	 the	 fund	provided	has	 to	 be	
with	“adequacy	and	predictability,”	which	is	a	very	ambitious	task.	Also,	Article	11	especially	
focuses	on	the	financial	assistance	that	shall	be	made	available	“through	the	entity	or	entities	
entrusted	with	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 financial	mechanism	 of	 the	 Convention”	 to	 developing	
countries.	 It	 thus	 requires	 developed	 countries	 to	 “provide	 new	 and	 additional	 financial	
resources”	with	accessible	mechanisms	“to	meet	the	agreed	full	costs	incurred	by	developing	
country	Parties.”133	 The	Kyoto	Protocol	has	thus	successfully	committed	its	parties	to	specific	
binding	 emission-reduction	 targets	 and	 the	 permitted	 financial	 support	 from	 signatories	 is	
quantifiable	and	easier	to	assess.	 	
4.4.3.1 Article 12 – The CDM 
The	CDM	was	established	under	Article	12	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	Countries	that	committed	to	
an	emission-reduction	target	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol	could	use	it	to	implement	the	target	by	
participating	CDM	projects	to	acquire	certified	emission-reduction	(CER)	credits,134	 which	can	
																																								 																				
133 See Kyoto Protocol, Article 11.2(b).  
134 each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. 
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be	 counted	 towards	 meeting	 Kyoto	 targets. 135 	 “It	 is	 the	 first	 global,	 environmental	
investment	 and	 credit	 scheme	 of	 its	 kind,	 providing	 a	 standardized	 emissions	 offset	
instrument,	 CERs.”136	 The	 mechanism	 provides	 great	 flexibility	 for	 Annex	 II	 countries	 in	
meeting	their	emission-reduction	targets.	Although	the	mechanism	does	not	have	an	explicit	
TT	 mandate,	 its	 general	 objective	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 sustainable	 development	 of	
developing	countries	has	 improved	the	 flow	of	TT	 in	many	of	 its	projects.137	 The	7th	COP138	
aims	 to	 “reiterate	 a	 number	of	 the	policy	 objectives	 set	 out	 in	 the	Bonn	Agreement	 and	 in	
addition	 state	 that	 projects	 should	 lead	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 environmentally	 safe	 and	 sound	
technology	and	know-how'	beyond	existing	UNFCCC	obligations.”139	 This	 is	accomplished	 in	
particular	through	“financing	emission-reduction	projects	that	use	technologies	currently	not	
available	 in	 the	host	 countries.”140	 The	CDM	 is	managed	by	 the	Executive	Board	under	 the	
UNFCCC	composed	of	ten	members	from	parties	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	according	to	guidance	
issued	 by	 the	 COP,141	 while	 the	 projects	 are	 monitored	 by	 the	 Designated	 Operational	
Entities142	 which	consist	of	several	private	independent	institutions.143	 	
																																								 																				
135 UNFCCC, ‘Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)  
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php> accessed Feburary 2017. 
136 Ibid. 
137 “Roughly 39% of all CDM projects accounting for 64% of the annual emission reductions claim to involve technology 
transfer.” Stephen Seres, Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects (Prepared for the UNFCCC Registration & Issuance 
Unit CDM/SDM, 2008). 
138 The outcome of the 7th COP is referred to as the Marrakech Accords, which is a set of agreements reached at the 7th Conference 
of the Parties (COP7) to the UNFCCC on the rules of meeting the targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol. See Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, held at Marrakesh FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1. 
139 UNEP (n 92), quoted by Cox (n 72). 
140 United Nations, The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to Technology Transfer 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, November 2010) p1 
141 Kyoto Protocol, Articles 12.4 and 12.5. The certified or designated operational entities (DOEs) are generally large international 
consulting firms. 
142 “A designated operational entity (DOE) is an independent auditor accredited by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) to 
validate project proposals or verify whether implemented projects have achieved planned greenhouse gas emission reductions.” 
‘Designated Operational Entities’ (UNFCCC website)  accessed Feubrary 2017. 
143 Jim Watson and others, UK-China Collaborative Study on Low Carbon Technology Transfer (Final Report by Sussex Energy 
Group SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, 2011) 
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The	establishment	of	CDM	was	indeed	creative,	for	it	has	exceeded	the	expectations	of	many	
debating	countries.144	 Gary	Cox145	 describes	the	CDM	as	a	“surprise”	to	signatories	because	
projects	 registered	 under	 the	mechanism	 are	 issued	with	 CERs	 according	 to	 the	 amount	 of	
emissions	 reduction	 and	 GHGs	 capture.	 Such	 credits	 are	 “tradable	 on	 carbon	markets	 and	
countable	 against	member	 states’	 emissions	 targets.”146	 The	mechanism	has	 significance	 in	
reconciling	the	bipolar	positions	conceived	by	developed	and	developing	countries.147	 On	the	
one	 hand	 it	 encourages	 the	 former	 countries	 to	 provide	 assistance	 in	 many	 aspects	 by	
enabling	Annex	 II	countries	 to	fulfil	 their	emission-reduction	goals	with	greater	geographical	
flexibility148	 and	 cheaper	 construction	 costs.149	 On	 the	 other,	 it	 stimulates	 companies	 in	
developing	 countries	 to	 pursue	 environmental	 friendly	 ways	 of	 manufacturing,	 by	 offering	
them	 financial	 support,	 production	 experience	 and	 technological	 resources.	 Through	
development	 of	 CDM	 projects,	 developing	 countries	 will	 benefit	 from	 TT,	 acquiring	
technologies	that	are	not	currently	available	to	them.	Empirical	data	collected	from	PDDs	of	
CDM	 projects150	 also	 indicates	 that	 TT	 from	 developed	 countries	 (Annex	 I	 countries)	 to	
developing	 countries	 (non-Annex	 I	 countries)	 are	 “signiﬁcantly	 affected	 by	 the	
contemporaneous	 establishment	 of	 projects	 under	 the	 CDM.”151	 However,	 the	 persistent	
effect	 of	 CDM	 projects	 upon	 knowledge	 diffusion	 and	 technology	 innovation	 is	 ultimately	
																																								 																				
144 Farhana Yamin, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, Assessment and Future Challenges’ (1998) 7 Review of European Community 
& International Environmental Law 113, quoted by Cox (n 72). 
145 Cox (n 72). 
146 United Nations, The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to Technology Transfer (n 
140). 
147 Hugh Wilkins, ‘What’s New in the CDM?’ (2002) 11 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 
144, quoted by Cox (n 72). 
148 Sebastian Oberthür and Hermann E. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century (Springer 
Science & Business Media 1999) quoted by Cox (n 72). 
149 Harro van Asselt and Joyeeta Gupta, ‘Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and the Role of Flexibility Mechanisms 
Beyond Kyoto’ (2009) 28 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 311, quoted by Cox (n 72). 
150 Seres (n 137). 
151 Ivan Haščič and Nick Johnstone, ‘CDM and International Technology Transfer: Empirical Evidence on Wind Power’ (2011) 11 
Climate Policy 1303. 
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determined	by	domestic	absorptive	capacity	and	policy	support	in	the	host	country.152	 Some	
studies153	 based	on	project-level	data	have	examined	TT	in	CDM	projects	and	concluded	that	
“TT	is	more	likely	to	feature	in	larger	CDM	projects,	in	those	involving	foreign	parties,	and	in	
projects	in	which	intermediaries	are	involved	in	project	development.”154	
4.4.3.2 Limitations of the CDM and decline in number of projects 
In	recent	years,	a	succession	of	studies	on	the	implementation	of	CDM	projects	and	the	trends	
of	 TT	 through	 these	 projects	 has	 been	 published.	 Even	 though	 many	 studies155 	 have	
confirmed	 that	 CDM	 has	 positive	 effects	 on	 TT	 promotion,	 after	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 Kyoto,	
statistical	 results	clearly	show	that	 this	 international	binding	treaty	on	cutting	emissions	has	
failed	 to	 slow	GHG	emission	 globally.156	 The	 emission-reduction	 target	 of	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 is	
for	the	committed	countries	to	cut	of	around	5	per	cent	relative	to	1990	levels	by	2012.	This	
was	 successful	 to	 some	 extent,	 since	 some	 signatories	 have	 in	 fact	 reduced	 emissions	
significantly.157	 More	 than	 half	 of	 the	 Annex	 I	 countries	 have	 met	 their	 reduction	 targets	
																																								 																				
152 See generally Erik Haites, Maosheng Duan and Stephen Seres, ‘Technology Transfer by CDM Projects’ (2006) 6 Climate 
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within the New Climate Regime: A “Helicopter” View under the CDM’ (2009) 13 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 
1138; quoted by Haščič and Johnstone (n 151). 
153 Dechezleprêtre, Glachant and Ménière, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: 
An Empirical Study’; Schneider, Holzer and Hoffmann (n 152); Seres, Haites and Murphy(n 152); quoted by Haščič and Johnstone 
(n 151). 
154 Haščič and Johnstone (n 151). 
155 The Dechezleprêtre, et.al's study recommends “the bundling of projects in order to exploit increasing returns on technology 
transfer and to promote technology transfer within non-Annex I subsidiaries of Annex I companies.” Antoine Dechezleprêtre, 
Matthieu Glachant and Yann Ménière, The North-South Transfer of Climate-Friendly Technologies Through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Research programme Gestion et Impacts du Changement Climatique (GICC), 2007); R. O. B. 
Youngman and others, ‘Evaluating Technology Transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation’ (2007) 7 
Climate Policy 488; Wilkins (n 147) p.149. 
156 Analysis of the ‘Kyoto Protocol Base Year Data’ (UNFCCC)  
<http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/kp_data_unfccc/base_year_data/items/4354.php> accessed 23 Aug 2017. 
157 for example Russia and the UE 15. European Environment Agency, Tracking Progress towards Kyoto and 2020 Targets 
(European Environment Agency Report (EEA Report No 6/2012), 2012); See conversely Duncan Clark, ‘Has the Kyoto Protocol 
Made Any Difference to Carbon Emissions?’ (TheGuardian, 26 November 2012)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions> accessed 22 Jul 2017. 
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according	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 data.158	 However,	 “emissions	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 have	
increased	sharply	–	especially	 in	China	and	other	emerging	economies.”159	 Overall,	 “China’s	
CO2	emissions	rapidly	grow	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	7.03%	from	1997	to	2012.”160	 In	fact,	
this	emission	growth	undermines	the	contribution	of	the	Annex	I	countries	because	“much	of	
the	 growth	 in	 China	 and	 other	 emerging	 economies	 has	 been	 driven	 by	 the	 production	 of	
goods	and	services	exported	to	developed	nations.”161	 The	outsourcing	production	pattern	of	
many	 developed	 countries	 is	 the	missing	 variable	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 calculation	 because	 carbon	
footprints	are	accounted	for	on	behalf	of	the	countries	producing	goods,	not	those	consuming	
them	under	the	Protocol.	If	imports	are	calculated,	the	emission	reductions	accomplished	by	
developed	 countries	 are	 cancelled	 out	 by	 the	 enormous	 goods	 they	 have	 imported	 from	
countries	 that	 are	 still	 relying	 on	 emission-intensive	 productions.162	 Therefore,	 the	Kyoto	
Protocol	has	been	a	failure	in	this	sense.	But	it	has	played	an	undeniable	role	in	global	climate	
diplomacy	 for	 its	 explicit	 binding	 obligations,	 flexibility	 and	 cost-effective	 mechanisms.	
Consequently,	a	more	ambitious	and	rational	second	step	 is	what	the	world	 is	really	 looking	
for	 to	 continue	 the	 fight	against	 climate	 change	while	avoiding	 the	obstacles	 that	appeared	
during	the	implementation	of	its	antecedents.	
																																								 																				
158 ‘GHG Data from UNFCCC’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)  
<http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php> . 
159 Clark (n 157). 
160 Wei Li, Ya-Bo Shen and Hui-Xia Zhang, ‘A Factor Decomposition on China’s Carbon Emission from 1997 to 2012 Based on 
IPAT-LMDI Model’ (2015) 2015 Article ID 943758 Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 
161 Clark (n 157). 
162 “When you look at total carbon footprint of each nation (including imports and excluding exports), the progress made under 
Kyoto looks extremely poor, with Europe's savings reduced to just 1% from 1990 to 2008 and the developed world as a whole 
seeing its emissions rise by 7% in the same period.” Ibid (n 157); At Felixstowe container port, “imported goods in developed 
countries cancel out carbon emissions savings, according to a new analysis.” Duncan Clark, ‘Carbon Cuts by Developed Countries 
Cancelled Out by Imported Goods’ (TheGuardian News Report, 25 April 2011)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/25/carbon-cuts-developed-countries-cancelled> accessed 22 Jul 2017. 
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Moreover,	 based	on	quantitative	data,	 the	UNFCCC	 study	 group	 concluded	 that	 TT	 through	
CDM	was	 more	 common	 during	 the	 early	 rather	 than	 later	 years	 of	 the	 first	 commitment	
period	 of	 Kyoto	 (2005–2008	 and	 2009–2012).163	 One	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 former	
technology-receiving	countries	are	now	transferors	themselves	in	many	sectors.	This	trend	is	
particularly	evident	in	China,	India,	and	Brazil,	which	are	the	three	countries	hosting	the	most	
CDM	projects.	For	example,	“the	results	show	that	over	90%	of	Chinese	projects	entering	the	
pipeline	 in	2004	and	2005	made	use	of	TT	while	the	same	can	be	said	 in	2009	and	2010	for	
only	 14%	 of	 projects.”164	 Such	 statistics	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 growth	 of	 technology	
capability	 in	 the	 hosting	 country.	 CDM’s	 ability	 to	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 TT	 towards	
developing	countries	eventually	 reduced	 the	need	 for	 international	 transfer.	 This	 is	possibly	
attributed	 to	 its	 indirect	 impact	 on	 the	 improvement	 of	 local	 sources	 of	 knowledge	 and	
equipment.165	 	
However,	decline	of	TT	through	CDM	projects	could	also	be	a	result	of	its	intrinsic	limitations.	
For	example,	China	used	to	have	a	rate	of	TT	through	CDM	that	was	higher	than	the	average	
for	other	host	countries	but	the	rate	is	now	substantially	lower.166	 It	is	easy	to	associate	such	
a	 decrease	 in	 CDM	 projects	 of	 TT	 to	 China	with	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 activities	 have	 created	
independent	 capacity	 in	 the	 country,	 allowing	 later	 projects	 to	 rely	 more	 on	 domestic	
																																								 																				
163 United Nations, The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to Technology Transfer (n 
140): “The CDM has grown rapidly since 2007. And technology transfer studies were completed. With a number of countries now 
hosting a considerable quantity of projects, the 2007 and 2008 studies, respectively, showed technology transfer to occur in 39% 
and 36% of projects, accounting for 64% and 59% of estimated emission reductions from the CDM.” But until 2010 the percentage 
of projects involve TT has declined.  
164 Ibid (n 140) p12. 
165 Ibid (n 140). 
166 In Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China, the Government of China 
requires that “CDM project activities should promote the transfer of environmentally sound technology to China.” Measures for 
Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China, Nov 21,2005; “This is a general provision for the 
country’s use of the CDM rather than a mandatory requirement for each project. The rate of technology transfer for projects in 
China is about half the average for all CDM projects measured in share of projects (19% versus 40%) and about 80% of the 
average for annual emission reductions (47% versus 59%).” United Nations, The Contribution of the Clean Development 
Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to Technology Transfer (n 140). 
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knowledge	 and	 equipment	 supply.167	 Yet,	 there	 are	 several	 other	 less	 direct	 factors	 that	
contribute	 to	 these	 results.	Under	 the	Kyoto	Protocol,	 CDM	projects	 are	 certified	when	 the	
proposals	satisfy	the	general	project	eligibility	requirements	criteria.168	 One	of	these	required	
criteria	is	the	“additionality”	which	specifically	means	that	“the	project	activity	is	expected	to	
result	 in	 a	 reduction	 in	 anthropogenic	 emissions	 by	 sources	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 that	 are	
additional	 to	 any	 that	 would	 occur	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 proposed	 project	 activity.”169	
Additionality	is	“the	crucial	test	of	whether	a	CDM	project	results	in	emission	reductions	that	
are	 in	 excess	 of	 what	 would	 have	 occurred	 under	 a	 business	 as	 usual	 scenario,	 and	 thus	
whether	the	project	should	be	awarded	carbon	credits.” 170	 Therefore,	it	is	required	to	certify	
GHG	 emissions	 reduction	 only	 if	 the	 reduction	 would	 not	 occur	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
implementation	of	 a	 CDM	project.	 In	 other	words,	 if	 an	 emission-reduction	project	 is	 to	be	
implemented	 without	 CDM	 registration,	 then	 it	 is	 non-additional.171	 The	 validity	 of	 such	 a	
requirement	is	questioned	by	Lohmann.172	 He	looks	into	the	PDD	of	projects	hosted	by	India,	
Brazil	 and	 Kenya	 as	 well	 as	 China	 and	 points	 out	 that	 the	 requirement	 is	 lacking	 clarity	
because	 it	 mainly	 depends	 on	 various	 countries’	 regulatory	 decisions.173	 For	 example,	 my	
interviewee174	 from	the	Shandong	Dongyue	HFC-23	Decomposition	Project	said	that	the	CERs	
gained	 were	 based	 on	 decomposition	 of	 HFC-23	 generated	 from	 its	 production	 process	 in	
																																								 																				
167 United Nations, The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to Technology Transfer (n 
140). 
168 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.5: (i) voluntary participation by the parties involved, (ii) 'real, measurable, and long-term benefits' 
for climate change mitigation, and (iii) additionally. Quoted by Cox (n 72). 
169 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 43. More details of the modalities and procedures as requirements for validation at the ‘CDM 
Rulebook’ (UNFCCC Website)  <http://cdmrulebook.org/> accessed 11 Mar 2017. 
170 Ben Pearson and Yin Shao Loong, The CDM: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Or Relabelling Business As Usual? (Third 
World Network, CDMWatch, March 2003). 
171 , ‘CDM Rulebook’ (n 169). 
172 Larry Lohmann, ‘Toward a Different Debate in Environmental Accounting: The Cases of Carbon and Cost–benefit’ (2009) 34 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 499 quoted by Watson and others (n 143). 
173 Watson and others (n 143). 
174 interview with the manager from the Shandong Dongyue HFC23 Decomposition Project 
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order	 to	 reduce	 GHGs	 emission.	 Currently	 under	 Chinese	 law,	 there	 are	 no	 regulations	
requiring	 the	 decomposition	 of	 HFC-23,	 thus	 the	 project	 clearly	 satisfied	 the	 CDM	
additionality	 requirement.	 However,	 with	 the	 continuous	 modification	 of	 the	 national	
environmental	 laws,	 Chinese	 HFC-23	 decomposition	 projects	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 qualify	 for	
CDM	 once	 decomposition	 is	 required	 under	 domestic	 regulations.	 This	 could	 be	 another	
reason	 to	 explain	 the	drop	 in	 TT	 through	CDM.	 In	 general,	 energy	policy	 –	 especially	 policy	
concerning	renewable	energy	–	in	China	is	largely	determined	by	the	NDRC.	Therefore	there	is	
uncertainty	over	the	meaning	of	“business	as	usual.”	If	a	project	would	have	occurred	in	any	
case	 (e.g.	 the	 decomposition	 would	 have	 happened	 without	 CDM	 because	 of	 national	
legislation)	it	is	considered	“business	as	usual”	and,	in	turn,	“additionality”	criteria	required	by	
the	 CDM	 would	 have	 disqualified	 companies	 from	 applying	 projects	 due	 to	 a	 change	 of	
domestic	policies.175	
An	argument	against	CDM	playing	a	significant	role	in	international	TT	is	that	the	mechanism	
mainly	 “encourages	Annex	 I	 parties	 to	 claim	 the	 'low-hanging	 fruit'	 in	developing	 countries,	
[…]	 without	 contributing	 to	 a	 long-term	 strategy	 of	 transforming	 these	 countries	 into	 low	
carbon	 economies.”176	 According	 to	 the	 reviews	 of	 other	 studies177	 and	 results	 generated	
from	 interviews178	 conducted	 in	 this	 research,	 TTs	 through	 CDM	 at	 this	 stage	 are	 mainly	
one-off	transfers	of	equipment,	with	a	minimum	level	of	know-how	that	 is	only	sufficient	to	
operate	 normally.	 Rarely	 is	 assistance	 provided	 to	 the	 host	 developing	 country	 during	 the	
																																								 																				
175 Gang He and Richard K. Morse, ‘Making Carbon Offsets Work in the Developing World: Lessons from the Chinese Wind 
Controversy’ (March 12, 2010) Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper No 90, quoted by Watson and 
others (n 143). 
176 Asselt and Gupta (n 153) p.349, quoted by Cox (n 72). 
177 Wilkins (n 147) p.157. 
178 especially interviews with managers and technicians from the wind projects. 
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implementation	of	CDM	projects	with	 the	purpose	of	developing	 the	 indigenous	and	 lasting	
bedding-in	of	ESTs	in	that	country.	Many	researchers179	 have	imputed	the	failure	of	establish	
sustainable	TT	by	CDM	to	the	lack	of	technology	capacity	in	the	host	countries.	However,	it	is	
actually	the	diffusion	of	ESTs	that	mostly	matters	to	the	long-term	extensive	development	of	a	
country’s	 technological	 level	 and	 application.	 Successful	 sustainable	 TT	 must	 go	 through	
several	 stages180	 and	 it	 requires	 the	 wide	 replication	 of	 the	 technology,	 the	 absorption	 of	
know-how,	 and	 ample	 assimilation	 until	 the	 integration	 of	 indigenous	 technologies	 is	
achieved.181	 Although	 the	 proportional	 relationship	 between	 TT	 growth	 and	 sustainable	
development	is	indeterminate,	it	is	too	early	to	state	whether	mechanisms	like	CDM	have	not	
been	 the	 necessary	 agitation	 that	 triggered	 technological	 renaissance	 in	 large	 emerging	
economies	 like	 China,	 India	 and	 Brazil.182	 Thus	 the	 question	 remains:	what	 other	 obstacles	
have	deterred	or	slowed	the	long-term	goals	of	the	CDM?183	 Problems	generated	from	issues	
such	 as	 “private	 sector	 competition,	 restrictive	 business	 practices	 and	 refusal	 of	 licensing”	
may	decelerate	progress.184	
																																								 																				
179 For example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Third Assessment Report - Working Group III: Mitigation, 
para. 5.1 (Geneva: IPCC, 2001) para 5.1; Damilola S. Olawuyi, ‘Achieving Sustainable Development in Africa through the Clean 
Development Mechanism: Legal and Institutional Issues Considered’ (2009) 17 African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 270 p.293: “The conclusion centres on the finding that there is no 'red thread' connecting a country's sustainable development 
strategy to the eventual technology selection for CDM projects. Van der Gaast and Begg argue for the bundling of small-scale 
projects to enable them to be more attractive to large investors as well as for smooth and reliable 'technology implementation 
chains'” Wytze van der Gaast and Katherine Begg, ‘Enhancing the Role of the CDM in Accelerating Low-Carbon Technology 
Transfers to Developing Countries’ (2009) 3 Carbon & Climate Law Review 58 p.59,62, quoted by Cox (n 72). 
180 “This would necessitate the embedding of what Maskus describes as 'technology ladders', with key steps being the duplicative 
imitative stage, creative imitation and implementation of knowledge-intensive inputs stage, and finally an implied autonomous 
technology development stage.” Keith E. Maskus, ‘Transfer of Technology and technological Capacity Building’ (2003) 
ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectual Property p.8-9, quoted by Cox (n 72). 
181 IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation: Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Bert Metz ed, Cambridge University Press 2001), para. 5.1. 
182 Schneider, Holzer and Hoffmann (n 152). 
183 Wilkins (n 147) p.157. 
184 Cameron Hutchison, ‘Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into Developing Countries?’ 
(2006) 3 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 517 p.537. 
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Scholars185	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	 issue	 of	 IPRs	 and	 whether	 they	 present	 a	 further	
obstacle	to	facilitating	TT	and	technology	diffusion.	Hutchison	believes	that	“overly	restrictive	
IPR	 regimes	 may	 stifle	 precisely	 the	 type	 of	 local	 follow-on	 innovations”	 in	 developing	
countries	 that	 are	 needed.186	 There	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 any	 dispute	 regarding	 IP	 that	 directly	
relates	 to	 a	 climate	 change	 TT	 brought	 before	 the	Dispute	 Settlement	Body187	 but	 there	 is	
already	evidence	of	refusals	 for	 licences	for	climate-friendly	technologies.188	 Such	a	trend	 is	
expected	 to	become	an	 increasing	problem	over	 future	 climate	 change	mitigation.	And	 it	 is	
claimed189	 to	do	with	a	negative	effect	of	the	TRIPS	regime.190	 However,	in	this	research,	the	
influence	 of	 TRIPS	 will	 be	 addressed	 in	 a	 much	 narrower	 environment	 (in	 China,	 and	 the	
renewable	 energy	 sector	 mainly).	 It	 is	 discussed	 with	 full	 consideration	 of	 the	 current	 IP	
system	and	a	sui	generis	case	of	a	 large	mid-income	emerging	economy	 in	order	 to	 identify	
more	 rational	 minimum	 standards	 of	 patent	 protection	 for	 ESTs.	 Such	 standards	 shall	 be	
tailored	according	 to	 the	 characteristics	of	 climate	 change	 technology	development	 in	 large	
developing	countries	that	are	capable	of	benefiting	from	increased	and	more	fluent	flows	of	
licensed	technology	and	which	are	able	to	attract	significant	FDI.	Fundamentally,	this	thesis	is	
aimed	at	an	amended	IP	system	that	works	better	with	the	facilitating	mechanisms	provided	
by	the	climate	change	regime	to	increase	EST	transfer	to	developing	countries	and	eventually	
																																								 																				
185 See detail discussion in Chapter I.  
186 Hutchison (n 184) p.528; Cox (n 72). 
187 “The General Council convenes as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to deal with disputes between WTO members […]The 
DSB has authority to establish dispute settlement panels, refer matters to arbitration, adopt panel, Appellate Body and arbitration 
reports, maintain surveillance over the implementation of recommendations and rulings contained in such reports, and authorize 
suspension of concessions in the event of non-compliance with those recommendations and rulings.” WTO, ‘Dispute Settlement 
Body’ (WTO website)  <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm> accessed July 2017 
188 Third World Network, Brief Note on Technology, IPRs and Climate Change (Penang: Third World Network, 2008). See also 
D. Shabalala and M. Orellana, Technology Transfer in the UNFCCC and other International Legal Regimes: The Challenge of 
Systemic Integration 2 (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009) at 12.  
189 Hutchison (n 184) p.528; Cox (n 72). 
190 Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ (2002) 5 The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 765; TRIPS Agreement. 
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contribute	 to	 environment	 protection.	 Expectations	 of	 CDM,	 are	 not	 high	 for	 the	 second	
commitment	 period191	 given	 that	 the	 major	 beneficiaries	 of	 CDM	 first	 time	 around	 (e.g.	
China)	are	no	 longer	seeking	as	many	CDM	projects	(detail	of	reasons	 is	 included	in	Chapter	
VI).	However,	such	a	flexible	market	mechanism	is	highly	likely	to	be	incorporated	in	any	other	
post-2012	 climate	 change	 regime192	 with	more	 effort	 on	 cooperation	 among	 countries	 and	
more	efficiency	 in	moving	 towards	 the	sustainable	development	objective	embedded	 in	 the	
UNFCCC.193	 The	outcome	of	such	a	mechanism	will	depend	on	how	successfully	it	uses	TT	to	
address	climate	change.	 	
4.4.4 The Paris Agreement 
After	 several	 less	 constructive	 COPs194	 following	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol,	 on	 4	November	 2016,	
the	2015	Paris	Climate	Change	Agreement195 entered	into	force.196	 The	core	objective	of	this	
																																								 																				
191 Began on 1 January 2013 and will end in 2020. 
192 Cox (n 72). 
193 Teresia Rindefjäll, Emma Lund and Johannes Stripple, ‘Wine, Fruit, and Emission Reductions: The CDM as Development 
Strategy in Chile’ (2011) 11 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 7. 
194 Climate change in context: 
“This time line detailing the international response to climate change provides a contextual entry point to the Essential Background. 
You can also use the links on the left-hand column under Essential Background to navigate this section. 
2015 - Intensive negotiations took place under the Ad Hoc Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) throughout 
2012-2015 and culminated in the adoption of the Paris Agreement by the COP on 12 December 2015. More on the Paris 
Agreement. 
2014 - At COP 20 in Lima in 2014, Parties adopted the ‘Lima Call for Action’, which elaborated key elements of the forthcoming 
agreement in Paris. More on the Lima Call for Action. 
2013 - Key decisions adopted at COP 19/CMP 9 include decisions on further advancing the Durban Platform, the Green Climate 
Fund and Long-Term Finance, the Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage. Under the Durban Platform, Parties agreed to submit “intended nationally determined contributions”, known as INDCs, 
well before the Paris conference. More on the Warsaw Outcomes. 
2012 - The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol is adopted by the CMP at CMP 8. More on the Doha Amendment. Several 
decisions taken opening a gateway to greater ambition and action on all levels. More on the Doha Climate Gateway.  
2011 — The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action drafted and accepted by the COP, at COP17. More on the Durban outcomes. 
2010 — Cancun Agreements drafted and largely accepted by the COP, at COP 16. More on the Cancun Agreements. 
2009 — Copenhagen Accord drafted at COP 15 in Copenhagen. This was taken note of by the COP. Countries later submitted 
emissions reductions pledges or mitigation action pledges, all non-binding. 
2007 — IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report released. Climate science entered into popular consciousness. At COP 13, Parties 
agreed on the Bali Road Map, which charted the way towards a post-2012 outcome in two work streams: the AWG-KP, and 
another under the Convention, known as the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention. 
More about the Bali Road Map. 
2005 – Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP 1) takes place in 
Montreal. In accordance with Kyoto Protocol requirements, Parties launched negotiations on the next phase of the KP under the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). What was to become the 
Nairobi Work Programme on Adaptation (it would receive its name in 2006, one year later) is accepted and agreed on. More about 
the Nairobi Work Programme.
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Agreement	 is	 to	 control	 the	 global	 average	 temperature	 increase	 to	 “	 below	 2°C	 above	
pre-industrial	 levels	 and	 to	 pursue	 efforts	 to	 limit	 the	 temperature	 increase	 to	 1.5°C	 above	
pre-industrial	 levels.”197	 The	Agreement	also	aims	at	“enhancing	the	 implementation	of	 the	
Convention,198	 including	 its	 objective”199	 and	 therefore	 to	 “strengthen	 the	 global	 response	
to	 the	 threat	 of	 climate	 change,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 sustainable	 development.”200	 In	 general,	
stabilization	 of	 GHG	 concentrations	 in	 the	 atmosphere	 is	 the	 ultimate	 objective	 of	 all	
agreements	under	the	UNFCCC,	 including	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	This	 is	 intended	to	reduce	the	
risk	 and	 impact	 of	 climate	 change,	 as	 well	 as	 advancing	 the	 ability	 to	 adapt	 to	 possible	
damages	 caused	 by	 climate	 change	 by	 facilitating	 finance	 flows	 and	 TT	 in	 relation	 to	 GHG	
emissions	reduction	and	adaptation.201	
By	 now,	 100	 parties	 have	 ratified	 the	 Paris	 Agreement.	 It	 is	 therefore	 unquestionably	 the	
latest	remarkable	step	in	the	evolution	of	the	climate	change	regime,	building	on	the	efforts	
undertaken	since	the	establishment	of	the	UNFCCC.202	 Despite	what	appears	on	paper,	there	
are	certainly	problems	 in	practice.	Many	disagreements	are	 recurring	as	 they	have	over	 the	
last	25	years.	Discord	about	the	different	contributions	that	should	be	made	to	tackle	climate	
change	among	countries	has	postponed	the	progress	of	reaching	an	international	agreement.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
2001 – Release of IPCC's Third Assessment Report. Bonn Agreements adopted, based on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1998. 
Marrakesh Accords adopted at COP 7, detailing rules for implementation of Kyoto Protocol, setting up new funding and planning 
instruments for adaptation, and establishing a technology transfer framework. 
1997 — Kyoto Protocol formally adopted in December at COP 3. More about the Kyoto Protocol.” 
‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change’ (UNFCCC Website)  
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195 Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 Dec 2015, C.N.819.2016.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d. 
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Nevertheless,	 efforts	 on	 forging	 an	 entirely	 new	 regime	 in	 all	 aspects,	 including	 climate	
change	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation,	 financing	 TT,	 and	 capacity	 building	 in	 less	 developed	
countries	have	never	stopped.203	
There	 are	 several	 notable	 features	 in	 the	 Agreement	 that	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 final	
achievement	of	the	consensus	among	parties.	For	example,	by	adding	“in	the	light	of	different	
national	circumstances”204	 to	the	“common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	
capabilities”	adopted	by	the	UNFCCC,	the	Paris	Agreement	explained	the	principle	in	a	slightly	
different	 way.205	 The	 newly	 expressed	 article	 not	 only	 represents	 developing	 countries’	
intentions	on	reiteration	of	 the	differentiation	principle	but	also	shatters	the	traditional	and	
non-flexible	 dichotomy	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	 Annexes.206 	 Accordingly,	 issues	 concerning	 the	
bindingness	 of	 the	 Agreement	 were	 also	 tailored	 to	 accommodate	 the	 different	 national	
situations	of	 the	parties.	Thus,	 the	 legal	 form	of	 the	Agreement	diverges	 from207	 the	Kyoto	
Protocol208	 and	in	turn	makes	it	easier	to	be	ratified	by	more	countries,	especially	the	US,	and	
it	 thereby	 becomes	 a	 real	 global	 agreement.209	 On	 the	 negative	 side,	 the	 Agreement	
sacrificed	 any	 binding	 obligations	 with	 regard	 to	 emission-reduction	 or	 financing	 activities.	
Contributions	provided	by	parties	are	voluntary	during	implementation	of	the	Agreement.	The	
																																								 																				
203 Obergassel and others (n 196). 
204 Paris Agreement, Art. 2.2. Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement. (n 197). 
205 Raymond Clémençon, ‘The two sides of the Paris climate agreement: Dismal failure or historic breakthrough?’ (2016) 25 The 
Journal of Environment and Development 3. 
206 “new institutions such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Committee, the Technology Executive Committee and the 
Clean Technology Centre and Network founded have furnished the construction of the Paris Agreement.” Obergassel and others (n 
196). 
207 “This convention-protocol construction was the preferred approach developed in the late 20th century for environmental treaty 
regimes.” Ibid (n 196). 
208 As for the history, see Oberthür and Ott (n 148) p.239 ff. quoted by Obergassel and others (n 196). 
209 “This, however, would have forced the US Government to submit the protocol to the Senate for ratification. The Parties in Paris 
thus chose a legal form that is not provided for in the UNFCCC because it is neither an amendment to the convention nor a 
protocol. This innovative legal approach immediately sparked a discussion in the US whether the Paris Agreement is a treaty and 
whether it has to be submitted to the Senate for ratification.” See David Bookbinder, ‘Is The Paris Climate Agreement A Treaty?’ 
(Climate and Energy Policy, May 5, 2017)  <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/paris-climate-agreement-treaty/> . 
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typical	 example	 is	 the	 dispute	 over	 wording	 in	 Article	 4.4	 of	 the	 final	 draft	 of	 the	
Agreement.210	 This	change	of	wording	raised	by	the	US	implied	that	the	developed	countries	
are	“meticulous	to	ensure	that	no	language	would	find	its	way	into	the	Agreement	that	could	
be	 construed	 as	 constituting	 new	 commitments	 which	 would	 require	 Congressional	
approval.” 211 	 In	 this	 case,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 the	 wording	 “nationally	 determined	
contributions”	 parties	 to	 the	 Agreement	 do	 not	 have	 to	 undertake	 an	 absolute	
emission-reduction	commitment,	 therefore	substantially	weakening	 the	obligations	 imposed	
on	relevant	countries.212	
Another	 product	 of	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 is	 the	 cooperative	 mechanism	 established	 under	
Article	 6.4	 of	 the	 Agreement.	 Such	 a	 mechanism	 is	 market-based,	 making	 use	 of	 the	
experiences	accumulated	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol	but	not	rigidly	adhering	to	its	patterns.213	
For	 example,	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 mechanism	 is	 considered	 broader	 than	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	
because	 it	 covers	 more	 than	 project-type	 activities.	 As	 a	 result,	 activities	 such	 as	 bilateral	
emission	 trading,	 international-level	 collaboration	 over	 EST	 capacity	 building	 and	
environmental	 policy	 amelioration	 will	 be	 counted	 as	 activities	 that	 “contribute	 to	 the	
mitigation	 of	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 and	 support	 sustainable	 development.” 214	
Furthermore,	 Article	 6.4(d)	 stipulates	 that	 the	 mechanism	 shall	 aim	 to	 “deliver	 an	 overall	
																																								 																				
210The using of “shall” were requested to be changed for “should” in the sentence “Developed country Parties shall (“should” in the 
published version) continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.” According to the 
US government lawyers, this is “a vital word which could make the difference between rich countries being legally obliged to cut 
emissions rather than just having to try to.” John Vidal, ‘How a ‘Typo' Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal’ (TheGuardian 
News Report, 2015)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal> . 
211 Obergassel and others (n 196). 
212 Ibid. 
213 Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, para. 37f. 
214 Article 6.4 
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mitigation	 in	 global	 emissions.”215	 The	 target	 of	 “overall”	 emission	 reduction	 would	 help	
avoiding	 loopholes	 that	 let	 unobligated	 developing	 countries	 continue	 their	 emission	
increases.	 These	 emissions	 are	 adding	 to	 the	 subtotal	 of	 global	 emission	 offsetting	 and	 the	
emission-reduction	effort	of	developed	countries.	Such	a	 requirement	will	probably	become	
the	norm	of	outsourcing	from	developed	countries	that	has	led	to	“the	zero-sum	game	of	the	
Kyoto	Mechanisms	 to	 date.”216	 However,	 it	 is	 still	 not	 possible	 at	 this	 stage	 to	 predict	 the	
success	 of	 the	 new	 mechanism	 compared	 to	 the	 Kyoto	 mechanisms.	 These	 opportunities	
hinge	 on	 yet-to-be-developed	 guidance	 and	 down-to-earth	 exploration.217	 By	 inviting	 both	
developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 to	 make	 use	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 and	 encourage	
participation	of	public	as	well	as	private	entities	under	the	oversight	of	UNFCCC,	it	is	possible	
that	 the	 cooperative	 mechanism	 invented	 by	 Paris	 Agreement	 will	 go	 beyond	 the	 current	
flexible	mechanisms	such	as	the	CDM.	 	
The	Paris	Agreement	 is	quite	cautious	 in	 its	approach	to	 IPR	 issues.	Text	directly	concerning	
IPR	issues	was	considered	to	be	too	sensitive	and	controversial,	so	 it	does	not	appear	 in	the	
final	version	of	the	Paris	Agreement.	This	derives	from	the	long	history	of	differentiation	over	
IPRs	between	developed	and	developing	countries	as	discussed	in	chapter	I.	Therefore,	it	was	
highly	predictable	 that	any	reference	to	 IPRs	 in	 the	text	would	 incur	strong	opposition	 from	
developed	 countries,	 especially	 the	 US,	 and	would	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 deadlock	 barring	 the	
achievement	of	the	Agreement.	 	
																																								 																				
215 Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4d. 
216 Obergassel and others (n 196). 
217 Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, para. 37f. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 2016. 
	 164	
With	 regard	 to	 TT,	 the	 Agreement	 also	 involves	 “further	 development	 of	 the	 UNFCCC's	
Technology	Mechanism,	including	the	work	of	the	Technology	Executive	Committee,	and	the	
development	and	operationalization	of	the	Climate	Technology	Centre	and	Network.”218	 With	
the	effort	of	developing	 countries,	 the	Agreement	also	established	a	 technology	 framework	
aiming	at	improving	the	UNFCCC	Technology	Mechanism.	Article	10	especially	points	out	the	
importance	of	technology	development	and	TT	“to	improve	resilience	to	climate	change	and	
to	 reduce	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.”219	 Moreover,	 it	 encourages	 parties	 to	 “strengthen	
cooperative	 action	 on	 technology	 development	 and	 transfer.”220	 Correspondingly,	 although	
not	 included	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Agreement	 directly,	 it	 will	 inevitably	 confront	 IPR	 issues	
through	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 provisions.221	 However,	 any	 pertaining	
disputes	remains	unclear	under	any	MEA	to	date.	 	
For	developing	countries,	the	bright	side	is	that	they	have	successfully	established	a	clear	link	
between	 technology	and	 finance.222	 Although	 the	 language	 concerning	 the	 legal	obligations	
of	financing	contributions223	 for	mitigation	and	adaptation	in	developing	countries	is	vaguely	
expressed	 to	 accommodate	 the	 US’s	 interior	 political	 constraints,224	 for	 now	 at	 least	 the	
finance	 needed	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 copyrighted	 technologies	 is	 acknowledged	 in	 the	
Agreement,	 providing	 a	 possible	 basis	 for	 future	 dispute	 settlements.	 Then	 again,	 the	
																																								 																				
218 Obergassel and others (n 196). 
219 Paris Agreement, Art. 10(1). 
220 Ibid. 
221 More details See A. E. L. Brown, ‘Intellectual Property and Climate Change’ in R. Dreyfuss and J. Pila (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press 2017). 
222 Paris Agreement, Art. 10(5). 
223 “The accompanying decision text reiterates that the goal of annual USD 100 billion of North-South financial flows in 2020 and 
beyond, promised already in Copenhagen, is still valid, and will be ramped up before 2025. The USD 100 billion must therefore be 
the floor of financial contributions. Until now, many industrialized countries regarded the pledge of Copenhagen more as a ceiling. 
However, the coming negotiations will prove interesting, as the current decision text does not specify who will contribute to the 
stronger financing goal, but only speaks of setting ‘a new collective goal’." Obergassel and others (n 196). 
224 Ibid. 
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shortage	of	the	weak	binding	power	is	a	makeshift,	being	“a	step	that	needed	to	be	taken	in	
order	to	get	moving	at	all.”	 225	 From	that	perspective,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	failed	to	qualify	as	a	
successful	 treaty,	 due	 to	 having	 several	 non-compliant	 countries	 refuse	 to	 comply	with	 the	
obligations	 in	 the	 first	 commitment	 period.226 	 Furthermore,	 the	 former	 party	 Canada	
withdrew	 from	 the	 Protocol	while	 other	members	 such	 as	 Russia,	 New	 Zealand,	 and	 Japan	
took	on	no	further	commitment	in	its	subsequent	commitment	period.	
Despite	 the	 price	 paid	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement,	 the	 actual	 effect	 of	 such	 an	
achievement	hinges	on	the	subsequent	negotiation	between	parties	over	 implementation	of	
the	 financial	 and	 other	 effectively	 enforced	mechanisms.	 At	 this	 stage,	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
mechanisms	under	 the	Paris	Agreement	 is	doubtful	 for	 it	has	no	 caps,	 compulsory	absolute	
emission	 targets	 or	 assistant	 obligations	 set	 in	 the	 provisions.	 This	 would	 have	 made	 the	
measuring	 of	 contributions,	 especially	 contributions	 to	 assist	 developing	 countries,	 more	
intricate	 and	 confusing.	With	 the	 contributions	 being	determined	by	 each	party	 voluntarily,	
there	 are	 no	 legally	 binding	 obligations	 securing	 the	 outcomes	 of	 its	 implementation.	 The	
Kyoto	Protocol	quoad	hoc	 has	 an	 intrinsic	 advantage.	Also,	with	 the	diplomatic	 atmosphere	
that	 surrounds	 international	 climate	 change	 negotiations,	 participants	 are	 scrupulous	 with	
issues	 that	might	 incur	 conflict	 and	 consequently	 result	 in	 failures.	Mention	 of	 IPRs	 within	
climate	change	treaties	seems	to	be	a	presumptuous	demand	because	it	“has	always	been	a	
red	 line	 issue”	 227	 and	probably	will	not	change	 in	the	future.	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	enough	to	
																																								 																				
225 Ibid. 
226 For example, “back in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force without the ratification by the US.” Igor Shishlov, Romain 
Morel and Valentin Bellassen, ‘Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period’ (2016) 16 Climate 
Policy 768. 
227 Obergassel and others (n 196). 
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rely	 on	 such	 concessions	and	 requires	 more	 work	 to	 be	 done	 in	 a	 chapter	 on	 IPRs	 to	 see	
whether	there	is	a	better	way	out	for	the	issue.	
4.5 Conclusion and bridging to IP regime 
The	discussion	 in	 this	 chapter	mainly	 looks	 into	 the	 international	efforts	 to	mitigate	climate	
change,	 and	 the	 platforms	 established	 to	 coordinate	 actions	 by	 all	 countries.	 Nearly	 all	
important	MEAs	employ	TT	as	a	tool	to	encourage	environmental	protection	capability	and	to	
generate	 enthusiasm	 for	 such	 in	 countries,	 especially	 the	 less	 developed	 ones.	 UNFCCC,	 as	
one	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 MEAs	 providing	 a	 vital	 mechanism	 for	 multilateral	 action	 to	
combat	climate	change,228	 has	clearly	promoted	TT	through	its	mechanisms	(i.e.	CDM	under	
the	 Kyoto	 Protocol).	 However,	 these	 efforts	 are	 far	 from	 sufficient	 to	 solve	 climate	 change	
crises	 and	unlikely	 to	 achieve	 global	 ratification.	Moreover,	MEAs	 are	not	 dealing	with	 IPRs	
issue	 directly	 arising	 from	 TT	 they	 have	 promoted.	 Almost	 unanimously,	 scholars	 and	
governors	 feel	 that	 the	 IP	 regime	 is	 a	 necessary	 and	 useful	 element	 that	 needs	 continued	
acknowledgement	 in	any	climate	change	agreement.	Although	the	TRIPS	preamble	seems	to	
be	 sufficient,	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 provisional	 and	 institutional	 design	 under	 the	
Agreement	is	set	up	to	reach	the	full	potential	of	its	objectives.	This	thesis	believes	that	more	
could	and	should	be	done	for	the	current	international	IP	system	(the	TRIPS)	to	complement	
the	MEAs	regarding	IP	 issues	derived	from	climate	change	TT.	This	will	be	discussed	in	more	
detail	in	the	next	chapter.	
	
																																								 																				
228 UNFCCC, ‘Introduction to the Convention’ (UNFCCC Newsroom)  
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php>  (n 96). 
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Chapter	 V:	 Bearing	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 and	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement	on	TT	to	China	
5.1 Introduction  
Global	 climate	 change	 has	 already	 had	 observable	 effects	 on	 the	 environment.	 And	 while	
awareness	 of	 the	 crisis	 is	 increasing,	 the	 need	 for	 transferring	 green	 technologies	 between	
developed	countries	and	developing	countries	is	rising.	IPRs	that	have	a	great	effect	on	green	
TT	 should	 there	 from	 be	 reconsidered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 a	 revisiting	 of	
relevant	agreements	is	important.	In	order	to	clarify	the	current	imperfect	legal	environment	
pertaining	 to	 climate	 change	 TT,	 this	 chapter	 aims	 looking	 at	 the	 current	 international	
agreements,	the	TRIPS	Agreement	in	particular,	and	whether	the	traditional	justifications	for	
IP	provide	a	suitable	rationale	for	protecting	and	disseminating	climate	change	technologies.	
This	chapter	will	refer	to	patent	rights	and	issues	regarding	green	technologies	that	could	be	
protected	under	IPR	regime	specifically	for	they	are	closely	bonded	to	TT	activities.	 	
Climate	change	influences	range	across	several	different	areas.	One	of	the	most	significant	is	
the	atmospheric	temperature-rise,	which	leads	to	an	increase	in	the	frequency	or	severity	of	
extreme	weather	 events,	 such	 as	 storms,	 flooding,	 high	 winds,	 and	 other	 direct	 threats	 to	
people	and	property.	Furthermore,	an	increase	of	the	incidence	of	diseases	may	be	caused	by	
climate	change	as	warmer	temperatures	may	increase	the	concentrations	of	unhealthy	air	and	
water	pollutants	and	extreme	events	might	promote	the	further	spread	of	some	diseases	such	
as	malaria.1	 To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 the	problem	of	 climate	 change	 shall	 be	 considered	 crucial	
and	unique,	because	the	issue	is	extremely	influential	in	terms	of	its	impact	on	human	health	
																																								 																				
1 Nicholas Herbert Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press 2007) p.65-88. 
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and	lifestyle.	Solutions	to	the	problem	may	need	to	be	radical	and	this	will	significantly	alter	
the	paradigm	of	global	economic	activity	and	the	relevant	regulations.	For	example,	“limiting	
GHGs	 emissions	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 requires	 developed	 countries	 to	 modify	 their	
primary	economic	structures,	including	making	transformations	within	energy,	transportation,	
manufacturing,	 agriculture,	 and	 investment	 sectors.” 2 	 Such	 agreements	 identify	 the	
determination	 and	 the	 actual	 need	 for	 special	 treatment	 towards	 climate	 change	
technologies.	 A	 more	 important	 factor	 in	 determining	 the	 success	 of	 climate	 change	
mitigation	 is	 the	 strong	 and	 positive	 political	will	 of	 each	 country.	 In	 other	words,	 if	 global	
climate	change	is	to	be	dealt	with	successfully,	many	countries	may	need	to	pass	and	enforce	
draconian	 legislation.	 In	 fact,	 some	 actions	 taken	 at	 a	 national	 level	 by	 internationally	
influential	countries,	like	China,	are	already	manifesting	this	political	will.3	 	
New	technologies	will	inevitably	be	involved	in	solving	the	problem,	and	they	are	believed4	 to	
have	 great	 potential	 in	 the	 future	 of	 global	 sustainable	 development.	 The	 downside	 of	
reliance	 on	 technology	 is	 that	 it	 requires	 large	 capital	 costs	 for	 research,	 development	 and	
large-scale	 application.	 Such	 costs	 could	 be	 burdensome	 to	 many	 developing	 countries.5	
																																								 																				
2 Cinnamon Piñon Carlarne, ‘The Kyoto Protocol & the WTO: Reconciling Tensions Between Free Trade & Environmental 
Objectives’ (2006) 17 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 45 p.48. 
3 More detailed observations on this matter will be presented in chapter VI. 
4 Stabilization Wedges, ‘Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies Pacala, S.; Socolow, R’ 
(2004) 305 Science (Washington, DC, United States) 968. 
5 According to the UNFCCC report on climate change adaptation costs, “total funding need for adaptation by 2030 could amount 
to $49–171 billion per annum globally, of which $27–66 billion would needed in developing countries.” (Martin L. Parry, 
Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of the UNFCCC and Other Recent Estimates (LIED 2009)) As an 
example, “removing the housing and infrastructure deficit in low- and middle-income countries will cost around $315 billion per 
year over 20 years; while adapting this upgraded infrastructure specifically to meet the challenge of climate change will cost an 
additional $16–63 billion per year.” (ibid) In some positive cases, climate change technologies will not generate large costs to 
developing countries if the technology is properly commercialized during the process of large-scale application. For example, in 
Brazil, production of biofuel from sugar cane is mutually commercialized, which means that the production processes are already 
cheaper than traditional energy sources such as petroleum, meaning that “the necessary capital investment should be forthcoming 
from the private sector, both for research and for installation.” (John H Barton, ‘Mitigating Climate Change Through Technology 
Transfer: Addressing the Needs of Developing Countries’ Energy, Environment and Development Programme: Programme Paper 
08/02, (October 2008) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/100
8barton.pdf> accessed 22 Aug 2017) However, these examples are few, while most of the technologies are expensive in many 
respects. Obviously, the costs must be envisioned before any climate change technology can actually work. Costs may be high 
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Legislative	 solutions	 to	 offset	 the	 limited	 application	 due	 to	 high	 price	 of	 climate	 change	
technology,	such	as	the	establishment	of	a	technology	fund,	could	be	feasible	options	in	the	
short	 term.	Yet	 such	aid	 requires	external	 force	 to	 consistently	 raise	 funds	and	manage	 the	
distribution	of	funds	in	order	to	maintain	the	proper	functioning	of	the	measures.	In	the	long	
run,	such	aid	can	only	scratch	the	surface	if	it	does	not	make	use	of	the	invisible	hand	of	the	
market.	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 role	 that	 an	 IP	 system	plays	 in	 climate	 change	mitigation	 actions,	 it	 can	 be	
positive	 “in	 encouraging	 new	 business	 development,	 rationalization	 of	 inefficient	 (green)	
industry,	 and	 inducing	 technology	 acquisition	 and	 creation.”6	 But	 IP	 protection	 is	 also	
suspected	 to	 “harm	development	prospects	by	 raising	 the	 costs	of	 imitation	and	permitting	
monopolistic	 behavior	 by	 owners	 of	 IPRS.”7	 Herein	 lies	 the	 classic	 dilemma	 between	 the	
advantages	and	disadvantages	of	 IP	protection,	regardless	of	 industry	sector.	Because	of	the	
subtle	 relationship	 between	 IPRs	 and	 the	 development	 and	 TTs,	 a	 cooperative	 system	
between	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 –	 carefully	 designed	 for	 regulating	 IP	 in	 the	
climate	 change	 context	 that	 both	 encourages	 innovation	 and	 facilitates	 distribution	 of	
technology	 –	 is	 required.	 However,	 there	 will	 be	 impediments	 from	 people	 with	 vested	
interests	that	frustrate	any	changes	to	the	established	order.	For	this	reason,	Garrett	Hardin8	
believes	that	international	solutions	intended	to	solve	the	problem	must	be	based	on	a	kind	of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
because the technology requires R&D before it can become economically attractive.” (ibid) Costs will remain high unless adjusted 
by the environmental consequences of GHG emissions. For this reason, the cost will decline after several years of implementation 
of the relevant subsidy or regulation in the affected area. At present, some of these technologies are not well commercialized to 
compete in the market, for instance, the more advanced technologies for GHG emission reduction, such as carbon capture and 
storage technologies are simply not economical at current prices. “Hence, they will be applied only if required by law, subsidized 
by governments, or made competitive by a substantial carbon tax.” (ibid). 
6 Keith E Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development’ (2000) 32 Case W Res J Int'l L 471. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 science 1243. 
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agreed	 “coercion”.	 Example	 agreements	 of	 such	 were	 indeed	 launched	 at	 the	 1992	 Earth	
Summit. 9 	 But	 it	 might	 be	 difficult	 for	 such	 coercion	 to	 be	 executable,	 feasible	 and	
implemented	 (ideally)	 in	 the	 short	 term.	 Bruch	 and	 Pendergrass	 propose	 “an	 alternative	
approach,	which	 is	 to	 rely	on	 voluntary	partnerships	between	governments	 and	 the	private	
sector	 to	advance	sustainable	development.”10	 While	 it	 is	more	moderate	and	 realistic,	 the	
voluntary	approach11	 could	be	 less	 strongly	binding	and	not	as	 regulatory	as	more	coercive	
approaches.	Despite	the	difficulties	 in	developing	a	new	way	to	 look	at	 IPRs,	with	an	eye	on	
the	long	term,	this	research	seeks	reforms	to	deal	with	the	perpetual	paralysis	of	the	current	
IP	system	 in	 regard	 to	climate	change,	while	 retaining	 the	 function	 that	 IPRs	already	play	 in	
many	 areas.	 Therefore,	 a	 revisit	 at	 the	 justification	 for	 IPRs,	 patents	 in	 particular,	 and	 the	
currently	widely	ratified	international	IP	regime	is	needed.	
5.2 Justification for patents 
IPRs	protect	objects	that	“are	produced	through	mental	or	creative	labor	by	human	beings,”	
stated	 in	 laws	 that	 “describe	 the	 legal	 status	 and	protection	 that	 allows	people	 to	own	 the	
																																								 																				
9 In Rio, two legally binding Conventions aimed at preventing global climate change and the eradication of the diversity of 
biological species were opened for signature at the Summit: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
The Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Moreover, Rio launched the process for four more conventions: 
The 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification; The 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species; The 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure 
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade; The 2000 Stockholm Treaty on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants. 
Finally, at Rio, governments adopted three major documents aimed at changing the traditional approach to development: 
Agenda 21 - a comprehensive programme of action for global action in all areas of sustainable development; The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development - a series of principles defining the rights and responsibilities of States; The Statement of Forest 
Principles - a set of principles to underlie the sustainable management of forests worldwide. 
United Nations, Earth Summit, at <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html>; Hilary French, ‘Reshaping Global Governance’ 
[2002] State of the World 174, p.178-179. 
10 See Carl Bruch and John Pendergrass, ‘Type II Partnerships, International Law, and The Commons’ (2002) 15 Geo Int'l Envtl 
L Rev 855. 
11 For example, the World Band Publich-Private-Partnership (“A long-term contract between a private party and a government 
entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility and 
remuneration is linked to performance.” See World Bank, ‘Publich-Private-Partnership Referecnce Guide 3.0’ (PPP Knowledge 
Lab)  <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/publicprivatepartnerships> accessed May 2017). 
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intangible	 products	 of	 their	 creativity	 and	 innovation	 imbedded	 in	 physical	 objects”12	 and	
their	physical	properties.	In	general,	the	reasons	that	protection	is	given	to	IPRs	are	twofold.	
One	is	to	“give	expression	to	the	moral	sentiment	that	a	creator,	such	as	a	craftsman,	should	
enjoy	 the	 fruits	of	 their	 creativity;”	 and	 the	other	 is	 to	 “encourage	 the	 investment	of	 skills,	
time,	finance,	and	other	resources	into	innovation	in	a	way	that	is	beneficial	to	society.”13	 	
However,	“the	tension	between	stimulating	creation	and	disseminating	its	benefits	to	society	
at	large	is	delicate.”14	 For	example,	Landes	and	Posner	claim	that	“expanding	IPR	can	actually	
reduce	 the	 amount	 of	 new	 IPR	 that	 is	 created	 by	 raising	 the	 creators’	 input	 costs,	 since	 a	
major	 input	 into	new	IP	 is	existing	(protecting)	such	property.”15	 This	 is	 intuitively	true	with	
patent	 rights	 behind	 which	 lie	 inventions	 and	 innovations	 adding	 up	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	
future	R	&	D	activities.	Patents,	as	a	vital	component	of	the	IPR	set,16	 in	fact,	provide	no	solid	
evidence	 to	 confirm	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 strength	 of	 patent	 protection	 and	 the	
growth	of	international	TT	flow	into	a	region.	Even	in	a	domestic	market,	for	example	the	US,	
a	 patent	 is	 merely	 one	 of	 the	 few	 encouragements	 to	 R	 &	 D	 investment	 and	 economic	
growth.17	 Conclusions	about	 the	effectiveness	of	patents	 as	 an	 incentive	 to	 investment	are	
ambiguous,	as	they	are	on	patents’	importance	in	encouraging	inventors	and	innovators.	
																																								 																				
12 See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, USA 2014) p.1-3. 
13 See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use (World 
Intellectual Property Organization 2004). 
14 See, e.g., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Intellectual Property: Trade, Competition, and Sustainable Development, vol 
3 (University of Michigan Press 2003). See also, Philippe Cullet, Intellectual Property Protection and Sustainable Development 
(LexisNexis, Butterworths 2005). 
15 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Harvard University Press 
2009) p.422. 
16 Patents “create a proprietary interest in non-excludable (The term is used to describe a good or service that can be assessed by 
non-paying consumers without being prevented from accessing it.), non-rivalrous (Non-rival goods are the opposite of rival goods. 
These goods allow consumption or possession to multiple users.) goods (i.e. the invention) by giving rights of exclusive use, 
manufacture and sale to the owner of an invention, and providing legal recourse against infringement (i.e. unauthorized use, 
manufacture or sale).” Cameron Hutchison, ‘Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into 
Developing Countries?’ (2006) 3 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 517. 
17 IPRs have the potential to provide incentives for investment and trade, and thereby sometimes contribute to economic growth. 
This is proved by evidence found in American pharmaceutical R & D practice. However, “it is hard to find evidence suggesting 
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With	the	rising	costs	of	exploring	and	applying	new	technologies,	one	might	ask:	“apart	from	
encouraging	 the	 innovation	 required	 for	 economic	 growth,	 aren’t	 IPR	 and	 patents	 also	
designed	to	contribute	to	the	public	good	by	ensuring	the	effective	short-term	dissemination	
and	 long-term	 assimilation	 of	 technology?”18	 With	 the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change	 becoming	
increasingly	 severe,	 lawmakers	 will	 be	 confronted	 with	 questions	 involving	 the	 rights	 to	
control	 information	 that	 may	 help	 in	 solving	 the	 problem.19	 Such	 contention	 leads	 to	 the	
necessary	 justification	 of	 the	 international	 framework	 of	 IPR	 protection.	 So	 many	 of	 the	
problems	mentioned	above	 should	be	dealt	with	a	 clearer	understanding	of	 the	purpose	of	
IPR/patents	and	of	how	to	balance	the	demands	of	the	different	entities.	The	discussion	of	the	
theoretical	 aspects	 of	 patents	 aims	 to	 provide	 lawmakers	 and	 governments	 with	 new	
perspectives	from	which	to	look	at	these	questions.	This	is	so	that	their	arguments	will	be	“not	
merely	 systematic	 accounts	 of	 the	 impulses	 that	 have	 shaped	 extant	 legal	 doctrines,	 but	
guides	 that	 legislators	 and	 judges	 can	 use	 in	 modifying	 or	 extending	 those	 doctrines	 in	
response	to	new	technologies	and	circumstances”20	 whenever	needed.	 	
5.2.1 Natural rights justification 
As	 identified	 by	 Machlup,21	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 patent	 must	 have	 absorbed	 the	 theory	 of	
natural	 rights22	 that	 recognizes	an	 inventor’s	 certain	basic	 rights	which	should	not	deniable	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
patents are a major factor spurring R & D investment, that patents contribute to economic growth, or even that the patent system is 
a source of great wealth to important inventors and innovators (outside of a few industries like pharmaceuticals).” James Bessen 
and Michael James Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton University 
Press 2008). 
18 Wei Shi, Intellectual Property in the Global Trading System: EU-China Perspective (Springer Science & Business Media 2008). 
19 Should the inventors of green technologies be granted rights to manipulate the price, keeping more potential users from 
affording the applications? What degree of monopoly power should be just necessary to encourage innovation without it being 
abused by the companies and slowing down progress and the diffusion of knowledge? Should we scale down patent protection to 
boost future configurations of widely distributed products? Should governments intervene in the transfer of climate change 
technologies as a supplement to patent law, or should they establish a quasi-legal regime? 
20 William Fisher, ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’ [Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK] 168 New essays in the legal 
and political theory of property. 
21 Fritz Machlup, Essays in Economic Semantics (New York University Press 1975). 
22 The most recognized theory is John Locke’s conception of natural rights. 
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by	 any	 authority.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 the	 presumption	 that	 if	 a	 person	 owns	 himself,	 then	 he	
owns	the	product	of	his	labour.	A	natural	right	is	different	fro	patent	right.	It	should	be	noted	
that	a	patent	holder's	rights	are	essentially	rights	to	exclude	others	from	performing	acts	that	
would	 severely	 damage	benefit	 of	 the	owner.	 “A	patent	 by	 itself	 does	 not	 give	 its	 owner	 a	
positive	 right	 to	 make,	 use,	 sell	 or	 import	 the	 patented	 invention,	 as	 these	 acts	 could	 be	
governed	by	other	 laws,	or	may	fall	within	the	scope	of	earlier,	broader	patents.”23	 But	 it	 is	
believed	by	Lemley24	 to	have	a	part	of	"absolute	protection"	in	order	to	fulfil	the	objective	of	
IP	law,	which	is	to	encourage	innovation.	The	underlying	thinking	is	that	creators	will	not	have	
sufficient	incentive	to	invent	unless	they	are	fairly	respected	by	society	and	legally	entitled	to	
capture	the	full	value	of	their	 inventions.	Such	view	supports	IP	as	a	type	of	"real"	property.	
However,	 there	 are	 parts	 of	 the	 IP	 system	 that	 are	 not	 designed	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
theory.	For	example,	the	first	to	file	an	application	for	a	patent,	instead	of	the	first	to	invent,	is	
recognized	as	 the	 right-owner.	Although,	on	many	occasions	 the	 first	 to	 file	and	 the	 first	 to	
invent	do	dovetail,	in	cases	where	the	two	do	not,	the	patent	does	not	recognise	the	labour	of	
the	 inventors	who	 failed	 to	 file	 their	patents	 in	 time.	A	 similar	example	 is	 that	 “patents	are	
territorial,	meaning	 that	 a	 patent	 granted	 in	 one	 country	 has	 no	 legal	 effect	 in	 another.”25	
One	 might	 argue	 that	 the	 state-of-the-art	 requirement	 entrenched	 in	 many	 jurisdictions	
would	eliminate	the	effect	of	such	territorial	 limitation.	However,	in	some	countries,	like	the	
																																								 																				
23 Antony Taubman and Jayashree Watal, ‘The WTO TRIPS Agreement – A Practical Overview For Climate Change 
Policymakers’ (13 Dec 2010) Intellectual Property Division of the WTO Secretariat 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/8_3_overviewclimatechange_e.pdf> accessed 30 June 2017. 
24 Mark A. Lemley, ‘Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding’ (2004) 83 Tex L Rev 1031. 
25 Taubman and Watal (n 23). 
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Chinese	2000	Patent	Law,26	 state-of-the-art	requirement	does	not	necessarily	imbue	the	true	
inventors	with	priority	in	the	filing	queue.27	
Some	countries	and	agencies	have	endeavoured	to	promote	the	international	harmonization	
of	 the	 IP	 law	 system.28	 Such	 an	 effort	 was	 encouraged	 by	 proposals	 made	 by	 scholars	 to	
further	 harmonize	 domestic	 laws	 at	 international	 level,	 pursuing	 globalization	 from	 the	
nineteenth	 century	 on.29	 More	 advocates	 such	 as	 Sherwood30	 and	 Radack31	 believe	 in	 “a	
uniform	 patent	 law	 system	 that	 simplifies	 the	 law,	making	 it	 easier	 to	 receive	 and	 enforce	
patents	 in	many	jurisdictions	while	reducing	administrative	costs.”32	 This	 idea	 is	adopted	by	
the	 majority	 of	 the	 international	 patent	 community.33	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 World	 Intellectual	
																																								 																				
26 The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (as amended up to the Decision of December 27, 2008, regarding the 
Revision of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China). 
27 More details in Chpater VI. Article 22 highlighted a novel requirement for the granting of a patent right.According to article 22: 
“Novelty means that, before the date of filing, no identical invention or utility model has been publicly disclosed in publications in 
the country (China) or abroad or has been publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country, nor has 
any other person filed previously with the patent administrative organ under the State Council an application which described the 
identical invention or utility model and was published after the said date of filing.” It should be noted that the article distinguished 
“disclosed in publications” from “other means” of disclosure. The latter is dealt with under a domestic regional standard rather than 
an absolute regional standard. In that case, inventions disclosed in a non-publication manner abroad might be considered as IP 
belonging to an applicant who filed them in China. Fortunately, such a loophole is counteracted by the amended 2008 Patent Law, 
yet it kept the old Article 24 in the text. Article 24 provides three circumstances where “an invention/creation for which a patent is 
applied does not lose its novelty. Within six months before the date of filing, if (1) it was first exhibited at an international 
exhibition sponsored or recognized by the Chinese Government; (2) it was first made public at a prescribed academic or 
technological meeting; or (3) it was disclosed by any person without the consent of the applicant.” Within article 24 a 
six-month-long “grace period” argument is in fact not recognized in many other countries where they apply a rule of absolute 
novelty (Christopher B. Kilner, ‘U.S. "Novelty" vs. International "Absolute Novelty"’ (Vol6, Issue 8 - 8/15/2002) 
<https://www.marburylaw.com/images/files/usnoveltyvsinternationalabsolutenovelty.pdf> accessed 22 Aug 2017) and thus the 
inventor might not be able to secure patent protection in these countries. (The grace period argument will not be rejected in the US 
and Canada. See Dongwook Chun, ‘Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization: The Necessity and Strategy for a 
Pragmatic Outcome’ (2011) 93 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 127; See also Geng Liu, ‘Patent Novelty and Its Application in 
Intellectual Property Strategy’ (2006) 7 Patent Law Research p.156-65 “This happens in some countries where they have a rule of 
absolute novelty to obtain a patent: any public disclosure of the invention, even by the inventor, is generally a bar to obtaining 
patent protection.”(Kilner n 27) Again, it is far-fetched to explain the juridical limitation of patents through the lens of natural right, 
and it is hard to hope for a unitary patent on an international basis. 
28 Such as the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, PL 112–29 [HR 1249] entered into force on 16th September, 2011; See also 
Chun (n 27). 
29 “when the Italian Minister of Justice Pasquale Stanislao Mancini sought to convene a conference for the harmonization of 
private international law” Max Rheinstein, Ulrich M. Drobnig and Peter Hay, ‘Conflict of laws’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
February 10, 2015)  <https://www.britannica.com/topic/conflict-of-laws> accessed 27 Aug 2017, quoted by Chun (n 27) 
30 Sherwood argues that “a uniform intellectual property system makes sense for the world.” Robert M. Sherwood, ‘Why a 
Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World’ (1993) 68 Global dimensions of intellectual property rights in 
science and technology 79. 
31 Radack further supported this idea as he stated that “the phrase [patent harmonization] refers to efforts to make individual 
national patent laws around the world more uniform.” David V. Radack, ‘Patent Harmonization: Creating Uniform Patent Laws’ 
(1997) 49 JOURNAL OF THE MINERALS 66, available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/ matters-9705.html. 
32 John F. Duffy, ‘Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law’ (2002) 17 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 685 Quoted by 
Chun (n 27). 
33 Duffy (n 32) quoted by Chun (n 27). 
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Property	 Organization	 (WIPO)	was	 established	 and	 the	WTO	 also	 includes	 agreements	 that	
endeavour	 to	 uniform	 and	 standardize	 the	 patent	 systems	 in	 its	Member	 States.	 Examples	
include:	“the	Paris	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Industrial	Property	(Paris	Convention),	the	
Patent	Cooperation	Treaty	(PCT),	the	Patent	Law	Treaty	(PLT),	and	the	Trade-Related	Aspects	
of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS).”34	 	
However,	 there	are	many	different	voices	that	are	not	 interest	 in	a	one-fits-all	 legal	system.	
This	 is	 not	 only	 due	 to	 the	 significant	 time	 and	 money	 costs	 required	 to	 join	 the	 patent	
system,	but	also	because	it	fetters	a	country’s	freedom	to	design	its	own	IP	structure	to	suit	its	
domestic	 situation.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 climate	 change,	 where	 circumstances	 are	 extremely	
different	between	countries,	 the	question	remains:	“to	what	 level	and	 in	what	order	should	
harmonization	take	place?”35	 More	importantly,	the	relevant	policy	decision	must	determine	
to	 what	 extent	 differing	 climate	 change	 situations,	 and	 differing	 independent	 technology	
capabilities	between	different	 jurisdictions,	 should	be	overlooked	 in	order	 to	achieve	global	
uniformity.	It	is	clear	that	a	green-technology-friendly	patent	system	would	help	a	country	to	
gain	an	edge	in	the	field	of	 intense	international	patent	competition.	By	taking	advantage	of	
the	jurisdictional	feature	of	patent,	some	countries	have	been	making	efforts	to	secure	‘green’	
patent	applications.	Certain	inventions,	such	as	energy	or	water	solutions	that	are	safe,	clean,	
recyclable,	 and	 efficient,	 are	 more	 eligible	 for	 a	 prioritized	 patent	 application	 process,36	
which	 is	more	 speedy	and	 straightforward.	Once	a	patent	 is	 filed	 in	one	of	 the	countries,	 it	
																																								 																				
34 Takashi Kinoshita, ‘Strategy for Harmonization of US Patent System with International Norm’ MACD Project (May 2001) 
<http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/pdf/ma_projects/kinoshita_takashi.pdf> accessed 24 Aug 2017, quoted by Chun (n 27). 
35 Jerome H. Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty’ (2007) 57 Duke Law Journal 85 p.126. 
36 Eric L. Lane, ‘Building the Global Green Patent Highway: A Proposal for International Harmonization of Green Technology 
Fast Track Programs’ (2012) 37 Berkeley Technology Law Journal. It has been noticed that China, Japan, the U.K. and the US 
have launched the accelerated patent examination for green-energy technologies. 
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actually	affects	potential	applicants	in	other	countries	ratified	by	the	PCT,	which	can	enhance	
the	advantage	of	future	competition	in	the	green-technology	market	and	promise	sustainable	
development	 for	 the	 country.	 Such	 an	 advantage	 could	 be	 visible	 in	 the	
environment-management	 input	 cost	 comparisons	 between	 green-technology	 owning	 and	
green-technology	 receiving	countries,	and	 the	gap	may	extend	 further,	 since	“a	major	 input	
into	 new	 IP	 is	 the	 existence	of	 such	property.”37	 After	 all,	 patents	 are	 by	 their	 very	 nature	
jurisdiction-based	and	aimed	 to	benefit	 society	 in	 a	particular	 jurisdiction.	 Therefore	patent	
rights	are	not	as	absolute	as	natural	right	on	which	they	claims	to	justify.	 	
5.2.2 Reward theory or award justification 
Another	 way	 to	 look	 at	 how	 to	 justify	 patents	 is	 that	 the	 grant	 of	 a	 patent	 with	
exclusive/monopoly	 rights	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 award	 rather	 than	 an	 underlying	 fiscal	
reward	to	inventors.	The	premise	for	this	discussion	is	a	consensus	that	law-making	should	be	
based	on	efforts	towards	the	maximization	of	net	social	welfare:	
It	requires	lawmakers	to	strike	an	optimal	balance	between,	on	one	hand,	the	power	of	
exclusive	 rights	 to	 stimulate	 the	 creation	 of	 inventions	 and	 works	 of	 art	 and,	 on	 the	
other,	 the	 partially	 offsetting	 tendency	 of	 such	 rights	 to	 curtail	 widespread	 public	
enjoyment	of	those	creations.38	
																																								 																				
37 Shi (n 18). 
38 Fisher (n 20). 
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The	pursuit	of	such	balance	might	sometimes	be	a	dilemma	when	lawmakers	are	prioritizing	
the	 reward	 theory39	 over	any	other	awarding	measures.	Thus	 it	might	be	easier	 to	 test	 the	
law	under	the	basic	objective	for	patent	establishment:	to	encourage	inventive	activities.	 	
Indeed,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 fiscal	 reward,	 technology	 developers	would	 struggle	 to	 recoup	
expenses	 needed	 in	 and	 for	 inventing.	 It	 would	 then	 discourage	 inventors	 from	 future	
inventive	 works,	 resulting	 in	 inadequate	 numbers	 of	 innovations	 available	 to	 society.40	
Therefore,	historically	and	still	today,	monopoly	patent	rights	are	the	preferred	form	of	award	
for	inventions,	for	they	are	considered	to	be	a	good	way	to	reward	the	inventor	for	his	or	her	
risk	and	expense.41	 The	reward	justification	of	a	patent	is	thus	based	on	an	acknowledgement	
that	it	“allows	innovators	to	recoup	their	costs	and	make	a	profit	from	their	inventions,	thus	
offering	 incentive	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 research	 and	 development	 of	 technologies	 and,	 upon	
fruition,	 to	 disclose	 the	 details	 of	 their	 inventions.”42	 This	 might	 be	 true	 today	 in	 some	
sectors	of	industry	where	there	is	extensive	R	&	D	on	which	millions	of	pounds	are	expended	
and	where	the	cost	of	duplication	is	relatively	low	once	the	secret	of	the	process	is	acquired.	
In	high-technology	sectors	like	pharmaceuticals:	
the	risk	of	failure	of	expensive	research	to	bear	fruit	is	high	and	entrepreneurs	must	have	
good	 reason	 to	 expect	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 failure	 can	 be	 recaptured	 from	 the	 profits	 of	
future	success.	Otherwise	there	is	little	incentive	to	undertake	innovative	activities.43	 	
																																								 																				
39 Economist Fritz Machlup has ably and comprehensively reviewed the history of the reward theory. See F. Machlup, An 
Economic Review of the Patent System (U.S. Government Printing Office 1958), quote by Matthew Erramouspe, ‘Staking Patent 
Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards a Rent-Dissipating Races’ (1995) 43 Ucla L Rev 961. 
40 Erramouspe (n39). 
41 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. (R. H. Campbell and A. S. 
Skinner eds, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976) p.339, quote by Erramouspe (n 39). 
42 Hutchison (n 16). 
43 Shi (n 18) p.24-66. 
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A	granted	monopoly	will	buy	them	some	time	to	recoup	their	investment	and	make	a	profit.	
This	is	not	only	a	variation	of	reward	but,	more	importantly,	it	will	provide	them	with	a	sense	
of	security	for	future	investments.	
However,	 the	 causality	 between	 temporary	 monopoly	 rights	 and	 financial	 returns	 from	 an	
invention	is	weak.	This	is	because	a	patent	is	defined	only	to	the	extent	to	which	right	holders	
may	exclude	others	from	activities	that	infringe	or	damage	the	IP.44	 In	other	words,	instead	of	
guaranteed	rewards,	the	patent	system	simply	“sets	out	and	protects	the	boundaries	of	legal	
means	of	 competition	among	 firms	 seeking	 to	exploit	 the	 value	of	 creative	 assets.”45	 Thus,	
although	 a	 patent	 provides	 some	 advantages	 for	 the	 inventor	 in	 future	 competition	 when	
exploiting	 the	 invention,	 it	 does	 not	 secure	 any	 capital	 gains.	 If	 the	 patent	 is	 not	 licensed,	
exploited	 or	 if	 it	 fails	 in	 subsequent	 commercialization,	 there	 will	 be	 no	 reward	 for	 the	
inventor	to	recoup	expenses.	 In	the	environmental	 industry,	most	equipment	manufacturers	
are	also	inventors	themselves	(usually	they	employ	people	to	invent	for	the	company).	The	UK	
Intellectual	Property	Office	(IPO)	statistics	show	that	only	1.4	per	cent	of	non-manufacturing	
firms	patent.46	 Thus,	the	majority	profit	made	by	these	manufacturers	is	from	the	selling	and	
installation	 of	 equipment,	 which	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 accumulation	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
knowledge	and	the	fruits	of	long-term	R	&	D.	In	other	words,	it	is	impractical	for	firms	that	are	
not	deeply	specialized	 in	a	narrow	area	to	duplicate	competitive	products	for	corresponding	
markets.	As	a	 result,	 the	secrets	of	environmental	 inventions	are	naturally	protected	by	 the	
complexity	 of	 the	 technology	 itself.	 Even	 without	 patent	 protection,	 the	 reward	 will	 be	
																																								 																				
44 Keith Eugene Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (Peterson Institute 2000) (n 6). 
45 Ibid 
46 Mark Rogers and others, ‘The Use of Alternatives to Patents and Limits to Incentives’ Intellectual Property Office Research 
Paper No 2012/21 (2012) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710628> accessed 21 Jun 2017. 
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secured	anyway.	Consequently,	Community	Innovation	Survey	(CIS)	data47	 suggests	that	the	
overwhelming	 share	 of	 firms	 do	 not	 consider	 patents	 to	 be	 an	 important	 mechanism	 to	
protect	inventions	and	secure	rewards.	Only	between	2.8	per	cent	(CIS	3)	and	5	per	cent	(CIS	
5)	 of	 firms	 regard	 formal	 IP48	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 trademark,	 not	 the	 patent,	 to	 be	
crucial.49	 After	all,	patenting	 is	 just	the	start	of	the	commercialization	 journey	and	 is	not	an	
end	in	itself.	Many	registered	patents,	which	are	expensive	and	difficult	to	obtain,	are	actually	
unexploited.	 In	 these	 situations,	 the	 patent	 system	 does	 not	 deliver	 the	 profits	 the	 reward	
theory	promises.50	 Those	who	have	 successfully	 commercialized	 require	much	more	 than	a	
patent	 description;	 they	 also	 require	massive	 funding	 and	 labour	 to	 develop,	 examine	 and	
refine	an	idea	to	the	point	of	commercial	viability.	 	
Do	patented	technologies	secure	companies’	 finance?	The	only	benefits	arise	primarily	 from	
the	 potential	 to	 license	 the	 patent	 in	 exchange	 for	 royalty	 payments	 or	 to	 sell	 patented	
technology	for	a	lump-sum	payment	(more	cases	being	found	in	small	technology	companies	
and	 in	 company	 acquisitions51);	 and	 secondarily	 to	 secure	 inventors’	 income	 by	 excluding	
imitators	from	duplicating	the	technology,	in	order	to	protect	their	competence	in	the	market.	
However,	 “it	 may	 be	 difficult	 for	 firms	 to	 determine	 the	 total	 stream	 of	 future	 expected	
																																								 																				
47 The Community Innovation Survey (CIS)” based innovation statistics are part of the EU science and technology statistics. 
Surveys are carried out with two years' frequency by EU member states and number of ESS member countries. Compiling CIS data 
is voluntary to the countries, which means that in different surveys years different countries are involved. The CIS is a survey of 
innovation activity in enterprises. The harmonised survey is designed to provide information on the innovativeness of sectors by 
type of enterprises, on the different types of innovation and on various aspects of the development of an innovation, such as the 
objectives, the sources of information, the public funding, the innovation expenditures etc. The CIS provides statistics broken down 
by countries, type of innovators, economic activities and size classes.” ‘Community Innovation Survey (CIS) - Description of 
Dataset’ (Eurostat Website)  <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/community-innovation-survey> accessed 11 Aug 2017. 
48 “Formal IP contains patents, trademarks, registered designs and copyright; registered IP contains patents, trademarks and 
registered designs; informal IP contains secrecy, lead-time, complexity and confidentiality.” Bronwyn H. Hall and others, The 
choice between formal and informal intellectual property: a literature review (No w17983, 2012) 
49 Rogers and others (n 46). 
50 William Kingston, ‘Innovation Needs Patents Reform’ (2001) 30 Research Policy 403; W. Kingston, ‘Innovation Patents and 
Warrants’ in J. Philips (ed), Patents in Perspective (London: ESC 1985); W. Kingston, ‘An Investment Patent’ (1981) 7 European 
Intellectual Property Review 207; quoted by Catherine Colston and others, Modern Intellectual Property Law (Routledge 2010) 
p.49. 
51 However, in acquisition cases, know-how is more valuable than patents to the purchasing party. 
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profits	since	there	is	considerable	uncertainty	attached	to	the	value	of	innovations.”52	 In	the	
clean-energy	supply	chain	the	focus	could	be	on	identifying	game-changing	new	technologies	
that	might	be	integrated	into	other	industrial	and	manufacturing	companies	within	a	business	
empire.53	 But	 patent	 royalties	 do	 not	 directly	 cover	 the	 expenditure	 of	 these	 subsequent	
steps,	thus	patents	are	rarely	licensed	without	being	feasible	for	marketing	in	the	first	place.	
For	example,	European	clean-technology	companies	are	struggling	to	attract	financing:	 	
On	the	generation	side	of	the	sector,	project	developers	typically	only	secure	project	debt	
financing	 for	proven	 technologies	 such	as	wind	and	 solar.	Other	 sectors	with	potential,	
like	 biomass,	 struggle	 to	 raise	 finance.	 Since	 2009	 the	 funding	 gap	 has	 continued	 to	
widen.54	 	
The	 reward	 theory	 predictively	 discriminates	 spontaneous	 and	 fortuitous	 inventions	 from	
patent/reward-induced	 inventions.	 Yet	 the	 patent	 system	 never	 “distinguishes	 between	
inventions	that	were	induced	by	the	patent	system	and	those	that	were	not,	and	grant	patent	
protection	only	 for	 the	 former”.55	 While	 patents	 are	 actually	more	often	used	 for	 strategic	
reasons56	 for	 gaining	 in	 a	broader	 area,	Horstmann	et	 al.57	 pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 “when	
inventors	 patent	 they	 reveal	 information	 about	 the	 value	 of	 the	 innovation	 as	 well	 as	
technical	 characteristics	 in	 the	 patent	 document.”	 Such	 information	 could	 be	 important	 to	
																																								 																				
52 Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes and Jonathan Putnam, ‘How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent 
Renewal and Application Data’ (1998) 46 The Journal of Industrial Economics 405. 
53 Dominic FitzPatrick and Carsten Bartholl, ‘Private Capital and Clean Energy: Exploring a Growing Relationship’ 
TaylorWessing, February 2012 
<https://www.taylorwessing.com/fileadmin/files/docs/Private-Capital-and-Clean-Energy-Report.pdf> accessed 1 Jul 2017. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Frederic Michael Scherer and David R.  Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (2d ed. edn, 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (HMH) 1980) p.442-44; A. Samuel Oddi, ‘Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the 
Twenty-First Century’ (1988) 38 Am UL Rev 1097 p.1101; quoted by Erramouspe (n 39). 
56 Rogers and others (n 46). 
57 Ignatius Horstmann, Glenn M. MacDonald and Alan Slivinski, ‘Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or 
(Maybe) Not to Patent’ (1985) 93 Journal of Political Economy 837. 
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competitors	that	intend	to	imitate,	whereas	they	have	to	invent	around	to	avoid	infringing	the	
patent.	Such	“propensity	to	patent	will	be	lower	the	more	profitable	a	competing	product	 is	
expected	 to	 be”.58 This	 is	 just	 another	 criticism	 of	 the	 reward	 theory,	 for	 it	 is	 not	 entirely	
consistent	with	the	patent	system.	While	the	reward	theory	claims	that	its	rewarding	function	
is	for	inventors	to	recover	their	expenses	during	R	&	D	and	in	turn	encourage	them	to	engage	
in	 future	 inventive	activities,	 “for	each	 individual	 invention,	 the	patent	 system	rewards	only	
the	first	inventor	to	obtain	a	patent;	other	contributing	inventors	remain	uncompensated,	as	
do	 other	 innovators	 who	might	 develop	 the	 same	 invention	 independently”.59	 This	 in	 fact	
denies	 the	 innovative	 efforts	 of	 later	 inventors	 by	 leaving	 them	 unrewarded,	 and	 it	 even	
becomes	a	disincentive	for	subsequent	innovators,	for	they	are	often	blocked	or	burdened	by	
a	prior	patent	during	further	innovation.	Thus,	a	strong	patent	system	based	on	reward	theory	
“may	 cause	 wasteful	 duplication	 of	 investment	 in	 R	 &	 D	 (that	 is,	 patent	 races)	 plus	 costly	
effort	 to	 assert	 ownership	 rights.	 Further,	 technical	 and	 judicial	 actions	 to	 enforce	 rights	
through	excluding	free	riders	may	be	costly.”60	 	
These	arguments	do	not	necessarily	negate	patenting	as	a	stimulus	to	invention,	but	it	is	not	
the	only	way	to	construct	a	legal	system	for	protecting	creativity.	If	a	patent	is	justified	by	the	
reward	theory,	it	is	hard	to	say	whether	the	model	was	designed	to	encourage	the	inventor	or	
to	 win	 more	 benefits	 for	 people	 in	 general.	 If	 the	 grant	 of	 a	 patent	 is	 truly	 to	 encourage	
inventors,	 there	 is	more	 than	 one	way	 to	 do	 so.	 Fisher,	 diverging	 from	 the	 reward	 theory,	
																																								 																				
58 Ibid. 
59 Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, ‘Patent Law and Rent Dissipation’ (1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 305 p.313. For 
example, in Tilghman, 102 US 707, the plaintiff devised a process for rendering animal fat into constituent elements used to make 
candles and soap. The plaintiff's application described a specialized apparatus with coils that subjected the fat to high pressure and 
heat. The defendant developed a more efficient refinement of the plaintiff's process, using a pressure cooker rather than coils. 
Extending the plaintiff's patent beyond the actual invention to encompass improvements, the Court held that the defendant's 
refinement infringed the plaintiff's patent. Ibid p.734. Quoted by Erramouspe (n 39). 
60 Maskus (n 44). 
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pointed	out	that	private	property	rights	such	as	 IPRs	“are	crucial	 to	the	satisfaction	of	some	
fundamental	 human	 needs;	 policymakers	 should	 thus	 strive	 to	 create	 and	 allocate	
entitlements	to	resources	 in	the	fashion	that	best	enables	people	to	fulfil	 those	needs.”61	 If	
personal	 human	 needs	 are	 valued	more	 than	materialism,	 patents	may	 be	 justified	 on	 the	
grounds	 that	 “they	 create	 social	 and	economic	 conditions	 conducive	 to	 creative	 intellectual	
activity,	which	 in	 turn	 is	 important	 to	human	 flourishing,”62	 and	 thus	 to	be	awarded	with	a	
set	of	legal	rights	as	a	ratification	from	the	authority.	In	truth,	some	inventors	are	conducting	
R	&	D	because	they	feel	they	will	have	a	better	product;	others	probably	just	have	the	desire	
to	contribute	to	their	businesses,	which	 is	natural.	Some	are	motivated	by	passion,	meaning	
that	they	really	care	and	want	to	perform	better	in	their	profession,	and	are	not	so	driven	by	
monetary	gain.	Also,	a	potential	inventor	looks	forward	in	time	and	evaluates	the	needs	of	the	
planet	in	the	near	future,	for	example	the	climate	change	problem;	their	reward	could	come	
from	the	satisfaction	of	accomplishment	and	enhanced	reputation.63	 Inventors	could	also	be	
awarded	accordingly	by	earning	“respect,	honour,	admiration,	and	money	from	the	public,”64	
with	fewer	rights	to	prevent	others	from	spreading	or	innovating	based	upon	their	inventions.	
As	a	matter	of	fact,	to	some	large	manufacturing	companies,	the	most	important	meaning	of	a	
large	patent-portfolio	 is	 as	 a	propaganda	 tool	 to	 attract	 clients	 and	 investors.	 This	 is	 saying	
that	 an	 equivocal	 rewarding	monopoly	 alone	may	 not	 be	what	 patents	mean	 to	 inventors,	
while	 the	 dynamic	 of	 the	 corresponding	 market	 is	 the	 real	 driving	 force	 behind	 their	
motivation.	This	is	true	in	the	climate	change	context.	For	example,	recently	water	started	to	
																																								 																				
61 Fisher (n 20). 
62 See Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property (University of Chicago Press 1993); Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private 
Property, vol 40 (Clarendon Press 1990) quoted by Fisher (n 20). 
63 Michael Pendleton, ‘Intellectual Property, Information-Based Society and a New International Economic Order-The Policy 
Options?’ (1985) 2 European Intellectual Property Review 31. 
64 See Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 Geo LJ 287 p.330-350. Quoted by Fisher (n 20). 
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be	 viewed	 as	 a	 precious	 commodity	 and	 relevant	 companies	 that	 innovate	 by	 designing	
water-saving	 systems	 came	 to	 prosper	 in	 the	 UK.	 New	 systems	 and	 devices,	 such	 as	
showerheads,	taps	and	washing	machines,	are	being	redesigned	with	this	objective	in	mind.	A	
UK	 company,	 Propelair,	 is	manufacturing	 a	 new	 toilet	 that	 uses	 80	 per	 cent	 less	water	 and	
energy	 per	 flush	 than	 conventional	 alternatives.	 The	 payback	 for	 customers	 in	 the	 form	 of	
lower	bills	will	be	between	two	and	four	years,	making	a	strong	financial	case.	As	businesses,	
governments	 and	 households	 seek	 to	 cut	 their	water	 and	 energy	 use,	 technologies	 such	 as	
this	will	be	vital	 in	helping	them	achieve	such	goals,	and	will	become	a	popular	R	&	D-target	
among	companies.	
So,	better	alternatives	are	available	 to	award	 inventors	 in	order	 to	help	 stimulate	 invention	
and	innovation	rates;	especially	in	large	climate	change	relevant	equipment	such	as	industrial	
awards/prices,	 state	 support	 of	 research 65 	 or,	 even	 better,	 the	 creation	 of	
government/society-oriented	market	demands.	In	history,	there	have	been	different	ways	of	
rewarding	 inventors	 for	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	 community66	 and	 now	 there	 are	 still	 a	
variety	 of	 awards,	 for	 example	 the	 most-recognized	 Nobel	 Prizes;	 the	 Lafarge	 Invention	
Awards	for	contributions	to	sustainable	construction;	the	Volvo	Environment	Prize,	and	so	on.	
These	 prizes	 and	 awards	 are	more	 than	 just	 an	 efficient	 encouragement	 for	 inventors	 and	
innovators	 to	 step	 forward:	 some	 have	 actually	 advanced	 climate	 change	 technology	 in	 a	
great	sense.	Such	incentives	might	be	a	better	solution	than	a	globally	united	patent	system	to	
some	extent.	
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66 See more National Research Council, Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology (National 
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5.2.3 Exchange for secrets  
A	common	objective	of	most	IP	laws	is	to	promote	creation67,	but	creation	itself	would	not	be	
possible	 without	 the	 prior	 possession	 of	 certain	 types	 of	 knowledge.	 Human	 knowledge	
develops	 in	 cycles.68	 By	 granting	 limited	 exclusive	 rights	 to	 innovators,	 society	 would	 gain	
disclosure	of	these	inventions	and	creative	works	in	return.	This	is	another	basic	rationale	of	
the	patent	system	–	to	encourage	disclosure,	
since	this	prevents	the	duplication	of	research	and,	once	the	patent	has	expired,	allows	
‘those	skilled	in	the	art’	to	quickly	replicate	the	invention.	This	rationale	is	referred	to	as	
the	 ‘contract	 theory’	 of	 patents	 by	 lawyers,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 ‘reward	 theory’	 (which	
focuses	on	incentives	to	invent).69	
For	example,	patent	rights	“prevent	free-riding	by	 imitators	and	encourage	the	disclosure	of	
inventions	 that	 otherwise	 might	 remain	 trade	 secrets.”70	 Additionally,	 patent	 files	 are	
available	 from	 the	 Patent	Office	 to	 the	 public,	which	might	 inspire	 potential	 inventors	who	
would	otherwise	have	problem	learning	about	and	accessing	the	technology.71	 In	such	ways,	
the	patent	system	 is	expected	to	benefit	society	by	providing	access	 to	new	knowledge	and	
therefore	securing	the	continuous	accumulation	of	knowledge	and	information.	 	
																																								 																				
67 For example the US Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
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Applying	for	a	patent	compels	the	disclosure	of	an	 idea	to	the	community	at	an	early	stage,	
before	the	decision	whether	to	grant	a	patent	is	taken.72	 Publication	eighteen	months	after	a	
patent	 application	 will	 reveal	 the	 information	 contained	 within	 it	 earlier	 than	 it	 would	
otherwise	 reach	 the	 public	 domain.73	 Oppenheim	 believes	 that	 a	 patent	 should	 provide	
information	more	quickly	than	other	sources,	such	as	technical	and	research	literature.74	 This	
attributes	to	the	patent	application	a	very	public	process,	 in	 the	sense	that	members	of	 the	
public	 can	 view	 applications	 once	 they	 are	 received	 and	 administered	 by	 the	 IP	Office.	 The	
logic	here	is	that	third	parties	can	then	use	this	public	document	as	a	launch	pad	for	their	own	
inventions.	 Research	 by	 Gambardella	 et	 al.	 on	 how	 much	 of	 a	 saving	 an	 imitator	 makes	
through	“having	access	to	the	information	in	a	patent	provides	a	first	set	of	estimates	of	cost	
savings	 incurred	 by	 follow-on	 inventors	 due	 to	 knowledge	 of	 the	 patent	 literature.”75	 A	
survey	among	inventors	was	conducted	and	more	than	22,000	inventors	in	23	countries	were	
involved.	“Inventors	were	asked	 in	 this	 survey	 to	quantify	 the	 time	saved	 for	 the	 respective	
invention	process	when	compared	to	a	situation	 in	which	the	 information	 from	patents	had	
not	been	available.”76	 The	heterogeneity	across	technical	fields	was	clear	with	median	values	
range	 from	 36	 hours	 (organic	 chemicals)	 to	 one	 hour	 (digital	 communication	 technology).	
More	 importantly,	 patent	 literature	 provides	 information	 in	 great	 quantities	 on	 a	 large	
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73 HÈlËne Dernis, ‘Nowcasting Patent Indicators’ Statistical Analysis of Science, Technology and Industry (STI) Working Paper, 
DSTI/DOC(2007)3 <http://www.oecd.org/sti/39485567.pdf> accessed 2 Jul 2017. 
74 C. Oppenheim, ‘Information Aspects of Patents’ in J. Philips (ed), Patents in Perspective (London: ESC 1985), quoted by 
Colston and others (n 50). 
75 Alfonso Gambardella, Dietmar Harhoff and Sadao Nagaoka, ‘The Social Value of Patent Disclosure’ Unpublished Manuscript, 
LMU Munich (2011) <http://www3.law.ox.ac.uk/denning-archive/news/events_files/Harhoff,_Dietmar.pdf> accessed 17 Jun 2017. 
76 Ibid. 
	 186	
number	 of	 commercialized	 technologies.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 US	 and	 Japan,	 the	
commercialization	percentage	is	60	per	cent.77	 	
However,	 the	 disclosure	 function	 of	 a	 patent	 has	 only	 limited	 value.	 First,	 patents	 are	
considered	to	be	“essential	for	inventions	that	are	easier	to	reverse-engineer	and	copy	than	to	
actually	invent	from	scratch.”78	 If	not	protected	by	monopoly	rights	granted	to	the	inventors,	
“competitors	would	quickly	 imitate	such	 inventions,	and	these	free-riders	would	drive	down	
prices,	 thereby	preventing	 the	 inventor	 from	profiting	off	 her	 invention.”79	 However,	many	
easily	 reverse-engineered	patented	 inventions	will	 be	disclosed	 to	 the	public	 at	 the	 time	of	
selling	or	exploiting,	regardless.80	 The	situation	and	the	dynamics	of	the	inventors’	world	are	
now	 quite	 different	 from	 earlier	 times	when	 “most	 inventions	were	 held	 in	 the	 custody	 of	
individuals	rather	than	companies.”81	 Favour	towards	the	secret	exchange	theory	may	have	
developed	due	to	a	fear	that	“inventors	would	take	their	secrets	to	the	grave	unless	they	filed	
for	 a	 patent,”82	 which	 is	 hardly	 the	 case	 today.	 Also,	 “many	 inventions	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	
reverse-engineer	 will	 never	 be	 patented	 because	 the	 inventor	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 detect	
infringement,	rendering	the	patent	of	little	value.”83	 This	might	be	due	to	the	fact	that	“any	
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technology	that	can	be	exploited	in	secrecy	by	its	 inventor	can	probably	also	be	exploited	in	
secrecy	 by	 an	 infringer,	 making	 a	 patent	 on	 such	 an	 invention	 difficult	 to	 enforce.”84	
Therefore,	where	trade	secrecy	is	a	better	alternative	to	secure	returns	from	an	invention	(i.e.	
process	 innovation);	 the	 disclosure	 requirement	might	 have	 become	 a	 greater	 deterrent	 to	
patenting.	Empirical	research	by	Levin85	 reaffirmed	this	view.	In	this	sense,	the	patent	system	
is	of	little	influence	in	causing	people	to	disclose	technology	secrets.86	
Moreover,	the	effect	of	a	patent	on	the	dissemination	of	information	contained	in	the	files	is	
not	 significant,	 according	 to	 Arora’s	 research.	 This	 research	 has	 identified	 that	 "patent	
disclosures	appeared	 to	have	no	measurable	 impact	on	 information	 flows	 from	other	 firms,	
and	 therefore	 no	 measurable	 effect	 on	 R	 &	 D	 productivity."87	 In	 fact,	 in	 practice,	 patent	
records	 have	 not	 been	 a	 chief	 resource	 for	 companies	 and	 researchers	 to	 learn	 about	 the	
most	 advanced	 technologies	 available.88	 Publications,	 conferences	 and	 reverse-engineering	
studies	of	the	newest	products	available	in	the	industry	are	more	popular	ways	to	get	access	
to	information	among,	for	example,	American	firms	looking	for	the	most	recent	technological	
advances.	Patent	disclosures	play	a	minor	role	in	disseminating	technologies.	A	Europe-based	
research	concluded	with	the	similar	finding	that	“the	use	of	patent	databases	[…]	are	among	
the	 least	 important	 external	 information	 sources	 available	 to	 firms."89	 Such	 observations	
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appear	to	be	true	in	my	research	based	on	empirical	data	collected	from	Chinese	companies,	
where	patents	have	only	a	minor	effect	on	the	flow	of	information	to	them.90	
“The	clean-energy	industry	has	so	far	seen	relatively	little	patent	litigation	compared	to	more	
mature	industries	such	as	the	semiconductor	and	mobile	phone	industries.”91	 This	seems	that	
the	secret-exchange	function	of	the	patent	system	is	performing	well	to	satisfy	the	needs	of	
society.	However,	as	the	market	for	clean-energy	technology	expands,	the	financial	incentives	
will	be	more	effective.	Therefore,	companies	might	act	more	aggressive	in	using	their	patents	
to	 occupy	 market	 share	 and	 to	 secure	 profits.	 This	 trend	 has	 been	 noticed	 by	 the	 US	
Government	 recently.	 Take	 for	 example,	 the	US	 Sipco	 v.	 Florida	 Power	 and	 Light	 and	 Silver	
Springs	Networks92	 case	 (in	 regarding	 three	of	Sipco’s	smart-grid	patents	 infringement)	and	
the	 case	 where	 EMS	 Technologies	 sued	 many	 companies93	 for	 they	 have	 been	 infringing	
smart-grid	patent	of	the	EMS	Technologies.	“The	number	of	patent	infringement	cases	being	
filed	 in	 US	 federal	 courts	 is	 certain	 to	 increase	 as	 the	 smart-grid	 sector	 grows	 into	 a	
multibillion-dollar	market.”94	 According	 to	Cohen	et	al.’s	 research,	“US	companies	generally	
prefer	other	sources	of	information	over	patents.”95	 But	one	of	the	major	reasons	for	them	to	
pursue	patents	is	not	to	acquire	information	but	to	strategically	hold	a	technology	–	they	use	
patents	for	blocking	and	preventing	other	companies	from	inventing	around.96	
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Patent	litigation	may	have	been	heated	up	in	the	area	of	smart-grid	technology	already,	and	
the	strategic	holding	rights	granted	by	patent	could	be	abused	in	a	much-widened	area.	The	
US	Patent	Assertion	Entities	(PAEs)97	 tend	to:	
focus	on	aggressive	litigation,	using	such	tactics	such	as:	threatening	to	sue	thousands	of	
companies	at	once,	[…]	and	asserting	that	their	patents	cover	inventions	not	imagined	at	
the	time	they	were	granted.	Suits	brought	by	PAEs	have	tripled	in	just	the	last	two	years	
(2011–2012).	Estimates	suggest	that	PAEs	may	have	threatened	over	100,000	companies	
with	patent	infringement	last	year	alone.98	
Such	a	phenomenon	constitutes	the	abuse	of	patent	rights	by	entities	known	as	patent	trolls.	
Rights	holders	are	gaining	a	considerable	amount	of	profit	mainly	by	enforcing	patents	against	
infringers/active	users.	Relevant	patents	are	usually	hard	to	substitute	and	thus	more	likely	to	
be	 infringed.	 And	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 these	 assertion-firms	 are	 therefore	 able	 to	 be	
sustainable	in	the	long	run.	Such	peculiar	players	who	“are	solely	 interested	in	the	exclusion	
right,	 not	 in	 the	underlying	 knowledge”99	 are	 betraying	 the	 secret-exchange	 justification	of	
the	patent	system	as	they	are	indulged	by	patent	rights	granted	to	them.	
Even	more,	some	practising	firms	are	beginning	to	use	such	tactics	as	well.	For	example,	GE	
Energy,	which	 controls	 a	number	of	patents	on	 the	variable-speed	 technology	used	 in	wind	
turbines,	 has	been	 seeking	 to	use	 its	 patent	 strategy	as	 an	 important	 competitive	 tool,	 and	
some	 foreign	 firms	 have	 had	 to	 design	 around	 its	 US	 patents	 in	 order	 to	 legally	 market	
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99 Timo Fischer and Joachim Henkel, ‘Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology–An Empirical Analysis of NPEs’ Patent 
Acquisitions’ (2012) 41 Research Policy 1519. 
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themselves	in	the	United	States.100	 Instead	of	the	traditional	US	federal	court,	patent	holders	
are	 now	 becoming	 more	 interested	 in	 bringing	 disputes	 to	 the	 US	 International	 Trade	
Commission	 (ITC).	This	 is	because	“the	 ITC	actions	proceed	much	 faster	and	are	particularly	
powerful	 against	 foreign	 importers”.101	 Any	 technology	 that	 is	 deemed	 by	 the	 ITC	 to	 be	
infringing	 a	 US	 patent	 will	 be	 blocked	 from	 entering	 the	 US	 market.	 American	 technology	
holders	 can	 secure	 market	 share	 for	 they	 have	 kept	 advantage	 in	 rivalry	 with	 foreign	
importers	running	business	in	the	country’s	growing	clean-energy	sector.	For	example,	
General	 Electric,	 facing	 stiff	 competition	 from	Mitsubishi	 Heavy	 Industries,	 filed	 an	 ITC	
patent	 action	 seeking	 to	 block	 allegedly	 infringing	Mitsubishi	wind	 turbines	 from	being	
imported	into	the	US.	Although	General	Electric	was	ultimately	unsuccessful,	ITC	litigation	
will	continue	to	 increase	as	US	patent	owners	seek	to	better	position	themselves	 in	the	
competition	with	foreign	imports.102	
As	far	as	patents	are	concerned,	for	a	20-year	period	of	protection-duration,	the	rights	owner	
will	 be	 the	 only	 supplier	making	 a	 profit	 unless	 it	 decides	 to	 license.	 But	 restricted	 by	 the	
patent	claims,	other	relevant	 inventions	are	held	back	 in	the	wind	turbine	 industry	and	thus	
there	will	not	be	enough	suppliers	 in	the	market.	As	a	consequence,	society	will	not	benefit	
from	large-scale	utilization	of	such	green	technology	and	a	more	affordable	price	attribute	to	
a	balanced	supply	demand	relationship.	
The	 long	 duration	 of	 a	 patent	will	 cripple	 the	 timeliness	 of	 information,	 especially	 in	more	
innovative	 industrial	 sectors,	 such	 as	 smart	 grids,	 computer	 modelling	 for	 blade	 alloy	
																																								 																				
100 Joanna Lewis and Ryan Wiser, ‘A Review of International Experience with Policies to Promote Wind Power Industry 
Development’ [2005] Prepared for the Energy Foundation China Sustainable Energy Program. 
101 Sadler and others (n 91). 
102 Ibid. 
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examination,	and	wind	turbine	overhaul.	Aggressively	sought	and	applied	patents	are	creating	
a	 barrier	 for	 the	majority	 of	 society	 to	 benefit	 from	 new	 technologies.	 And	 the	 increasing	
needs	of	society	will	create	 large	potential	markets	and	profits	could	be	considerable.	Many	
capable	imitators	are	therefore	tempted	to	become	illegal	IP	infringers	and	this	will	 increase	
the	difficulty	of	IP	protection	implementation.	In	this	case,	the	longer	the	duration	of	patents,	
the	 harder	 it	 is	 to	 protect	 them	 because	 it	 will	 construct	 an	 uneven	 supply-demand	
relationship.	A	 short	monopoly	 time-period	would	bring	 information	 into	 the	public	domain	
more	rapidly,	and	early	availability	of	information	would	certainly	accelerate	the	exploitation	
and	innovation	of	an	invention.	
As	 an	 information	 source,	 a	 patent	 is	 not	 quite	 eligible	 where	 inventions	 are	 not	 easily	
reverse-engineered.	 Indeed,	 most	 patent	 laws	 require	 patent	 applicants	 to	 provide	
specifications	when	 filing	 for	 invention	 patents	 that	 require	 the	 document	 to	 “disclose	 the	
invention	 in	 a	manner	which	 is	 clear	 enough	 and	 complete	 enough	 for	 the	 invention	 to	 be	
performed	 by	 a	 suitably	 skilled	 person.”103	 However,	 in	 practice,	 specifications	 available	 to	
the	 public	 are	 not	 necessarily	 to	 be	 understood	 or	 performed	 easily	 by	 a	 technician	 in	 the	
industry.	 There	are	 reasons,	 such	as	 “many	applicants	deliberately	 fail	 to	disclose	 the	 trade	
secrets	 and	 know-how	 necessary	 to	 recreate	 or	 use	 the	 invention	 efficiently;	 the	
[specifications]	are	often	drafted	in	ways	that	make	them	tedious	or	difficult	for	engineers	to	
understand.”104 	 In	 fact,	 the	 hypothetical	 technician	 employed	 by	 courts	 when	 making	
judgements	may	 be	much	more	 capable	 than	 a	 real-life	 skilled	 person,	 so	 it	 requires	more	
resource	and	information	for	them	to	carry	out	the	invention.	Plus,	it	is	practically	difficult	for	
																																								 																				
103 For example, the UK Patent Act 1977, Section 14(3) 
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a	 third	 party,	 without	 help	 from	 an	 insider,	 to	 trace	 and	 identify	 the	 specific	 omitted	
information	 that	 led	 to	 a	 failure	 of	 performance	 in	 an	 invention,	 in	 order	 to	 challenge	 the	
validity	of	the	patent.	Thus,	the	inadequately	disclosed	patents	remain	valid	and	protected	by	
law.	
For	example,	many	patents	are	drafted	to	deliberately	hide	important	information	about	the	
invention,	by	hiring	experts	and	agencies	to	draft	using	vague	language	about	the	invention’s	
application.	These	professionals	are	skilled	in	drafting	strategies	that,	on	one	hand,	are	meant	
to	ensure	that	patents	are	interpreted	broadly	by	the	courts	and	on	the	other	to	make	reading	
the	patent	specifications	"an	uncomfortable	experience,	 [where]	the	document	seems	to	be	
unreasonably	repetitive	and	in	parts	almost	incomprehensible."105	 As	a	result,	it	has	become	
difficult	for	innovators	and	potential	inventors	to	learn	about	cutting-edge	technologies	from	
patent	 documents. 106	 To	 some	 extent,	 third	 parties	 began	 to	 lose	 all	 interest	 in	 the	
disclosure	function	of	patents.107	 This	has	really	diminished	the	value	of	the	secret-exchange	
aspect	 of	 patents,	 as	 it	 has	 incurred	 a	 lot	 of	 unnecessary	 costs108	 and	made	 the	 system	 “a	
poor	medium	for	communicating	technical	information.”109	
Moreover,	 patent	 documents	 only	 provide	 the	 minimum	 information	 required	 to	 pass	 the	
application	and	do	not	give	access	to	any	additional	valuable	information,	which	may	be	vital	
																																								 																				
105 V. Irish, ‘How to Read a Patent Specification’ (2000) 10 Engineering Management Journal 71, quoted by Roin (n 71). 
106 Michael Abramowicz, ‘The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 803, quoted by Alan 
J. Devlin, ‘The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law’ (2010) 23 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 401; 
“Patents in the information technology (“IT”) industry are perhaps the worst offenders, being notorious for their vague language.” 
Quoted by ibid; See also Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison and Bhaven N. Sampat, ‘University Software Ownership and Litigation: A 
First Examination’ (2009) 87 North Carolina law review 1519. 
107 See Mark A. Lemley, ‘Ignoring Patents’ (2008) Mich St L Rev 19. “Disinterest” here refers not merely to subjective 
indifference, but to deliberate ignorance of the prior art. Quoted by Devlin (n 106). 
108 See Patricia E. Campbell, ‘Representative Patent Claims: Their Use in Appeals to the Board and in Infringement Litigation’ 
(2006) 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 55 (noting the expense of prior art searches) 
109 See, e.g. National Research Council, A Patent System for the 21st Century (National Academies Press 2004), at 63 (noting that 
"patents [are] a less than ideal vehicle for communicating technical information," partly because "a patent is written by an attorney 
or a patent agent to persuade an examiner to grant and a court to uphold a property right of the desired scope"), quoted by Roin (n 
71). 
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to	the	actual	use	of	the	 invention.	"Oftentimes,	 [...]	 there	 is	a	certain	amount	of	know-how,	
show-how	and	other	types	of	information	available	[only	through]	frequent	consultation	with	
the	 inventors."110	 Thus,	 many	 skills	 and	 human	 aspects	 of	 technology	 management	 and	
production-arrangement-links	within	which	a	technology	operates111	 remain	secret,	without	
revelations	or	assistance	from	the	rights	holder.	Interviewees	of	this	research	also	confirmed	
that	they	“could	not	be	more	agree	that	patents	provide	information	far	less	than	enough	to	
actually	 put	 the	 invention	 into	 use	 without	 extra	 work	 from	 and	 cost	 paid	 to	 the	 right	
holder.”112	 Environmental	inventions,	especially	ones	in	the	form	of	large	equipment	are	not	
easily	 reverse-engineered	 without	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 know-how	 being	 transferred	 by	 the	
inventors,	and	it	requires	skilled	experts	to	be	involved	in	the	exploitation	of	the	final	product.	
It	 is	 even	 harder	 for	 companies	 or	 countries	 that	 cannot	 afford	 the	 licence	 and	 facilities	 to	
absorb	the	 information.113	 Therefore,	 the	speculative	secrets-exchange	function	of	a	patent	
is	 very	 limited	 and	 leaves	 the	 inventors	 with	 plenty	 of	 room	 to	 profit	 further	 by	 licensing	
know-how	and	relevant	information,114	 or	even,	in	contradiction	to	the	function,	keep	hold	of	
their	secrets	for	as	long	as	it	is	beneficial	for	them.	
																																								 																				
110 James D. Hamilton and William E. Beaumont, ‘Licensing Patents and Trade Secrets’ (American Conference Institute's 
Licensing Intellectual Property Conference, Chicago, Illinois June 5-7, 2000) §1.01 Determining What Rights Are Licensable; See 
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Policy (DIANE Publishing 2003) ch. 3, at 33; Peter J. Toren, ‘Protecting Inventions as Trade Secrets: A Better Way When Patents 
Are Inappropriate, Unavailable’ (FindLaw Website)  
<http://corporate.findlaw.com/intellectual-property/protecting-inventions-as-trade-secrets-a-better-way-when-patents.html> 
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111 WTO Council for Trade-Related-Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights, Report on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the 
Trips Agreement (IP/C/W/602/Add7, 23rd Feburary 2015). 
112 Interview transcript. 
113 Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global 
Public Goods’ in Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman (eds), Maskus and Reichman, International Public Goods and 
Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
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If	the	patent	system	is	to	be	justified	by	its	secrets-exchanging	function,	society	might	expect	
the	 paradigm	 to	 extract	 more	 from	 the	 patent	 holder.115	 As	 discussed	 above,	 patents	 are	
providing	 too	 little	 knowledge	under	 the	 current	 requirements	of	disclosure,	 and	 the	public	
might	 ask	 for	more	 detailed	 information	 in	 order	 to	 actually	 benefit	 from	 the	 invention	 in	
question.116	 In	the	wind	turbine	blade-manufacturing	industry,	for	example,	there	might	be	a	
strong	case	for	requiring	patent	applicants	to	disclose	the	source	of	their	raw	materials	and	a	
serious	 processing	 technics.	 Key	 information	 needed	 to	 duplicate	 an	 innovation,	 such	 as	
technological	know-how,	should	be	made	available	by	the	patent	system	if	secrets-exchange	
is	 the	 primary	 justification	 for	 it.	 And	 a	 step	 further	 if	 possible:	 to	 establish	 a	
voluntary-expertise	 labour	 model	 like	 the	 legal-aid	 system,	 including	 duty	 specialists,	
industrial	technology	institutions,	and	the	governmental/guild	payment	of	consultants	to	deal	
with	 cases	 for	 firms	who	 are	 seeking	 professional	 aid.	 All	 in	 all,	 to	 get	 back	 to	 the	 root	 of	
justification	for	patents,	the	regime	“should	primarily	be	construed	as	a	tool	for	incentivizing	
the	invention	and	commercialization	of…technology.”117	 Secrets-exchange	targets	should	be	
considered	merely	as	an	ancillary	part	of	 the	system.	Confronted	by	the	conflict	of	 interests	
between	 society’s	 urgent	 need	 of	 technologies	 (especially	 environmental	 technologies	 to	
defeat	climate	change)	and	the	benefits	of	rights	holders	to	profit	from	their	inventions,	one	
has	to	return	to	the	ultimate	goal	of	incentivizing	invention	and	commercialization	in	order	to	
serve	 the	 public.	 Disclosure	 is	 only	 a	 tool,	 and	 should	 be	 put	 to	 best	 use	 to	 satisfy	 public	
interests.	 	
																																								 																				
115 See Christopher A. Cotropia and Mark A. Lemley, ‘Copying in Patent Law’ (2008) 87 NCL Rev 1421. 
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5.2.4 Patent protection as international technology transfer incentives 
“In	 terms	 of	 technology	 flows	 from	 developed	 countries,	 it	 is	 speculated	 that	 firms	will	 be	
more	 willing	 to	 trade,	 licence,	 and	 invest	 in	 technologies	 in	 countries	 with	 strong	 IPR	
regimes.”118	 Although	not	explicitly	set	forth	by	a	lot	of	the	literature,	the	incentive	for	TT	or	
FDI	function	could	be	seen	as	new	ground	for	the	justification	of	patenting.	“Patent	protection	
facilitates	the	trade	in	goods	by	assuring	exporters	that	there	are	remedies	for	infringements	
when	 imitators	 illegally	 copy	 or	 reverse-engineer	 patented	 technologies” 119 	 without	
permission,	 in	 other	 countries.	 Indeed,	 “it	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 the	 protection	 and	
enforcement	of	IPRs	should	encourage	innovation	and	promote	TT.”120	 The	same	objective	is	
found	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement,121	 showing	that	the	stimulant	effect	of	IP	in	general	(including	
patenting)	 is	 well	 recognized	 and	 given	 prominence.	Moreover,	 “one	 of	 the	main	 forms	 of	
knowledge	 dissemination	 (and	 probably	 the	 most	 valuable	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
developing	 productive	 and	 innovative	 capabilities)	 is	 TT.” 122 	 Thus,	 the	 TT-incentive	
justification,	 which	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 prolongation	 of	 the	 “ex	 ante	 justification,”123	 is	
important	 in	 valuing	 the	 patent	 system,	 as	 it	 is	 regarded	 not	 only	 as	 an	 inducement	 for	
innovation	but	also	for	broader	dissemination,	commercialization	and	application.124	
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However,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	make	 a	mistake	 by	 predicting	 TT	 as	 a	 simple	mechanism	 under	 the	
“implicit	 assumption	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 technology	 diffusion	 is	 lower	 than	 that	 of	 its	
production.”125	 Even	 after	 production,	 it	 requires	 a	 lot	 of	 effort	 before	 technology	 can	 be	
internationally	 applied.	 Foray	 states	 that	 the	 “difficulties	 and	 complexity	 of	 TT	 operations,	
particularly	 when	 they	 involve	 two	 countries’	 different	 levels	 of	 development,	 has	 been	
recognized.”126	 The	 tacitness	and	 stickiness	of	 knowledge	make	 the	process	of	TT	 complex,	
especially:	
the	 difficulties	 created	 by	 the	 complementary	 role	 of	 tacit	 knowledge	 in	 successfully	
transferring	incompletely	codified	technological	knowledge	from	advanced	to	developing	
countries	 suggests	 that	 involving	 firms	 from	 the	 former	 countries	 via	 cooperative	
ventures,	technology	support	and	training	contracts	will	be	in	the	interests	of	firms	in	the	
latter	countries.127	
In	 fact,	 patents,	 as	 a	 form	of	 IP	 included	 in	most	 IP	 laws	 and	 TRIPS,	 are	 beneficial	 to	 some	
economies,	when	 strongly	 enforced,	 as	 this	 strengthening	will	 lead	 to	 an	 increased	 flow	 of	
royalties	 or	 profits	 in	 industries	 such	 as	 entertainment	 and	 pharmaceuticals.128	 Moreover,	
the	 patent	 system	may	 fulfil	 a	 number	 of	 additional	 advantages	 beyond	 the	 legal	 right	 to	
prevent	third	parties	from	using	an	invention:	such	as	
signalling	 the	 quality	 of	 an	 invention	 to	 potential	 investors	 and	 customers,	 a	 generally	
improved	 public	 image	 by	 conveying	 technological	 leadership	 through	 large	 patent	
portfolios,	 deterrence	 of	 infringement	 suites,	 an	 increase	 in	 bargaining	 power	 in	
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cross-licensing	 negotiations,	 the	 ability	 to	 participate	 in	 patent	 pools,	 the	 possibility	 to	
signal	 to	potential	 research	collaborators	expertise	 in	a	 specific	area,	or	 to	block	 (entry	
of)	competitors	by	restricting	their	freedom-to-operate.129	 	
All	of	the	additional	functions	are	benefiting	transferors’	(especially	multinational	companies)	
bargaining	 position	 in	 international	 TTs.	 Thus	 these	 benefiting	 countries	 are	 placing	 strong	
pressure	on	developing	nations	over	the	negotiation	of	a	global	 IP	 law	system.	Of	course,	to	
some	 extent	 this	 is	 a	 positive	 development	 for	 countries	 from	 which	 companies	 expect	 a	
growth	 in	 profit	 of	 their	 R	 &	 D	 investments.	 	 And	 according	 to	 one	 study130,	 stronger	 IP	
protection	encourages	patented	goods	flows	from	developed	countries	to	middle-income	and	
large	developing	countries.	Therefore,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	patents	on	the	whole	are	a	force	for	
good.	However,	this	conclusion	cannot	prove	that	strong	IP	protection	is	the	sole	incentive.	 	
Growing	evidence	tends	to	prove	that	there	is	no	causality	between	IPR	and	the	volume	of	TT.	
Although	 in	 cases	 strengthening	 of	 IP	 protection	 can	 be	 important	 in	 increasing	 FDI,131	 TT	
from	 developed	 country	 companies	 to	 developing	 countries	 is	 depended	 on	 more	 factors	
except	 for	 willingness	 of	 giving	 from	 transferor.	 Without	 huge	 market	 potential	 in	
middle-income	 countries	 there	 might	 be	 not	 enough	 enticement	 for	 both	 transferor	 and	
transferee	to	pursue	in	a	specific	industry	sector	in	that	country.	The	question	is,	which	is	the	
major	 factor	 that	 increases	 TT:	 better	 IPR	 protection	 or	 market	 potential?	 This	 could	 be	 a	
																																								 																				
129 Rogers and others (n 46). 
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rather	controversial	rationale	based	on	the	idea	that,	in	most	cases,	patent	holders	will	target	
the	market	where	their	 innovations	and	profits	derived	from	sales	represent	pure	economic	
rents.132	 And	 as	 beneficiaries	 of	 that	 market	 demand,	 they	 should	 pay	 back	 or	 make	
concession	 to	 customers	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 case	 in	 point	 is	 “China,	 which	 has	 one	 of	 the	
highest	 piracy	 rates	 in	 the	 world,	 yet	 is	 still	 attracting	 substantial	 FDI	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	
technology.”133	 According	 to	 a	 survey	 conducted	 among	 foreign	 businessmen	 in	 China,	 the	
size	and	potential	of	the	market	act	as	the	determining	factors	that	 induce	FDI	and	TT.134	 A	
typical	 example	 is	 Microsoft.	 Like	 many	 Western	 companies	 that	 have	 had	 a	 notoriously	
difficult	time	in	China,	Microsoft	has	been	battling	against	piracy	in	China	for	years.	Although,	
the	Chinese	Government	has	been:	
sympathetic	 to	 the	 pirates,	 openly	 hostile	 to	 the	 Microsoft	 monopoly	 and	 officially	
embraced	Linux,	 the	 free	 rival	 to	Windows.	Cheap	software	has	been	critical	 to	China's	
economic	 boom,	 and	 Beijing	 saw	 no	 upside	 to	 forcing	 citizens	with	 an	 average	 annual	
income	of	$1,000	to	spend	much	of	it	on	Windows.135	 	
Microsoft	system	and	programmes	are	indeed	severely	pirated	in	China	due	to	weak	copyright	
protection	 in	 the	 Chinese	 market.	 Even	 so,	 the	 company	 has	 not	 reined	 its	 attempts	 at	
exploiting	the	Chinese	market.	The	company	actually	took	advantage	of	piracy	to	occupy	the	
market	 and	 consolidate	 its	 position.	 In	 fact,	 Microsoft	 has	 enjoyed	 its	 monopoly	 power	 to	
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maintain	prices	on	its	software	for	a	long	time.	If	it	was	not	for	a	terrible	downturn	and	rising	
competition,	 it	would	not	consider	shifting	 to	a	compromising	approach,	cutting	prices	on	a	
variety	 of	 its	 products	 and	 services	 in	 China.	 “The	 idea	 is	 to	 accept	 lower	margins	 in	 some	
businesses	but	boost	overall	earnings	by	going	after	a	grab	bag	of	growth	opportunities.”136	
Indeed,	such	changes	 in	strategy	range	from	expanding	 its	share	of	big	companies'	software	
purchases,	 to	 lowering	 the	 price	 of	 MS	 Office	 software	 so	 that	 consumers	 in	 emerging	
markets	 are	 encouraged	 away	 from	 pirated	 version	 to	 pay	 for	 authentic	 software	 at	 an	
affordable	 price.	 For	 example,	 a	 price	 cut	 from	 $150	 to	 $100	 on	MS	 Office	 (even	 lower	 in	
countries	 like	 Brazil	 and	 India)	 has	 led	 to	 a	 spark	 of	 optimism	 for	 significant	 growth	 in	 unit	
sales,	which	surged	415	per	cent	in	the	second	half	of	the	year.137	 The	most	aggressive	price	
cut	 came	 in	 China,	 where	 95	 per	 cent	 of	 Office	 installations	 were	 pirated.	 And	 since	 the	
company	 began	 testing	 a	 $29	 offer	 in	 China	 in	 2008,	 80,000	 copies	 of	Office	 in	 China	 sales	
have	soared	more	than	800	per	cent.138	 “Microsoft’s	willingness	to	bear	millions	of	dollars	of	
losses	 to	Chinese	piracy	 implied	 the	 firm’s	 confidence	 that	Microsoft	will	 eventually	 receive	
huge	returns	despite	today’s	 lax	protection.”139	 And	now	the	company	is	 intending	to	make	
the	low	prices	permanent.	
So	while	it	might	be	debated	as	a	matter	of	IP	infringement	temporarily,	it	does	not	imply	that	
Microsoft	will	 allow	 piracy	 of	 its	 IP	 to	 continue	without	 regaining	monies	 and	 control,	 in	 a	
veiled	form,	in	the	future.	The	important	fact	remains	that	IP	protection	does	not	necessarily	
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make	 much	 difference	 from	 an	 efficiency	 standpoint:	 the	 supply	 and	 exploitation	 of	
innovations	would	not	be	much	diminished	in	countries	that	have	some	IP	policies	in	place	as	
long	as	it	is	profitable	for	the	business	either	in	the	short	term	or	in	the	long	run.	Maskus	and	
Reichman’s	 research	pointed	out	 that	 “trade	 flows	 to	poor	 countries	 ‘are	not	 responsive	 to	
patent	 rights’”;140	 it	 is	 therefore	highly	possible	 that	 the	potential	profit	 to	be	made	 in	 the	
market	is	much	more	important	than	the	IP	implementation	in	that	nation.	The	more	recent	
growth	 in	 global	 environmental	 product	 marketing	 in	 developing	 countries	 with	 emerging	
economies	 has	 tended	 to	 vitiate	 the	 conventional	 philosophy	 of	 IP	 protection	 as	 well.	
Evidence	is	provided	in	detail	in	chapter	VI	on	TT	to	China,	based	on	empirical	data	collected	
from	 practitioners	 in	 the	 renewable-energy	 sectors.	 Although,	 according	 to	 Arora,141	 IP	
protection	may	affect	each	 individual	 industry	differently,	 it	has	been	proved	true,	only	to	a	
limited	extent	that	the	consolidation	of	IPRs	is	the	right	path	to	pursue.	 	
In	 the	meanwhile,	 there	 still	 remains	a	 fear	of	 illegal	 imitation	 in	 the	mid-income	and	 large	
developing	 countries,	 and	 the	 rights	 owners	 tends	 to	 retain	 control	 over	 their	 “technical	
information	 and	 the	 know-how	 needed	 to	 exploit	 them.”142	 But	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 FDI	 may	
solve	 the	 problem	 of	 lack	 of	 know-how	 and	 capacity	 in	 developing	 countries.	 This	 usually	
means	TT	from	the	parent	firm	to	the	subsidiary	in	a	developing	country.	Not	only	that,	but	in	
some	 large	developing	 countries	 (i.e.	 China	and	 India)	 company	acquisition	appears	 to	be	a	
more	efficient	way	of	transferring	technology	and	know-how.143	 In	this	way	an	IPR	portfolio	
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141 Ashish Arora, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and The International Transfer of Technology: Settings Out An  Agenda for 
Empirical Research in Developing Countries’ (The Economics of Intellectual Property, January 2009). 
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can	be	bought	as	a	whole	and	with	ease.	A	strong	and	varied	 IP	portfolio	could	also	make	a	
huge	 difference	 in	 attracting	 investment	 or	 encouraging	 cooperation	 decisions.	 But	 again,	
strong	 IPR	 protection	 in	 a	 country	 is	 hardly	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 determinative	 consideration	 for	
investment	or	cooperation	decisions	by	technology	owning	firms,	so	relatively	few	developing	
countries	have	benefited	from	it.144	 	
Moreover,	 with	 regard	 to	 climate	 change,	 it	 is	 questionable	 “whether	 technologies	 from	
transnational	 corporations	 that	 invest	 in	 developing	 countries	 tend	 to	 be	 more	
environmentally	sound”145	 or	just	sound	enough	to	enable	the	running	of	foundries	by	parent	
companies	 in	developed	 countries.	Many	multinational	 firms	 “rely	on	 the	 splitting	of	R	&	D	
into	different	components	across	researchers	and	research	labs,	so	that	individual	pieces	of	R	
&	D	do	not	allow	a	complete	understanding	and	functioning	of	a	given	technology.”146	 As	a	
result,	 the	positive	 impact	 that	 this	 intentional	approach	 (i.e.	 FDI)	has	on	TT	 is	 very	 limited.	
Strategic	 and	 astute	 knowledge-management	 itself	 protects	 technical	 secrets	 well	 enough,	
making	the	importance	of	IPRs	less	observable.	When	technology	owners	are	cleverly	abusing	
their	 possession	 of	 the	 knowledge,	 it	 is	 even	 more	 difficult	 for	 companies	 in	 developing	
countries	to	detect	or	police	the	misuse	of	IPRs,	because	they	lack	information	about	the	most	
advanced	 innovations.147	 Access	 to	 upstream	 information	 inputs,	 including	 scientific	 and	
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technical	data	as	such,	are	distorted	and	this	“could	narrow	access	to	the	research	commons	
and	 limit	other	 transfer	mechanisms,	with	 incalculable	 long-term	effects	on	 international	TT	
as	it	used	to	occur.”148	
After	 all	 the	 discussions	 above,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 patent	 system	 cannot	 be	 justified	 on	
irrefutable	 grounds;	 each	 theory	 has	 a	 blemish	 that	 could	 hinder	 the	 dissemination	 of	
technology	 and	 therefore	 raise	 “entry	 barriers	 for	 firms	 and	 competition	 in	 developing	
countries,	 while	 even	 the	 middle-income	 nations	 find	 their	 scope	 of	 action	 limited.”149	
Nonetheless,	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 trying	 to	 say	 that	 the	 justification	 of	 patents	 is	 absolutely	
without	 merit.	 In	 fact,	 the	 active	 function	 of	 patenting	 is	 proven	 both	 in	 the	 US	 and	 EU	
markets,	 for	 they	 have	 been	 benefiting	 economically	 from	 stronger	 foreign	 IPRs.	
Strengthening	of	IP	protection	is	believed	to:	
lead	to	an	increased	flow	of	royalties	or	profits	in	the	entertainment,	pharmaceutical,	and	
other	 industries.	 The	 introduction	 of	 a	 global	 system	 to	 enforce	 IPRs	 is	 a	 positive	
development	 for	 multinational	 companies	 as	 well,	 which	 expect	 an	 increase	 in	 the	
profitability	of	their	R	&	D	investments.150	 	
Moreover,	Maskus	&	 J	Reichman	point	out	 that	 “weak	 IP	protection	 is	not	 the	only	path	 to	
technology	 growth”	 151	 They	 have	 provided	 some	 examples	 in	 other	 research	 that	 “a	 few	
now-developed	 economies	 underwent	 significant	 technological	 learning	 an	 industrial	
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transformation	 without	 the	 benefit	 of	 weak	 IP	 protection.”152	 The	 development	 history	 of	
Japan	has	demonstrated	 the	effect	 of	 strategic	 IP	 policy	 reform.153	 By	 favouring	 small-scale	
innovation,	adaptation	and	diffusion,	and	the	 licensing	of	new	technologies,	the	country	has	
become	one	of	the	most	innovation-productive	headstreams.154	 South	Korea	took	a	different	
path	 and	 is	 an	 equally	 valid	 example	 in	 its	 encouraging	 of	 “domestic	 firms	 to	 acquire	 and	
adapt	mature	technologies	available	on	international	markets	for	purposes	of	developing	local	
innovation	 capacities.”155	 These	 precedents	 give	 more	 reasons	 for	 society	 to	 keep	 the	
international	IP	order	as	it	is.	Nevertheless,	when	countries	with	vested	interests	place	strong	
pressure	 on	 the	 negotiators	 of	 less-equipped	 developing	 nations,	 and	when	 it	 becomes	 an	
obstacle	 to	 the	dissemination	and	wide	application	of	 climate	change	 technologies	 required	
for	climate	mitigation,	it	is	time	to	revisit	this	system	within	the	context	of	a	global	IPR	system.	
The	pros	and	cons	of	the	impact	of	TRIPS	–	the	most	effective	international	IP	regime	so	far	–	
on	TT	flows	into	developing	countries.	
5.3 The TRIPS Agreement 
The	TRIPS	Agreement	was	negotiated	in	1994	and	administrated	by	the	WTO.	The	Agreement	
sets	 down	minimum	 standards	 for	 IP	 regulation	 applicable	 to	 all	WTO	members.	 The	 TRIPS	
Agreement	is	legally	binding	on	original	WTO	members	and	later	WTO	members	must	adhere	
to	it	when	acceding	to	the	WTO.	Sustainable	development	is	one	of	the	objectives	of	the	WTO	
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Agreement.	The	TRIPS	Agreement,	as	part	of	the	WTO	Agreement	package,	requires	member	
states	to	comply	with	a	certain	level	of	IPR	protection.	In	exchange	for	greater	market-access	
rights	 to	 developed-country	markets,	 many	 developing	 countries	 adjusted	 their	 national	 IP	
law	to	fulfil	the	entry	requirements	of	the	WTO.	While	developing	nations	seek	to	obtain	easy	
access	 to	 the	 international	 markets	 opened	 by	 the	 WTO,	 they	 have	 comparatively	 little	
interest	in	adopting	more	expensive	non-fossil	ways	of	production.	This	is	because	the	old	way	
of	 growth	 using	 fossil	 energy	 is	 much	 cheaper	 than	 any	 greener	 alternatives.	 Without	
financing	and	assistance	from	the	developed	world,	it	is	hard	to	promote	a	sustainable	means	
of	growth	in	these	countries.	In	the	meantime,	under	TRIPS,	developing	countries	must	adopt	
minimum	 standards	 of	 protection,	meaning	 that	 20-year	 patent	 terms	must	 be	 granted	 for	
"inventions"	 in	all	"fields	of	technology"	 if	 they	meet	all	other	patentability	requirements.156	
They	are	prohibited	from	favouring	domestic	innovation	industries.	The	question,	however,	is	
whether	 these	 standards	 are	 working	 effectively	 in	 accordance	 with	 TRIPS	 principles	 and	
objectives?	 According	 to	 Maskus	 and	 Penubarti157 	 there	 is	 a	 “trade-off	 between	 the	
enhanced	 market	 power	 for	 the	 firm	 created	 by	 stronger	 patents	 and	 the	 larger	 effective	
market	size	generated	by	the	reduced	abilities	of	 local	 firms	to	 imitate	the	product.”	Thus	 it	
may	require	a	 longer	time	for	developing	countries	that	have	more	 imitative	capability	 than	
independent	 innovating	ability	to	develop	their	economy	in	order	to	afford	new	technology;	
but	climate	change	issues	are	urgent	and	cannot	suffer	from	delays.	Although	the	significance	
of	IP	reforms	and	the	enforcement	of	strengthened	IP	laws	are	not	negligible,158	 by	focusing	
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on	patent	transfer	as	the	main	means	of	TT,	TRIPS	is	conceptually	based	on	a	narrow	view	of	
the	 channels	 through	 which	 knowledge	 can	 diffuse.159 	 Therefore,	 the	 fact	 that	 many	
alternatives	 that	 can	 contribute	 to	 TT	 are	 not	 emphasized	 and	 promoted	 by	 TRIPS	 entails	
revisiting	the	objectives	and	provisions	of	the	Agreement.	Focusing	exclusively	on	one	means	
of	“providing	better	IP	protection	is	likely	to	cause	collateral	damage	to	other	complementary	
means”160	 and	values	of	equal	importance	that	support	innovation	and	TT	in	different	ways.	
In	 addition,	 the	 nature	 of	 patents	 is	 ambiguous,	 as	 they	 may	 be	 positive	 or	 negative	 for	
innovation	and	growth.	Richard	Fairchild	 categorized	 the	effect	 that	patent	applications	will	
have	on	TT	or	public	welfare	into	three	types	according	to	the	degree	of	their	spill-over	effect	
or	profit	dissipation.	In	two	out	of	the	three	situations,	patent	obtaining	will	minimize	welfare	
and	 diminish	 competition.161	 Some162	 others	 further	 suggest	 that	 stronger	 IP	 laws	 could	
make	 technologies	 expensive,	 and	 suggest	 that	 the	 whole	 system	 is	 not	 much	 help	 in	
improving	 access	 to	 technology	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 TT.	 This	 is	 especially	 so	 where	 the	
patent	system	 leads	 to	detrimental	knowledge	spill-overs	because	 it	 lessens	 the	pressure	of	
innovative	 competition	 between	 rivals	 to	 race	 for	 more	 advanced	 technologies.	 This	 is	
probably	the	main	case	where	TRIPS	fails	to	facilitate	climate	change	TT.	
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Literature	in	the	field163	 has	been	highlighting	the	impacts	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	which	has	
reinforced	 IPRs.	 Studies	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 effective	 patent	 protection	 is	 promoting	
international	 TT	 only	 towards	 countries	 that	 already	 have	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 technological	
capability,	 and	 it	 varies	 significantly	 among	 industry	 sectors.164	 However,	 a	 few	 financial	
incentives,	 such	 as	 those	 provided	 by	 Kyoto's	 CDM,	 were	 proposed	 to	 be	 explicitly	
implemented	 in	 a	 TRIPS/Doha-like	 agreement	 because	 such	 mechanisms	 had	 increased	
climate	 change	 technology	 innovation	 and	 fulfilled	 the	 TT	 objectives	 of	 TRIPS	 indirectly.165	
Such	a	standpoint	is	mostly	asserted	by	developing	countries166	 that	believe	that	technology	
is	a	 form	of	valuable	knowledge167	 and	an	asset	 that	belongs	 to	mankind	should	be	shared	
more	 freely	 between	 all	 societies.	 However,	 as	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 was	 not	 based	 on	
“democratic	 negotiations	 between	 the	 larger	 public	 and	 commercial	 interests	 or	 between	
industrialized	 countries	 and	 the	 Third	 World,”168	 for	 it	 reflects	 more	 of	 the	 values	 and	
interests	of	developed	countries.	As	a	consequence,	a	TT	mechanism	was	not	valued	enough	
by	the	negotiating	members	as	 if	 it	 is	crucial	to	the	achievement	and	implementation	of	the	
Agreement.	At	this	special	stage	of	combatting	climate	change,	and	at	a	time	when	Kyoto	 is	
sun-setting	 (without	 insisting	 on	 equal	 replacements),	 some	 ratification	might	 be	 added	 to	
existing	 legal	 obligations	 for	 TT	 in	 TRIPS	 in	 cases	 where	 TTs	 are	 not	 being	 effective	 and	
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sufficient.	 At	 least	 this	 is	 one	 possibility	 in	 the	 future	 to	 help	 eliminate	 the	 effects	 of	 IP	
obstacles	between	green-technology	holders	and	potential	 importers.	Clearly	it	 is	easier	said	
than	 done,	 given	 the	 difficulty	 of	 previous	 TRIPS	 negotiations.	 However,	 because	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement	was	the	result	of	multilateral	negotiations	trying	to	represent	the	 interests	of	all	
member	states,	it	is	ought	to	keep	up	with	time	and	situations,	emancipate	fixed	minds	about	
intangible	 assets,	 and	 continue	 to	 compromise	 between	 countries	 with	 strongly	 opposing	
views	regarding	the	value	of	IP	for	development.169	
5.3.1 Article 7: Objectives of the TRIPS Agreement 
The	 first	 important	 aim	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 in	 Article	 7.170	
Through	this	article,	“TRIPS	stipulates	that	the	objective	of	the	protection	and	enforcement	of	
IPRs	 should	 be	 to	 both	 promote	 innovation	 and	 facilitate	 the	 diffusion	 of	 technology,	
balancing	 legitimate	 interests	 in	 a	 socially	 beneficial	manner.”171	 And	 by	 pointing	 out	 “the	
mutual	advantage	of	producers	and	users	of	technological	knowledge”	this	laudable	provision	
is	understood,	in	this	thesis,	as	reflecting	the	search	for	a	balanced	approach	to	IPR	protection	
that	takes	into	account	the	interests	of	both	technology	creators	and	receivers.	 	
The	provision	mentions	 in	 particular	 the	 transfer	 and	dissemination	of	 technology,	which	 is	
not	 essentially	 achievable	 under	 the	 TRIPS	 strong	 IP	 protection	 requirements	 and,	 without	
feasible	 and	 practical	 mechanisms	 provided,	 is	 far-fetched.	 For	 example,	 by	 examining	 FDI	
flows	 into	 a	 country,	 scholars	 attempted	 to	 measure	 a	 country’s	 situation	 regarding	 the	
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acquisition	 of	 technologies.	 Intuitively,	 stronger	 IPR	 protections	 imposed	 by	 TRIPS	
requirements	should	give	 technology	owners	more	 incentive	 to	 license,	participate	 in	R	&	D	
cooperation,	 and	 invest	 in	 affiliates	 abroad	 where	 intangibles	 used	 to	 be	 protected	
insufficiently.	With	 IP	 law	 reforms,	 they	ought	 to	worry	 less	 about	 technology	 leakages	and	
will	 therefore	 be	 more	 conﬁdent	 in	 offering	 FDI	 in	 that	 country.172 	 Based	 on	 results	
generated	 from	 surveys	 of	 patent	 lawyers	 and	 manufacturing	 executives,	 Mansfield	 found	
that	FDI	 is	 logically	associated	with	 IPR	protection	available	 in	 the	 targeted	country.173	 This	
would	 be	 a	 sensible	 initial	 conclusion	 to	 draw.	 However,	 his	 research	 failed	 to	 isolate	 the	
effect	 of	 IPR	 protection	 on	 FDI	 from	 other	 influencing	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 technological	
capabilities	 of	 the	 receiving	 country	 (which	 itself	 may	 be	 significant	 as	 an	 attractor	 for	
investors);	nor	did	it	particularly	link	the	result	to	the	effect	of	TRIPS	implementation.	In	fact,	
TRIPS	 is	 just	 one	 variable	while	 there	 are	 other	more	 pressing	 and	 predominant	 influences	
relating	to	the	investment	climate,	government	stands,	market	size,	infrastructure	and	labour	
costs	in	the	receiving	country.174	 Moreover,	it	is	pointed	out	that	the	effect	of	IPR	protection	
varies	 from	 sector	 to	 sector,	 while	 it	 matters	 least,	 even	 in	 higher-tech	 manufacturing	
industry,	where	the	products	are	diﬃcult	to	imitate	and/or	reverse-engineer.175	 The	issue	is	
looked	 at	 from	another	 angle	 by	 Lippoldt	 and	Park,	who	examine	data	 from	 countries	with	
different	 income	 levels	 (high-income,	 middle-income,	 and	 low-income	 countries).176	 The	
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positive	effect	of	strengthened	IPR	protection	in	middle-income	and	least-developed	nations	
is	much	less	significant	than	it	is	in	the	developed	countries.	This	demonstrates	specifically	the	
weak	role	that	TRIPS	is	playing	in	promoting	international	TT	to	less	developed	countries,	and	
how	it	is	unintentionally	discriminating	members	according	to	their	income	levels.	
In	the	medical	industry,	mere	‘market	pull’	forces,	such	as	feasible	pricing,	will	better	facilitate	
technology	 development	 and	 diffusion	 in	 the	 target	 market	 with	 higher	 customer	
acceptance.177	 But	 these	kinds	of	practices	are	not	as	well-suited	 to	climate	change	TT	and	
diffusion	 because	 they	 concern	 different	 technical,	 financial,	 and	 political	 risks.	 Developing	
renewable	energy,	for	example,	plays	to	the	oil	and	gas	sector.	Any	investment	made	will	have	
to	take	many	factors	into	consideration,	such	as	energy-market	insight,	ancillary	infrastructure	
availability,	 technology	 know-how,	 mega-project	 management	 excellence,	 solid	 credit	 and	
community	engagement	experience.	In	many	instances	where	renewable	energy	technologies	
are	competing	against	cheap	diesel-	or	propane-based	power	in	on-grid	applications,	success	
is	 very	 much	 dependent	 on	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 domestic	 policy	 at	 stake.	 Challenges	
naturally	 arise	 from	 low	 natural-gas	 prices	 and	 the	 comparatively	 high	 capital	 costs	 of	
renewable	 energy,	 coupled	 with	 comparatively	 low	 rates	 of	 return	 for	 renewable	 power	
projects. 178 	 Thus,	 to	 overcome	 a	 big,	 long-term	 problem	 like	 climate	 change,	 the	
implementation	 of	 Article	 7	 needs	 to	 combine	 with	 practical	 mechanisms	 consisting	 of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
the GP and Park and Wagh patent indices, a copyrights index, a trademark rights index, and an IPR survey from the World 
Economic Forum covering 120 high-, middle-, and low-income countries between 1990 and 2005. They ﬁnd that increasing the 
strength of patent laws by 1% (as measured by the indices), raises FDI by 2%. When they examine each group of countries 
separately, however, results vary depending on income level: for developed countries, the 1% change in the index leads to an 
11.2% increase in FDI. For middle-income and least-developed nations, the positive eﬀect drops to less than 2%.” Watson (n 172). 
177 Rod Coombs, Paolo Saviotti and Vivien Walsh, Economics and Technological Change (Rowman & Littlefield 1987) p.96. 
178 Jason Switzer, ‘When Renewables Meet the Oil and Gas Industry, Opposites Attract’ (Renewable Energy World, April 14, 
2014)  
<http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2014/04/when-renewables-meet-the-oil-and-gas-industry-opposites-attract.html> 
accessed 26-June-2017. 
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financial	and	technical	assistance,	promoting	research	and	development	along	with	a	range	of	
targeted	supports	in	order	to	efficiently	encourage	TT	in	diverse	forms.	
A	more	practical	provision	would	be	to	promote	international	TT	efficiency	(e.g.	amending	the	
TRIPS	Agreement	to	require	patent	applications	to	disclose	know-how	used	in	the	inventions);	
and	to	focus	national	political	efforts	on	climate	change	and	renewables,	including	setting	up	
a	meaningful	carbon	price	and	encouraging	renewable-energy	literacy	among	different	types	
of	 companies	 (state	owned	and	privately	owned	companies).	 This	again	 could	be	actualized	
through	developed-country	members’	 duty	 to	provide	 “technical	 and	 financial	 cooperation”	
for	TRIPS	 implementation	to	all	developing	countries.179	 At	the	same	time,	while	ministerial	
declarations	(i.e.	on	TRIPS	and	Public	Health180)	may	not	carry	the	same	weight	as	the	formal	
agreement,	 they	 do	 indicate	 that	members	 consider	 the	 guiding	 principles	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	
TRIPS	 interpretation.181	 The	Trade	and	Environment	Committee	under	 the	Doha	Ministerial	
Declaration182	 therefore	pursued	the	objective	by	altering	the	way	they	look	at	the	relevant	
provisions	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement.183	 Littleton	points	out	that	the	“public	health	exemptions	
granted	 during	 the	 Doha	 Round	 of	 WTO	 negotiations	 must	 be	 construed	 broadly	 so	 as	 to	
include	some	technologies	that	guard	against	climate	change.”184	 	
																																								 																				
179 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (unamended version), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
180 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL 2001: TRIPS, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 30 
June 2017 
181 Matthew Littleton, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to Developing Countries’ 
(2009) 33 Natural Resources Forum 233. 
182 Ministerial Declaration, Doha 9-14 Nov 2001 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (01-5859) 20 November 2001 
183 See more details in Section 5.3.3. 
184 Littleton (n 181). 
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However,	 concerning	 the	 different	 viewpoints	 of	 developed	 countries	 and	 developing	
countries	with	 respect	 to	 IP	protection	 in	 reaching	 the	TRIPS	Agreement,185	 the	 chances	of	
broadest	 disclosures	 (i.e.	 disclosure	 that	 includes	 know-how	 and	 other	 trade-secrets)	 being	
agreed	to	by	signatories	of	TRIPS	is	 likely	to	be	low.	Only	such	a	huge	shift	 in	IP	laws,	and	in	
particular	 the	approach	 to	patent	applications,	would	survive	 through	persistent	efforts	and	
the	 potential	 ways	 of	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 viewpoints	 of	 the	 developed	 and	
developing	countries	regarding	IP	protection.186	 Just	like	the	history	of	TRIPS,	prior	to	which	
countries	had	widely	varying	levels	of	IP	protection	and	enforcement	due	to	divergent	goals,	
values,	 history,	 culture,	 tradition	 and	 political	 climate,	 it	 is	 not	 ‘mission	 impossible’	 to	
accomplish	 this.187	 “Because	 ratification	 of	 TRIPS	 is	 a	 compulsory	 requirement	 of	 WTO	
membership,”188 	 the	 Agreement	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 multilateral	
instruments	for	the	globalization	of	IP	laws.	To	countries	such	as	Russia	and	China	that	were	
very	 unlikely	 to	 commit	 themselves	 to	 restrictive	 IP	 obligations,	 the	 prospect	 of	 WTO	
membership	has	proved	a	powerful	 enticement.189	 Therefore,	 those	 countries	 that	used	 to	
provide	very	little	in	the	way	of	IP	protection	would	be	willing	to	compromise	to	secure	better	
access	to	trade	opportunities	and	to	the	most	advanced	technologies	in	developed	countries.	
Likewise,	nations	are	likely	to	shift	IP	systems	given	the	scope	of	IP	protections	to	be	altered.	 	
																																								 																				
185 L. Danielle Tully, ‘Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries After the DOHA Conference’ 
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mandates.” Zhongfa Ma, ‘The Effectiveness of the kyoto protocol and consummating the legal institution for international 
technology transfer’ (2010) 6 Asian Social Science 19. 
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Even	with	wide	ratification	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	the	original	goal	of	IP	law	harmonization	
remains	 incomplete	 today.	Quite	 obviously,	 reform	of	 IP	 protection	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 tough	
and	 something	 for	 the	 long	 run.	However,	 it	 is	no	excuse	 for	 timidity	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	
direction	of	reform.	The	need	to	complement	the	TRIPS	preference	for	the	“pull”	approach190	
has	 grown	 because	 the	 agreement	 is	 “more	 concerned	with	 how	 developing	 countries	 can	
provide	an	appropriate	environment	for	TT	than	how	developed	countries	can	actively	propel	
TT.”191	 Requirements	on	developed	countries	to	actively	act	on	promoting	and	facilitating	TT	
are	vaguely	worded,	making	the	provision	largely	unenforceable.	Therefore,	because	it	is	said	
that	“a	right	correction	is	overcorrection,”	actions	that	seem	militant	could	be	a	stimulant	to	
the	now	inactive	TRIPS	regime	regarding	TT.	 	
5.3.2 Article 8: the principles 
Article	8192	 recognizes	member	states'	right	to	adopt	measures	that	protect	“not	only	public	
health	 and	 nutrition	 but	 also	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 sectors	 of	 vital	 importance	 to	 their	
socio-economic	and	 technological	development.”193	 Any	measure	undertaken	by	a	member	
state	 should	 be	 consistent	 with	 this	 TRIPS	 principle.	 This	 provision	 also	 recognizes	 that	
members	 may	 need	 to	 take	 appropriate	 measures	 “to	 prevent	 the	 abuse	 of	 IPRs	 by	 right	
holders	or	 the	 resort	 to	practices	which	unreasonably	 restrain	 trade	or	 adversely	 affect	 the	
international	transfer	of	technology.”194	 As	a	principle	article,	especially	the	later	part	of	it,	it	
																																								 																				
190 Hutchison (n 16). 
191 Littleton (n 181). 
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intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. 
193 Taubman and Watal (n 23). 
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should	have	provided	great	significance	in	the	context	of	climate	change	TT,	while	also	having	
the	potential	to	become	a	protectionist	provision,	and	the	actual	effect	of	the	provision	being	
debatable.	
In	 the	 view	 of	 some	 countries	 the	 Article	 8	 is	 a	 redundant	 statement	 that	 emphasises	 the	
balancing	of	goals	that	had	already	been	negotiated	the	forming	the	process	of	TRIPS	and	had	
already	been	embodied	 in	 the	 final	 texts	of	 the	Agreement.	 In	particular,	 the	EC	pointed	 to	
the	 last	 phrase	 of	 Article	 8.1,	 which	 requires	 any	 government	 measures	 taken	 to	 protect	
important	 socio-economic	 policies	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement.	 This	would	 not	 only	 involve	 a	 double	 counting	 of	 such	 socio-economic	 policies	
among	other	articles	(i.e.	Article	30)	but	also	direct	away	from	the	basic	purpose	of	the	TRIPS	
Agreement	according	 to	 the	Preamble	and	Article	1.1–	 to	 lay	down	minimum	 requirements	
for	 the	protection	and	enforcement	of	 IPRs.195	 The	Appellate	Body	seems	to	be	affected	by	
this	argument	and	therefore	interpreted	the	Article	in	a	conservative	manner.	In	the	Canada:	
Term	 of	 Patent	 Protection	 case,	 the	 Appellate	 Body	 acknowledged	 that	 it	 has	 yet	 to	
determine:	
the	applicability	of	Article	7	or	Article	8	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	in	possible	future	cases	
with	respect	to	measures	to	promote	the	policy	objectives	of	the	WTO	Members	that	are	
set	out	in	those	Articles	and	that	‘those	Articles	still	await	appropriate	interpretation.’196	
“Article	8	 speaks	about	 the	protection	of	public	health. But	 ‘public	health’	 is	not	mentioned	
anywhere	else	in	the	agreement.”197	 However,	the	Doha	Ministerial	Declaration	suggest	that	
																																								 																				
195 Peter K. Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2008) 46 Houston Law Review 797. 
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“the	TRIPS	Council	shall	be	guided	by	the	objectives	and	principles	set	out	in	Articles	7	and	8	
of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 and	 shall	 take	 fully	 into	 account	 the	 development	 dimension.”198	
With	 this	 reaffirmed	 principle	 of	 the	 Article	 countries	 could	 find	 good	 ground	 available	 for	
them	when	facing	refusal	 to	 transfer	climate	change	related	technologies	and	to	claim	their	
conventional	 rights.	 Actually,	 there	 is	 already	 strong	 evidence	 of	 IP	 abuse	 in	 the	 trading	 of	
green	products.	 In	 the	ozone	regime,	 refusal	 to	 license	due	to	 fear	of	competition	has	been	
hindering	TT	to	firms	in	some	developing	countries.	For	example,	“according	to	Korean	firms	
and	R	&	D	institutions,	there	were	cases	where	the	private	firms	and	even	public	institutions	
of	industrialized	countries	refused	to	license	such	green	techs	like	HFC	134a,	fuel	cell	and	the	
Integrated	Gasification	Combined	Cycle.”199	 Such	refuse	to	sell	non-ozone-depleting	products	
to	Korea	“forced	local	firms	to	invest	$12	million	over	a	six-year	period	to	develop	their	own	
technology.”200	 Article	8	authorizes	members	to	take	measures	to	prevent	the	abuse	of	IPRs	
and	 to	 promote	 trade	 and	 TT.	 Yet	 understanding	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 provision	 can	 be	
different.	 “For	 one	 thing,	 ‘unreasonable’	 practices	 are	 in	 the	 eye	 of	 the	 beholder.”201	 For	
another,	is	it	unclear	what	measures	shall	be	considered	as	‘appropriate.’202	 Nevertheless,	if	
developing	countries	makes	fair	use	of	it,	Article	8	still	has	the	potential	to	protect	TT	in	some	
cases.	For	example,	 if	the	climate	change	issue	is	considered	of	“public	 interest	 in	sectors	of	
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vital	importance”,	member	states	in	such	circumstances	are	entitled	to	ask	for	remedies	from	
the	technology	owner’s	country.	And	a	refusal	to	license	to	a	competitor	on	commercial	terms	
will	have	“adverse	effect	on	the	 international	TT”,	thus	making	 it	an	abuse	under	Article	8.2	
that	can	be	addressed	in	a	national	legislation.203	
Both	 Article	 7	 and	 Article	 8	 are	 treated	 only	 as	 goals	 without	 specific	 obligations	 being	
imposed.	 The	 spirit	 of	 the	 two	 articles	 “is	 not	 adequately	 reflected	 in	 the	 wording	 of	 the	
operative	sections	of	the	Agreement.”204	 A	fortunate	part	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	is	that	the	
generically	 worded	 articles	 are	 influential	 as	 guiding	 principles.205	 Both	 these	 articles	 are,	
indeed	at	some	length,	vaguely	drafted	so	as	to	allow	signatory	states	considerable	room	for	
manoeuver	when	implementing	the	balance	between	TT	and	protecting	jurisdictionally	based	
IP	 rights.	 For	 example,	 as	 an	 objective	 article,	 Article	 7	 demands	 fair	 consideration	 of	 the	
rights	of	patent	holders,	which	will	affect	the	invocation	of	other	provisions	in	the	Agreement;	
for	 instance,	 limiting	 member	 states’	 ability	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 flexibilities206	 provided	
under	TRIPS.	These	flexibilities	are	made	available	to	member	states	when	amending	national	
laws	 in	 terms	 of:	 what	 is	 being	 patented,	 on	 what	 basis,	 how	 are	 claims	 be	 interpreted,	
permitted	 exceptions,	 compulsory	 licensing,	 the	 remedying	 of	 abuses,	 and	 anti-competitive	
practices.	 They	 are	 especially	 important	 for	 developing	 countries	 maintain	 healthy	
competition	in	their	domestic	markets.	Developing	country	governments	may	play	with	these	
flexibilities	in	order	to	buy	some	time	for	their	indigenous	companies	that	are	less	competitive	
at	the	current	stage	and	need	the	special	support	of	favourable	policy.	The	Agreement	does	
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not	 constrain	 the	 freedom	 to	 adopt	 different	 types	 of	 policies	 by	member	 states,	 whether	
these	policies	are	to	increase	international	TT.	 	
However,	even	though	reviews	of	the	objectives	and	principles	of	TRIPS	have	 identified	that	
there	 is	 a	 supportive	 attitude	 towards	 technology	diffusion	 and	 fair	 benefits	 for	 technology	
users,	more	 can	 and	 should	 be	 done	within	 the	 regime.207	 While	member	 states	 find	 little	
room	to	manoeuvre	from	within	the	TRIPS	themselves	(because	the	Agreement	requires	them	
to	be	consistent	with	international	standards	of	IP	protection)	“developing	countries	could	be	
given	 increased	discretion	 in	adapting	 IPR	 laws	 to	 their	economic,	 social	 and	environmental	
needs.	 Climate-friendly	 technologies	 could	 receive	 special	 treatments	 like	 those	 afforded	 to	
essential	 medicines.”208	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 any	 significant	 amendments	 made	 to	 the	
Agreement	will	 come	at	a	cost	 to	Member	states,	especially	 the	developed	ones,	which	will	
reduce	the	possibility	of	reaching	agreements	and	enforcing	implementation.	Therefore,	there	
is	 a	 need	 to	 provide	 a	 rationale	 and	 transitional	measures	 for	 embedding	 commitments	 as	
part	of	a	negotiating	framework.	 	
5.3.3 Article 27.1: Patentable subject matter 
WTO	 members	 are	 obliged	 under	 Article	 27.1209	 to	 grant	 patents	 to	 applicants	 for	 any	
invention,	 whether	 product	 or	 process,	 in	 all	 fields	 of	 technology,	 with	 some	 permitted	
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exclusions,	provided	 that	 three	criteria	are	met:	 “that	 the	 invention	 is	new,	non-obvious,	or	
involves	an	inventive	element	and	is	useful	or	industrial	application.	But	how	countries	choose	
to	set	thresholds	for	these	criteria	is	a	matter	of	discretion.”210	
Firstly	 this	means	 that	 a	patent	 could	be	 granted	 to	basically	 any	 invention,	whether	 it	 is	 a	
product	 or	 a	 process	 irrespective	 of	 the	 field	 of	 technology.	 For	 example,	 “whether	 the	
invention	is	a	new	reflector/concentrator	system	in	solar	power	or	a	new	process	for	storing	
heat	 longer,”211	 it	 can	be	protected	by	 IP	 laws.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 incentive	 for	everyone	
involved	 in	 industry	 from	 manufacturing	 to	 customer-facing.	 All	 of	 these	 people	 have	 the	
potential	to	become	innovators.	However,	in	practice,	there	are	“broad	patent	claims	stifling	
follow-on	 innovation,	 since	 subsequent	 inventors	 will	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 ‘invent	 around’	 a	
previous	innovation,	or	too	costly	to	obtain	a	licence	from	the	patent	holder.”212	 According	to	
Barton,	 broad	 patent	 claims	 clearly	 happen,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 biotechnology	 field	 on	 all	
transgenic	 cotton	 and	 on	 biological	 receptors.	 He	 states	 that	 “biotechnology	 is	 perhaps	
special,	 in	 that	almost	any	 invention	has	a	variety	of	analogues	 that	may	be	claimed	and	 in	
that	the	current	development	of	the	technology	often	 identifies	specific	 techniques	that	are	
useful	 in	other	inventions.”	 213	 Barton	also	argues	that	“the	existence	of	such	broad	patents	
can	lead	to	a	pattern	of	cross-licensing	among	the	leading	firms	of	a	particular	sector,	and	may	
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be	usable	to	prevent	entry	by	others	into	that	network	or	may	affect	the	inventive	for	further	
research	 by	 others.”214	 Once	 this	 happens,	members	will	 find	 it	 hard	 to	 revoke	 patents	 on	
exceptional	grounds.	Even	more,	the	TRIPS	Agreement	precludes	“a	member	from	revoking	a	
patent	 in	order	to	serve	other	general	societal	goals,	such	as	promoting	technology	transfer	
for	 environmentally	 sound	 technologies.”215	 Although	 Article	 32216	 mentions	 the	 possible	
revocation/forfeiture	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 judicial	 review	of	 any	 decision,	 there	 is	 no	 fast	way	
under	TRIPS	 to	challenge	these	patents.	 If	 such	broad	patents	are	granted	 in	a	country,	 it	 is	
even	 harder	 for	 foreign	 competitors	 to	 enter	 the	market.	 Any	 conflicts,	 however	 arguable,	
would	 not	 generate	 anything	 like	 a	 legal	 cause	 of	 action,	 leaving	 anyone	 that	 believes	 a	
member	 state’s	 patent	 standards	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 Agreement	 without	 a	 remedy	
under	TRIPS.217	 This	leaves	competitors	with	only	these	means	of	recourse:	seeking	domestic	
forms	of	redressing	the	problem	(highly	risky	in	terms	of	cost	and	time	invested),	or	cheating	
(which	is	a	short	cut)	in	order	to	obtain	technology	protected	by	these	patents.218	
On	 the	 bright	 side,	 this	 could	 be	 less	 problematic	 in	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	 the	 UK	 where	
broad/generic	patent	claims	are	regarded	with	a	very	dim	view	and	not	granted	as	a	matter	of	
law	 and	 policy.	 Indeed,	 the	National	 Patent	Offices	 in	most	 countries	 carry	 out	 substantive	
examinations	 before	 granting	 patents	 to	 applicants.	 Often	 such	 substantive	 examination	
involves	 searching	 the	 prior	 art	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 applicant	 is	 entitled	 to	 patent	
protection.	In	most	cases,	patent	applications	are	filed	with	relatively	broad	claims	and	will	be	
																																								 																				
214 Ibid. 
215 Taubman and Watal (n 23). 
216 Article 32, Revocation/Forfeiture: An opportunity for judicial review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent shall be 
available. 
217 M. Ho. Cynthia, ‘Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies’ (2005) 39 U 
Mich JL Reform 433. 
218 Carlos M. Correa, ‘Managing the Provision of Knowledge: The Design of Intellectual Property Laws’ in Inge Kaul and others 
(eds), Providing global public goods: managing globalization (Oxford University Press 2003) p.415. 
	 219	
declined.	And	even	in	countries	with	less	experience	in	enforcing	IP	laws,	such	issues	could	be	
solved	through	improvements	in	the	granting	of	patents.	But	still,	in	Barton’s	view,	whether	a	
patent	is	too	broad	is	in	the	eyes	of	the	parties	concerned;	for	instance,	a	company	wishing	to	
enter	a	particular	market	covered	by	a	patent(s)	 is	 inevitably	going	to	argue	that	the	patent	
should	 be	 revoked.	 In	 a	 more	 recent	 US	 case,	 Mayo	 Collaborative	 Services	 v.	 Prometheus	
Laboratories	 Inc.	 (2012)	 a	 general	message	 about	 broad	 patents	 was	 conveyed.	 Claims	 are	
likely	to	encompass	non-patentable	subject	matter	if	"the	steps	in	claimed	processes	involve	
well-understood,	 routine,	 conventional	 activity	 previously	 engaged	 in	 by	 researchers	 in	 the	
field."219	 Upholding	 patents	 as	 such	 “would	 risk	 […]	 inhibiting	 their	 use	 in	 the	 making	 of	
further	 discoveries."220	 Messages	 like	 this	will	 affect	 the	 thousands	of	 existing	patents	 that	
are	 considered	 too	broad	 to	 harm	 innovation	 in	 society	 and	 encourage	 investors	 to	 remain	
optimistic	regarding	the	potential	for	successful	commercialization	in	relevant	sectors.221	 	
According	 to	 Article	 27,	 apart	 from	 the	 specific	 exceptions	 in	 TRIPS,	member	 states	 cannot	
exclude	whole	classes	of	inventions	in	fields	of	technology	from	patenting.	An	earlier	example	
before	 India	 amended	 its	 IP	 law	 to	meet	 TRIPS	 requirements	 is	 found	 in	 “the	 1970	 Indian	
Patents	Act	which	prohibited	product	patents	for	agricultural	and	food”.222	 Such	exclusion	of	
a	 whole	 class	 of	 technology	 from	 patenting	 is	 clearly	 against	 Article	 27.1	 of	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement,	which	requires	that	patents	should	be	available	for	any	invention,	 in	all	 fields	of	
technology	 no	 matter	 they	 are	 products	 or	 processes.	 With	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 several	
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amendments223	 were	made	according	to	the	Act	in	exchange	for	trade	enabled	by	the	WTO.	
Since	the	April	1989	mid-term	review	of	the	Uruguay	Round,	an	ethos	of	expanded	scope	for	
IPRs	 and	 enforcement	 to	 ensure	 IPR	 standards	 emerged.	 The	 developed	 countries	
represented	by	the	US	insisted	that	the	scope	of	IPRs	be	placed	“in	the	wider	developmental	
and	technological	context”	 in	 individual	countries.224	 Although	developing	countries	such	as	
India	 have	 raised	 objections	 to	 the	 requirement	–	 especially	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 process	 versus	
product	 patents	 and	 the	 negative	 effect	 of	 granting	 patents	 to	 all	 pharmaceutical	 and	
agricultural	technologies225–	most	of	these	concerns	failed	to	win	sufficient	attention	during	
the	 negotiations.	 Even	 the	 developing	 countries	 have	 been	 advocating	 for	 a	 less	
comprehensive	patentability	agreement	on	IPRs	to	date,	yet	changes	have	been	made.	 	
This	could	be	a	barrier	 for	countries	seeking	possible	resolution	to	climate	change	problems	
through	 granting	 exceptions	 for	 a	 list	 of	 green	 technologies	 or	 other	 designated	 fields	 of	
environmental	 technologies	 to	 be	 non-patentable	 or	 semi-patentable.	 For	 example,	
“depending	on	the	circumstances	it	may	be	considered	discriminatory	for	members	to	exclude	
from	 patent	 grants	 an	 entire	 field	 of	 technology	 such	 as	 biofuels,	 or	 to	 provide	 special	
exceptions	 to	 patent	 rights	 only	 in	 one	 field	 of	 technology.”226 	 Exemption	 need	 not	
completely	 deprive	 green-technology	 owners	 from	enjoying	 IP	 protection	 and	 its	monopoly	
benefits,	 but	 instead	 of	 a	 full	 version	 of	 IP	 rights,	 limited/fewer	 IP	 rights	 could	 be	 granted,	
compared	 to	other	patents.	As	mentioned	 in	 the	 justification	 section	earlier,	 innovators	are	
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not	 purely	 patent-driven	 but	 can	 be	 encouraged	 to	 invent	 through	 many	 alternative	
strategies.	 There	 are	 already	 similar	 exemptions	 accepted	 under	 TRIPS.	 In	 Article	 27.3(a)	 it	
states	that	members	can	exclude	three	types	of	technology	from	patentability:	the	diagnostic,	
therapeutic	and	surgical	methods	for	the	treatment	of	humans	or	animals	(in	which	sectors	no	
significant	delay	in	inventing	and	innovating	is	found);	but	the	literal	scope	of	the	provision	is	
not	 broad	 enough	 to	 cover	 green	 technologies	 directly.	 This	 optional	 exclusion	 could	 be	
further	exploited	during	future	climate	change	negotiations,	given	that	application	of	a	range	
of	 climate	 change	 technologies	 are	 highly	 relevant	 to	 human	 and	 animal	 health.	 The	 2001	
Doha	 Declaration	 emphasized	 that	 TRIPS	 does	 not	 prevent	member	 states	 from	 taking	 the	
necessary	 steps	 to	 protect	 public	 health.	 As	 “the	 understanding	 that	 global	 climate	 change	
represents	a	profound	threat	to	the	health	and	well-being	of	human	and	non-human	species	
worldwide	is	growing,”227	 states	could	also	be	able	to	apply	the	public	health	goal	to	climate	
change	 issues	 because	 climate	 change	 damages	 can	 affect	 diseases,	 agricultural	 resources,	
and	 water	 supply	 and	 quality,	 among	 other	 consequences.	 Therefore,	 Abbott	 suggest	 a	
declaration	 comparable	 to	 the	 Doha	 Declaration	 with	 respect	 to	 IPRs	 and	 climate	 change,	
saying	 that	 it	“may	be	useful	 in	 the	progressive	development	of	 international	 law,	so	 that	 it	
properly	balances	the	rights	of	innovators	and	access	by	the	public	to	the	benefits	arising	from	
new	 technologies.” 228 	 The	 example	 of	 certain	 pharmaceutical	 products	 having	 been	
exempted,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 “WTO	 Appellate	 Body	 has	 interpreted	 this	 non-discrimination	
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provision	leniently”,229	 indicates	that	such	exempting	measures	may	not	pose	a	problem	for	
countries	wishing	 to	 isolate	 green	 technologies	 for	 special	 treatment.	 A	 stronger	 argument	
could	 be	 made	 with	 TRIPS	 dispute	 settlements	 clarification	 that	 “differential	 treatment	 of	
different	fields	of	technology	does	not	automatically	equal	discriminatory	treatment.”230	 The	
most	 difficult	 part	 of	 the	 search	 for	 exceptional	 regulation	 solutions	 to	 the	 world's	
environmental	degradation	 is	that	the	need	for	a	constantly	updated	 inventory	of	“new	and	
emerging	technologies	and	state	capabilities.”231	
5.3.4 Article 28: IPRs 
Article	28232	 sets	out	a	number	of	rights	that	should	be	available	under	national	IP	law	to	the	
owner	of	a	patent.	It	states	that	where	the	subject	matter	of	a	patent	is	a	product,	the	patent	
owner	shall	have	the	right	to	prevent	others	from	making,	using,	offering	for	sale,	selling,	or	
importing	for	these	purposes	that	product.	Unfortunately,	“there	is	no	corresponding	section	
on	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	 patentees,	 although	 Article	 7	 speaks	 of	 balancing	 the	 rights	 and	
obligations.”233	 This	 will	 possibly	 raise	 the	 cost	 of	 TT,	 making	 it	 harder	 to	 afford	 for	
developing	 countries.	 Because	 environmental	 protection	 already	 consumes	 a	 lot	 of	money,	
higher	 costs	 on	 technology	 imports	 will	 further	 discourage	 developing	 countries	 from	 a	
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commitment	to	sustainable	ways	of	growth.	Studies234	 suggest	that	“patents	and	other	IPRs	
may	 not	 be	 acting	 as	 barriers	 to	 market	 entry.”235 	 In	 fact,	 the	 relationship	 between	
strengthening	IPR	protection	and	economic	growth	in	the	countries	where	reform	took	place	
could	be	proportional.	Park	and	Ginarte	find	“that	IPRs	affect	economic	growth	indirectly	[but	
positively]	by	stimulating	the	accumulation	of	factor	inputs	like	R	&	D	and	physical	capital.”236	
Branstetter	et	al.237	 confirmed	the	above	observation	from	a	different	perspective	by	looking	
at	 firm-level	 data.	 They	 found	 that	 TT	within	US	multinational	 firms	 responded	much	more	
actively	to	IPR	reforms	undertaken	by	sixteen	countries	in	an	early	period	from	1982	to	1999.	
A	clear	increase	in	foreign-patent	application	rates	was	discovered	during	IP	reforms	meeting	
developed-country	 standards	 (strengthening	 IP	 protection),	 which,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
indicated	a	predictable	decline	in	patenting	and	even	more	backsliding	in	innovation	rates	if	IP	
reform	poles	apart	(weakening	the	IP	protection).	 	
However,	 these	 studies	 are	 by	 no	 means	 conclusive238	 and	 proper	 abatement	 reform	 of	
excessive	IP	protections	can	in	fact	be	beneficial	to	innovations	in	and	the	diffusion	of	climate	
change	technologies.	There	have	been	a	number	of	patent	disputes	affecting	the	US	market.	
For	 example,	 in	 1996	 Enercon	was	 barred	 by	 the	 US	 International	 Trade	 Commission	 from	
importing	wind	turbines	into	the	US.239	 “The	patent	involved	covered	a	particular	method	of	
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controlling	the	inverter	in	order	to	provide	power	most	effectively	to	the	grid,	and	was	held	by	
Kinetech.”240	 Another	 case	 is	Gamesa	Eolica,	 S.A.	 v.	General	 Electric	Co,	where	 the	plaintiff	
sought	to	enforce	a	patent	on	a	strategy	of	controlling	the	turbine	speed	against	GE.241	 More	
recently,	 in	 2008	 GE	 asked	 the	 US	 ITC	 to	 “bar	 imports	 of	 wind	 turbines	 made	 by	 Japan’s	
Mitsubishi	Heavy	Industries	Ltd.,	arguing	that	Mitsubishi’s	turbines	infringe	on	its	patents.”242	
These	cases	demonstrate	the	potential	hindering	effects	of	patent	protection	on	the	diffusion	
of	 technology.	 Even	 acquitting	 of	 a	 barrier	 to	 market	 entry,	 it	 is	 not	 making	 IPRs	 an	
encouragement	 to	 TT	 as	 stated	 in	 TRIPS.	 This	 is	 especially	 so	 in	 the	wind	 turbine	 industry,	
which	is	highly	concentrated	with	the	top	four	companies	already	accounting	for	nearly	75	per	
cent	of	the	market243	 and	where	patent	monopoly	is	undisputedly	reinforcing	the	unbalanced	
power	 possessed	 by	 the	 technology	 holders.	 Major	 players	 like	 GE	 have	 a	 reputation	 for	
enforcing	 their	 patents	 aggressively	 in	 the	 US	 market,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 foresee	 them	
repeating	the	same	pattern	in	other	developing	countries	if	IP	environments	allow	them	to	do	
so.	
Article	28	goes	on	to	state	the	rights	of	a	process-patent	owner	to	prevent	others	from	the	act	
of	 using	 the	 process,	 and	 from	 the	 acts	 of	 using,	 offering	 for	 sale,	 selling,	 or	 importing	 for	
these	 purposes	 the	 product	 obtained	 directly	 by	 the	 process	 in	 question.	 This	 further	
emphasizes	the	rights	of	the	patent	owner.	For	example,	a	patent	on	a	novel,	cheaper	method	
of	producing	photovoltaic	cells	that	used	to	be	manufactured	in	a	known	way,	could	be	used	
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to	prevent	the	sale	of	PV	cells	produced	by	this	new	method.244	 This	 is	 indicating	that	even	
though	Article	28	does	not	grant	rights	to	the	owners	to	block	the	use	of	any	other	PV	cells,	
the	 right	 over	 the	 control	 of	 sales	 is	 still	 there	 for	 them	 to	 influence	 the	 solar-energy	
industry.245	 Together	 with	 Article	 33246,	 under	 which	 states	 are	 obliged	 to	 grant	 20-year	
monopoly	 rights	 to	patent	holders,	developing-country	members	are	prevented	 from	selling	
products	 freely	 –	 as	 long	 as	 the	 innovation	 concerns	 the	patented	 technologies	 –	 for	many	
years.	According	to	the	study	by	Horowitz	and	Lai,247	 there	is	a	countervailing	effect	of	patent	
length	upon	 the	 "size"	and	 "frequency"	of	 innovation.	 Longer	patents	 increase	 the	 size,	but	
decrease	 the	 frequency	 of	 innovation	 and	 vice	 versa.	 However,	 at	 an	 intermediate	 patent	
length,	 these	 two	 forces	 will	 balance	 eventually	 so	 as	 to	 maximize	 the	 overall	 rate	 of	
innovation.	When	pursuing	a	finite	welfare-maximizing	patent	length,	however,	the	decline	in	
the	 frequency	 of	 innovation	 as	 the	 patent	 life	 is	 extended	 will	 affect	 the	 behaviour	 of	 its	
consumers.	 Consequently,	 from	a	welfare	 perspective,	 “the	balance	point	 between	 the	 size	
and	 frequency	 of	 innovation	 occurs	 at	 a	 shorter	 patent	 length.”248	 In	 the	 climate	 change	
context,	encouraging	more	users	of	green	technology	is	the	crucial	point	of	welfare	at	stake;	
therefore,	given	 the	priority	of	 climate	change	 issues,	a	patent	 life	 that	 could	maximize	 this	
welfare	 benefit	 is	 acceptably	 shorter	 than	 the	 secondary	 consideration,	which	would	 be	 to	
maximize	the	rate	of	innovation.	
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Even	if	developing	countries’	firms	obtain	non-infringing	technologies	independently,	they	will	
struggle	 to	 compete	 with	 their	 mature	 foreign	 competitors.	 Meanwhile,	 home	 states	 have	
little	 to	 help	 them	 as	 they	 are	 prohibited	 from	 applying	 preferential	 treatment	 to	 foster	
domestic	innovative	products	under	the	WTO.	A	different	perspective	on	the	minimum	length	
of	patent	protection	derives	from	the	chemical	industry.	As	patents	are	granted	to	the	“first	to	
file”	 in	 many	 countries,	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 patent	 filing,	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 usually	
apply	patents	when	the	chemical	is	still	at	the	laboratory	stage.	As	a	result,	“many	years	will	
elapse	whilst	the	product	progresses	through	the	various	stages	of	development	towards	the	
market	place.”249	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 considered	 that	a	20-year	patent	 life	 is	 too	 short	because	
the	majority	 of	 it	 is	 consumed	 by	 further	 development	 of	 the	 product	 itself	 and	 by	 getting	
access	 to	marketing	approval	 from	the	public	health	 regulatory	bodies,	 leaving	 the	effective	
term	of	 a	pharmaceutical	 product	 as,	 on	 average,	 eight	 years.250	 It	 has	been	observed	 in	 a	
WTO	 report	 paper	 that	 “for	 this	 reason,	 most	 of	 the	 major	 developed	 countries	 have	
introduced	 systems	 whereby	 a	 prolonged	 period	 of	 protection	 can	 be	 obtained	 to	
compensate,	at	least	in	part,	for	this	loss	of	the	effective	period	of	protection.”251	 However,	if	
chemicals	 are	 intended	by	 companies	 to	 get	 patent	 registered	 in	 a	 rush	 at	 their	 premature	
stage,	should	extra	 longer	protection	be	granted	to	 them	 in	order	 to	compensate	 time	they	
have	wasted	 deliberately?	 To	 date,	 there	 is	 yet	 request	 for	 prolonged	 period	 of	 protection	
from	 the	 green-technology	 field.	 This	 could	be	 seen	as	 an	 indicator	 that	 competition	 in	 the	
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climate	change	technology	sector	is	less	intense	than	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry	and	that	
market	access	is	comparatively	fast	and	convenient.	Moreover,	the	cost	of	developing	a	drug	
for	market	 compared	 to	 the	 cost	 to	 reverse-engineer	 it	 is	 significantly	 different	 from	 costs	
related	 to	 green	 technologies.	 Imitative	 competitors	 in	 the	 green	 industry	 sector,	 especially	
renewable	energy	area,	will	have	to	pay	considerable	amounts	of	R	&	D	costs	and	it	requires	
remarkably	long	time	spans	to	develop	compatible	products	to	market.252	 Therefore,	the	risk	
of	 investment-return	 loss	 is	 lower.	Accordingly,	 there	 is	 less	need	 for	countries	 to	deal	with	
this	problem	by	enacting	legislation	to	partially	restore	the	lost	patent	life.253	
For	indigenous	innovators	in	developing	countries,	it	may	be	beneficial	to	enjoy	strong	patent	
protection	 in	 the	 domestic	 market,	 and	 some	 firms	 in	 large	 developing	 countries	 are	
becoming	 more	 aware	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 IP	 protection	 as	 they	 transform	 from	 being	 a	
technology	 receiver	 to	 a	 producer.	 Not	 only	 that,	 but	 “based	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 Asian	
economies,	developing	countries	should	adopt	standards	of	patentability,	novelty,	and	utility	
that	 are	 stricter	 (i.e.	 they	 raise	 a	 higher	 bar	 to	 patenting)	 than	 those	 in	 the	 US	 and	 EU	
Members”254	 to	 effectively	 protect	 the	 order	 of	 the	 technology	 market.	 Yet	 in	 reality	 the	
majority	of	developing-country	parties	are	limited	due	to	their	lower	capability	of	conducting	
original	 R	 &	 D.	 Therefore,	 they	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 minor	 follow-on	 innovations	 (including	
adaptation	 or	 the	 improvement	 of	 already	 developed	 technologies).	 So,	 any	 benefit	 from	
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strong	patent	protections	accruing	to	domestic	innovators	in	developing	countries	is,	in	most	
cases,	“overwhelmingly	outweighed	by	the	high	cost	of	importing	patented	technologies	from	
developed	countries.”255	 It	is	indeed	as	the	World	Bank	has	suggested	that	“overly	protective	
IPR	 regimes	 may	 inhibit	 follow-on	 innovations,	 thus	 generally	 slowing	 down	 technological	
development,	particularly	in	developing	countries.”256	
5.3.5 Article 30: Exceptions to IPRs 
Article	30257	 authorizes	members	to	allow	limited	exceptions	to	the	exclusive	rights	conferred	
by	 a	 patent,	 “provided	 that	 such	 exceptions	 do	 not	 unreasonably	 conflict	 with	 normal	
exploitation	of	 the	patent	and	do	not	unreasonably	prejudice	the	 legitimate	 interests	of	 the	
patent	 owner,	 taking	 account	 of	 the	 legitimate	 interests	 of	 third	 parties.”258	 In	 a	 broader	
sense,	 as	Watal	 states,	 “limited	 exceptions”259	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 “those	 recognized	 in	most	
patent	 laws:	 private	 and	 non-commercial	 use,	 use	 for	 research,	 experimental	 or	 academic	
purposes,	 and	 use	 in	 the	 direct	 preparation	 of	 individual	medicines	 by	 pharmacies.”260	 The	
research	 exception,	 under	 which	 researchers	 can	 use	 patented	 inventions	 for	 research	 is	
important	 for	 academics	 who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 pay	 commercial	 licensing	 fees	 for	 a	 key	
patent.261	 “TRIPS	 negotiators	 adopted	 the	 approach	 of	 establishing	 general	 principles	 that	
national	 legislators	 should	 observe,	 rather	 than	 an	 exhaustive	 list	 that	 would	 have	 set	 out	
																																								 																				
255 Duncan Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS Agreement (Routledge 2003) p.110 
256 World Bank (n 119) p.34. 
257 Article 30, “Exceptions to Rights Conferred: Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” 
258 Article 30, “Exceptions to Rights Conferred: Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” 
259 The crucial sentiment here is ‘limited’ otherwise the exceptions would become meaningless. 
260 Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer Law International 2002) p.314, 
quoted by Hutchison (n 16). 
261 J. H. Reichman and J. Giordano Coltart, ‘A holistic approach to patents affecting frontier science: Lessons from the seminal 
genomic technology studies’ (European Patent Forum, May 2008) p.6-7. 
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specific	 exceptions	 to	 be	 implemented	 at	 the	 national	 level.”262	 Thus,	 TRIPS	 does	 not	
ascertain	 the	meaning	of	 terms	used	 in	 this	Article	 (i.e.	 “limited	exceptions”,	 “unreasonably	
conflict”,	 “legitimate	 interests”)	 which	 are	 in	 fact	 independent	 requirements	 that	 must	 be	
applied	cumulatively.	This	makes	this	article	a	possible	juncture	for	climate	change	technology	
to	seek	remedial	action	to	the	current	 IP	protection	considered	to	be	too	stubborn	to	allow	
more	exceptional	use	of	climate	change	technology.	However,	there	has	been	much	scope	to	
consider	 the	 immense	difficulty	 in	 balancing	 these	 exemptions	with	 the	 legitimate	 rights	 of	
patent	 holders.	 These	 exceptions,	 if	 widely	 defined,	may	 hinder	 the	 very	 objective	 patents	
application	rate	and	even	further	hinder	the	innovation	rate	across	the	whole	of	society.	This	
explains	why	TRIPS	only	provides	a	general	 rule	 to	be	 respected	by	national	 law	 in	allowing	
exceptions	rather	than	setting	out	specific	exceptions.	This	 is	also	reserving	the	right	for	the	
interpretation	of	the	Article	in	a	conservative	way	to	restrict	member	states	from	interpreting	
it	too	far	from	its	original	intention.	
For	 example,	 an	 interpretation	 given	 by	 a	WTO	 dispute-settlement	 panel	 is	 available	 in	 its	
ruling	where	“while	a	Canadian	law	allowing	generic	drug	manufacturers	to	use	the	patented	
medicine	to	obtain	regulatory	approval	in	order	to	market	the	product	after	patent	expiry	was	
legal	under	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	allowing	such	manufacturers	 to	make	and	freely	stockpile	
medicines	during	the	patent	term	was	not.”263	 This	so-called	'Bolar'	exception	basically	allows	
“manufacturers	 of	 generic	 drugs	 to	 use	 the	 patented	 invention	 for	 purposes	 of	 obtaining	
																																								 																				
262 Taubman and Watal (n 23). 
263 Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co 733 F2d 858 (Fed Cir 1984) quoted by Taubman and Watal (n 23). 
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marketing	approval	from	drug	regulatory	authorities”264	 during	the	patent	protection	period,	
so	that	they	can	be	launched	immediately	on	expiry	of	the	patent	period.	Potentially,	with	the	
growing	 interest	 in	 climate	 change	 mitigation,	 this	 provision	 could	 be	 meaningful	 in	 the	
context	 of	 certain	 environmental	 technologies.	 For	 example,	 the	 smart-grid	 technology	 and	
offshore	 wind-energy	 technology-related	 construction	 projects	 are	 currently	 subject	 to	
regulatory	processes	for	national	security	reasons	and	central	planning	by	the	government	in	
China.	 If	 such	 exceptions	 are	made	 available	 to	 this	 area,	 they	may	 help	 bring	 forward	 the	
project	 design	 process	 and	 accelerate	 the	 diffusion	 of	 such	 technologies.265	 However,	 this	
precedent	 is	 rather	 narrow	 in	 regard	 to	 its	 applicability.	 As	we	 have	 said,	 the	 ruling	 of	 the	
WTO	dispute-settlement	panel	 recognized	 the	exceptional	use	of	patented	medicine	 for	 the	
preparation	of	 regulatory	market	access	only.	Actions	 like	allowing	 “manufacturers	 to	make	
and	 stockpile	medicines	 in	 unlimited	 quantities	 during	 the	 patent	 term	was	 not	 consistent	
with	 this	 three-step	 test.”266	 In	 contrast,	 similar	 activities	 of	 producing	 renewable	 energy	
equipment	should	not	be	considered	as	violating	Article	30	in	the	case	of	an	EST	because	they	
are	 more	 expensive	 to	 produce,	 require	 immense	 capitals	 and	 virtually	 unlikely	 to	
“unreasonably	 conflict	 with	 a	 normal	 exploitation	 of	 the	 patent”	 as	 development	 and	
application	 of	 such	 technologies	 to	 a	 full	 commercialized	 level	 takes	 a	 long	 time	 once	
knowledge	is	acquired,	and	in	turn	would	not	“unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	
of	 the	 patent	 owner”	 during	 their	 entitled	monopoly	 period.	 However,	 it	 is	 very	 uncertain	
																																								 																				
264 Anthony Tridico, Jeffrey  Jacobstein and Leythem  Wall, ‘Facilitating generic drug manufacturing: Bolar exemptions 
worldwide’ (World Intellectual Property Organization, June 2014)  
<http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2014/03/article_0004.html> accessed Feburary 2017. 
265 Taubman and Watal (n 23). 
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whether	the	Bolar	exception	can	be	applied	to	wind	energy	projects	preparation,	and	even	it	
can,	whether	such	narrow	exception	will	help	accelerating	widen	of	EST	application.	
Indeed,	 the	 issues	are	more	complex	 in	 the	context	of	climate	change	technology	than	they	
are	 for	essential	drugs,	 given,	 for	example,	 that	 the	question	of	what	precisely	 counts	as	 ‘a	
green	 technology’	 that	 could	 be	 exempt	 from	 IPRs	 remains	 murky	 without	 consensus.	
Nevertheless,	 “developing	 countries	 might	 well	 choose	 to	 advocate	 broadening	 the	
conception	 of	 current	 licensing	 exceptions	 beyond	 essential	 medicines.”267	 Therefore,	 the	
exact	 scope	 of	 Article	 30	 is	 depending	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 its	 limiting	 conditions	while	
bearing	 in	 mind	 the	 objectives	 and	 limitations	 stated	 in	 Article	 7	 and	 8.1	 as	 well	 as	 other	
provisions	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 that	 helps	 understanding	 of	 these	 objectives	 and	
limitations.268	 If,	 for	 example,	 the	 “legitimate	 interests	 of	 third	 parties”	 in	 mitigating	 or	
adapting	 to	 climate	 change	 are	 to	 be	 given	 tremendous	weight	 in	 the	 interpretation,	 using	
green	technologies,	especially	 in	urgent	cases,	may	be	exempted	from	patent	restrictions.269	
Such	 exceptions	may	 not	 be	 sufficient	 for	 a	 competitor	 to	 imitate	 freely,	whereas	 it	will	 at	
least	help	accelerate	the	access	and	diffusion	of	such	technologies.	As	limited	in	applicability,	
fortunately	the	dispute-settlement	panel	interpreting	of	Article	30	does	not	say	that	it	would	
not	 be	 challenged	 or	 revised	 in	 future.	 And,	 more	 importantly,	 nothing	 should	 prevent	 a	
national	 law	 from	 elaborating	 on	 these	 requirements	 and	 exceptions.	 “The	 fact	 that	 some	
provisions	of	 the	TRIPS	Agreement	are	ambiguous	does	not	mean	that	developing	countries	
will	have	to	interpret	it	in	terms	favorable	to	patentees	from	the	developed	countries.”270	 In	
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fact,	the	Doha	Declaration271	 has	opened	up	new	horizons	for	reasons	like	public	health	to	be	
interpreted	 as	 part	 of	 exception	 making.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 hope	 that	
environmental	protection	will	be	seen	as	 important	while	requiring	nations	to	amend	law	to	
make	its	TRIPS	consistent.	 	
5.3.6 Article 31: Compulsory licensing 
Article	 31272	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 covering	 compulsory	 licensing273	 requirements.	
According	to	grounds	set	under	the	laws	of	each	member	state,	a	compulsory	licence	will	be	
granted	non-exclusively	 in	 the	 nation	without	 permission	 from	 the	patent	 holder.	 A	 certain	
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more than just the blueprint. In particular, compulsory licensing does not oblige the patent holder to transfer know-how (nor does 
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amount	 of	 adequate	 remuneration	 will	 be	 given	 to	 the	 patent	 holder.274	 Countries	 can	
develop	their	own	grounds	for	compulsory	licensing	and	this	view	has	been	confirmed	in	the	
Doha	 Declaration	 on	 Public	 Health.275	 Article	 31	 is	 not	 the	 only	 avenue	 for	 compulsory	
licensing;	reference	can	also	be	made	on	some	grounds	in	Article	7,	8,	30	and	40.	“Members	
may,	 in	their	discretion,	 taking	account	of	 the	balance	of	rights	and	obligations,	set	grounds	
for	compulsory	licensing	under	their	national	legislation.”276	
Compulsory	 licences	 provide	 developing	 countries	 with	 “another	 set	 of	 options,	 especially	
when	foreign	firms	refuse	to	deal	with	local	firms	or	refuse	to	make	technologies	available	at	
prices	 that	 local	 firms	 can	 afford.”277	 Compulsory	 licences	 could	 even	 be	 useful	 to	 the	
environmental	sector	in	the	form	of	government-use	licences.	Such	a	licence	is	for	the	use	of	
government	manufacturing	to	make	patented	products	available	 to	 the	public	at	 large,	with	
the	 relevant	 transaction	 costs	 being	 kept	 low.	 Another	 form	 of	 compulsory	 licence	 is	 the	
so-called	“public	interest”	compulsory	licence.	This	approach	is	widely	used	in	many	countries	
where	the	government	will	nominate	a	private	party	to	produce	the	patented	goods	without	a	
licence	 from	 the	 patentee.	 This	 is	 normally	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 “the	 public	 interest	
requires	 the	goods	 in	question	 to	be	made	available	 in	greater	quantities	or	at	 lower	prices	
than	the	patentee	is	willing	to	accept.”278	 There	is	no	limitation	of	grounds	under	Article	31	
of	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	which	grants	the	freedom	for	member	states	to	determine	grounds	
for	granting	such	licences	in	domestic	patent	laws.	
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In	 terms	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 compulsory	 licensing,	 there	 is	 concern	 about	 the	 possible	
detrimental	 impact	 on	 patent	 applications	 and	 innovations	 if	 it	 became	 a	 mainstream	
practice;	 this	 is	 because	 it	might	 reduce	 the	 incentive	 for	 innovation	 offered	 by	 the	 patent	
system.279	 First,	there	is	a	fear	that	widespread	compulsory	licensing	could	affect	the	patent	
rate.	It	might	be	argued:	why	apply	for	a	patent	if	compulsory	licensing	may	be	the	end	result	
regardless	 of	 remuneration?	 However,	 according	 to	 Article	 31(h)	 “the	 right	 holder	 shall	 be	
paid	adequately	in	the	circumstances	of	each	case,	taking	into	account	the	economic	value	of	
the	authorization.”	Legitimate	gain	 from	a	patent	 is	clearly	respected	by	the	wording	of	 this	
provision.	It	is	actually	the	price	at	which	remuneration	is	set	that	will	determine	whether	and	
how	much	the	future	patent	rate	is	affected.	In	general,	remuneration	of	compulsory	licensing	
whose	price	is	set	at	a	level	below	that	which	the	market	would	offer	might	have	operated	to	
“effectively	 strip	 the	 patentee	 of	 its	 right	 to	 any	 monopoly	 profits.”280	 But	 then	 again,	 if	
remuneration	 is	priced	essentially	at	 the	 level	 that	a	patent	holder	asks	 for,	 there	 is	no	real	
reason	to	expect	that	 innovation	will	be	substantially	harmed;	more	importantly,	there	is	no	
sense	in	replicating/supporting	the	abusive	behaviour	of	patentees	by	refusing	to	license.	
In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 fear	 that	 compulsory	 licensing	 could	 become	 a	 discouragement	 to	
incentivise	 R	&	D.	A	 survey	 of	 British	 pharmaceutical	 executives	 discovered	 that	 companies	
believed	“in	some	extreme	forms,	[compulsory]	licensing	could	harm	innovation.”281	 Indeed,	
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the	 practice	 of	 allowing	 third	 parties	 to	 use	 patented	 inventions	 without	 patentee’s	
permission	does	controvert	the	terms	of	 limited	monopoly	offered	to	patentees,	and	 is	thus	
believed	 to	 have	 discouraged	 inventors	 from	 investing	 in	 further	 R	&	 D.	 However,	 such	 an	
assumption	was	 empirically	 tested	 by	 researchers	 in	 case	 studies282	 where	 they	 compared	
rates	of	patenting	 to	other	measures	of	 inventive	activity	both	before	and	after	compulsory	
licences.283	 According	to	their	observations,	there	was	“no	uniform	decline	 in	 innovation	by	
companies	 affected	 by	 compulsory	 licences	 and	 we	 find	 very	 little	 evidence	 of	 a	 negative	
impact.”284	 Even	compared	with	patents	 in	 the	pharmaceuticals	 sector	 (where	 the	 result	of	
cost-return	is	strongly	associated	with	protection	of	patents	more	than	other	industries),285	 it	
was	 found	 that	 weakening	 patents	 through	 the	 use	 of	 compulsory	 licences	 does	 not	
necessarily	 reduce	 innovation	 in	 the	 industry.	While	 past	 experience	 suggests	 that	 licensing	
categorically	might	not	be	harmful	 to	 innovation,	 compulsory	 licences	as	a	policy	option	 for	
increasing	 access	 to	 new	 technologies	 –	 especially	 in	 the	 industries	 that	 are	 less	 reliant	 on	
patents	(i.e.	climate	change	technology)	–	deserves	greater	exploration.	
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Still,	there	are	several	underlined	requirements	in	Article	31	that	“pose	important	prohibitions	
and	constraints	to	compulsory	licensing.”286	 First,	compulsory	licensing	may	proceed	without	
any	 negotiation	 and	 “without	 regard	 to	 the	 location	 of	 the	 predominant	 market	 when	
licensing	is	permitted	to	remedy	a	practice	determined	after	judicial	or	administrative	process	
to	be	anti-competitive”.287	 The	criteria	to	determine	anti-competitiveness	are	ambiguous.288	
As	 to	 market	 significance,	 refusal	 to	 grant	 licences	 can	 vary	 according	 to	 the	 degree	 of	
competitive	threat	they	pose	to	licensors.	“If	a	licence	covers	a	known	product	in	a	licensor's	
target	market,	 the	 licensor	and	 the	 licensee	will	have	 to	 share	 the	same	market.”289	 In	 this	
case,	 anti-competitiveness	 might	 be	 high.	 But	 due	 to	 a	 common	 price	 difference	 between	
products	with	and	without	the	know-how	and	technical	skills	of	patent	holders,	the	licensor's	
market	may	not	 to	be	directly	 threatened.	 Licensors,	 as	well	 as	manufacturers	 supplying	 to	
the	targeted	market,	usually	aim	at	a	higher	end	of	the	market	because	of	the	higher	price	of	
their	 products,	 whereas	 licensees	 are	 suppliers	 of	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 market,	 which	
originally	could	not	afford	the	imported	products.	This	is	an	example	of	when	licensing	covers	
a	market	that	is	unimportant,	to	some	extent,	to	the	licensor.	In	this	case,	there	it	is	likely	that	
the	 licensee	 and	 licensor	will	 not	 be	 in	 rivalry.	Accordingly,	 the	 anti-competitiveness	of	 this	
licence	could	be	reviewed	as	relatively	low	making	a	judicial	determination	of	anti-competitive	
behaviour	 less	 likely	 and	 the	 use	 of	 compulsory	 licencing	 unjustified.	 Clarifications	 of	 these	
terms	as	such	are	therefore	required.	
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Moreover,	 a	 licence	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 exporting	 technologies	 will	 be	 binding.	 “The	 main	
limitation	is	that	the	compulsory	licence	must	primarily	serve	the	domestic	market,	and	only	
incidentally	 may	 items	 be	 exported.”290	 This	 is	 stated	 under	 Article	 31(f)	 of	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement,	requiring	that	compulsory	licences	be	made	“predominantly	for	the	supply	of	the	
local	market,	which	means	 no	more	 than	 49.9	 per	 cent	 of	 productions	 can	 be	 exported	 to	
another	 country	 (unless	 such	 exports	 can	 conceivably	 be	 justified	 as	 an	 “exception”	within	
Article	30).”291	 States	are	then	prohibited	from	granting	compulsory	licences	to	serve	export	
markets292	 and	 might	 need	 “to	 waive	 the	 requirements	 of	 Article	 31(f)	 to	 supply	 export	
markets	with	needed	 technologies.”293	 For	developing	countries	 that	have	a	 large	domestic	
market	 demand	 (e.g.	 China	 has	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 environmental	 projects	 launching	 each	
year),	 such	 compulsory	 licences	would	 still	 be	worth	 granting	 under	 this	 limitation,	 but	 for	
countries	with	relatively	small	domestic	markets	it	would	be	an	extravagance	and	a	waste.	 	
Even	if	a	technology	is	worthy	of	filing	a	compulsory	licensing	application	against	the	patent,	
the	 limited	 duration	 of	 the	 compulsory	 licence	 would	 become	 another	 practical	 economic	
disincentive	 to	 pursuing	 one.	 Green	 technologies,	 particularly	 those	 that	 relate	 to	
renewable-energy	generation:	
need	major	manufacturers	to	build	them,	skilled	installers	and	operators	to	deploy	them,	
well-funded	 project	 developers	 to	 finance	 the	 facilities	 that	 use	 them	 –	 such	 as	 wind	
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farms	 and	 solar	 plants	 –	 and	 utilities	 to	 purchase	 and	 distribute	 the	 energy	 generated	
from	them.294	
Establishing	such	projects	 is	very	time	consuming.	Therefore,	“potential	compulsory	 licensee	
applicants	 may	 be	 discouraged	 by	 the	 strict	 time-limited	 nature	 of	 the	 licence.”295	 The	
primary	business	of	a	number	of	environmental	manufacturers	is	large	equipment	production	
and	 sales	 of	 the	 equipment.	 For	 them,	 to	 employ	 compulsory	 licensed	 green-tech	 would	
constitute	a	potential	risk	in	future	production.	As	a	licence	is	“a	non-exclusive	licence,	it	does	
not	prevent	the	patent	holder	from	joining	in	the	same	market.”296	 An	expensive	production	
line	installed	by	domestic	companies	could	be	halted	at	the	expiry	of	the	compulsory	license	
and	probably	already	lose	competitive	advantage	where	the	owner	company	has	brand-name	
strength.297	 Moreover,	 significant	primary	costs	 for	green-tech	applications	still	 remain	as	a	
great	impediment.	The	actual	costs	of	a	solar,	wind	or	biofuel	power	plant:	construction	and	
developing	the	ancillary	infrastructure,	or	conversion	and	refitting	an	emission-control	device,	
could	 amount	 to	 a	 huge	 sum.	 Not	 to	 mention	 the	 follow-up	 subsidiary/financial	 support	
required	 from	 local	 government	 (e.g.	 electricity	 tariff	 subsidies);	 even	 if	 states	 used	
compulsory	 licensing	 to	 bring	 these	 technologies	 to	 their	 local	 industries,	 the	 problem	 of	
capital	outlay	remains	in	place	before	the	technologies	can	be	effectively	implemented.	
There	 seem	 to	 be	 solid	 legal	 and	 policy	 reasons	 for	 developing	 countries	 to	 obtain	 climate	
change	 technologies	 through	 compulsory	 licensing	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 refusal	 to	 deal	 with	
																																								 																				
294 Lane (n 36). 
295 Hutchison (n 16). 
296 Ibid. 
297 Carlos M. Correa, ‘Can the TRIPS Agreement foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries’ in Keith E. Maskus and 
Jerome H. Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property 
Regime (Cambridge University Press 2005) p.249: “Canada’s amendment to its patent legislation to implement the WTO Public 
Health decision, for example, limits compulsory licensing for essential medicines to a 2-year term.” 
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situations.	 However,	 “this	 may	 not	 be	 as	 sound	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 as	 it	 may	 first	
appear.”298	 When	a	country	does	not	have	technology	capacity	enough	to	reverse-engineer	
the	 product	 or	 process	 in	 question,	 the	 threat	 of	 a	 compulsory	 license	 being	 issued	 is	
minor.299	 “Developing-country	 firms	 may	 lack	 the	 expertise	 to	 develop	 the	 technology	
without	 far	 more	 than	 a	 blueprint.	 In	 particular,	 compulsory	 licensing	 does	 not	 oblige	 the	
patent	 holder	 to	 transfer	 know-how.” 300 	 The	 situation	 may	 be	 less	 difficult	 in	 the	
pharmaceutical	 industry	 because	 these	 technologies	 are	 often	 constrained	 to	 ‘one	 drug	 for	
one	illness’,	and	once	an	active	pharmaceutical	ingredient	is	known,	a	drug	can	be	produced	
with	 some	 efficiency.	Many	 African	 countries	 have	 compulsory	 licensing	 provisions	 in	 their	
patent	laws,	although	the	use	of	this	provision	has	been	rare.	But	with	a	great	amount	of	vital	
know-how	 in	 hand,	 it	 is	 easy	 for	 a	 patent	 owner	 to	 cripple	 compulsory	 licensees	 from	
efficiently	 being	 productive	 in	 the	 environmental	 industry.	More	 than	 that,	 the	 compulsory	
licensing	 provisions	 under	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 prohibit	 licences	 for	 primarily	 export	 markets,	
which	discourages	competitor	firms	from	investing	further.	
In	 the	 fear	 that	 compulsory	measures	 could	act	 as	 an	even	 stronger	disincentive	 for	patent	
owners	 to	 transfer	 their	 inventions,	 very	 few	 developing	 countries	 turn	 to	 this	 flexibility	
available	 under	 TRIPS.	 For	 example,	 to	 date,	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 single	 case	 of	 the	
compulsory	 licensing	 of	 a	 patent	 owned	 by	 a	 foreign	 company	 in	 China.	 There	 was	 one	
near-case	 about	 licensing	 the	 patent	 of	 Tamiflu	 (an	 avian	 influenza	 drug	 that	 has	 been	
																																								 																				
298 Hutchison (n 16). 
299 “unless it can obtain similar products from other countries where they are off-patent or available under the doctrine of 
exhaustion” Mario Cimoli and others, Intellectual Property Rights: Legal and Economic Challenges for Development (Oxford 
University Press 2014) p.380. 
300 Article 29 only requires sufficiently clear and complete disclosure, and best mode, of the invention to the skilled addressee in 
the art. 
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compulsory	licensed	in	India	and	some	other	countries)	where	the	Chinese	State	IPO	allowed	
plenty	of	‘mercy	time’	for	the	Roche	Group	(the	patent	owner)	to	sign	a	licence	contract	with	
two	Chinese	pharmaceutical	 companies	before	carrying	out	 the	compulsory	 license-granting	
process.301	 Yet,	 no	 such	 licences	 have	 yet	 been	 issued.	 Even	 the	 actual	 use	 of	 compulsory	
licences	 is	 rare,	 such	 licences	 still	 require	 notice	 and	 prior	 negotiations	with	 rights	 holders.	
Sometimes	 the	 prior	 negotiations	 themselves	 are	 enough	 to	 discourage	 refuse	 to	 license	
making	the	actual	need	of	compulsory	licence	unnecessary.	
5.4 Conclusion  
Based	on	the	above	observations,	it	is	clear	that	TRIPS	is	intended	to	promote	innovation	and	
the	dissemination	of	technologies	while	respecting	the	importance	of	environment	protection	
and	the	welfare	of	people	in	each	member	state.	However,	it	has	been	acting	less	efficiently	
by	 encouraging	 the	 diffusion	 and	 wide	 application	 of	 more	 complex	 technologies	 that	 are	
needed	for	combatting	climate	change.	This	is	partially	due	to	the	well-adopted	but	defective	
justification	 theories	 for	patents	as	well	 as	 the	history	of	 compromise	between	countries	 in	
reaching	an	international	agreement	on	IP	issues	(the	TRIPS	Agreement).	The	TRIPS	mandate	
is	 thought	 to	 be	 fundamental	 and	 widely	 acceptable	 but	 its	 current	 level	 of	 objective	
implementation,	and	in	particular	the	function	of	promoting	TT,	is	seen	as	insufficient	in	many	
situations.	Part	of	the	explanation	might	lie	in	the	discord	between	countries	at	the	receiving	
end	of	TT	and	countries	that	hold	most	of	the	core	technologies.	However,	with	the	consistent	
goal	 of	 global	 environment	 protection,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 has	 the	
																																								 																				
301 Similar situations can be seen in the Western market; for example “in the context of public health needs, both France and 
Belgium have enacted laws allowing the issuance of expedited public interest compulsory licences for public health purposes.” See 
Part 2, Section 2 of Geertrui Van Overwalle, Gene Patents and Public Health (G. Van Overwalle ed, Brussel, Bruylant 2007). 
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potential	 to	 be	 enabled	 to	 fulfil	 its	 own	 objective	 of	 facilitating	 EST	 transfer	 and	 diffusion.	
Moreover,	 TRIPS	 is	 more	 of	 a	 mediator	 than	 a	 facilitator,	 lacking	 the	 integration	 of	 an	
exponent	and	an	executant	with	a	pragmatic	mechanism	that	could	be	acting	as	a	significant	
assistance	 to	developing	 countries	 in	 importing	 and	absorbing	 climate	 change	 technologies.	
The	 impact	of	these	shortcomings	bring	to	developing	member	states,	 in	terms	of	attracting	
climate	change	TT,	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter,	within	which	we	will	look	at	how	it	is	
reflected	in	cases	in	practice	in	order	to	get	the	first-hand	information	that	may	help	to	solve	
problems.	Many	of	 the	problems	mentioned	above	will	be	examined	within	one	developing	
country	 (China)	 and	will	 be	 considered	within	 a	 specific	 industry	 sector	 (that	 of	 renewable	
energy).	
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Chapter	VI:	Climate	Change	Technology	Transfer	to	China	
6.1 Introduction 
The	discussions	about	 the	 relevant	 literature	and	 international	 agreements	have	 shown	 the	
importance	 of	 climate	 change	 TT	 to	 developing	 countries.	 Previous	 chapters	 have	 also	
demonstrated	 that	 successful	TT	depends	on	enabling	environments	suitable	 for	 technology	
development,	 transfer,	 adaptation,	 and	 deployment	 of	 such	 technologies.	 It	 is	 “abundantly	
clear	 that	 the	 development	 of	 local	 capabilities,	 policies,	 and	 institutions	 to	 guide,	manage	
and	support	this	process	is	no	less	critical”1	 than	encouraging	developed	countries	to	initiate	
TT.	However,	 the	development	of	 capabilities	 and	policies	 in	developing	 countries	 is	 not	 an	
easy	 task	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 uniformity	 in	 the	 specific	 ways	 that	 international	 efforts	 might	
dovetail	 with	 local	 efforts	 for	 the	 goal	 of	 TT	 promotion.	 China,	 as	 a	 developing	 country,	 is	
considered	to	be	unique	because	it	is	a	big	emitter	which	is	at	the	transition	stage	from	being	
a	 technology	 receiving	 country	 to	 becoming	 an	 exporter.	 Thus	 it	 “should	 not	 be	 used	 as	 a	
proxy	 for	 developing	 countries	 in	 general.”2	 This	 thesis	 therefore	 attempts	 to	 add	 to	 the	
understanding	 of	 how	 technology	 capacity	 and	 supporting	 policies	 may	 be	 developed	 to	
facilitate	and	attract	TT	in	developing	countries	individually,	and	China	in	particular.	 	
The	rise	of	China’s	manufacturing	has	led	to	an	enormous	emissions	increase	in	the	country.	
In	 fact,	 the	 country	 is	 now	 the	 second-largest	 economy	 in	 the	 world	 as	 well	 as	 the	 top	
consumer	of	energy.	Therefore,	it	is	and	has	been	the	biggest	emitter	of	carbon	dioxide	(CO2)	
																																								 																				
1 H. C. de Coninck and Ambuj Sagar, ‘Technology in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and beyond’ International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) International Environment Issue Paper No42 
<http://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/749373/2015_-_technology_in_the_2015_paris_climate_agreement_and_beyond_-_ictsd_issue_p
aper_no_42.pdf> accessed 11 Jun 2017. 
2 Jim Watson and others, UK-China Collaborative Study on Low Carbon Technology Transfer (Final Report by Sussex Energy 
Group SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, 2011). 
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in	the	world	since	2006,	accounting	for	around	23.4	per	cent	of	global	CO2	emissions	in	2016.3	
This	 is	one	of	 the	many	 challenges	 that	China	 faces	as	 its	 economy	develops.	The	 relatively	
low	 per	 capita	 income	 level	 is	 not	 yet	 able	 to	 afford	 the	 extensive	 application	 of	 climate	
change	technology	that	is	needed	for	environmental	protection.	This	requires	the	country	to	
wisely	 distribute	 its	 resources	 to	 encourage	 low-carbon	 innovation	 and	 deployment	 while	
improving	 the	 living	standards	of	 its	people.	Accordingly,	China	has	 in	 recent	years	carefully	
redesigned	 its	 national	 innovation	 system,	 including	 its	 innovation	 capabilities,	 its	 capable	
institutions	 and	 R	 &	 D	 to	 meet	 the	 challenges	 of	 climate	 change.4 	 China	 has	 been	
continuously	 investing	 in	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sector,	 especially	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades.	
Some5	 believe	 such	 growth	will	 become	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 current	 technology	 owners	 as	 the	
emerging	 developing	 country	 will	 become	 a	 capable	 competitor	 in	 innovative	 technology	
sooner	 or	 later.	 This	 potentially	 creates	 difficulties	 for	 China	 to	 get	 access	 to	 the	
state-of-the-art	 technologies	 it	 needs	 from	 abroad.	 Yet	 the	 country	 has	 managed	 to	
implement	 its	 technology	development	 to	 a	mature	 level,	where	 it	 is	 still	 largely	 relying	on	
investments	from	government	sources,	legitimate	acquisition,6	 and	licensing	from	developed	
																																								 																				
3 Statista, ‘Largest Producers of CO2 Emissions Worldwide in 2016, Based on Their Share of Global CO2 Emissions’ (Statista – 
The Portal for Statistics, 2016)  <https://www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world/> accessed 
January 2017; See also Jos G. I. Olivier, Jeroen A. H. W. Peters and Greet Janssens-Maenhout, ‘Trends in Global CO2 Emissions 
2013 Report’ PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency The Hague (2013) 
<http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/news_docs/pbl-2013-trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2013-report-1148.pdf> . 
4 Kelly Sims Gallagher, The Globalization of Clean Energy Technology: Lessons from China (MIT Press, Cambridge 2014). 
5 Jim Watson and others, ‘Low Carbon Technology Transfer: Lessons from India and China’ Sussex Energy Group Policy Briefing 
No 9 (2010) <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/58024/1/low_carbon_tech_transfer_briefing_-_nov_10%5B1%5D.pdf> ; See also de Coninck 
and Sagar (n 1). 
6 For example, “in 2016, General Electric has sold its appliances business to Qingdao-based Haier.” ‘Chinese consumer electronics 
giant Haier is buying GE's appliance unit for $5.4 billion’ (Buniness Insider UK, 15th Janurary 2016)  
<http://uk.businessinsider.com/haier-buying-ge-appliance-unit-for-54-billion-2016-1?r=US&IR=T> accessed July 2017 Moreover, 
“WESTPORT, Conn. (AP) — Shares of heavy lifting equipment maker Terex Corp. soared after the company announced it had 
received an unsolicited takeover offer of $30 per share from China's Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and Technology Co.” 
‘Penny Shares Advice - Tips and Strategies for  
2017’ (Business Insider UK, 26th Janurary 2016)  
<http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-terex-shares-zoom-climb-on-unsolicited-zoomlion-bid-2016-1?IR=T> accessed July 2017 
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countries.	Such	unbalanced	technology	improvement	is	resulted	from	the	optimization	of	the	
country’s	economic	growth	without	an	insight	of	a	long-term	development.	 	
The	strong	role	of	the	Chinese	government	is	also	confirmed	in	this	thesis,	through	its	efforts	
at	 “directing	 strategic	 technology	 acquisition,	 providing	 R	 &	 D	 support,	 developing	
comprehensive	 policy	 frameworks	 and	 in	 systematically	 taking	 advantage	 of	 international	
mechanisms	(especially	the	CDM).”7	 By	looking	at	the	“pull	side”	of	TT,	regarding	the	market	
and	 policy	 environment	 based	 on	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 Chinese	 government,	 this	 thesis	 has	
discovered	that	although	TT	was	done	in	collaboration	with	parties	from	developed	countries,	
climate	 change	 technology	 development	 was	 in	 fact	 not	 supported	 by	 these	 countries,	
financially	 or	 patent-wise.8	 Therefore,	 considering	 the	 equity	 justification	 discussed	 in	 the	
preceding	chapters,	existing	systems,	including	the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	UNFCCC,	need	to	be	
changed	so	that	they	are	more	equitable	and	practically	enforceable	towards	their	objectives.	
More	 radical	 attempts	 should	have	 led	 to	a	more	efficient	but	 less	 carbon-intensive	way	of	
development	globally.	
6.2 Background: A call for renewable energy  
As	 discussed	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 energy	 is	 vital	 for	 economic	 development	 and	 is	
traditionally	 a	 major	 contributor	 (through	 fossil	 fuels)	 to	 climate	 change.	 Such	 a	 valuable	
resource	 is,	 however,	 limited	 and	 is	 sharply	 decreasing	 in	 volume.	 Therefore,	 to	 achieve	
sustainable	development,	“we	need	not	only	to	efficiently	reduce	energy	use	but	also	to	find	
																																								 																				
7 Watson and others (n 2). 
8 de Coninck and Sagar (n 1). 
	 245	
new	 energy	 resources	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 rapid	 global	 growing	 demand	 for	 development.”9	
However,	 the	 current	 global	 economy	 is	 too	 dependent	 on	 non-renewable	 energy	
resources. 10 	 In	 recognition	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 renewable	 energy	 for	 sustainable	
development	and	to	increase	the	share	of	renewables,	the	diffusion	and	innovation	of	green	
technology	to	developing	countries	that	have	vast	potential	for	renewable	energy	expansion	
is	required.	This	has	been	a	primary	global	concern	as	the	development	of	green	energy	incurs	
substantial	investment	costs	and	requires	assistance	from	more	developed	countries.	 	
For	all	 that,	 countries	–	not	only	 the	developed	but	also	 the	developing	ones	–	have	shown	
their	 resolve	 by	 announcing	 climate	 change	 commitments.11	 Over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	
investment	in	renewable	energy	(solar	power,	wind	power,	and	bioenergy)	has	grown	rapidly	
in	China,	Brazil	and	India.	China	alone	“absorbed	9%	of	total	global	renewable	investment	in	
2006	mainly	to	develop	its	wind	power,	methane,	and	dust	burying.”12	 As	a	result,	successful	
integration	 of	 large	 amount	 of	 renewable	 recourse	 is	 now	 found	 in	 the	 existing	 energy	
infrastructure	 in	 this	 country.	 Moreover,	 renewable	 energy	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 reliable	 and	
possibly	also	an	affordable	power	supply.13	 The	maturity	of	the	sector	and	experience	in	the	
area	 in	 China	 is	 the	 most	 important	 reason	 why	 this	 thesis	 deliberately	 focuses	 on	 TT	
																																								 																				
9 Fei Ding and others, ‘Green Energy Development and Technology Transfer in China and India’ (2012) 19 Journal of 
International Development and Cooperation 13. 
10 “considering the small share (19.1%) that renewable energy has of global total energy consumption.” P. S. Ren, Renewables 
2015 Global Status Report (REN21 Secretariat: Paris, France, 2015). 
11 See in ibid: “Together, China and the United States emitted 40% of global carbon dioxide emissions in 2014.” Leigh Phillips, 
‘How Big a Deal Is the US-China Climate Deal?’ (Road to Paris, 16 November 2014)  
<http://roadtoparis.info/2014/11/16/big-deal-us-china-climate-deal/> accessed Feburary 2017;The White House, U.S.-China Joint 
Announcement on Climate Change (11 November 2014); Bloomberg Alex Nussbaum and Eric Martin, ‘Mexico Pledges to Cut 
Emissions 25 Percent in Climate Change Milestone’ (Renewable Energy World, 30 March 2015)  
<http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/news/2015/03/mexico-pledges-to-cut-emissions-25-percent-in-climate-change-milestone.
html> accessed Feburary 2017; European Commission, ‘2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies’ (European Commission 
for Climate Action, 07 July 2017)  <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en> accessed July 2017. 
12 Ding and others (n 9). 
13 Ren (n 10). 
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concerning	renewable	energy	instead	of	focusing	comprehensively	on	climate	change	TT	in	all	
industries.	 	
As	 considerable	 investments	 flow	 to	 the	 sector,	 a	 right	 mixture	 of	 renewable	 energy	
technology	acquisition	and	the	rational	management	of	energy	supply	are	obviously	needed	in	
China.14	 For	 example,	 continuous	 importing	 of	 renewable	 energy	 technology	 has	 been	 a	
primary	 concern	 to	 China,	 but	 the	 country	 struggles	 with	 it	 because	 the	 development	 of	
renewable	energy	incurs	significant	expenses	directly	to	and	around	the	industry.	As	crucial	as	
a	 financial	 investment	 is	 to	 the	 development	 of	 renewable	 energy	 and	 emission	 reduction,	
much	more	 is	 required	 to	 succeed.	 For	 instance,	 the	 capacity	 of	 human	 capital;	 peripheral	
infrastructure;	 and	 the	 policy	 environment	 for	 TT	 are	 of	 equal	 importance.	 Thus	 although	
China	 now	 has	 the	world	 highest	 CO2	 emissions,	 it	 claims	 that	 it	 is	 still	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	
country	to	develop	a	significantly	greener	energy	structure.15	
Most	recently,	the	Chinese	government	has	discarded	its	once	passive	posture	and	has	started	
attaching	 great	 importance	 to	 emission	 reduction	 and	 the	 development	 of	 renewable	
energy.16	 In	 particular,	 China	 has	 shown	 its	 intention	 to	 abandon	 its	 resistance	 to	 limits	
on	carbon	 emissions	 in	 post-Kyoto	 negotiations	 and	 it	 wants	 to	 establish	 a	 more	 active	
international	 image	 to	 fight	 climate	 change.17	 This	 would	 be	 propitious,	 leading	 to	 a	 new	
commitment	 from	 the	 country	on	emission	 reduction,	but	 in	 return	China	wants	developed	
countries	 “to	 commit	 to	more	 ambitious	 reduction	 targets,	 to	 share	 low-carbon	 technology	
																																								 																				
14 Ding and others (n 9). 
15 William Bleisch, ‘China 'unfairly seen as eco-villain'’ BBC News (UK, 16th June, 2009). This attitude is changing now. See 
Matt Hoye and Holly Yan, ‘US and China reach historic climate change deal, vow to cut emissions’ (2014) 12 CNN Edition 
International. 
16 Ding and others (n 9). 
17 TheGardian, ‘China Ready for Post-Kyoto Deal on Climate Change’ (Gardian.co.uk, 6 May 2009)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/06/china-seeks-climate-change-deal> accessed Feburary 2017. 
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and	to	set	up	a	UN	fund	that	would	buy	related	IPRs	for	use	across	the	world.”18	 As	the	use	of	
CDM	 has	 already	 demonstrated	 a	 way	 of	 encouraging	 climate	 change	 TT	 from	 developed	
countries,19	 the	 less	developed	nations	 like	China	are	 seeking	more	assistance	 to	encourage	
them	 to	 further	 commit	 to	 international	 climate	 change	 cooperation.	 This	 is	 currently	 a	
challenge	 and	 an	 opportunity	 for	 both	 China	 and	 all	 the	 developed	 countries	 to	 discover	 a	
win-win	solution	to	climate	change	through	the	enhanced	application	of	renewable	energy	
6.3 The climate change situation in China 
Before	 analyzing	 TT	 to	China,	 this	 chapter	 looks	 into	 the	 country’s	 environmental	 problems	
and	its	technology	needs.	China,	which	is	already	the	largest	emitter	of	GHGs	in	the	world,	the	
country’s	 share	 of	 GHG	 emissions	 has	 increased	 dramatically	 in	 recent	 years.20	 As	 its	
environmental	 problems	 grow,	 China	 will	 struggle	 with	 issues	 such	 as	 poor	 air	 and	 water	
quality.21	 In	 recent	 years,	 “Shanghai,	 Beijing	 and	 other	 cities	 in	 China	 have	 been	 suffering	
from	 smogs	 that	 hark	 back	 to	 the	 London	 pea-soupers	 of	 the	 late	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	
century.”22	 Meanwhile,	approximately	79	per	cent	of	electricity	is	still	generated	from	coal	in	
China,23	 intensifying	 its	 domestic	 environmental	 issues	 and	 making	 the	 country	 a	 primary	
																																								 																				
18 Ibid. 
19 Wytze van der Gaast, Katherine Begg and Alexandros Flamos, ‘Promoting Sustainable Energy Technology Transfers to 
Developing Countries Through the CDM’ (2009) 86 Applied Energy 230. 
20 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009 (DOE/EIA-0384(2009), 2010) at 343 (stating that in 
2006, China emitted 6,018 million metric tons (“MMT”) of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) to the United States’ 5,903 MMT); see also 
Mckinsey&Company, ‘China's Green Revolution: Prioritizing Technologies to Achieve Energy and Environmental Sustainability’ 
2009 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-insights/chinas-green-revolution-priori
tizing-technologies-to-achieve-energy-and-environmental-sustainability>  at 29 (“While China’s total GHG emissions have 
surpassed those of the United States, China’s emissions are still lower on a per capita basis, and China sought to exploit that fact in 
international climate negotiations.”); See National Development and Reform Comission of China, Implementation of the Bali 
Roadmap: China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (20 May 2009) (stating the Chinese negotiation 
position that “[d]eveloped countries shall take responsibility for their historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita 
emissions to change their unsustainable way of life and to substantially reduce their emissions”). 
21 Christina Larson, ‘The Great Paradox of China: Green Energy and Black Skies’ (2009) 360 Yale Environment 17, quoted by 
Joel B. Eisen, ‘China's Renewable Energy Law: A Platform for Green Leadership’ (2010) 35 Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol'y Rev 1 
22 Christine Ottery, ‘Q&A: China’s Airmaggedon’ (EnergyDesk Greenpeace, 4 December 2013)  
<http://energydesk.greenpeace.org/2013/12/04/qa-chinas-airmaggedon/> accessed Feburary 2017. 
23 Behind Energy, ‘Which Countries in The World Use The Most Coal to Generate Electricity’ (25 Auguast 2015)  
<http://www.behindenergy.com/quali-paesi-del-mondo-utilizzano-piu-carbone-per-generare-elettricita/?lang=en> accessed 
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contributor	to	global	warming.24	 China	accounts	for	more	than	40	per	cent	of	the	global	coal	
consumption	 from	200825	 and	 its	 coal	 use	has	 even	 increased	 since	 then	due	 to	 the	needs	
associated	with	 growth.26	 To	meet	 its	 projected	 needs	 in	 2030,	 it	 is	 predicted	 that	 China’s	
needs	 for	 power	 generation	will	 continue	 to	 grow.27	 Given	 this	 fact,	 slowing	 down	 China’s	
emission	increases	could	be	more	meaningful	to	mitigate	climate	change	than	environmental	
progress	 in	 any	 other	 countries.28	 This	 argument	 is	 reaffirmed	 by	 the	 recent	 Greenpeace	
analysis,29	 demonstrating	a	decrease	of	global	coal	use	by	at	least	2.3	per	cent	in	2015.	This	
is,	to	a	great	extent,	due	to	the	presence	of	dense	smog	in	many	parts	of	China	in	2012–2013,	
and	since	then	China	has	eased	off	its	coal	use,	leading	to	a	standstill	in	consumption	in	2014	
and	a	4	per	cent	fall	 in	2015.	This	reduction	amounts	to	more	than	the	UK	uses	 in	an	entire	
year.	Nonetheless,	the	US	accuses	China	of	inaction	and	uses	it	as	an	excuse	not	to	act	itself	
on	 global	 warming.30	 Therefore,	 taking	 action	 in	 China	 is	 vital	 because	 “it	 will	 not	 matter	
whether	 the	 rest	of	 the	world	endeavors	 to	address	climate	change	 in	comparison	with	 the	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
Feburary 2017; Liyu Lin, ‘China’s Power Generation Goes Greener with Total Capacity Up 10%’ (China View, 7 Janurary 2010)  
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/07/content _12771880.htm> accessed Feburary 2017, (coal-fired power accounted for 
74.6 percent of the nation’s 874 million kilowatts of electricity generation capacity in 2009); see also U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (n 20) (stating that “[c]oal makes up 70 percent of China’s total primary energy consumption”). 
24 See Keith Bradsher, ‘China Fears Warming Effects of a Rising Consumer Class’ (New York Times, 5 July 2010)  
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02E0D81531F936A35754C0A9669D8B63> accessed Feburary 2017. 
25 U.S. Energy Information Administration (n 20) p.13 (noting that “[i]n 2008, China consumed an estimated three billion short 
tons of coal, representing nearly 40 percent of the world total and a 129 percent increase since 2000”). 
26 National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2014 (2014). 
27 See The 13th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection: “According to the unified arrangements of the central government, 
the "13th Five-Year Plan "will focus on promoting the establishment of a sound system to cover all pollution sources, and 
implement the vertical management system for monitoring and supervising environmental protection agencies at provincial level 
and below. It has proposed two periodic goals for the milestones of 2020 and 2030 initially.”; See also Mckinsey&Company (n 20) 
p.37 (noting an increased demand for energy without any demand-reducing measures); see also U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (n 20) (noting that according to projections, “[t]he most rapid growth in energy demand from 2007 to 2035 occurs 
in nations outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development”). Quoted by Eisen (n 21). 
28 A good quick take on this issue featuring recent data can be found in Ann Carlson, ‘China’s Growth in Energy Usage Truly 
Alarming’ (Legal Planet, 7 May 2010)  <http://legal-planet.org/2010/05/07/chinas-growth-in-energy-usage-truly-alarming/> 
accessed Feburary 2017. 
29 Lauri Myllyvirta, ‘Coal’s Terminal Decline: How a Bad Year for Coal in 2014 Has Been Followed by the Biggest Fall in 
Consumption Ever’ Greenpeace International (2015) 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2015/Coals-Terminal-Decline.pdf> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
30 Brad Plumer, ‘China's Ambitious Plan to Limit Carbon Emissions, Explained’ (https://www.vox.com, 25 September 2015)  
<https://www.vox.com/2015/9/25/9399055/china-climate-cap-trade> accessed December 2016. 
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influence	 of	 China,”31	 and	 it	 will	 probably	 increase	 global	 cooperation	 on	 climate	 change	
mitigation.	
China’s	 intention	 to	 rein	 in	 its	 emissions	 is	 crucially	 needed.	 In	 fact,	 China	 has	 been	 taking	
action	on	emission	reduction	already	(i.e.	by	introducing	renewable	energy).	As	early	as	2005,	
“renewable	energy	provided	8%	of	the	China’s	total	energy	consumption	and	16%	of	its	total	
electricity	output.”32	 Moreover,	China	has	committed	in	its	12th	five-year	plan33	 to	reduce	its	
CO2	 emissions	 per	 unit	 of	 GDP	 by	 40	 per	 cent	 to	 45	 per	 cent	 from	 2005	 levels	 and	 to	 use	
non-fossil	fuels	for	about	15	per	cent	of	its	energy	by	2020.34	 The	Chinese	President	Xi	Jinping	
announced	 that	 China	 would	 enact	 a	 national	 cap-and-trade	 system35 	 to	 limit	 carbon	
emissions,	 starting	 in	 2017.36	 In	 2014	 China	 pledged	 to	 peak	 its	 CO2	 emissions	 in	 2030	 or	
earlier	and	to	increase	its	share	of	non-fossil	fuel	energy	to	20	per	cent	by	2030.37	 The	most	
recent	13th	five-year	environmental	protection	plan	reinforced	this	objective	by	focusing	on	
																																								 																				
31 As one long-time observer of China puts it, “China is on track to overwhelm the global effort to address climate change.” 
Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
(111th Cong 16 (2009)) (statement of Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on 
Foreign Relations). 
32 This includes hydroelectric power generation capacity. Li Junfeng, Shi Jinli and Ma Lingjuan, ‘China: Prospect for Renewable 
Energy Development’ Energy Research Institute, Beijing (2006) 
<http://frankhaugwitz.info/doks/policy/2006_10_30_China_RE_Mitigation_Renewables_Sector_Research_ERI.pdf> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
33 The 12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection of China. 
34 See, e.g. Eric Martinot and Junfeng Li, Powering China's Development: The Role of Renewable Energy, vol 175 (Worldwatch 
Institute 2007); See also Barbara Finamore, ‘China Renews Its Commitment to Renewable Energy’ (https://www.nrdc.org, 01 
February 2010)  <https://www.nrdc.org/experts/barbara-finamore/china-renews-its-commitment-renewable-energy> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
35 Evironmental Defense Fund, ‘How Cap and Trade Works’ (Environmental Defence Fund)  
<https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-trade-works> accessed Janurary 2017: “Cap and trade is the most environmentally and 
economically sensible approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions, the primary driver of global warming. The ‘cap’ sets a 
limit on emissions, which is lowered over time to reduce the amount of pollutants released into the atmosphere. The ‘trade’ creates 
a market for carbon allowances, helping companies innovate in order to meet, or come in under, their allocated limit. The less they 
emit, the less they pay, so it is in their economic incentive to pollute less. A cap sets a maximum allowable level of pollution and 
penalizes companies that exceed their emission allowance. The cap is a limit on the amount of pollution that can be released, 
measured in billions of tons of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) per year. It is set based on science.” 
36 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change (25 September 
2015); The programme will cover some key industries, including electricity, iron and steel, chemicals, building materials, and 
paper-making. Josh Margolis and Daniel J. Dudek, ‘Stronger Markets, Cleaner Air- Carbon Emission Trading: Rolling out a 
Successful Carbon Trading System’ Paulson Institute 
<http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/5-Emissions-Trading-EN-final1.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
37 Brad Plumer, ‘The US and China just Reached a Major Climate Deal on Cutting Emissions’ (www.vox.com, 11 November 2014)  
<https://www.vox.com/2014/11/11/7200909/US-china-climate-deal-cutting-emissions> accessed Feburary 2017. 
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promoting	 the	establishment	and	 improvement	of	 the	emissions	permit	 system	covering	all	
pollutant	 enterprises,	 and	 the	 implementation	 authority	 is	 assigned	 to	 provincial	
environmental	supervision	through	vertical	management	systems.38	 Environmental	concerns	
have	not	only	been	raised	 in	the	Chinese	government,	but	also	 in	the	people	 in	China.39	 Xu	
and	et	al.’s	survey	on	public	opinion	on	climate	change	indicates	that	in	China	87.6	per	cent	of	
interviewees	 were	 concerned	 about	 climate	 change	 and	 45.6	 per	 cent	 expressed	 great	
concerns;	96.6	per	cent	deemed	that	their	government	should	take	more	measures	to	tackle	
global	warming	and	climate	change.40	 All	these	factors	are	indicating	that	China	is	very	likely	
to	continue	taking	emission-reducing	measures41	 and	may	also	agree	to	a	new	international	
climate	 agreement	 that	 caps	 its	 emissions	 in	 the	 future.	 However,	 because	 of	 its	 GHG	
emissions	it	might	have	to	take	more	drastic	actions	“to	slow	or	reverse	the	growth	in	China’s	
GHG	emissions.”42	
																																								 																				
38 The 13th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection. 
39 Xiaojie Xu, Yoon Jung Kim and Dongchao Li, ‘Chinese Policies on Climate Change and Environment Protection’ Center for 
Energy Studies [337] (2008) The G8, Energy Security and Global Climate Issues 
<http://bakerinstitute.org/research/chinese-policies-on-climate-change-and-environment-protection/> accessed Feburary 2017. 
40 Ibid; See also Jon Dee, ‘Top 30 Surveys on Climate Change Topics of Most Concern in China’ (www.gmichina.com, 19 June 
2007)  <http://money.163.com/07/0619/15/3HC3JDE1002525CK.html> accessed Feburary 2017. 
41 “In May 2009, China demanded that developed countries as a whole... reduce their GHG emissions by at least 40% below their 
1990 level by 2020, and stated that China and other developing countries need not meet emissions targets but instead should only 
“take proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change.” The 13th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection, (n 27). 
“China sees its role as different from that of developed nations due to the historical differences between them: There’s a difference 
between the United States position on how China should address climate change, and China’s position on what it should do. It’s 
been repeated many times, but the controversy surrounding historical vs. current emissions and gross vs. per capita emissions re- 
mains. Depending on how you read the numbers, China can either look really good or really bad. Also, there’s the debate about 
whether China is a developed or a developing country. So, I think the challenges and the opportunities stem from that difference in 
stance. The US seems to believe that China should be doing as much as the US. China has indicated that—at least in this round of 
negotiations—no cap on emissions will be committed to.” An 2009 interview with China Energy Specialists, Elizabeth Balkan and 
Chris Brown, quoted by Eisen, (n 21). 
“The “Copenhagen Accord” reached in December 2009 did not impose emissions caps on any nations.” See John Vidal, Allegra 
Stratton and Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure’ (Guardian, 19 December 2009)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal> accessed Feburary 2017. “Following the Copenhagen 
summit, China avoided the term ‘associated with’, but gave qualified approval to the Copenhagen Accord. Arthur Max, ‘China, 
India Join Copenhagen Accord, Last Major Emitters to Sign On’ (Huffington Post, 9 March 2010)  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/09/ china-india-join-copenhag_n_491640.html> accessed Feburary 2017;At the same 
time, its Premier, Wen Jiabao, rejected the notion among some nations that the Accord was a platform for further negotiations 
toward binding emissions caps, stating “ ‘it is neither viable nor acceptable to start a new negotiating process’ outside the 
framework of previous U.N. treaties.” Ibid. (quoting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao). 
42 Mckinsey&Company (n 20); Tao Wang and Jim Watson, ‘China’s Energy Transition: Pathways for Low Carbon Development’ 
Sussex Energy Group , Sience and Technology Policy Research, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.705.341&rep=rep1&type=pdf> p.3-5. 
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In	 the	 view	of	 both	China	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world,	 reducing	 emissions	 in	 the	 country	 has	
become	a	new	environmental	and	political	imperative.	Yet	it	is	still	China’s	decision	to	choose	
whether	and	 in	what	 forms	to	address	climate	change.	 In	China's	view,	 those	countries	 that	
had	 released	most	 of	 the	 GHG	 emissions	 in	 history	 should	 bear	 the	majority	 of	 mitigation	
responsibility.	Developing	countries	that	have	not	emitted	as	much	should	be	less	responsible	
for	 the	present	 climate	change	crisis.43	 Otherwise,	 it	would	deprive	 the	equal	development	
rights	of	the	developing	countries	to	grow	in	the	same	way	adopted	by	developed	countries.	
This	also	comes	from	an	environmental	justice	argument,	as	there	is	a	tremendous	amount	of	
outsourcing	 of	 both	 production	 and	 CO2	 emissions	 from	 the	 developed	 to	 the	 developing	
countries.44	 China,	 as	 the	 workshop	 of	 the	 world,	 claims	 to	 be	 a	 victim	 of	 this	 fact.	 And	
censure	 against	 China	 because	 of	 its	 increasing	 total	 carbon	 emissions	 is	 untenable	 as	 its	
“emission	per	capita	 is	only	approaching	the	average	 level	of	 the	EU	countries	 in	 the	recent	
couple	of	years	and	 it	 is	still	 significantly	 lower	than	that	of	 the	U.S.”45	 Therefore,	although	
"China	 is	 committed	 to	pursuing	a	more	 sustainable,	 lower-carbon	 future”	 it	will	not	be	“at	
the	 expense	 of	 economic	 development…	 It	 is	 too	 early,	 too	 abrupt	 and	 too	 blunt	 for	 the	
international	community	to	impose	emission	caps	on	China”46	 if	the	country	itself	refuses	or	
is	unable	 to	bear	 them.	This	 is	 generally	 saying	 that	 a	 greener	economy	 in	China	 should	be	
accomplished	 through	 voluntary	 cooperation	 and	with	 assistance	 from	developed	 countries	
																																								 																				
43 Margret J. Kim and Robert E. Jones, ‘China: Climate Change Superpower and the Clean Technology Revolution’ (2008) 22 
Natural Resources & Environment 9. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Zhu Liu, ‘China’s Carbon Emissions Report 2015’ Sustainability Science Program and Energy Technology Innovation Policy 
Research Group, Belfer Center Discussion Paper #2015-02 Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA 
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/carbon-emissions-report-2015-final.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
46 In a June 4, 2007, Ma Kai’s speech at a press conference, Minister of the National Development Reform Commission, quoted by 
Kim and Jones (n 43). 
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because	 it	 lacks	 resources,	 such	 as	 the	 best	 technologies,	 in	 virtually	 all	 areas	 of	 energy	
production	and	utilization.47	
6.4 IP protection and development in China 
In	 keeping	 with	 the	 standpoint	 of	 China	 in	 committing	 itself	 to	 addressing	 global	 climate	
change,	 it	 has	 explicitly	 expressed	 a	 desire	 in	 accessing	 green	 technologies	 essential	 for	
climate	 change	 mitigation.	 In	 acquiring	 such	 technologies,	 an	 appropriate	 legal	 and	 policy	
environment	for	TT	is	required.	While	the	big	technology	owners	consider	that	IPRs	are	crucial	
to	 the	 economies	 of	 developed	 countries,48	 some	 imply	 that	 strengthening	 IP	 protection	 is	
also	for	the	good	of	developing	countries	as	well.49	 However,	a	question	remains	as	to	what	
extent	 this	conclusion	 is	 true	 in	regard	to	climate	change	TT	to	China.	This	will	be	 looked	at	
separately	from	IP	protection	in	general	within	the	specific	context	of	this	chapter.	
China	 joined	 the	WTO	 in	2001,	pursuing	 the	benefits	of	 international	 trade.	 To	achieve	 this	
goal,	China	made	a	series	of	reforms	to	 its	 IP	 laws.50	 The	WTO	agreements	 included	TRIPS51	
and	China	had	to	“bring	its	domestic	IPR	legislation	up	to	minimum	international	standards	in	
order	 to	 meet	 its	 obligations	 under	 TRIPS	 upon	 accession	 to	 the	 WTO.”52 	 Regarding	
technology	IP	protection	and	TT	enforcement,	the	outcome	is	subject	to	not	only	the	IP	laws	
																																								 																				
47 Ibid. 
48 See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, ‘Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries’ (1994) 31 Common 
Market Law Review 1245 p.1245-46. 
49 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective’ (2001) U Ill 
L Rev 457; see also Robert M Sherwood, ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries’ 37 IEDA 491; see also 
Evelyn Su, ‘The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects 
on Developing Countries’ (2000) 23 Hous J Int'l L 169. 
50 Kiel Downey, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Renewable Energy Technology Transfer in China’ (2012) 9 SCJ Int'l L & Bus 
89. 
51 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (unamended version), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
52 See generally Ramona L. Taylor, ‘Tearing Down the Great Wall: China's Road to WTO Accession’ (2001) 41 Idea 151, 
p.158-64; Also TRIPS binds its Parties to a broad set of standards for domestic IPR legislation. The Preamble to TRIPS sets forth 
this principle. It states that the parties to the Agreement recognize the "need for new rules and disciplines concerning... the 
provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property 
rights... [and] the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights, 
taking into account differences in national legal systems." TRIPS at Preamble, 320. Quoted from Downey (n 50). 
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but	also	other	legislations	such	as	contract	law,	the	company	law,	and	the	anti-monopoly	law.	
None	of	 the	 aforementioned	 laws	address	 renewable	energy	 IP	 exclusively,	 but	 they	 are	 all	
relatively	important	to	the	Chinese	IP	environment	in	regard	to	the	renewable	energy	market.	
6.4.1 Contract law 
The	Contract	 Law	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	was	adopted	 in	1999,	 two	years	before	
China	 joined	 the	WTO.53	 In	 the	 “Contracts	 for	 Technology”	 chapter,	 a	 specific	 section	 that	
focuses	 on	 TT	 contracts	 is	 included.54	 The	 contract	 law	 specifies	 TT	 by	 creating	 a	 legal	
framework	 in	 which	 IP	 can	 be	 transferred.55	 It	 is	 relatively	 broad	 as	 the	 law	 deems	 any	
agreement	 that	 specifies	 rights	 and	 obligations	 for	 technology	 development,	 transfer,	
consultation	 or	 service	 shall	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 technology	 contract.56	 More	 specifically,	 it	
defines	the	scope	of	a	TT	contract	in	Article	342	as	“contracts	for	the	transfer	of	patent	right,	
transfer	of	the	right	to	apply	for	a	patent,	transfer	of	technological	know-how	and	license	for	
exploitation	of	 patents.”57	 The	 interesting	part	 is	 that	 the	Article	 articulates	 the	 transfer	 of	
know-how,	which	 is	not	covered	by	 the	Chinese	Patent	Law.	 In	Article	347	 the	 contract	 law	
further	states	that	during	the	implementation	of	know-how	transfer	the	transferor	shall,	“as	
contracted,	 provide	 technical	 materials,	 give	 technical	 guidance,	 guarantee	 the	 practical	
applicability	 and	 reliability	 of	 the	 technology,	 and	 maintaining	 confidentiality.”	 The	 law	
stipulates	 the	 corresponding	 legal	 obligations	of	 the	 recipient	 as	well,	 including	 the	duty	 to	
maintain	 the	confidentiality	of	 the	 technology	and	know-how.58	 Any	 litigation	regarding	 the	
																																								 																				
53 Contract Law of the P.R.C. (promulgated by the Standing Commission of NationalPeople's Congress on 01 Oct 1999). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Downey (n 50). 
56 Chinese Contract Law 1999 (n 53) chapter 18 article 32. 
57 Ibid, chapter 18 article 342. 
58 Ibid chapter 18 article 346 and article 348. 
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transfer	of	know-how	can,	therefore,	refer	to	the	contract	law	and	its	judicial	interpretations,	
which	would	decrease	 the	 risk	of	 know-how	 information	belonging	 to	 the	 transferors	being	
infringed.	In	that	sense,	this	Article	could	act	as	a	stimulus	to	encourage	TT.	
Although	the	contract	law	secures	some	of	the	transferors’	interests	by	stipulating	obligations	
of	 both	 parties,	 still	 there	 are	 retained	 privileges	 for	 the	 potential	 domestic	 technology	
developer	 and,	 in	 turn,	 risks	 for	 the	 transferors	 hidden	 in	 the	 text.	 For	 example,	 the	
ambiguously	 worded	 Article	 329,	 states	 “any	 technology	 contract	 that	 illegally	 monopolies	
technologies	 impedes	 technological	progress”	will	 be	 considered	as	null	 and	void.	 The	2005	
Supreme	People's	Court	 Interpretation59	 explains	 the	Article	by	clarifying	that	any	“contract	
that	prohibits	research	and	development	or	improvements	upon	licensed	technology,	illegally	
monopolizes	 technology	 or	 impairs	 technological	 advancement”60	 can	 be	 considered	 as	
anti-competitive	 business	 behaviour.	 Ever	 since	 the	 implementation	 came	 out,	 much	
attention	has	been	paid	 to	 IP	 rights	monopolies.	This	guidance	on	what	 is	counted	as	 illegal	
monopoly	 or	 impediment	 creates	 uncertainty	 to	 a	 transferor	 because	 attempts	 to	 pursue	
marginal	improvements	by	a	competitor	in	the	recipient	country	might	be	justified	under	this	
Article.	 So	 IP	 owners	 take	 extra	 care	 analyzing	 the	 “risks	 of	 being	 sued	 for	 conducting	 IP	
rights-related	monopolistic	acts	when	entering	into	a	technology	license	deal	in	China.”61	 This	
has	 caused	 them	 to	worry	 about	 TT,	 and	 relevant	 investments	 to	 facilitate	 the	 TT	 could	 be	
made	in	vain	if	a	monopoly	is	affirmed.	In	practice,	such	problems	are	likely	mitigated	by	the	
																																								 																				
59 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes 
over Technology Contract. 
60 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes 
over Technology Contracts (16 December 2004) article 10; Chinese Contract Law 1999 (n 53) chapter 18 article 329. 
61 Dixon Zhang and Claudia Yun, ‘What is the Best Way to Structure Technology Transfer Deals and What IP Issues do I Need to 
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	 255	
relatively	 low	 absorptive	 capacity62	 in	 China's	 renewable	 energy	 industry63	 at	 this	 stage,64	
but	with	fast	growth	in	China	it	does	not	mean	that	it	will	never	become	a	real	problem	in	the	
future.	 	
Article	 353	 even	 puts	 an	 unreasonable	 burden	 on	 the	 transferors	 by	 making	 them	 liable	
“where	 the	 exploitation	 of	 the	 patent	 or	 utilization	 of	 the	 technical	 know-how	 by	 the	
transferee	as	contracted	 infringes	upon	the	 legitimate	rights	and	 interests	of	others.”65	 This	
Article	 worries	 the	 transferors	 and	 suggests	 a	 careful	 drafting	 of	 TT	 agreements	 and	 the	
thoughtful	choice	of	recipient.	Thus,	IP	holders	are	meant	to	contract	with	large	companies	in	
order	 to	minimize	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 sued	 by	 a	 third	 party	 and	 in	 turn,	 small	 businesses	 are	
expelled	gradually	from	the	industry	that	requires	new	technologies	being	imported.	
Participants	 of	 this	 research	 are	 all	well-known	enterprises	 in	 Shandong	 and	 even	 in	 China.	
Therefore	 they	 are	 in	 good	 positions	 in	 an	 industry	 which	 had	 brought	 them	 many	
opportunities	 of	 cooperating	 with	 foreign	 companies.	 This	 is	 a	 “two-way	 collaboration”	
according	to	the	interviewees.66	 While	Chinese	companies	are	seeking	high-quality	suppliers,	
foreign	 providers	 are	 looking	 for	 partners	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 utilizing	 and	 improving	 upon	
these	 advanced	 technologies.	 For	 example,	 in	 one	 of	 the	 projects,	 the	 Japanese	 CER	 buyer	
who	 is	 also	 the	 equipment	 supplier	 to	 the	 Chinese	 chemistry	 company	 was	 motivated	 to	
cooperate	 with	 the	 latter	 for	 it	 had	 the	 ability	 to	 solve	 many	 technical	 problems	 in	 their	
operation.	 The	 operational	 efficiency	 of	 the	 equipment	 provided	was	 only	 80–90	 per	 cent,	
																																								 																				
62 “is the ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends".” Wesley M. Cohen and 
Daniel A. Levinthal, ‘Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation’ (1990) Administrative science quarterly 
128. 
63 Downey (n 50). 
64 this will be discussed later in this chapter. 
65 Chinese Contract Law 1999 (n 53) chapter 18 article 353. 
66 See for example interview with manager of the Shandong Dongyue Chemical Co. Ltd. 
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while	with	their	specific	strengths	on	wastewater	treatment,	flocculants	for	special	materials,	
and	 the	 crystallization	 technology	 independently	 developed	 by	 the	 Chinese	 company,	 the	
engineers	were	able	to	improve	the	ratio	efficiently.	Therefore,	sometimes	foreign	technology	
owners	 express	 their	 intention	 to	 collaborate	 with	 these	 large	 Chinese	 enterprises	 in	 the	
so-called	“golden	age”	of	CDM.	As	most	Chinese	companies	that	would	consider	applying	for	
CDM	projects	 have	been	doing	business	 that	 relates	 to	 environmental	 protection	 already,67	
the	 foreign	 partners	 sometimes	 have	 to	 take	 the	 initiative	 and	 bring	 a	 variety	 of	 new	
technologies	for	Chinese	companies	to	choose	from	in	order	to	acquire	CERs	easier.	 	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 reputation	 of	 enterprises	 is	 crucial	 in	 attracting	 TT	 from	 abroad.68	 Large	
companies	 have	 great	 advantages	 in	 achieving	 contracts	with	 foreign	 suppliers.	 Green-tech	
companies	from	overseas	are	very	unlikely	to	join	any	agreements	with	small	businesses.	This	
could	be	a	result	of	the	high	burden	that	imposed	on	foreign	companies	by	the	Contract	Law;	
or	attribute	to	an	impression	that	Chinese	IP	protection	is	inadequate	to	protect	their	IPRs;	or	
it	could	be	due	to	the	poor	absorption	capability	of	small	companies.	Indeed,	“China's	piracy	
rate	 for	 software	was	92%	 in	2001	 resulting	 in	a	 total	of	$1.66	billion	 in	 lost	 revenue	 for	 IP	
owners.	 Also,	 in	 2001,	 U.S.	 businesses	 lost	 an	 estimated	 $1.9	 billion	 total	 to	 copyright	
piracy.”69 	 Even	 in	 cases	 where	 EST	 is	 transferred,	 it	 is	 found	 that	 “the	 technologies	
[transferred]	to	China	are	usually	at	least	five	years	old,	or	likely	to	soon	become	obsolete.”70	
Many	 multinational	 companies	 are	 particularly	 reluctant	 to	 establish	 R	 &	 D	 institutions	 in	
																																								 																				
67 Most projects are conducted by companies that are specialized in green production already as it is a lot easier for them to 
establish CDM projects based on past experience and only need to add things that are specially required by the CDM. 
68 This point is confirmed in my interviews with every interviewee from the management type. 
69 Mikhaelle Schiappacasse, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in China: Technology Transfers and Economic Development’ (2003) 2 
Buff Intell Pro LJ 164. 
70 Ibid. 
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China	 at	 all.71	 Those	 companies	 that	 do	 TT	 to	 China	 prefer	 “joint	 ventures	 and	 Wholly	
Foreign-Owned	 Enterprise,	 to	 control	 access	 to	 trade	 secrets	 and	 other	 knowledge-based	
assets.	Multinational	companies	will	often	avoid	fully	 integrating	with	the	Chinese	operation	
due	to	China's	weak	IP	protection.”72	 Smaller	companies,	without	a	well-reputed	referee,	are	
therefore	 unlikely	 even	 to	 contact	 the	 powerful	 technology	 owners.	 A	 similar	 conclusion	 is	
made	in	a	UN	report	on	CDM	projects	which	states	that	TT	“varies	widely	across	project	types	
but	 is	more	common	for	 larger	projects.	Small-scale	and	unilateral	projects	are	 less	 likely	 to	
involve	 TT.”73	 Interviewees74	 also	 indicated	 that	 these	 TT	 processes	 sometimes	 leads	 to	
poaching	 staff	 from	 more	 experienced	 companies,	 no	 matter	 from	 which	 country	 they	
originate.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 understandable	 for	 the	 IP	 holders	 to	 take	 more	 precautions	 when	
choosing	partners.	Fortunately,	most	of	these	hoppers	are	not	key	employees	in	their	original	
companies.	Some	R	&	D	staff	get	poached	from	abroad,	originally	tempted	by	a	generous	job	
offer,	but	lose	confidence	in	their	future	after	a	while	working	in	China.	This	is	due	to	a	very	
intricate	and	complex	 research	environment	 in	 the	country	and	 it	will	be	a	challenge	 to	 the	
future	 of	 independent	 technology	 development	 in	 China.	 From	 such	 a	 perspective,	 China's	
weak	IP	protection	will	sooner	or	later	affect	on	China’s	influx	of	foreign	knowledge	which	is	
essential	to	the	country’s	sustainable	development.	
																																								 																				
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Steven Seres, Erik Haites and Kevin Murphy, ‘The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto 
Protocol to Technology Transfer’ Document for the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (2010) accessed 
Janurary 2017. 
74 See interviews with technical and managerial group interviewees from all three of the wind projects. 
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6.4.2 The Anti-monopoly Law  
TT	into	China	is	not	only	subject	to	the	basic	principles	applicable	to	contracts	but	also	to	the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law	 of	 the	 People's	 Republic	 of	 China75	 enacted	 in	 2007.	 The	way	 that	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law	deals	with	patents	–	granting	a	monopoly	for	a	fixed	period	and	regulating	
innovation	 upon	 existing	 patents	 –	 is	 crucial	 to	 IP	 owners’	 future	 business.	 It	 not	 only	 sets	
clear	administrative	protection	by	relevant	authorities	but	also	lays	a	foundation	for	civil	and	
criminal	 protection.	 The	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 also	 stipulates	 what	 constitutes	 abuse	 of	 IP	
stated	in	contract	law.76	 	
Article	55	states	that	the	 	
Law	does	not	govern	the	conduct	of	business	operators	to	exercise	their	IPRs	under	laws	
and	relevant	administrative	regulations	on	IPRs;	however,	business	operators	conduct	to	
eliminate	or	restrict	market	competition	by	abusing	their	 IPRs	shall	be	governed	by	this	
Law.	 	
This	means	 that	 the	Anti-monopoly	 Law	applies	 to	 the	abuse	of	 IPRs	under	 two	 conditions:	
first,	 the	abuse	of	 IPRs77	 and	 rights	under	administrative	 regulations	 that	exist;	 second,	 the	
act	must	 have	 excluded	 or	 restricted	 competition	 or	may	 eliminate	 or	 restrict	 competition.	
Therefore,	when	implemented,	the	authorities	must	identify	the	abuse	of	IPRs	and	eliminate	
or	 restrict	 consequences	 affecting	 competition.	 Judicial	 decisions	will	 be	made	 according	 to	
																																								 																				
75Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (Adopted at the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People's Congress on 30 August 2007); see Peter J. Wang and Yizhe Zhang, ‘New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law’ 2007 
<http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/eb6dcb2a-624d-4242-b791-cc8faa3a1e52/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4836e7
46-cc52-49cd-b96c-d764ae9bea1a/New%20Chinese%20Anti.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
76 complementing the judicial interpretation of the Contract Law. 
77 Here it refers to abuse of of IPR in relation to competition law rather than someone breaching another’s IPRs. 
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the	existence	of	monopoly	agreements,78	 abuse	of	dominant	position,79	 and	concentration	
of	business	operators.80	 It	 is	worth	noticing	 that	although	 the	Anti-monopoly	 Law	does	not	
include	 a	 separate	 chapter	 named	 after	 the	 abuse	 of	 IPRs	 by	 monopolistic	 behaviour,	 it	
explicitly	 prohibits	 the	 abuse	of	 restrictive	 IPR	performance	 in	 competition.81	 This	 could	be	
the	basis	for	a	domestic	company	pursuing	compulsory	licensing	articulated	in	TRIPS	when	a	
technology	is	not	available	in	China.	
The	prohibition	of	IPR	abuse	protects	the	interests	of	 innovators	from	difficulties	they	might	
face	during	R	&	D	imposed	by	technologies	already	owned	by	others.	For	now,	it	is	conducive	
to	 Chinese	 parties	 because	 according	 to	 China's	 current	 level	 of	 development	 many	
technologies	 are	 imported,	 and	 further	 technical	 development	 is	 largely	 dependent	 on	 IP	
owned	by	companies	from	another	country.	Take	the	development	of	wind	power	technology	
in	China	as	an	example.	Before	2010,	there	was	no	price-competitive	Chinese	turbine	supplier	
active	in	the	market.	According	to	this	research,	all	the	visited	wind	projects	established	from	
																																								 																				
78 Article 13-16. 
79 Article 17-19. 
80 Article 20-31. 
81 Actions listed by article 13,14, (when found in IP contract that is determined as monopoly agreement) and article 17 (Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position by IP owner) which can be considered as IP abuse explains “illegal monopoly” stated in Article 329 of 
the Contract Law in detail. “Article 13 Competing undertakings are prohibited from concluding the following monopoly 
agreements: (1) on fixing or changing commodity prices; (2) on restricting the amount of commodities manufactured or marketed; 
(3) on splitting the sales market or the purchasing market for raw and semi-finished materials; (4) on restricting the purchase of 
new technologies or equipment, or the development of new technologies or products; (5) on joint boycotting of transactions; and 
(6) other monopoly agreements confirmed as such by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council. For the purposes of this Law, monopoly agreements include agreements, decisions and other concerted conducts designed 
to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14 Undertakings are prohibited from concluding the following monopoly agreements with their trading counterparts: (1) on 
fixing the prices of commodities resold to a third party; (2) on restricting the lowest prices for commodities resold to a third party; 
and (3) other monopoly agreements confirmed as such by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State 
Council. 
Article 17 Undertakings holding dominant market positions are prohibited from doing the following by abusing their dominant 
market positions: (1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low prices; (2) without 
justifiable reasons, selling commodities at prices below cost; (3) without justifiable reasons, refusing to enter into transactions with 
their trading counterparts; (4) without justifiable reasons, allowing their trading counterparts to make transactions exclusively with 
themselves or with the undertakings designated by them; (5) without justifiable reasons, conducting tie-in sale of commodities or 
adding other unreasonable trading conditions to transactions; (6) without justifiable reasons, applying differential prices and other 
transaction terms among their trading counterparts who are on an equal footing; or (7) other acts of abuse of dominant market 
positions confirmed as such by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council. For the purposes 
of this Law, dominant market position means a market position held by undertakings that are capable of controlling the prices or 
quantities of commodities or other transaction terms in a relevant market, or preventing or exerting an influence on the access of 
other undertakings to the market.” 
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2004	 to	2009	 relied	on	 imported	wind	 turbines	 from	Spain,	Denmark	and	Germany.	At	 that	
time,	 the	 cost	 of	 operating	 the	 turbines	 ranged	 from	 9361.98	 Yuan	 to	 10032	 Yuan	 per	
kilowatt.	 Such	 costs	were	 significantly	 lowered	 in	 a	 2010	project	 to	 9037	Yuan	per	 kilowatt	
due	 to	progress	 in	 the	nationalization	and	 localization	of	wind	power	equipment.	However,	
such	 trends	 could	 increase	 fears	 of	 competition	 from	 firms	 transferring	 IP	 into	 the	 Chinese	
market.82	 This	unwillingness	could	be	determined	as	monopoly	action	because	according	 to	
Article	13(4)	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law,	agreements	"restricting	[…]	the	development	of	new	
technology	 or	 new	 products"83	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 concerted	 actions	 that	 eliminate	 or	
restrict	 competition.	 In	 an	 extreme	 case,	minor	 advancements	 to	 the	 imported	 technology	
could	survive	restrictive	clauses	placed	by	the	transferor	because	such	clauses	are	prohibited	
by	Article	13	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law.	This	may	make	it	difficult	for	the	transferor	to	prevent	
Chinese	 receivers	 from	patenting	 improvements	 to	 their	 technologies	 and	may	well	worsen	
grievances	among	IP	owners,	impairing	future	investment	to	the	country.84	
Except	 for	 the	 risk	 caused	 by	 the	 missing	 constraints	 on	 minor	 technology	 improvement,	
technology	owners	could	be	facing	the	 loss	of	pricing	power	due	to	the	Anti-monopoly	Law.	
Article	 17(1)85	 stipulates	 that	 if	 “a	 business	 operator	 with	 a	 dominant	 market	 position”	 is	
“selling	 commodities	 at	 unfairly	 high	 prices”	 it	 shall	 be	 considered	 as	 abusing	 its	 dominant	
market	position.	"Dominant	market	position"	depends	on	a	business	operator’s	“capacity	 to	
control	the	price,	quantity	or	other	trading	conditions	of	commodities	in	the	relevant	market,	
or	 to	 hinder	 or	 affect	 any	 other	 business	 operator	 to	 enter	 the	 relevant	market.”	 Although	
																																								 																				
82 Wang and Zhang, (n 75) p.3-4. 
83 Chinese Anti-monopoly Law 2007 (n 75) chapter 2, article 13(4). 
84 Downey (n 50). 
85 Chinese Anti-monopoly Law 2007 (n 75) chapter 3, article 17(1). 
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there	are	no	defined	criteria	for	the	“capacity,”	a	largely	occupied	market	share	by	a	business	
operator	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 deemed	 as	 a	 determining	 factor.	 This	 could	 be	 a	 fetter	 to	 many	
non-Chinese	companies.	For	example,	 in	China’s	wind	power	market,	 foreign	manufacturers	
including	Vestas,	Gamesa,	and,	GE	Wind,	held	high	market	shares.	And	they	are	surely,	at	least	
were	 once,	 entities	 with	 power	 to	 manipulate	 pricing	 of	 wind	 turbine	 in	 Chinese	 market.	
However,	 in	 judicial	practice,	determining	dominant	position	depends	on	how	one	defines	a	
“market.”	If	the	wind	turbine	market	is	counted	as	a	whole,	these	foreign	manufacturers	are	
not	 in	 a	 dominant	 position	 or	 only	 close	 to	 become	 so.	 However,	 when	 looking	 at	 the	
large-capacity	 wind	 turbine	 market,	 they	 are	 surely	 holding	 a	 great	 percentage	 of	 market	
share.	 According	 to	 Gosens	 and	 Lu, 86	 the	 majority	 of	 current	 installations	 in	 China	 are	
turbines	 of	 approximately	 1.5	 MW	 that	 are	 mainly	 manufactured/assembled	 by	 Chinese	
companies.	 Only	 1.9	 per	 cent	 of	 installations	 have	 unit	 capacities	 of	 2.5	MW	 or	more,	 the	
turbines	of	which	are	mostly	provided	by	 foreign	 suppliers.	Therefore,	 “the	average	 turbine	
size	 in	 China	 remains	 smaller	 than	 in	 the	 US	 and	 EU	 markets” 87	 because	 these	 imported	
turbines	are	significantly	more	expensive	than	domestically	made	equipment.88	 If	the	price	of	
the	products	from	abroad	is	thus	considered	as	“unfairly	high,”	which	 is	very	 likely	“echoing	
the	argument	from	developing	countries	that	IPR	protection	makes	technology	too	expensive	
to	 acquire,” 89 	 it	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 example	 of	 monopoly	 conduct	 –	 a	 form	 of	
dominant-market	position	abuse.	A	case	regarding	the	abuse	of	dominant	market	position	in	
the	 alloy	 industry	 was	 initiated	 by	 four	 Chinese	 companies	 and	 upheld	 by	 the	 Ningbo	
																																								 																				
86 See more detailed data in Fig. 5 in Jorrit Gosens and Yonglong Lu, ‘Prospects for Global Market Expansion of China’s Wind 
Turbine Manufacturing Industry’ (2014) 67 Energy Policy 301. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Interviewees in this research hold an accordant conclusion about the higher price of the imported equipment in both the wind 
and biomass energy sectors. 
89 Downey (n 50). 
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Intermediate	People’s	Court	 in	2015.90	 This	 is	the	very	first	case	testing	what	constitutes	an	
abuse	of	patent	rights	in	China.	It	argued	that	the	Japanese	company	Hitachi	Metals’	refusal	to	
license	 its	 patents	 related	 to	 neodymium-iron-boron	 magnets	 was	 abusing	 its	 dominant	
market	 position,	 thus	 violating	 anti-monopoly	 laws.91	 Hitachi	Metal	 owns	most92	 of	 the	 IP	
associated	with	 the	sintered	magnets	 field	by	holding	over	600	patents	globally.	Hitachi	has	
refused	licences	to	Chinese	firms	except	for	eight	selected	ones.	Now,	four	Chinese	firms	were	
actually	 “seeking	 $3.4	million	 in	 a	 patent	 antitrust	 lawsuit	 before	 the	 Ningbo	 Intermediate	
Court.”93	 By	refusing	to	license,	Hitachi’s	behaviour	affected	the	majority	of	Chinese	sintered	
neodymium-iron-boron	manufacturers	 and	 hindered	 them	 from	 entering	 overseas	markets.	
Details	 of	 the	 trial	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 published,	 but	 with	 attention	 being	 placed	 on	 the	
technology’s	 rare	Earth	alloys,	 similar	 cases	 regarding	 renewable	energy	 technologies	might	
have	 a	 more	 certain	 foundation	 in	 the	 future.	 While	 waiting	 on	 a	 ruling	 in	 Ningbo,	 it	 is	
foreseeable	that	the	verdict	could	have	a	wide-reaching	impact	on	actions	such	as	compulsory	
licensing	to	be	used	in	more	sectors	other	than	the	pharmaceutical	field.	 	
Indeed,	the	enforcement	of	IPRs	does	not	in	itself	undermine	the	market	and	therefore	it	does	
not	 violate	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law.	 However,	 the	 law	 clearly	 prohibits	 abuse	 of	 IPRs	 or	 a	
dominate	position	enabled	by	owning	IPs	in	a	way	that	disfavours	the	IP	owners.	This	could	be	
beneficial	to	the	Chinese	entities	for	now,	when	most	core	technologies	are	owned	by	foreign	
																																								 																				
90 Benjamin Bai, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: When Does IP Owner Become IP Abuser?’ (Kluwer Patent Blog, 8 March  2016)  
<http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2016/03/08/crossing-the-rubicon-when-does-ip-owner-become-ip-abuser/> . 
91 See Jacob Schindler, ‘Hitachi Metals Case in China the Latest Sign that ‘De-facto Standards’ are Moving into Regulators’ 
Crosshairs’ (iam-media.com, 14 March 2016)  
<http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=12dbcdc1-170c-4b1a-b346-463f4257c260> . 
92 Bai (n 90). 
93 Schindler (n 91). 
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firms.	However,	 it	has	the	potential	to	become	a	huge	problem	when	indigenous	companies	
start	to	own	more	IPs	and	occupy	greater	market	share	than	firms	from	overseas.	 	
6.4.3 Patent Law 
Patent	 Law	 is	 based	 on	 granting	 an	 exclusive	 right	 to	 innovators	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 full	
disclosure	 of	 inventions,	 and	 thus	 encourages	 the	 spread	 of	 state-of-the-art	 knowledge.	
Chinese	 Patent	 Law	 sets	 out	 the	 framework	 for	 basic	 procedures	 regarding	 applications,	
examinations,	 re-examinations,	 and	 invalidation 94 	 acting	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 patent	
protection	for	patent	holders	from	home	and	abroad.95	 The	function	of	the	Law	determines	a	
close	relationship	it	has	to	TT	flows.	The	Chinese	Patent	Law	was	enacted	in	1984,	followed	by	
three	 amendments.96	 Except	 for	 the	 1992	 amendment,	 the	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	
National	People's	Congress	amended	the	Patent	Law	in	2000,97	 in	preparation	for	compliance	
with	TRIPS	when	joining	the	WTO.98	 Again	in	2008,	the	Committee	amended	the	Patent	Law	
during	 China's	 second	major	 set	 of	 legal	 reforms.99	 In	 August	 2012,	 the	 State	 IPO	 issued	 a	
"revised	draft	People's	Republic	of	China	Patent	Law	(draft)"	which	has	not	entered	into	force	
yet.100	 This	 section	 focuses	 on	 the	 2000	 and	 the	 2008	 amendments,	 as	 they	 are	 the	 latest	
																																								 																				
94 See P. Ganea and others, Intellectual Property Law in China (Kluwer Law International 2005) p.39, quoted by Raymond M. 
Gabriel, ‘The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intellectual Property Law, Policy, and Practice Are The Latest Step 
to Bolster Patent Protection in China’ (2008) 9 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 323. 
95 See Ganea and others (n 94) p.39; ”Procedural law has been significantly improved in the course of the two [Patent Act] 
amendments, not only in order to remedy defects, but also in order to harmonise the domestic procedural law with international 
standards.” “Where the Patent Act provides the legal framework for patent issuance and protection, the Patent Act Implementing 
Rules (PAIR) provide detailed information for the form and content of application documents. The PAIR interpret a number of 
legal provisions and provide instructions to the SIPO and local law enforcement. Further administrative rules govern interactions 
within administrative authorities, e.g., the Patent Examination Guidelines.” Ibid p.5, quoted by Gabriel (n 94). 
96 Bai (n 90). 
97 Ibid. 
98 J. Benjamin Bai et. al, ‘What Does the Third Amendment to China's Patent Law Mean to You?’ (2009) Jones Day 
<http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/4bec1582-391d-497a-af19-bb314ae94433/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ff8794
50-6699-4f2a-93fe-c33eb7d604cc/What%20Does%20Third.pdf> . 
99 Downey (n 50). 
100 Draft of the Chinese Patent Law revisions for public comment (published by State Council Legislative Affairs Office  on 
December 2, 2015). 
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ratified	versions	of	Patent	Law	and	are	considered	to	be	the	most	significant	amendments	to	
date.	
6.4.3.1 The 2000 Patent Law 
The	2000	Patent	Law	was	drafted	to	harmonize	national	law	with	international	standards	and	
treaties.101	 Moreover,	with	China	becoming	a	member	of	the	PCT,	international	patents	could	
also	 be	 filed	 through	 the	 State	 IPO.102	 Patent	 holders	may	 look	 for	 remedies	 regarding	 IPR	
infringement	through	administrative	or	civil	enforcement.103	
However,	the	seemingly	standardized	2000	Patent	Law	had	several	problems	hidden	within	its	
system	 that	 foreign	 investors	 could	 have	 their	 IP	 infringed.104	 For	 example,	 a	 patent	must	
meet	 the	 novelty	 requirement	 in	 order	 to	 get	 issuance	 in	 China,105	 which	 is	 broadly	
worded.106	 Article	22107	 prohibits	 inventions	 that	have	been	 filed	previously	 in	China,	have	
been	published	internationally,	or	have	been	publicly	used	or	made	known	in	China	before	the	
filing	date	from	getting	patent	approved.	Unlike	the	US	law	which	has	a	“more	than	one	year	
prior	to	the	date	of	the	application	for	patent”,	the	Chinese	2000	Patent	Law	excludes	viable	
																																								 																				
101 Louis S. Sorell, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United States’ (2002) 11 Pac Rim 
L & Pol'y J 319 p.323. See also Peter K. Yu, ‘The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China’ Occasional papers in 
intellectual property 
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/William_Brown19/publication/49851262_Intellectual_property/links/55dbc0d408aeb38e8a8
b9031.pdf> , p.27. 
102 The Office has authority in “infringement matters, invalidation proceedings, and over certain matters of public interest, such as 
passing off another’s patent as one’s own.” Peter Ganea, Thomas Pattloch and Christopher Heath, Intellectual Property Law in 
China, vol 11 (Kluwer Law International 2005) at ix; “The second revisions to the Patent Act in 2000 made invalidation decisions 
of the Patent Re-examination Board (PRB) subject to review by a People’s Court.” Ibid p.62; “The Intermediate People’s Court of 
Beijing No. 1 is competent to review PRB decisions in the first instance.” Ibid p.63; see also Jiang Zhipei, ‘Patent Litigation in 
China’ (1999) 9 Fed Cir BJ 479, p.479-81 (discussing “the location of the SIPO and PRB within geographical limitations of the 
Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing No. 1”). Matthew L. Goldberg, ‘The Viability of Stimulating Technology-Oriented 
Entrepreneurial Activity in China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: How Regulations and Culture Encourage the Creation, 
Development, and Exploitation of Intellectual Property’ (2005) 1 Int'l L & Mgmt Rev 1; see generally Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
103 Ganea and others (n 102) p.289, quoted by Gabriel (n 94). 
104 Schiappacasse (n 69 ) p.128. 
105 Goldberg (n 102) art. 22; See Ganea and others (n 102) p.10-20 quoted by Gabriel (n 94). 
106 See Tiancheng Jiang, China and EU Antitrust Review of Refusal to License IPR, vol 3 (Maklu-Pblishers 2015) p.147. 
107 Article 22: “Novelty means that, before the date of filing, no identical invention or utility model has been publicly disclosed in 
publications in the country or abroad or has been publicly used or made known to the public by any other means in the country, nor 
has any other person filed previously with the Patent Administration Department Under the State Council an application which 
described the identical invention or utility model and was published after the said date of filing.”. 
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inventions	 from	 being	 patented,	 including	 one-year	 new	 technologies	 which	 is	 not	 novel	
(know	to	the	public	or	disclosed	at	exhibition).	Also	patents	already	filed	 in	another	country	
are	 still	 patentable	 under	 the	 2000	 Patent	 Law.	 This	 is	 because	 there	 are	 insufficient	
limitations	 on	 defining	 “prior	 art”.108	 Thus	 inventions	 that	 are	 excluded	 from	 patentability	
under	other	countries’	patent	laws	may	be	considered	novel	in	China.109 At	the	same	time,	a	
malevolent	company	could	file	the	patent	right	before	the	original	inventor	and	get	away	with	
it	via	the	loophole.110	 	
Furthermore,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 retains	 great	 control	 over	 holders	 exercising	 their	
patent	 rights.111	 For	 example,	when	 Chinese	 companies	 pursue	 joint	 ventures	with	 foreign	
companies,	 any	 patent	 licensing	 to	 the	 companies	 from	 abroad	 must	 be	 approved	 by	 the	
state. 112 	 Although	 the	 law	 does	 not	 clarify	 what	 criteria	 shall	 be	 applied	 to	 obtain	
approvals,113	 such	an	intervention	has	the	ability	to	deter	investors	from	considering	business	
with	 Chinese	 companies.	 Government	 power	 to	 require	 compulsory	 licences114	 will	 also	
																																								 																				
108 Ganea, Pattloch and Heath p.10 quoted by Gabriel (n 94). 
109 For example, the United States expressly limits and defines prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“A person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless...the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on 
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”); See discussing Draft 
Amendment to art. 22. ABA, ‘Coments of American Bar Association’s Section of Intellectual Property Law and International Law 
on Draft Amendments to the China’s Patent Law’ AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advocacy/advocacy-20150427-comments
.authcheckdam.pdf> accessed Apr 2017) p.27-29. 
110 “Notably, it is also apparent that foreign applicants could capitalize on this loophole by filing for inventions patented by third 
parties in other countries.” Goldberg (n 102). 
111 Ibid p.6. 
112 Patent Law of the P.R.C. (2000 revision) (Promulgated by the Standing Comm. Natn’l. People’s Cong., Aug. 25, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2001) Article 10; see Goldberg (n 102) p.7. 
113 Goldberg (n 102). 
114 Ibid, art. 48-50, (Article 48. Where any entity which is qualified to exploit the invention or utility model has made requests for 
authorization from the patentee of an invention or utility model to exploit its or his patent on reasonable terms and conditions and 
such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time, the Patent Administration Department Under the State 
Council may, upon the request of that entity, grant a compulsory license to exploit the patent for invention or utility model. 
Article 49. Where a national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs occurs, or where the public interest so requires, the 
Patent Administration Department Under the State Council may grant a compulsory license to exploit the patent for invention or 
utility model. 
Article 50. Where the invention or utility model for which the patent right has been granted involves important technical advance 
of considerable economic significance in relation to another invention or utility model for which a patent right has been granted 
earlier and the exploitation of the later invention or utility model depends on the exploitation of the earlier invention or utility 
model, the patent administration department under the State Council may, upon the request of the later patentee, grant a 
compulsory license to exploit the earlier invention or utility model. 
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affect	 IP	holders	 receiving	desired	 licensing	 fees	and	 they	may	be	 forced	 to	allow	others	 to	
exploit	their	patents.115	 Article	48	states	that:	 	
where	 any	 entity	which	 is	 qualified	 to	 exploit	 the	 invention	 or	 utility	model	 has	made	
requests	for	authorization	from	the	patentee	of	an	invention	or	utility	model	to	exploit	its	
or	 his	 patent	 on	 reasonable	 terms	 and	 conditions	 and	 such	 efforts	 have	 not	 been	
successful	 within	 a	 reasonable	 period	 of	 time,	 the	 Patent	 Administration	 Department	
Under	the	State	Council	may,	upon	the	request	of	that	entity,	grant	a	compulsory	licence	
to	exploit	the	patent	for	invention	or	utility	model.	
Such	broad	wording	of	the	Article	requires	the	owner	to	exploit	the	patent	in	a	limited	period	
when	the	inventors	do	not	intend	to	exploit	a	patent	in	China	within	a	few	years.	For	example	
when:	 	
a	 foreign	 inventor	 who	 files	 a	 patent	 application	 in	 China	 at	 the	 same	 time	 he	 files	 a	
patent	 in	 his	 home	 country116	 the	 inventor	 may	 not	 have	 the	 funding	 to	 exploit	 the	
patent	 in	 China	 because	 the	 invention	may	 not	 become	 commercially	 successful	 in	 his	
home	country	yet.117	 	
This	 is	worth	notice	 that	 the	 retention	of	 government	 control	 in	 compulsory	 licence	 falls	 to	
both	domestic	and	foreign	 inventors.	Thus	 it	 is	not	considered	as	protectionism	 in	 favour	of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
Where, according to the preceding paragraph, a compulsory license is granted, the Patent Administration Department Under the 
State Council may, upon the request of the earlier patentee, also grant a compulsory license to exploit the later invention or utility 
model.) The 2000 Patent Law of P.R.C. (Promulgated by the Standing Commission. National People’s Congress, Aug. 25, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2001) available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/17/content_569573_4.htm; See also Goldberg 
(n 102) p.6. 
115 Goldberg (n 102) p.6-7. 
116 A foreign inventor would have to file in this sequence because a foreign disclosure, or patent application, would be a complete 
bar to a patent in China.) See ABA) p.8. 
117 It should also be noted that the 2006 Draft Amendments to arts. 49, 51, and A3 bring the Patent Law in line with arts. 30 and 31 
of TRIPS. See ibid) p.55. 
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Chinese	 companies. 118 	 However,	 the	 government	 requires	 foreign	 applicants	 to	 use	
government-approved	 patent	 agencies	 to	 file	 a	 patent	 in	 Article	 19119	 of	 the	 2000	 Patent	
Law.120	 This	 could	 constitute	 a	 barrier	 to	 TT	 because	banning	 foreign	 applicants	 from	 filing	
patents	 directly	 by	 themselves	 does	 not	 help	 reduce	 transaction	 costs.	 Also,	 it	 is	 may	 be	
inconsistent	with	Article	3	of	TRIPS:	the	national	treatment	requirement	asking	member	states	
to	 treat	 foreign	 applicants	 as	 “no	 less	 favorable	 as...its	 own	 nationals.”121 Article	 19	 uses	
different	words	(“shall”	and	“may”)	when	stipulating	patent	agency	requirements	on	foreign	
and	domestic	 inventors.	This	could	be	seen	as	a	 less	 favourable	 treatment	because	“foreign	
entities	have	a	burden	to	use	approved	patent	agencies	while	domestic	inventors	do	not.”122	
Meanwhile,	though	these	provisions	seem	to	be	favouring	local	firms	in	patent	competition	by	
requiring	 additional	 restrictive	 conditions	 from	 foreign	 companies,	 actually	 the	 burden	 of	
facilitating	TT	 is	 shifted	back	 to	domestic	enterprises	 indirectly	 in	 the	end	because	 they	are	
responsible	for	removing	these	obstacles	for	their	foreign	partners	in	practice.	To	quell	foreign	
parties’	fears	of	risks,	any	pre-project	works	such	as	an	administrative	examination	or	getting	
governmental	 approvals	 are	 executed	 by	 Chinese	 enterprises.	 These	 activities	 incur	
considerable	costs,	which	are	assumed	by	the	Chinese	buyer.	 	
																																								 																				
118 Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Section of Intellectual Property Law, Section of International Law, and 
Section of Science & Technology Law on Draft Amendments to the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, at 1 (2006) p.6, 
8, 17-21 (Draft Amendments to arts. 16, 19, 22, 48-50, 55, 
A3).<http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/blanketauthority/PRCpatentlawchanges.pdf> 
119 Article l9. Where any foreigner, foreign enterprise or other foreign organization having no habitual residence or business office 
in China applies for a patent, or has other patent matters to attend to, in China, it or he shall appoint a patent agency designated by 
the patent administration department under the State Council to act as his or its agent. Where any Chinese entity or individual 
applies for a patent or has other patent matters to attend to in the country, it or he may appoint a patent agency to act as its or his 
agent. The patent agency shall comply with the provisions of laws and administrative regulations, and handle patent applications 
and other patent matters according to the instructions of its clients. In respect of the contents of its clients' inventions-creations, 
except for those that have been published or announced, the agency shall bear the responsibility of keeping them confidential. The 
administrative regulations governing the patent agency shall be formulated by the State Council. 
120 See ABA) p.4, 23-25. 
121 The TRIPS Agreement, art. 3 
122 Gabriel (n 94). 
	 268	
A	 final	 issue123 	 with	 the	 2000	 Patent	 Law	 is	 its	 “broad	 defenses	 and	 exceptions	 for	
infringement	but	niggardly	with	compensation.”124	 For	example,	Article	63(1)	stipulates:	
where,	after	the	sale	of	a	patented	product	that	was	made	or	imported	by	the	patentee	
or	with	the	authorization	of	the	patentee,	or	of	a	product	that	was	directly	obtained	by	
using	the	patented	process,	any	other	person	uses,	offers	to	sell	or	sells	that	product125	
shall	 not	 be	 deemed	 an	 infringement	 of	 the	 patent	 right.	 Such	 provision	 does	 not	 require	
importers	to	only	import	from	countries	where	the	product	was	legally	produced	in	order	to	
avoid	 infringement	 of	 IPRs.126	 Thus	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 get	 an	 illegally	 manufactured	 device	
outside	 of	 China	 and	 then	 import	 it	 back	 into	 the	 country	 for	 sale,127	 meaning	 that	 piracy	
outside	 China	 could	 be	 indulged.	 This	 is	 against	 Article	 28(1)	 of	 TRIPS	 where	 importing	
patented	 goods	 without	 authorisation	 is	 prohibited.	 And	 it	 is	 potentially	 harmful	 in	 cases	
where	 many	 consumable	 parts	 of	 imported	 renewable	 energy	 equipment	 require	
replacements	 purchased	 from	 abroad.	 However,	 those	 that	 purchased	 from	 patent	 holders	
are	 priced	 several	 times	 or	 even	 more	 than	 ten	 times	 higher	 than	 domestically	 produced	
parts.	 Therefore,	 energy	 plants	 prefer	 introducing	 indigenous	 components	 to	 combine	with	
imported	core	components	 in	production.	For	example,	 the	digital	control	of	 the	generating	
equipment	 –	 the	 mechanical	 and	 electrical	 equipment	 as	 well	 as	 chemical	 equipment	 –	 is	
mainly	made	in	China	in	the	biomass	energy	industry.128	 In	the	wind	energy	sector,	instead	of	
importing	 from	 the	 original	manufacturer,	 damaged	 components	 due	 to	wear	 and	 tear	 are	
																																								 																				
123 Ibid. 
124 See ABA p.11, 69-71.  
125 See ibid) p.29. 
126 See ibid) p.70. 
127 Ibid). 
128 Interview with managers of the four Biomass energy plants. 
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dismantled,	 reported	and	sent	 to	the	headquarters	of	 these	Chinese	 firms.	With	the	help	of	
specialized	 engineering	 experts,	 the	 headquarters	 will	 provide	 a	 consolidated	 solution	 to	
part-damage	of	 the	same	kind	and	authorize	a	Chinese	or	a	manufacturing	plant	 in	another	
country	 to	 repair	 or	 refurbish	 these	 components.	 Such	 a	 resource	 is	 available	 for	 all	
subordinate	companies.	A	large	cooperation	like	the	Guoneng	(National	Bio	Energy	Co.	Ltd.),	
having	 more	 than	 30	 subsidiary	 factories,	 is	 saving	 significantly	 by	 relying	 on	 refurbished	
consumables.	According	to	the	interviewees,129	
Reprocessing	of	these	components	depends	on	foreign	patented	technologies	to	varying	
degrees,	while	none	of	them	are	licensed.	Having	them	made	elsewhere	is	to	avoid	high	
cost	of	parts	from	original	overseas	manufacturers	incurred	by	patented	technologies.	
Moreover,	the	maximum	statutory	fine	for	patent	infringement	is	limited	to	only	50,000	Yuan	
(4,500	pounds),130	 which	is	hardly	a	deterrence	to	well-financed	infringers	and	to	those	who	
benefit	 from	piracy.	 The	 cost	 of	 litigation,	 especially	 for	 foreign	 patent	 holders,	 is	 high	 and	
compensation	is	not	particularly	promising	and	may	also	be	slow	to	obtain.	Therefore,	a	sharp	
rise	 in	maximum	recoverable	damages	and	statutory	 fine	are	needed,	and	 it	may	offset	 the	
expense	 of	 protecting	 patent	 rights	 and	 compensate	 for	 damages	 due	 to	 continuing	 illegal	
operations.131	
																																								 																				
129 Interview with manager and technical staff from China Resources (Holdings) Co. Ltd participated in wind project 
130 Goldberg (n 102) Article 58. Where any person passes off the patent of another person as his own, he shall, in addition to 
bearing his civil liability according to law, be ordered by the administrative authority for patent affairs to amend his act, and the 
order shall be announced. His illegal earnings shall be confiscated and, in addition, he may be imposed a fine of not more than 
three times his illegal earnings and, if there is no illegal earnings, a fine of not more than RMB 50,000 Yuan. See ABA p.11, 64-65. 
131 Geoffrey T. Willard, ‘An Examination of China's Emerging Intellectual Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings, the 
Current System and Prospects for the Future’ (1995) 6 Ind Int'l & Comp L Rev 411 p.430 (stating that cultural and political 
influences of Communism affect intellectual property rights in modern China). 
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6.4.3.2 The 2008 Patent Law 
Nonetheless,	the	2000	Patent	Law	is	an	amendment	designed	to	basically	align	with	the	TRIPS	
requirements.132	 However,	 external	 pressures	 continued	 to	 mount	 against	 it	 afterward.	
Coercion	by	developed	countries	has	always	been	a	tool	to	push	less	developed	countries	to	
improve	 their	 IP	 laws.133	 Accordingly,	 in	 2006	 both	 the	 US	 and	 the	 EU	 indicated	 that	 they	
would	 bring	 investigation	 proceedings	 at	 the	WTO	 to	 try	 to	 rectify	 the	 piracy	 of	 patents	 in	
China.134	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 these	 legal	 challenges	 and	 to	 serve	 its	 own	 interests,	 China	
amended	its	Patent	Law	in	2008.	Adding	the	goal	of	"enhancing	innovation	capability"	to	the	
basic	 objective	 of	 IPR	 protection	 for	 inventions	 (encouraging	 inventions	 and	 their	 diffusion;	
facilitating	patent	applications	as	well	 as	meeting	 the	needs	of	 socialist	modernization),	 the	
2008	 amendment135	 is	 the	 current	 act	 that	 regulates	 patent	 and	 relevant	 IP	 issues.	 Several	
improvements	have	been	made	to	the	2000	Patent	Law,	as	follows.	
(a)	The	absolute	novelty	standard	
Article	22136	 of	the	2008	Patent	Law	amended	the	2000	novelty	standard137	 for	patentability	
with	an	absolute	standard	to	cover	"prior	art"	and	define	it	as	“publicly	known	art	anywhere	
																																								 																				
132 Gabriel (n 94). 
133 Yu (n 101) p.28-30; Robert C. Bird, ‘Defending Intellectual Property Rights in The BRIC Economies’ (2006) 43 American 
Business Law Journal 317 p.329-44. 
134 “As early as September, 2006, the United States was considering mounting a case in the WTO attacking China’s lax IPR 
enforcement.” Richard McGregor, ‘Beijing Asks for More Time to Combat Piracy’ (Financial Times, 06 September 2006)  
<http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/national-news/114/beijing_asks_for_more_time_to_combat_piracy> accessed Feburary 
2017; in October, 2006, Peter Medelson, the European Union Trade Commissioner, challenged China to “crack down on the piracy 
of European patents and trademarks, or it will face legal challenge at the World Trade Organization.” See Michael Burr, ‘China’s 
IP Protections are Improving, but Enforcement Remedies Remain Weak’ (InsideCounsel, November 2006)  
<http://dev.insidecounsel.com/ assets/article/729/China.pdf.> accessed December 2016 (stating that the commissioner of the State 
Intellectual Property Office, Tian Lipu, wants to increase innovation in China). 
135 Bai (n 98) chapter 1 article 1. 
136 Article 22: “Novelty means that the invention or utility model concerned is not an existing technology; no patent application is 
filed by any unit or individual for any identical invention or utility model with the patent administration department under the State 
Council before the date of application for patent right, and no identical invention or utility model is recorded in the patent 
application documents or the patent documentations which are published or announced after the date of application.” 
137 This discussion of the significance of the 2008 amended Patent Law in general draws on analysis by J. Benjamin Bai et. al (n 
98). 
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in	 the	world	 before	 the	 filing	 date.”	 Thus,	when	 assessing	 the	 novelty	 of	 an	 invention,	 one	
should	consider	not	only	publication	but	also	public	use	or	knowledge	outside	of	China.	Under	
the	 2000	 Patent	 Law,	 inventions	 and	 designs	 used	 publicly	 outside	 China	 could	 still	 be	
considered	 as	 novel	 and	 thus	 not	 subject	 to	 invalidation	proceedings.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 2008	
Patent	 Law	 improved	 this	 standard	 so	 that	 evidence	 of	 overseas	 public	 sale,	 public	
dissemination,	 and	 public	 knowledge	 is	 relevant	 and	 eligible	 proof	 to	 disqualify	 novelty.138	
The	 change	helped	 close	 the	 loophole	 for	 "patent	hijacking",	 i.e.	 “the	patenting	 in	China	of	
another's	 invention	witnessed	at	a	public	event	 (such	as	a	trade	show)	outside	of	China.”139	
Foreign	firms	may	invoke	this	broadened	wording	of	prior	art	to	challenge	patents	successfully	
registered	 in	 China	 that	 they	 allege	 conflict	 with	 their	 own.140	 Indeed,	 this	 change	 has	
deterred	 a	 lot	 of	 patent	 applicants	 in	 China	 that	 intended	 to	 rush	 patent	 registry	 solely	
generated	 from	 foreign	experiences.141	 However,	 the	 “amendment	does	not	 state	whether	
and	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 absolute	 novelty	 requirement	 would	 be	 made	 retroactive	 to	
previously	granted	patents	or	pending	applications.”142	 Therefore,	its	effect	on	the	validity	of	
some	of	the	existing	problematic	patents	in	China	is	unclear.	 	
(b)	Inventions	based	on	genetic	resources	
A	special	point	to	note	here	about	the	2008	Patent	Law	is	its	provisions	that	relate	to	"genetic	
resources."143	 The	 Law	 retains	great	government	 control	by	 stipulating	 that	 “no	patent	will	
																																								 																				
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Downey (n 50). 
141 this in indicated by the staff in charge of technical department of Shandong Dongyue Chemical Co. Ltd 
142 This discussion of the significance of the 2008 amended Patent Law in general draws on analysis by J. Benjamin Bai et. al (n 
98). 
143 Prior to the 2008 amendment, the Patent Law did not contain references to "genetic resources." Bai (n 98) Article 5, 26. 
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be	granted	for	an	invention	based	on	genetic	resources	if	the	access	or	utilization	of	the	said	
genetic	 resources	 is	 in	 violation	 of	 any	 law	 or	 administrative	 regulation.” 144 	 These	
administrative	 regulations	 include,	 for	 example,	 the	Administration	of	 Import	 and	Export	 of	
Technologies, 145 	 the	 Administration	 of	 Registration	 of	 Technology	 Import	 and	 Export	
Contracts	 Measures, 146 	 the	 Catalogue	 of	 Technologies	 Prohibited	 or	 Restricted	 from	
Import,147	 and	related	Supreme	Court	interpretations	regarding	technology	contracts.	
And	more	than	that,	for	inventions	based	on	genetic	resources,	the	amendment	requires	that	
“the	applicant	shall	state	the	direct	source	and	the	original	source	of	the	genetic	resources	in	
the	application	documents.	If	the	applicant	is	not	able	to	state	the	original	source,	it	or	he/she	
shall	state	the	reasons.”148	 This	provision	imposes	a	burden	on	the	inventors	to	provide	the	
direct	 and	 original	 source	 of	 the	 genetic	 resources	 and	 proof	 that	 these	 were	 lawfully	
obtained.149 	 The	 genetic	 resource	 disclosure	 requirement	 potentially	 affects	 renewable	
energy	TT	because	such	patents	are	commonly	involved	in	the	biofuel	industry.	For	example,	
technologies	developed	to	produce	 low-emission	biofuels150	 will	be	required	to	disclose	the	
source	 of	 genetic	 resources,	 or	 at	 least	 explain	 why	 they	 cannot	 be	 disclosed.151	 With	
abundant	 genetic	 resources	 in	 China,	 the	 extra	 information	 disclosed	 will	 help	 potential	
																																								 																				
144 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (as amended up to the Decision of December 27, 2008, regarding the Revision of 
the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China) article 5. 
145 Regulations on Administration of Import and Export of Technique (Promulgated by the State Councilon 10 December 2001 and 
effective as of 1 January 2002) English version available at <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=38107&lib=law > 
146 Measures of the Administration of Technology Import and Export Contracts Registration (Degree No. 3 [2009] of the Ministry 
of Commerce of the People's Republic of China); United Nations, ‘Chapter 1 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment’ in Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 5-16 June 1972 (UN 
Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 1972). English version available at <http://english.7139.com/2609/18/39020.html > 
147 United Nations (n 146). 
148 Chinese Patent Law 2008 Article 26. 
149 J. Benjamin Bai et. al (n 98). 
150 “For example, at the 2009 Bio World Congress on Industrial Biotechnology, in July 2009, biotechnology firms gathered to 
discuss how genetic engineering and biotechnology could be used to produce second- generation biofuels.” See, e.g., United 
Nations (n 146), quote by Downey (n 50). 
151 Bai (n 98) chapter 3 article 26. 
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competitors	 to	 explore	 similar	 products.	 No	 requirement	 is	 found	 in	 the	 patent	 laws	 of	
Europe,	 Japan,	or	 the	US	equivalent	 to	 such	 tough	disclosure	 rules	 for	 inventions	 relying	on	
genetic	 resources	 are	 unique152 .	 However,	 this	 risk	 for	 investors	 may	 not	 affect	 the	
development	of	 renewable	energy	 in	China	 as	 a	whole	because	biofuels	 occupy	a	 relatively	
small	share	of	the	market.	According	to	the	World	Energy	Outlook	2007's	Reference	Scenario	
estimation,	biofuels	will	account	for	only	"2%	of	road	fuel	consumption"	in	China	by	2030.153 
But	importantly	it	will	deter	or	could	deter	biomass	companies	from	TT	to	China	in	the	future.	
If	China	 intends	 to	attract	more	TT	and	 relative	 investment,	 it	has	 to	envisage	 the	potential	
risk	that	the	current	legal	system	is	imposing	on	investors	and	therefore	construct	a	fairer	and	
free	domestic	market	for	business.	 	
6.5 IP law enforcement in the renewable energy sector 
While	 Chinese	 IP	 correlative	 laws	 on	 the	 books	 still	 send	 out	 a	 few	 negative	 signals	 to	
potential	 investors,	sufficient	protection	in	practice	plays	a	no-less-important	role,	or	even	a	
greater	role	in	attracting	investment.	Despite	certain	defects	discussed	above,	as	a	whole	the	
Chinese	government	has	used	its	adoption	of	stronger	legal	regimes	facilitating	TT	to	indicate	
its	will	to	shift	towards	a	more	business-friendly	environment.154	 But	how	and	to	what	extent	
the	reformed	IP	system	is	affecting	TT	flows	and	their	dynamic	in	the	renewable	energy	sector	
is	 another	 separate	 subject.	 For	 example,	 a	 better-enforced	 IP	 and	 IP-relative	 law	
environment	might	have	 increased	FDI	and	multinational	 cooperation	activities,	while	 these	
																																								 																				
152 J. Benjamin Bai et. al (n 98) at 3 (noting that no such requirement exists in American, European, or Japanese patent law) 
153 International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights’ INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
AGENCY (2007) <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/WEO_2007.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017 
p.299. 
154 Ligang Song, Ross Garnaut and Cai Fang, Deepening Reform for China’s Long-term Growth and Development (ANU Press 
2014). 
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activities	 do	 not	 necessarily	 equal	 higher	 levels	 of	 international	 TT.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 a	mature	
associated	 effect	 in	 the	 receiving	 country	 required	 for	 adequate	 TT,	 including	 good	
adaptation,	wide	application,	affordable	commercialization,	independent	innovative	potential,	
and	so	on.155	 Therefore,	 this	 thesis	endeavours	 to	exam	the	 level	of	TT	 reflected	 in	 several	
different	 IP	 law	 enforcement	 aspects,	 showing	 that	 the	 proportional	 relation	 between	
stronger	IP	law	and	ITT	is	weak	and	inconclusive,	even	in	mid-income	countries	like	China.	
6.5.1 Patent growth 
Some	 sectors	 of	 China's	 economy,	 such	 as	 the	 renewable	 energy	 industry,	 are	 very	 much	
dependent	 on	 technological	 advances.	 Noticeable	 growth	 in	 the	 renewable	 sector	 can	 be	
found	 in	 the	years	after	2000.	China	also	became	one	of	 the	 top	 four	countries	 to	have	 the	
most	 electricity	 generated	 from	 renewable	 sources.156 	 The	 country	 has	 been	 the	 top	
renewable	 energy	 commodity	 producer	 since	 2005.157	 This	 significant	 advance	 has	 been	
reflected	in	patent	growth	as	well,	in	the	same	period	of	time.	For	example,	patent	holders	in	
the	“BRIC”	countries	increased	by	33	per	cent	from	1998	to	2008	in	number	with	almost	all	of	
that	growth	occurred	in	China.158	 Patent	data	have	been	used	as	indicators	of	sufficient	TT	in	
many	 empirical	 studies159	 on	 climate	 change	 technology	 development.160	 Growth	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
155 Amanda Watson, ‘Does TRIPS Increase Technology Transfer to the Developing World? The Empirical Evidence’ (2011) 20 
Information & Communications Technology Law 253. 
156 The data is collected from 1980 to 2010 statistics, and four countries include Canada, the United States, Brazil, and China. The 
data is provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. At the time of writing this article, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration did not provide data for years beyond 2010. See The US Energy Information Administration, ‘Total Renewable 
Electricity Net Generation’ US Department of Energy, Washington, DC 2010 <http://www.eia.gov 
/cfappsipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=6&pid=29&aid=12&cid=BR,CA,CH, US,&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit=BKWH> accessed 
July 2015. See in compare with The US Energy Information Administration, ‘Electric Power Monthly with Data for April 2017’ 
US Department of Energy, Washington, DC 2017 <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf> accessed June 2017. 
157 Downey (n 50). 
158 Copenhagen Economics and The IPR Company, Are IPR a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology 
(Copenhagen Economics Informed Decisions, 2009). 
159 See Ivan Haščič et. al, Climate Policy and Technological Innovation and Transfer: An Overview of Trends and Recent 
Empirical Results (2010); N. Johnstone and Ivan Hascic, ‘Indicators of Innovation and Transfer in Environmentally Sound 
Technologies: Methodological Issues’ OECD Environment Working Paper, Working Party on National Environmental Policies ; 
OECD, Invention and Transfer of Environmental Technologies, OECD Studies on Environmental Innovation (OECD Publishing, 
Paris, 2011); EPO and ICTSD UNEP, Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap Between Evidence and Policy (Final Report) 
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number	of	patents	registered,	in	theory,	should	indicate	a	better	environment	for	investment	
in	 technology-based	 industries	 in	 a	 country,	 along	with	 a	 greater	 capacity	 for	 independent	
technology	development.	 Indeed,	since	the	2008	Patent	Law,	Chinese	companies	have	been	
filing	 for	 utility-model	 patents	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 more	 than	 300,000	 per	 year.	 The	 utility-model	
patent161	 is	 a	 special	 patent	 type	 created	by	 the	Chinese	Patent	 Law	which	 is	 less	 rigorous	
and	 less	expensive	 than	 invention	patents	because	 it	does	not	 require	a	 substantive	 review	
process	and	provides	just	ten	years	of	protection	(compared	to	20	for	invention	patents).”162	
The	 advantage	 of	 the	 utility	 model	 is	 its	 quick	 review	 process,163 	 which	 shrank	 from	
approximately	 four	 and	 a	 half	 months	 in	 2012	 to	 three	 months	 in	 2015.164	 This	 is	 mainly	
because	 the	 review	 does	 not	 require	 a	 utility	 model	 to	 have	 substantive	 features	 and	
represent	the	state	of	the	art.	Although	such	low	criteria	will	 inevitably	cause	a	considerable	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
(United Nations Environmental Programme, European Patent Office, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
2010). 
160 Pauline Lacour and Catherine Figuiere, ‘Environmentally-Friendly Technology Transfers from Japan to China: An Empirical 
Analysis using Patent Data’ (2014) 3 Juournal of Innovation Economics and Management 145. 
161 “Utility models are a form of patent-like protection for minor or incremental innovations. They tend to protect the functional 
aspect of a product (examples of utility models apply to the functional aspects of toys, watches, optical fibres, machinery, etc). 
Utility models are very common in the mechanical, optical and electronic fields and played a role in the industrial development of 
countries like Germany and Japan, as well as South Korea and India.” U. Suthersanen, Utility models and innovation in developing 
countries (UNCTAD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue paper No 13, 2006). 
The main differences between utility models and patents are, according to WIPO, the following: 
“The requirements for acquiring a utility model are less stringent than for patents. While the requirement of "novelty" is always to 
be met, that of "inventive step" or "non-obviousness" may be much lower or absent altogether. In practice, protection for utility 
models is often sought for innovations of a rather incremental character which may not meet the patentability criteria. 
The term of protection for utility models is shorter than for patents and varies from country to country (usually between 7 and 10 
years without the possibility of extension or renewal). In most countries where utility model protection is available, patent offices 
do not examine applications as to substance prior to registration. This means that the registration process is often significantly 
simpler and faster, taking, on average, six months. Utility models are much cheaper to obtain and to maintain. In some countries, 
utility model protection can only be obtained for certain fields of technology and only for products but not for processes.” 
‘Protecting Innovations by Utility Models’ (WIPO)  
<http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/utility_models.htm> accessed May 2017. 
162 Basil Moftah and Thomson Reuters, ‘The New Patent Dynasty’ (The Patent Lawyer, CTC Legal Media, 2013)  
<http://ip.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/new-patent-dynasty.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
163 “China differs from many Western jurisdictions by providing patent protection for utility models, which protects the shape, 
structure, or the combination of shape and structure of a physical product (methods and compositions can only be protected by 
invention patent) for a term of 10 years (compared to 20 years for invention patents). Obtaining a utility model patent, sometimes 
colloquially called ‘mini-inventions’, requires a lesser degree of ‘inventiveness’ (i.e. the degree of innovation over known 
technology) than needed to obtain an invention patent. Utility models are inexpensive and quick to obtain, on average within 9-12 
months, and are well suited to protecting products with shorter product life-spans.” The Development Solutions and the European 
Chamber, ‘IP Strategies for EU ‘Cleantech’ SMEs in China’ China IPR SME Help desk 2012 
<http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/sites/all/docs/publications/EN_IP_Strategies_for_EU_Cleantech_SMEs_in_China.pdf> 
accessed Feburary 2017. 
164 EPO, IP5 Statistics Report 2012 Edition (European Patent Office, Japan Patent Office, Korean Intellectual Property Office, 
 tate Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2013). 
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part	 of	 the	 utility	 model	 to	 be	 low	 quality,	 it	 does	 nurture	 many	 small	 R	 &	 D	 companies	
nowadays	in	China	that	rely	on	selling	registered	utility	models.	This	shorter	protection	period	
could	also	have	encouraged	a	faster	metabolism	for	green-technology	development,	as	many	
green	 technologies	 are	 registered	 under	 this	 category	 (e.g.	 Patent	 CN	 203312804	 U:	
Renewable	energy	portfolio	grid	system).165	 This	device	under	Chinese	IP	law	could	be	one	of	
the	 explanations	 for	 the	 rapid	 growth	 of	 patent	 applications	 in	 China.	 However,	 it	 is	 a	
double-edged	sword	because	it	might	have	caused	the	quality	of	these	Chinese	patents	to	sink	
lower	than	those	granted	in	other	countries.166	 Such	an	argument	can	be	affirmed	through	a	
comparison	between	patents	registered	domestically	in	China	and	those	filed	internationally.	
The	number	of	patents	filed	abroad	from	China	grew	from	13,005	in	2008	to	33,222	in	2013,	
whereas	overall	patenting	including	domestic	applications	has	increased	from	239,663	in	2008	
to	629,612	in	2013.167	 Although	the	ratio	of	patents	filed	in	other	countries	by	Chinese	firms	
to	 domestically	 registered	 patents	 remained	 at	 almost	 the	 same	 level,	 the	 proportion	 of	
patents	 filed	 abroad	 remains	 small.	 As	 for	 patents	 filed	 in	 2013,	 80	 per	 cent	 were	 filed	
domestically.168	 	
Foreign	 companies	 intending	 to	 invest	 in	 China	 need	 to	 establish	 their	 patent	 portfolios	
according	 to	Chinese	 law	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 finding	 themselves	 at	 an	 IP	 disadvantage	 in	 this	
market,	or	being	victims	of	patent	infringement.169	 Sufficient	attention	should	be	paid	to	the	
																																								 																				
165 Solar cells, wind power generation unit and a biogas power units are connected to the DC bus and the system controller, the 
system controller detects and calculates the power output by the wind power generation unit and solar unit, and adjust the power 
output of biofuel power generation unit. 
166 This is indicating a need of TT remains in China though the Number of patent application appears to be large.  
167 Reuters (n 162). 
168 Ibid. 
169 Georgia Chiu and Skip Fisher, ‘China as Innovator? Recent Thomson Reuters Report Examines Trends in Chinese Patent Filing 
& Litigation’ (LimeGreen IP News, 15 Janurary 2015)  
<http://www.limegreenipnews.com/2015/01/china-as-innovator-recent-thomson-reuters-report-examines-trends-in-chinese-patent-f
iling-litigation/> accessed Feburary 2017. 
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use	of	utility	models	as	well	as	to	invention	patents.	Meanwhile,	Chinese	companies	are	much	
more	 familiar	with	utility	model	patents	and	taking	advantage	of	 them	to	 fight	 their	 foreign	
competitors.	Pre-empting	registration,	combining	utility	models	with	invention	patents	is	the	
trick	that	Chinese	companies	use	to	deal	with	clean	technology	based	on	 legacy	technology.	
For	 example,	 in	 the	well-known	 2009	 Chint	 vs.	 Schneider	 case,	 the	 registered	 utility	model	
patent	 (ZL97248479.5)	 owned	 by	 Chinese	 company	 Chint	 was	 used	 to	 sue	 the	 French	
company	Schneider	and	its	distributors	over	patent	infringement.	“The	Chinese	company	was	
able	to	settle	the	case	through	arbitration	for	USD	23	million	using	a	utility	model.”170	 This	is	
considered	 a	 successful	 fight	 back	 by	 an	 individual	 Chinese	 company	 against	 an	 acquisition	
threat	from	its	foreign	competitor,	but	also	a	warning	to	foreign	investors	of	the	powerful	use	
of	the	utility	model	by	Chinese	firms.	
Regardless	 of	 the	 growth	 of	 patent	 registrations,	 the	 patent	 quality	 has	 to	 be	 looked	 at	 to	
build	 up	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 IP	 development	 in	 China.171	 In	 the	
renewable	energy	sector,	technology	development	appears	to	have	improved	significantly	 in	
China.172	 According	to	Lee	et	al.,	“by	2009,	China	held	significant	shares	of	worldwide	patents	
in	various	 renewable	energy	 technologies,	 including	over	10%	of	worldwide	patents	 in	wind	
power,	biomass,	and	concentrated	solar	power	(CSP).”173	 Such	numbers,	 if	then	adjusted	by	
the	 geographic	 origin	 of	 the	 parent	 companies	 to	 exclude	 patents	 owned	 by	 foreign	
																																								 																				
170 EPO (n 164); Relevant Patent -the "low voltage and small circuit breakers", is widely used in the construction industry and 
domestic air switch products. This patent is available for alternative products to the traditional electrical protection device- fuse. As 
early as in November 1997 CHINT group has filed to the State Intellectual Property Office of China for a utility model patent 
registered as "ABB S2IM S800S-C ". 
171 Bob Stembridge, ‘Chinese Patenting: Report on the Current State of Innovation in China’ Thomson Reuters 
<http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/TR-China-Patenting-Report.pdf> . 
172 Downey (n 50). 
173 Bernice Lee et. al, Who Owns Our Low Carbon Future? (Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies: A Chatham House 
Report, 2009). 
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subsidiaries,	show	that	Chinese	companies	held	only	about	5	per	cent	to	8	per	cent	of	global	
patents	 in	 those	 types.174	 However,	 countries	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 renewable	 energy	 patenting,	
with	a	high	volume	of	installed	capacity,	are	not	necessarily	scoring	high	on	technology/patent	
quality.	 China	 has	 the	 highest	 installed	 capacity	 for	 solar	 PV	 but	 does	 not	 figure	 in	 the	 top	
owners	of	patents	 in	this	area.175	 Although	there	 is	an	 increase	 in	patenting	 in	China,	 there	
are	significant	gaps	between	the	top	technology	holders	in	the	developed	countries	and	their	
Chinese	rivals.	Chinese	firms	were	granted	a	much	smaller	proportion	of	patents	in	the	three	
big	patent	offices	(US,	Japan	and	the	European	Patent	Office)	than	in	China.176	 According	to	
WIPO	 data	 2015,	 “US	 applicants	 filed	 the	most	 applications	 abroad	 (224,400),	 followed	 by	
those	 from	 Japan	 (200,000)	 and	 Germany	 (105,600).	 Chinese	 applicants	 filed	 only	 around	
36,700.”177	 This	 could	be	an	 indication	of	 the	unusually	high	volume	of	 low-quality	patents	
that	China	has,	giving	under	its	low	standard	for	utility	patent	application.	 	
Patenting	activity	 in	China	 in	2014	outstripped	the	USA	and	Japan	combined.	China’s	patent	
office	received	almost	one	million	applications.	Despite	such	an	explosion	of	Chinese	patents,	
it	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	 in	 terms	 of	 patent	 application	 per	 capita,	 China	 is	 still	
lagging	 behind	 several	 developed	 countries	 with	 high	 innovative	 capability.	 “Per	 capita	
measures	provide	necessary	context	to	date,	and	in	the	case	of	patent	filings,	arguably	better	
																																								 																				
174 Ibid. 
175 See Sarah Helm et.al, Renewable Energy Technology: Evolution and Policy Implications - Evidence from Patent Literature 
(WIPO Global Challenges Report: An Overview of Issues Relevant to Debates about Solutions to Global Challenges, such as 
Climate Change, Public Health and Food Security, 2014). 
176 Pointed out by Ahmed Abdel-Latif, from the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. See Julia Fraser, 
‘WIPO Report Indicates Unprecedented Rise In Renewable Energy Tech Innovation’ (Intellectual Property Watch, 13 June 2014)  
<https://www.ip-watch.org/2014/06/13/wipo-report-indicates-unprecedented-rise-in-renewable-energy-tech-innovation/> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
177 WIPO, Global Patent Filings Rise in 2014 for Fifth Straight Year; China Driving Growth (WIPO 14 December 2015). 
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reflect	penetration	 rates	of	 invention	capacity	 than	absolute	patent	 filings.”178	 According	 to	
the	2014	WIPO	and	World	Bank	 statistics	database,	China	 ranks	number	nine	of	 the	 top	20	
origins	 regarding	 their	 resident	 patent	 applications	 per	 million	 per	 population.179 	 The	
Republic	 of	 Korea	 had	 the	 highest	 resident	 applications-to-population	 ratio,	 followed	 by	
Japan,	 Switzerland,	 and	 Germany.180	 China’s	 resident	 applications-to-population	 ratio	 is	
below	Denmark’s	whose	population	 is	 less	 than	0.5%	of	China’s,	and	below	seven	others.181	
China’s	patent	applications-per-million	capita	is	only	about	a	quarter	of	that	of	Japan	and	half	
of	the	US,	which	lends	a	stark	contrast	to	its	vast	total	applications	in	comparison	with	those	
two	countries.	 	
The	increase	in	Chinese	patent	applications	may	be	due	to	its	design	of	patent	laws,	but	may	
also	be	at	 least	partly	explained	by	the	 financial	 incentives	offered	by	different	 levels	of	 the	
Chinese	government	to	increase	the	use	of	clean	technology.	The	Chinese	national	IP	regime	
started	 to	 incentivize	 green	 patent	 application	 by	 local	 firms	 from	as	 early	 as	 1999	 but	 the	
rapid	growth	 in	 clean-energy	 technology	patents	 in	China	did	not	occur	until	 2004–2005.182	
The	lag	in-between	might	indicate	a	lack	of	financial	incentives	and	market-oriented	policies,	
like	the	Chinese	Renewable	Energy	Law	or	the	five-year	plans	with	their	 targets	 for	reduced	
energy	 intensity	over.	These	 factors	were	more	 influential	 as	 inducements	 for	 innovation	 in	
the	clean	energy	sector	 than	was	 IP	protection.183	 Other	 than	 favourable	domestic	policies,	
																																								 																				
178 Dan Prud'homme, ‘A Statistical Analysis of China’s Patent Quality Situation and Larger Innovation Ecosystem’ in Dan 
Prud'homme (ed), Dulling the Cutting Edge: How Patent-Related Policies and Practices Hamper Innovation in China (European 
Union Chamber of Commerce in China Publications 2012). 
179 WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators 2014 (WIPO Statistics Database, October 2014, 2014). 
180 Ibid. 
181 the Top eight regions in terms of resident patent applications per million population: Republic of Korea, Japan, Switzerland, 
Germany, United States of America, Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
182 Gallagher (n 4). 
183 China has joined the WTO in 2001, and amended IP law to meet requirements of TRIPS were available even earlier. However, 
such IP law reform did not make much difference in incentivising technology development and TT to the country. Ibid (n 4). 
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preferential	government	policies	introduced	to	take	advantage	of	international	environmental	
agreements	are	also	playing	a	key	role	in	the	increase	of	green	patents.	For	example,	between	
1990	and	2008	 the	number	of	 climate	change	mitigating	patents	under	 the	PCT	 in	 this	 field	
increased	 33	 times.	 Among	 them,	 the	 number	 of	 environmental	 patent	 applications	 by	
Chinese	 inventors	 has	 been	 growing	 the	 fastest.184	 Patents	 filed	 for	 technology	 in	 energy	
production	from	renewable	resources,	 in	particular,	 increased	20-fold	from	1990	to	2009.	 In	
contrast,	 the	 total	 patent	 filings	 increase	 only	 by	 about	 four	 times.185	 “The	 growth	 rate	 of	
environmental	 innovations	 is	 more	 significant	 than	 that	 of	 all	 technological	 fields	
combined.”186	 This	 could	 indicate	 that	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 in	 1997	 was	 perhaps	 a	 bigger	
stimulant	than	the	Chinese	Patent	Law	2000.187	 	
However,	 using	 the	 information	 in	 the	 PATSTAT	 database,188	 the	 OECD	 has	 found	 that	
“Chinese	domestic	companies	are	more	competitive	in	the	midstream189	 and	downstream190	
parts	of	the	industry	chain	while	they	still	rely	on	foreign	technologies	for	the	upstream	part,	
which	 requires	 more	 investment	 and	 technological	 capabilities.”191	 With	 a	 significantly	
growing	number	of	patent	applications,	China’s	technological	development	will	be	confronted	
with	a	considerable	amount	of	existing	less-innovative	patents	and	low	technology	capability	
in	 the	 upstream	 industry.	 Such	 a	 sceptical	 view	 is	 confirmed	 by	 results	 from	 interviews	
																																								 																				
184 Patents are classified by priority date and according to the inventor’s country of residence. Fractional accounts are applied to 
patents which have several inventors. OECD (n 159). 
185 ‘World Patent Report: A Statistical Review - 2008 edition’ (WIPO)  
<http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/wipo_pub_931.html> accessed May 2017. 
186 Figuiere (n 160). 
187 Ibid. 
188 It is a worldwide patent statistical database, known as EPO European Patent Office PATSTAT. 
189 For example, in the energy industry the midstream sector involves electricity transportation (i.e. cables and construction of 
these products). 
190 Downstream sector is highly related to the final products purchased by end users. In the wind power industry, for example, the 
refining of assembling blades, engine and the construction of wind tower shall be considered as downstream sectors. 
191 Figuiere (n 160). 
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conducted	 in	 this	 research.	 Let’s	 take	 the	 wind	 energy	 sector	 as	 an	 example:	 on	 the	
macro-national	 level,	 Chinese	 activity	 in	 renewable	 power	 technologies	 has	 risen	 sharply	 in	
recent	 years.192	 In	 2011,	 “global	 wind	 power	 patent	 applications	 by	 applicants	 from	 China	
totalled	 2600,	 compared	 to	 3044	 for	 EU-15193	 applicants	 and	 1234	 for	 US	 applicants.”194	
However,	only	52	per	cent	of	all	wind	patents	registered	at	the	Chinese	Patent	Office	belongs	
in	 the	 invention	 patent	 category.195	 The	 remaining	 were	 utility-model	 and	 design	 patent	
types,	which	lack	rigour	with	respect	to	their	novelty	assessment.	Most	of	the	interviewees196	
had	expressed	that	a	certain	amount	of	the	so-called	independently	developed	wind	turbines	
were	 actually	 products	 assembled	 from	 hardware	 that	 had	 been	 imported.	 In	 addition,	 a	
Chinese	policy	 aiming	at	 encouraging	 innovation	 in	China	 requires	 that	70	per	 cent	of	wind	
energy	 installation	has	 to	use	 indigenous	equipment.197	 As	a	 result,	a	pattern	of	 fabrication	
using	parts	made	in	foreign	factories	is	embedded	in	the	soil	of	China’s	political	environment.	
This	 observation	 is	 supported	 by	 Gosens	 and	 Lu198	 who	 identify	 a	 much	 lower	 number	 of	
patent	applications	by	Chinese	wind	turbine	manufacturers	than	by	their	foreign	competitors.	
																																								 																				
192 Patrick Bayer et.al, ‘Global Patterns of Renewable Energy Innovation, 1990–2009’ (2003) 17 Energy for Sustainable 
Development 288 p.288-295. 
193 the 15 EU countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
194 Analysis of online databases from European Patent Office (EPO) (2012), State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) (2012) by 
Gosens and Lu, (n 86) p.301–318. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Interview with wall three managers recruited from wind projects. 
197 The "National Development and Reform Commission notice of relevant requirements on wind power construction 
management" issued in 2005 articulates: "wind power equipment localization rate shall reach more than 70%, wind project that 
does not meet the requirements of the localization rate of equipment will not be approved." Because of this policy, from 2006 
onwards, China's endogenous wind power installed capacity reached a approximate 100% increased rate annually. During the time, 
the Chinese government also provided financial subsidies and other favourable policies to further support the development of its 
domestic wind power equipment manufacturers. The abolishment of the "70% localization rate", although not officially announced 
in written document, has been made to known by the end of 2009 to the relevant provincial authorities. And it has actually been 
implemented. It has been implemented for 5 years, "the 70% localization rate of wind power equipment” policy has become history. 
Liu Yanjun, the Chinese spokesman of the world's largest Danish wind turbine manufacturer Vestas, points out that currently Vestas 
products available in the Chinese market are produced 80% locally in China to satisfy the policy. The bespoke V60-850 kilowatts 
turbine for China is manufactured 90% in China. Therefore, the abolishment of the "70% localization rate" is very important to 
those who want to enter the Chinese market as it is making the entry easier. But still, more advanced equipment such as the 3 MW 
turbine parts are not fully absorbed by the domestic suppliers/manufacturers. The need of import remains high, for example, most 
core components of Sinovel 3 MW wind turbines are imported from the United States. 
198 Details see Fig 3 of Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
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Despite	the	limited	independent	technology	capacity	of	Chinese	wind	turbine	manufacturers,	
they	 are	 still	 keen	 on	 filing	 patents	 meaning	 that	 they	 intend	 to	 pursue	 a	 decent-looking	
patent	portfolio.	This	is	because	the	more	patents	possessed,	the	better	position	a	company	
will	be	in	during	project	tenders	because	owning	many	patents	is	considered	as	a	qualification	
of	 reputable	 suppliers.	 It	 is	 much	 easier	 for	 companies	 with	 a	 good	 “reputation”	 to	 get	
favourable	policies	 from	the	state	and	 local	government,	which	has,	on	 the	other	hand,	 left	
smaller	and	start-up	companies	to	face	a	difficult	situation.199	 	
In	fact,	patent	growth	in	numbers	only	indicates	a	rough	trend	of	technology	development,	as	
more	 applicants	 are	 getting	 protection	 from	 being	 infringed	 by	 potential	 imitators.	 Neither	
does	 it	 necessarily	 reﬂect	 the	 amount	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 TT	 from	developed	 countries	 to	
China	 nor	 the	 technology-capacity	 growth	 as	 a	whole. In	 addition,	 in	 some	 cases	 inventions	
may	be	protected	by	 strategic	measures	used	by	 technology	owners,	 such	as	 trade	 secrets,	
production	or	operation	 know-how,	and	well-planned	 cross-filing.200	 Many	 companies	 from	
developed	countries	are	selective	about	which	 inventions	are	to	be	filed	 in	China.	They	only	
patent	 inventions	 that	 they	 absolutely	must	market	 in	 China,	 at	 a	minimum	 level,	 to	 avoid	
publicly	 disclosing	 too	 many	 technological	 details.201	 Only	 blueprints	 and	 other	 technical	
information	that	is	closely	relevant	to	the	end	product	sold	in	China	is	being	patented.	More	
upstream	 technologies	 and	 even	 channels	 to	 purchase	 materials	 for	 consumables	 and	
components	to	the	imported	equipment	are	undisclosed	thus	mainly	protected	as	a	business	
																																								 																				
199 indicated by interviewee from the government officer group that has participated in one of the three wind projects. 
200 Ivan Haščič and Nick Johnstone, ‘CDM and International Technology Transfer: Empirical Evidence on Wind Power’ (2011) 11 
Climate Policy 1303. 
201 Ros Davidson, ‘Wind Manufacturers Act to Defend Intellectual Property Rights’ (Wind Power Monthly, 26 January 2012)  
<http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1114292/wind-manufacturers-act-defend-intellectual-property-rights> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
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secret.202	 The	 core	 components	 used	 on	 wind	 turbines	 in	 China	 are	 basically	 imported,	 as	
there	 are	 currently	 no	 comparable	 indigenous	 alternatives	 available	 in	 the	 market.	 For	
example,	the	stable	performance	of	a	wind	turbine	is	mainly	dependent	on	the	quality	of	 its	
wind	blades.	The	engine	motor	and	spindle	are	of	secondary	importance.	First,	imported	wind	
blades	 are	 manufactured	 under	 fastidious	 production	 procedures	 and	 the	 material	 used	
provides	minimum	deformation	 rate,	which	will	 adapt	 to	 a	 variety	 of	wind	 speeds.	 Second,	
these	blades	are	highly	concentric	between	the	spindle	and	the	outer	circle.	Third,	they	have	a	
high	 precision	 of	 balance,	 with	 only	 a	 0.4	 to	 1.0	 deviation.	 These	 three	 features	 are	 so	
advanced	 that	 none	 of	 the	 domestic	 turbine	 manufacturers	 are	 able	 to	 compete	 in	 their	
manufacture.	Chinese	wind	 farms	 reported	 that	 replacement	 components	provided	by	 joint	
ventures	 and	 local	 suppliers	 had	 a	 much	 higher	 failure	 rate	 in	 operation.203	 Frequently	
requested	 mechanical	 parts,	 such	 as	 electricity	 relays,	 are	 usually	 demand	 for	 highly	
specialized	steel	components	used	 in	axle	and	yaw	bearings.204	 Therefore,	 they	are	entirely	
dependent	on	imports	because	domestic	manufacturers	are	unable	to	provide	products	good	
enough	to	be	applied. 	
6.5.2 R & D development in renewable energy 
As	patent	growth	does	not	necessarily	 indicate	 the	 success	of	 the	amended	Chinese	 IP	 law,	
neither	 does	 it	 mean	 sufficient	 TT	 is	 flowing	 into	 the	 country.	 Two	 things	 stand	 out	 in	
explaining	the	weak	linkage	between	IP	law	reform	and	the	increase	of	TT.	First,	the	Chinese	
																																								 																				
202 According to statement from interviewees of this research. 
203 All manager and technician interviewees from wind projects pointed out this problem. 
204 LI Junfeng et. al, ‘China Wind Energy Outlook 2012’ Chinese Wind Energy Association 2012 
<http://www.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/China-Outlook-2012-EN.pdf> accessed Feburary 20127; And see Jingyi Han 
et.al, ‘Onshore Wind Power Development in China: Challenges Behind a Successful Story’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 2941 p.2941–
2951.  
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government	is	determined	to	encourage	the	domestic	innovation	rate	with	big	commitments	
from	 itself.	 For	 example,	 between	 2004	 and	 2008,	 the	 funding	 for	 science	 and	 technology	
activities	in	China	increased	by	111	per	cent.205	 As	a	result,	expenditure	on	R	&	D	grew	by	135	
per	 cent	 and	 increased	 as	 a	 share	 of	GDP	 from	1.23	 per	 cent	 to	 1.54	 per	 cent.206	 In	 2014,	
government	investment	in	renewable	energy	R	&	D	even	leaped	to	$1.7	billion.207	 This	could	
be	a	solid	reason	explaining	the	patent	 inflation	 in	China.208	 Indeed,	 in	order	 to	narrow	the	
gap	 between	 China	 and	 the	 industrialized	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 technological	 intensity,	 the	
Chinese	 government	 has	 been	 providing	 more	 and	 more	 resources	 to	 R	 &	 D	 activities,	
especially	 in	 the	 environmental	 sector,	 since	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 1990s.209	 Therefore,	 the	
increase	 in	 environmental	 patents	 in	 China	 could	 reveal	 the	 authorities’	 concerns	 for	
environmental	protection	(more	than	the	strengthened	IP	and	global	effort	perspectives)	for	
encouraging	 the	 diffusion	 of	 renewable	 energy	 technologies. Although	 the	 Chinese	
government	 devotes	 considerable	 financial	 resources	 to	 environmental	 technology	 R	 &	 D,	
human	resources	in	this	field	remain	low.210	 In	2008,	R	&	D	labour	per	thousand	of	the	total	
employment	in	China,	was	still	at	least	3	units	below	other	developed	countries.211	 	
Second,	the	Chinese	government	has	implemented	policies	which	encourage	FDI	to	maximize	
spill	 overs	 of	 foreign	 knowledge	 and	 TTs.212	 For	 example,	 between	 2000	 and	 2010,	 the	
																																								 																				
205 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2009 (China Statistics Press, 2009) p.820. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Prud'homme (n 178). 
208 See Roman Kilisek, ‘Higher R&D Investment in Renewable Energy Technologies Critical for Clean-Energy Innovation & 
Climate Action’ (Breaking Energy, 13 May 2015)  
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number	 of	 foreign-invested	 R	 &	 D	 centres	 increased	 from	 fewer	 than	 200	 to	 more	 than	
1,300.213	 A	proportionate	relationship	between	FDI	and	patent	application	is	even	applicable	
domestically	among	provinces.	In	China,	according	to	Cheung	and	Lin,214	 provinces	with	more	
FDI	have	more	domestic	patent	applications.	“They	attribute	this	to	a	form	of	spill	over	from	
foreign	 investment	 –	 namely,	 a	 demonstrative	 effect	 on	 domestic	 enterprises.”215	 FDI	
through	joint	ventures	and	wholly	foreign-owned	companies	is	provided	with	a	tax	rebate	on	
capital	 goods	 imports	 and	 other	 tax	 exemptions.	 But	 in	 return	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 some	
requirements,	such	as	the	adoption	of	“advanced	technologies	to	develop	new	products;	save	
energy	and	natural	 resources;	 improve	existing	products	 and/or	 replace	 imported	products;	
provide	 technological	 and	organizational	 training;	and	pursue	 some	economic	activities	 that	
favour	technological	upgrading.”216	 Government	at	different	levels	also	has	“local	policies	or	
regulations	on	land	or	tax	concessions	to	attract	foreign	investment	and	technology.”217	
Accordingly,	 R	 &	 D	 investment	 from	 abroad	 increased	 substantially	 in	 China.	 More	 foreign	
multinational	R	&	D	centres	were	established	in	the	country.	This	indicates	a	positive	trend	of	
China’s	 innovative	 capacity	 development	 alongside	 its	 patent	 growth.	 For	 example,	 “at	 the	
end	of	 2011,	 there	were	over	1,400	 foreign-invested	R	&	D	 centres	 in	China,”218	 and	more	
collaboration	between	Chinese	and	foreign	companies	occur	in	R	&	D.219	 A	survey	finds	that	
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2.2	per	cent	of	EU	companies’	outward	R	&	D	investment	is	designated	to	go	to	China.220	 As	a	
result,	 while	 China	 is	 becoming	 an	 increasingly	 attractive	 place	 for	 R	 &	 D	 investment	 from	
abroad,	 the	 number	 of	 patent	 applications	within	 the	 region	 is	 growing	 as	 well.	 Song	 et.al	
confirmed	 that	R	&	D	 intensification	 in	China	 is	one	of	 the	primary	driving	 forces	of	China’s	
patent	boom.221	
However,	 the	 potential	 of	 such	 investment	 to	 promote	 China’s	 technology	 capability	 is	
limited,	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 these	 investments	 is	 relatively	 low	 at	 present.	 According	 to	 the	
same	survey	mentioned	above,	on	average,	 the	“EU	firms’	R	&	D	 investment	 in	China	 is	not	
projected	 to	 rise	 by	more	 than	 3%	 (to	 about	 5%	 of	 total	 R	 &	 D	 expenditures)	 in	 2013.”222	
More	 importantly	 the	 R	 &	 D	 collaboration	 that	 is	 in	 place	 does	 not	 necessarily	 involve	
breakthrough	 and	 core	 technologies.	 According	 to	Wu	 and	 Pangarkar,	 FDI	 flows	 to	 mainly	
low-tech	industries	in	China.223	 A	similar	conclusion	is	found	in	another	study	that	points	out	
that	technologies	transferred	to	China	are	usually	“at	least	five	years	behind	global	standards	
or	 transfer	 technologies	 that	 would	 be	 obsolete	 in	 the	 near	 future.”224	 Some	 studies225	
argue	that	this	reluctance	is	likely	attribute	to	perceived	weak	IPR	protection	in	China.	In	fact,	
this	could	be	due	to	companies’	natural	 instinct	to	keep	their	core	R	&	D	in	headquarters	or	
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other	more	IP-mature	areas	instead	of	dispersing	their	highly	innovative	efforts	elsewhere,	in	
order	to	prevent	unnecessary	competition.	It	is	possible	that	entities	with	the	most	advanced	
and	 high	 quality	 patents	 in	 the	 world	 deliberately	 not	 to	 develop	 breakthrough	 patented	
products	 in	 potential	 competitors’	 countries	 regardless	 of	 the	 level	 of	 IP	 protection,	 and	
perhaps	especially	in	China.	This	might	be	attributed	to	the	country’s	large-scale	economy	and	
the	 acquiescent,	 preferential	 government	 support	 that	 is	 available	 to	 domestic	 firms	 and	
which	assists	them	in	commercializing	imported	technologies,	making	them	affordable	quickly	
once	they	are	transferred.	Foreign	firms	may	be	reluctant	to	develop	such	products	in	China	
given	concerns	over	the	competency	of	development	by	Chinese	firms	and	the	potential	risk	
of	 lost	 sales	 in	 other	markets	 abroad.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 IP	 protection	 provided	 by	 the	
legal	system	is	acting	as	a	harbour	for	the	anti-competitive	and	diffusion-hindering	behaviour	
of	technology	owners.	
As	 a	 result,	 in	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sector,	 although	 China	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 highest	
producers	 in	 the	 field	 of	 renewable	 energy	 and	 possesses	 the	 relevant	 equipment226	 (for	
example	more	than	half	the	global	output	of	solar	photovoltaic	(PV)	panels),227	 its	indigenous	
companies	 are	 still	 more	 engaged	 in	 the	 midstream	 and	 downstream	 industry	 chain	 (the	
production	 of	 modules	 and	 cells)	 and	 owns	 fewer	 core	 technologies.228	 The	 situation	 is	
amplified	 in	 the	wind	energy	sector.	Rapid	growth	 in	Chinese	wind	turbine	manufacturing	 is	
reflected	 by	 a	 44	 per	 cent	 share	 of	 the	 market	 by	 domestic	 providers	 in	 2012.	 Such	 an	
increase	 is	 due	 to	 clearly	 favouring	 and	 significant	 financial	 support	 from	 the	 Chinese	
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government.	 According	 to	 the	 GWEC	 Global	 Wind	 Report,229 	 the	 Chinese	 government	
requires	 70	per	 cent	 of	 all	 installed	projects	 in	 the	 country	 to	have	 “domestically	 produced	
content.”	 	
A	possible	reason	for	this	increase	in	foreign	invested	R&D	could	be	the	economic	recession	of	
2008	 in	 China,	 with	 the	 government	 desperate	 to	 stimulate	 domestic	 demand	 instead	 of	
relying	on	export	to	keep	the	economy	growing.	In	2005	the	Notice	of	the	National	DRC	on	the	
Relevant	Requirements	for	Wind	Power	Construction	Management	was	promulgated.230	 The	
Notice	requires	localization	rate	of	wind	power	equipment	installation	to	reach	more	than	70	
per	cent.	Wind	farms	unable	to	comply	with	the	localization	requirement	will	not	be	approved	
to	proceed.	From	2006	this	has	increased	the	Chinese	wind	power	capacity	by	nearly	100	per	
cent	 annually.231	 Subsequent	 government	 policies	 regarding	 subsidies	 and	 other	 assistance	
gave	more	support	to	the	development	of	domestic	wind	power	manufacturers.	Abolition	of	
the	70	per	cent	localization	requirement232	 was	relayed	to	each	province	in	China	in	2009	for	
implementation.	 Such	 protectionism,	 enacted	 for	 only	 five	 years,	 forced	 foreign	 firms	 to	
establish	joint	ventures	with	domestic	industries	under	the	restrictive	quota	requirement	and	
encouraged	many	purely	foreign-funded	factories	to	set	up	in	China.	This	is	referred	to	as	FDI	
in	many	articles233	 and	considered	to	be	an	 important	mechanism	of	TT.234	 Such	TT	among	
affiliated	 firms	 is	 a	 mechanism	 that	 “usually	 involves	 large	 resource	 commitments	 and	
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provides	a	high	degree	of	control	over	the	technology	that	is	transferred.”235	 In	fact,	leading	
manufacturers	 such	 as	 Vestas,	 GE,	 and	 Repower	 all	 have	 subsidiary	 factories	 in	 China.	
Indirectly,	 these	 FDIs	 facilitated	 Chinese	 indigenous	 turbine	 manufacturers	 in	 developing	
smaller	 capacity	wind	 turbines	 by	 learning	 from	 the	market	 leaders	 from	 overseas.	 Vestas’	
Chinese	district	 spokesman	Yanjun	 Liu	 pointed	out	 that	 the	 localization	 rate	of	wind	power	
installation	 in	 China	 had	 reached	 80	 per	 cent	 already.236	 But	 neither	 the	 purely	 indigenous	
nor	the	foreign-funded	manufacturers	are	exempted	from	depending	on	foreign	technologies	
for	the	consumable	parts,	which	is	characterized	by	strong	barriers	to	entry.237	 	
Therefore,	 on	 the	 surface,	 the	 70	 per	 cent	 localization-rate	 policy	 encouraged	 TT	 to	 China,	
while	 in	 fact	 it	 motivated	 companies	 to	 enter	 the	 industry	more	 carelessly.	 In	 the	 primary	
stage	of	the	use	of	political	incentives	to	encourage	wind	power,	many	defective	policies	were	
established.	 Some	 private	 investors	 initiated	wind	 turbine	 projects	 on	 purpose	 to	 occupy	 a	
piece	 of	 land	 granted	 by	 the	 favoured	 policies,	 and	 many	 poorly	 qualified	 manufacturers	
attempted	to	produce	wind	turbines.	As	a	result,	even	 in	the	small	city	of	Weihai,	 there	are	
three	turbine	manufacturing	enterprises	now.	Businesses	supplying	turbines	can	be	found	in	
even	 a	 small	 city	 such	 as	 Rongcheng.	 Currently	 the	 company	 has	 only	 two	 sample	 units	
installed	in	Inner	Mongolia	as	a	pilot,	and	more	than	20	turbines	waiting	in	the	warehouse	for	
purchase.	This	 is	an	unhealthy	dynamic	and	a	waste	of	resources.	 In	theory,	R	&	D	activities	
should	correspond	to	the	sales	volumes	of	Chinese	manufacturers	and	FDI	received.	According	
																																								 																				
235 See general Slavo Radosevic, International Technology Transfer and Catch-up in Economic Development (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 1999); Sharmila Vishwasrao, ‘Royalties vs. Fees: How do Firms Pay for Foreign Technology?’ (2007) 25 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 741; João Leitão and Rui Baptista, ‘Inward FDI and ICT: Are They a Joint Technological Driver 
of Entrepreneurship?’ (2011) 10 International Journal of Technology Transfer and Commercialisation 268. 
236 The V60-850 kW turbines tailor-made for wind farms located in China has even reached a localization rate of 90%. 
237 Figuiere (n 160). 
	 290	
to	the	interviewees,	although	the	Chinese	wind	turbine	suppliers	currently	have	the	majority	
of	 the	market	 share,	 the	most	 advanced	 components	 for	 3	MW	 and	 higher	 wind	 turbines	
cannot	be	manufactured	in	China.	Chinese	wind	turbine	manufactures,	even	the	sales	leaders	
Sinovel	and	Gold	Wind,	rely	on	licences	to	assembly	core	components	such	as	the	rotor	and	
gearbox	 that	 are	 imported	 from	 the	 US238	 and	 Germany.239 More	 than	 half	 of	 the	 existing	
Chinese	turbine	manufacturers	are	still	heavily	dependent	on	assembling	under	licences	from	
foreign	manufacturers.240	 Production	 of	 these	 factories	 is	 mainly	 “supporting	 systems	 that	
account	for	a	small	proportion	of	the	total	costs	of	the	entire	wind	turbine.”241	 	
The	indigenous	companies:	Xiangtan	Electric,242	 Sany,243	 and	Envision,244	 on	the	other	hand,	
have	 better	 technology	 capabilities	 because	 they	 used	 to	 be	 large	 heavy	 machinery	 and	
power-generation	 equipment	 manufacturers.	 As	 such,	 they	 have	 a	 certain	 experience	 of	
electricity	 generator	 engineering	 and	 a	 base	 point	 from	 which	 to	 conduct	 further	 R	 &	 D	
activities.	For	example,	Envision,	which	has	set	up	“R	&	D	centres	 in	Denmark,	China,	 Japan	
and	the	US,	as	well	as	collaboration	centres	at	a	number	of	Chinese	universities”,	endeavours	
to	independently	develop	turbine	design.245 With	stronger	imitation	and	reverse-engineering	
ability,	 these	 Chinese	 manufacturers	 intend	 to	 develop	 wind	 turbine	 design	 as	 a	 whole.	
Therefore,	 they	tend	to	collaborate	with	 licence	 issuers	or	other	manufacturers	 to	carry	out	
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collaborative	research.246	 These	firms	are	very	likely	to	become	powerful	competitors	to	the	
current	technology	owners,	although	not	yet.	 	
Despite	 R	 &	 D	 growth	 among	 Chinese	 entities,	 there	 are	 still	 notable	 gaps	 between	 these	
domestic	 manufacturers	 and	 the	 international	 industry	 leaders.	 For	 example,	 although	 the	
Xiangtan	 Electric	 has	 long-term	 experience	 of	 power	 machinery	 production,	 they	 are	 still	
lacking	 the	capability	of	building	a	high-quality	generator	 for	wind	power.	These	generators	
are	specially	required	for	 low	frequency	(10–20	rpm)	which	is	unfamiliar	to	Xiangtan	Electric	
who	 used	 to	 provide	 ones	 designed	 for	 thermal	 power	 plants,	 which	 are	 high-frequency	
generators	 (3000	 rpm).	 Additionally,	 many	 affiliated	 facilities	 are	 required	 and	 these	 new	
turbine	 manufacturers,	 in	 a	 weaker	 market	 position,	 find	 it	 harder	 to	 profit	 from	 sales.	
Regarding	Xiangtan	Electric,	although	it	rang	up	more	than	10	billion	Yuans	in	yearly	sales,	its	
net	 profit	 is	 only	 tens	 of	millions	per	 year.	 To	 narrow	 these	 gaps	 as	 soon	 as	 possible	 some	
Chinese	 firms	 are	 trying	 a	 new	 modality	 of	 TT,	 namely	 company	 acquisition:	 purchasing	
foreign	 firms	 to	 get	 their	 IPR.	 For	 example,	 Goldwind	 has	 acquired	 the	 German	 company	
Vensys	Energy	AG	to	strengthen	its	R	&	D	abilities.247	 	
Such	short	cuts	to	 improving	R	&	D	are	more	evident	 in	the	Chinese	biomass	energy	sector.	
The	majority	of	the	approved	CDM	biomass	projects	are	initiated	by	Guoneng.248	 As	early	as	
2003,	the	president	of	Guoneng	began	to	investigate	biomass	energy	technology	in	Denmark	
in	order	to	introduce	biomass	power	generation	project	to	the	Chinese	market.	After	a	month	
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of	 on-the-spot	 investigation	 in	 Denmark,	 Guoneng	 decided	 to	 introduce	 biomass	 boiler	
technology	 from	 BWE,	 one	 of	 the	most	 reputable	 companies	 in	 the	 area.	 Some	 core	 parts	
were	imported	with	royalties	also	paid	to	BWE,	and	Jinan	Boiler	Group	Co.	Ltd	was	contracted	
to	assemble	and	install	boilers.	Each	boiler	was	then	sold	for	60	million	Yuan,	1.5	times	higher	
than	a	domestic	boiler,	which	was	 remarkably	expensive	at	 the	 time.	Thirty	per	 cent	of	 the	
sale	price	was	paid	for	the	license,	accounting	for	presumably	half	of	the	profits.	Even	so,	due	
to	encouraging	policies	on	renewable	energy	projects	and	financial	support	from	international	
resources,	such	as	the	CDM,	Guoneng	has	developed	rapidly	 in	both	capital	and	operational	
strength.	Although	 taking	 a	 limited	 share	 of	 the	 profits,	 five	 years	 later	 in	 2008,	Guoneng’s	
sister	 company	LoonG	was	able	 to	acquire	another	equally	qualified	Demark	biomass	boiler	
company	 –	 Bioener.	 In	 the	 first	 stage,	 LoonG	 acquired	 a	 full	 set	 of	 biomass	 furnace	
technology,	introduced	through	licensing,	and	soon	after	LoonG	convinced	Bioener	to	export	
some	 core	 technology	 engineers	 to	work	 in	 China	 and	 enticed	 these	 employees	with	 stock	
shares	in	the	Chinese	enterprise.	Using	the	opportunity	of	the	global	recession	in	2008,	LoonG	
acquired	 Bioener,	 thereby	 all	 succeeding	 installed	 boilers	 in	 Guoneng	 projects	 became	
indigenously	produced.	Until	this	acquisition,	China,	at	least	one	Chinese	firm,	has	updated	its	
technology	to	the	most	advanced	level.249	
6.5.3 Transfer of know-how 
Undeniably,	 the	role	China	 is	now	playing	 in	 the	global	 renewable	energy	market	cannot	be	
underestimated,	particularly	in	the	solar	power	sector	and	the	biomass	energy	sector	where	it	
has	 acquired	 advanced	 international	 manufacturing	 companies,	 fully	 absorbing	 the	
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technology	and	innovation	for	 its	 large	domestic	market.	Except	for	Chinese	firms’	proactive	
efforts,	 TT	 to	 China,	 especially	 in	 less	 tangible	 forms,	 is	 rather	 immature	 at	 present.	 For	
example,	most	of	our	 interviewees250	 were	 sceptical	 about	 the	operational	performance	of	
wind	turbines	produced	domestically	and	acknowledged	that	“the	quality	gap	between	these	
indigenous	 equipment	 and	 imported	 turbines	 are	 significant.”251	 Moreover,	 in	 comparison	
with	the	global	market	leaders,	such	as	Vestas,	GE,	and	Siemens,	the	Chinese	manufacturers	
are	 weaker	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 independent	 technology	 and	 innovation,	 because	 they	 have	
rather	 lower	 patent	 registration	 numbers	 in	 this	 area	 of	 technology	 and	 use	 less	
state-of-the-art	technology	in	their	turbine	models.252	 Such	deficiencies	are	due	to	a	shorter	
history	 of	 turbine	 design	 in	 China,	 something	which	would	 have	 built	 a	 solid	 foundation	 of	
know-how	on	top	of	patents.	 	
Know-how	is	of	vital	importance	even	when	a	patent	licence	has	been	acquired.	Although	the	
patented	technology	is	supposed	to	be	repeatable	under	defined	experimental	conditions,	the	
environment,	 skills	 of	 workers	 and	 raw	 materials	 used	 by	 another	 experimenter	 will	 be	
different	during	processing.	Therefore,	without	technical	know-how,	results	may	not	be	ideal.	
TT	 even	 fails	 completely	 in	 some	 extreme	 cases.	 Also,	 many	 experienced	 foreign	
manufacturers	are	strict	with	operational	requirements,	ranging	from	temperature	control	to	
environment	and	quality	control.	For	example,	in	alloy	production,	a	minor	difference	in	raw	
materials	will	lead	to	varying	amounts	of	impurities	in	the	alloy	and	the	ceramic	powder	made	
from	them.	In	turn,	entirely	different	products	could	have	been	made	with	the	same	formula.	
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As	 a	 result,	 products	 based	 on	 patented	 formula	 licensing,	 even	 using	 imported	 source	
materials,	could	have	a	low	pass	rate	under	quality	assurance	requirements.	Abundant	details	
and	possible	variables	could	be	beyond	the	imagination	of	Chinese	manufacturers.	Experience	
and	 assistance	 from	 foreign	 experts	 are	 thus	 an	 indispensable	 part	 of	 a	 successful	 TT.	
Information	 regarding	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 production	 line,	 process	 control,	 personnel	
training,	 product	 testing	 and	 so	 on,	 is	 crucial	 to	 achieving	 the	 acceptable	 performance	 of	
finished	 products	 at	 a	 better-qualified	 rate.	 Interviewees253 	 implied	 that	 some	 highly	
advanced	 technologies	 require	particular	precision	while	others	need	 less.	 For	example,	 the	
alloys	used	in	aircraft	engines	are	designed	with	extreme	accuracy;	such	technology	is	simply	
impossible	to	acquire	without	essential	know-how	being	transferred.	In	comparison,	the	same	
alloy	 if	 used	 to	 build	 human	 joints	 does	 not	 require	 the	 same	 degree	 of	 precision	 in	 its	
formulation.	 For	 highly	 fine	 and	 sensitive	 technologies,	 it	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	
commercialize	them	through	reverse-engineering.	
In	the	field	of	renewable	energy,	technology	directors	sent	from	foreign	manufacturers	have	
played	 a	 prominent	 role	 during	 the	 construction	 of	 wind	 farms	 in	 China.254	 These	 experts	
introduced	 detailed	 technical	 standard	 operational	 procedures	meticulously,	 even	 down	 to	
trivial	minutiae	such	as	the	driving	route	of	the	cranes	hired.	In	the	beginning,	many	domestic	
wind	farms	did	not	use	this	production	method	and	had	 inflexible	ways	of	doing	things.	But	
later	experience	proved	the	significance	of	such	know-how	when	properly	applied	and	how	it	
ensured	 the	 performance	 of	 equipment	 during	 operation	 with	 better	 safety	 and	 stability	
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during	operations.	In	fact,	the	failure	rate	of	these	imported	power	generators	is	relatively	low	
and	requires	only	a	regular	maintenance	shutdown	every	2,000	hours.	Such	stable	operation	
performance	provided	the	wind	farms	with	complete	control	over	production.	 	
In	 the	 biomass	 power	 sector,	 a	 project 255 	 that	 employs	 a	 biogas	 power	 generation	
methodology	 has	 chosen	 German	 generators	 (now	 acquired	 by	 GE).	 Danish	 experts	
recommended	 by	 the	 CDM	 investor	 provided	 information,	 including	 the	 screening	 of	 raw	
materials;	 a	 series	 of	 quality	 control	 tests	 and	 so	 on;	 together	 with	 strict	 operational	
standards.	As	a	result,	this	imported	device	can	provide	8,000	stable	full-load	hours	per	year.	
Compared	 with	 other	 Chinese	 biomass	 power	 plants	 using	 domestic	 equipment,	 such	
operational	 performance	 is	 peerless.	 Eventually,	 the	 biomass	 power	 plant	 established	 a	
specialized	 team	 comprised	 of	 Chinese	 nationals,	 including	 maintenance,	 operator,	
management,	and	technology	staff,	which	enables	them	to	run	well,	independently,	and	to	be	
capable	of	innovating	and	patenting.	The	technical	director	of	the	company	revealed	that	she	
was	 sceptical	 and	 at	 first	 hesitated	 about	 introducing	 a	 lot	 of	 monitoring	 devices	
recommended	 by	 the	 experts	 but	 eventually	 she	 and	 her	 team	 were	 convinced	 of	 the	
necessity	 for	 this	 equipment	 in	 keeping	 them	 informed	 of	 the	 running	 status	 of	 their	
company.	 Although	 technology	 know-how	was	 sometimes	 considered	 to	 be	 expensive	 and	
unnecessary,	it	is	now	getting	more	attention	by	the	Chinese	for	the	value	it	has	on	long-term	
operation	and	efficiency	improvements.	 	
Another	 example	 that	 reflects	 the	 importance	 of	 know-how	 is	 found	 in	 the	 areas	 of	
installation	 and	 customer	 service.	 Interviewees	 tell	 of	 how	 the	 “quality	 difference	 between	
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imported	turbines	and	domestic	ones	made	under	license	is	considerable.”256	 For	example,	a	
common	 gearbox	 failure	 was	 discovered	 in	 the	 first	 batch	 of	 wind	 turbines	 produced	 by	
Goldwind	after	 a	 few	years	of	 putting	 them	 in	operation.	Many	wind	 farms	 throughout	 the	
country	were	queuing	 for	 repairs	and	 it	 took	more	than	half	a	year	 to	get	 it	 fixed.	Shanghai	
Electric	began	to	develop	turbines	relatively	later	than	the	other	Chinese	manufacturers	and	it	
purchased	 foreign	 gearboxes.	However,	 they	 cleaned	 the	 gearbox	 two	 times	 instead	of	 five	
times	as	required	by	the	foreign	supplier	before	installation,	resulting	in	an	oil	leakage	which	
held	up	the	operation	of	the	wind	farm.	In	contrast,	the	Danish	company	Vestas	accumulated	
a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 know-how.	 As	 part	 of	 its	 presale	 service,	 Vestas	 demanded	 that	 it	
undertake	a	micro-site	selection	for	the	wind	farms.	Even	though	some	Chinese	buyers	prefer	
conducting	 the	work	 by	 themselves,	 Vestas	 insisted	 on	 doing	 so	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 proper	
turbine	 performance	 during	 operation.	 Site	 selection	 demands	 a	 lot	 of	 experience	 and	
knowledge	in	the	area.	For	example,	some	operators	had	installed	a	turbine	at	the	edge	of	the	
cliff	 expecting	 better	 wind	 resources,	 whereas	 the	 up-flow	 winds	 at	 the	 cliff-edge	 affect	
turbine	blades	that	are	designed	to	cope	only	with	parallel	air	flow.	The	lack	of	such	services	
provided	by	Chinese	wind	turbine	manufacturers	resulted	in	higher	failure	rate.	 	
The	 transfer	 of	 know-how	 is	 generally	 insufficient,	 at	 least	 partly	 due	 to	 a	 less	 established	
legal	environment	to	protect	and	encourage	such	TT.	There	are	several	different	versions	of	
know-how	interpretation	 in	the	Chinese	context.	The	term	can	be	understood	together	with	
many	 other	 concepts	 such	 as	 "technical	 secret,"	 "trade	 secret,"	 "industrial	 and	 commercial	
secret,"	 "proprietary	 technology,"	 "non-patent	 technology,"	 and	 so	 forth;	 and	 sometimes	
																																								 																				
256 interview with manager participated in the Shandong Haiyang Qiuershan Wind Power Project, and similar opinion can be found 
in interviews with management group interviewees from all three wind projects. 
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these	 terms	are	 interchangeable.	Most	 scholars	 use	 the	 term	 "proprietary	 technology"	 as	 a	
substitute	 for	 know-how.	While	 “know-how,”	 "trade	 secrets,"	 "proprietary	 technology"	 and	
"non-patent	 technology"	 are	 all	 used	 in	 legal	 texts	 as	 general	 concepts	 of	 law,	 the	 Chinese	
laws	and	regulations	interpret	these	concepts	differently,	with	various	legal	effects.	Article	10	
of	the	Chinese	Countering	Unfair	Competition	Law257	 defines	a	trade	secret	as:	
technical	 information	 and	 operational	 information	 which	 is	 not	 known	 to	 the	 public,	
which	 is	 capable	 of	 bringing	 economic	 benefits	 to	 the	 owners	 of	 the	 rights,	which	 has	
practical	applicability	and	which	 the	owners	of	 the	 rights	have	 taken	measures	 to	keep	
secret.	
Meanwhile	 the	 Regulations	 on	 Administration	 of	 Technology	 Import	 Contracts258 	 uses	
“proprietary	 technology”	 and	 defines	 it	 as	 technology	 that	 is	 “provided	 in	 the	 forms	 of	
drawings,	 technical	 data,	 technical	 specifications,	 etc.,	 such	 as	 technological	 processes,	
formulae,	product	designs,	quality	control	and	management	skills”;	and	the	Detailed	Rules	for	
the	 Implementation	of	 the	Regulations	on	Administration	of	Technology	 Import	Contracts259	
interprets	 know-how	 as	 “technical	 knowledge	 for	 manufacturing	 a	 product	 or	 applying	 a	
technology	as	well	as	 for	product	designs,	 technological	processes,	 formulae,	quality	control	
and	management,	which	is	neither	publicized	nor	under	legal	protection	of	industrial	property	
rights.”	These	overlapping	and	broadly	worded	definitions	all	touch	upon	the	connotations	of	
the	term	know-how,	however,	making	the	use	of	the	term	rather	confusing.	Know-how	is	not	
																																								 																				
257 Leitão and Baptista (n 235). 
258 Anti Unfair Competition Law of the P.R.C. (Adopted by the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People's Congress On September 2nd, 1993) article 2. 
259 Regulations of The People's Republic of China on Administration of Technology-Introduction Contracts (Promulgated by the 
State Council on May 24, 1985). 
	 298	
yet	a	well-established	legal	term,	for	it	is	a	rather	intangible	estate	and	still	vaguely	stipulated	
by	 the	 current	 Chinese	 law.	 Therefore,	 in	 most	 cases,	 know-how	 is	 only	 successfully	
transferred	to	Chinese	firms,	voluntarily	and	proactively,260	 by	more	experienced	companies,	
properly	shielded	under	the	legal	system.	Such	ambiguity	makes	know-how	transfers	difficult	
to	assess	and	therefore	harder	to	pursue	during	litigation	when	there	is	a	know-how	leakage;	
and	this	deters	transferors.	Although	nowadays	foreign	renewable	technology	pioneers	have	
to	compromise	 in	order	to	business	with	Chinese	buyers,261	 they	are	still	capable	of	getting	
potential	 partners	 to	 the	 negotiating	 table	 for	 they	 have	 demonstrated	 strong	 control	 over	
credible	 technologies	 that	 require	 specific	 know-how	 to	 be	 fully	 actualized.	 Technology	
holders	are	usually	able	to	find	key	factors	and	provide	solutions	in	niche	areas	which	enable	
local	licensees	to	manufacture	products	efficiently.	Indeed,	a	large	part	the	secret	of	success	
in	operations	is	linked	to	know-how	related	to	implementing	or	using	the	technology.262	
Despite	 in	 cases	 where	 know-how	 transfer	 seems	 successful	 (e.g.	 the	 biomass	 furnace	
company	acquisition),	the	improvement	of	China’s	domestic	absorptive	capacity	in	general	is	
inadequate	 in	 facilitating	 TT	 at	 large.263	 Even,	 in	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sector,	 sufficient	
support	to	fully	absorb	the	most	advanced	technologies	has	not	been	developed.	A	detailed	
discussion	 of	 the	 technology	 absorptive	 capability	 in	 China	 is	 included	 in	 Annex	 III	 of	 this	
thesis.	
																																								 																				
260 Indeed, that some of the ‘know-how’ regarding the maintaining and operating the equipment would be stipulated in the TT 
contract, and that the transferor would be paid for ‘services’ such as Vestas’ pre-site selection. when the transferor offered to do 
this, there would be less problem with the licensed product. However it is clear that the licence did not include the manufacturing 
of wind turbine. This would be subject to negotiation individually in each contract between a foreign manufacturer and a Chinese 
competitor, which is not covered in this thesis. Nevertheless, interviewees recruited by this research are the customer of these 
Chinese manufacturer as well, and their experience of using the end product provided by Chinese manufacturers reflect the lack of 
know-how transferred to that equipment making firms.  
261 Interview with manager from the Shandong Wulian Dongfeng Phase I Wind Power Project 
262 The Development Solutions and the European Chamber (n 163).  
263 Haščič and JohnstoneI (n 200). 
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6.5.4 IP litigation  
With	 an	 increased	 register	 rate	 of	 patents	 and	 a	 series	 of	 reformed	 laws	 to	 protect	 IP,	 in	
theory	 it	 should	 be	 easier	 and	 more	 predictable	 for	 foreign	 investors	 to	 seek	 remedies	
through	litigation	in	China.	Sepetys	and	Cox	note	that	“from	2001(the	year	that	China	signed	
TRIPS)	 to	2008,	 there	was	a	50%	annual	 increase	 in	the	number	of	 IPR	court	cases	 involving	
foreign	firms	 in	China.”264	 In	general,	 the	number	of	patent	 infringement	cases	accepted	by	
the	People’s	Courts	has	increased	significantly	from	2006	(less	than	3,000)	to	2015	(more	than	
10,000).265	 An	aspiring	trend	of	IP	litigation	in	China	is	also	seen	from	the	late	2000s	because	
the	value	of	damages	awarded	by	the	courts	has	become	more	predictable	as	the	outcome	of	
an	 IPR	 lawsuit	 is	 easier	 to	 be	 estimated	 by	 foreign	 companies.266	 However,	 the	 amount	 of	
compensation	 in	 IPR	cases	still	 tends	to	be	 low	and	therefore	 it	 is	argued	that	 low	damages	
fail	 to	 significantly	 deter	 infringers.267	 Sepetys	 and	 Cox	 also	 identify	 a	 median	 value	 of	
damages	awarded	for	IPR	infringement	related	cases	in	China	in	2006	and	2007	was	close	to	
$15,000	(around	11,600	Pounds),268	 which	is	about	only	15	per	cent	of	damages	claimed	by	
plaintiffs.269	 Nevertheless,	a	positive	phenomenon	for	foreign	investors	is	that	foreign	patent	
plaintiffs	have	a	75	per	cent	win	rate	against	Chinese	defendants	versus	a	63	per	cent	win	rate	
for	domestic	plaintiffs.270	 And	 in	 the	 cases	with	 foreign	plaintiffs,	 damages	awarded	are	28	
																																								 																				
264 Kristina Sepetys and Alan Cox, ‘Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic Damages’ 
NERA EcoNoMIc CONSULTING (2009) <http://www.nera.com/extimage /PUB IPR ProtectionChina_0109_final.pdf.> . 
265 Conor Stuart, ‘Recent Trends in Patent Litigation in China’ (NAIP Portal, 26th May, 2017)  
<http://en.naipo.com/Portals/0/web_en/Knowledge_Center/Feature/IPNE_170526_0703.htm> accessed Mar 2017; See also 
Weinian Hu, International Patent Rights Harmonization: The Case of China (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group 2017); Chiu and 
Fisher (n 169). 
266 Sepetys and Cox, (n 264) p.6. 
267 Ibid p.6. 
268 Ibid p.8. 
269 Ibid p.8. 
270 Chiu and Fisher (n 169). 
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per	cent	higher	than	the	figure	for	cases	with	Chinese	plaintiffs.271	 This	might	due	to	the	fact	
that	foreign	firms	are	more	inclined	to	pursue	litigation	and	the	have	more	experience	in	such	
lawsuits	 which	 is	 useful	 in	 winning	 IPR	 cases.272 	 Such	 reault	 from	 these	 researchers	
challenges	the	widely	held	view	that	China	practises	protectionism.	 	
From	the	statistics	of	 IP	 litigation,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	 IP	 law	reforms	that	China	undertook	 in	
preparation	to	accede	to	the	WTO	have	encouraged	the	use	of	IP	litigation	in	both	foreign	and	
domestic	firms.	However,	 laws	and	reforms	have	had	a	rather	muted	impact	compared	with	
the	 political	 force	 of	 the	 Chinese	 government	 on	 every	 important	 issue.	 Therefore,	 their	
contribution	 to	 facilitating	 TT	 and	 promoting	 technology	 development	 in	 the	 country	 is	
relatively	insignificant.	Especially	in	the	renewable	energy	sector,	so	far	relatively	little	patent	
litigation	 is	 seen	compared	 to	more	mature	sectors	 such	as	 the	software	and	mobile	phone	
industry.273	 At	present,	 intense	competition	mainly	exists	between	companies	 in	developed	
countries.	For	example,	the	titans	of	the	wind	energy	market	are	already	well	underway,	and	a	
patent	battle	is	seen	in	patent	lawsuits	such	as	the	ones	brought	by	GE	against	the	Vestas.274	
Competition	 between	 Chinese	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 companies	 in	 the	 renewable	 energy	
market	 is	 not	 as	 fierce.	 But	 as	 the	 market	 expands	 and	 the	 allure	 of	 profits	 increases,	
companies	will	 become	more	 aggressive	 in	 business	 and	 arm	 themselves	with	 large	 patent	
portfolios	 to	 grow	 market	 share	 or	 revenues.	 The	 AMSC	 (US)	 vs.	 Sinovel	 Wind	 group275	
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(China)	case	is	one	example	of	the	trend.	Cooperation	between	the	two	companies	began	in	
2005,	with	AMSC	providing	Sinovel	with	central	control	components,	software,	and	design	for	
turbine	manufacturing.	In	June	2011,	after	the	discovery	of	the	theft	of	IP,	AMSC	pursued	law	
enforcement	 authorities	 in	 Europe	 and	 carried	 out	 investigations	 against	 its	 business	
partner.276	 In	2011,	AMSC	launched	several	cases	against	Sinovel,	seeking	a	total	of	over	1.2	
billion	US	dollars	of	the	contract	breach	and	damages.277	 On	the	other	hand,	Chinese	entities	
are	learning	to	protect	their	indigenous	IP	in	order	to	gradually	secure	competitiveness	in	the	
future.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 China	 Environmental	 Project	 Tech,	 Inc.	 vs.	 Fujikasui	 Engineering	
Co.	Ltd.	case,278	 more	than	7.4	million	dollars	were	awarded	to	the	Chinese	holder	against	a	
Japanese	 water	 treatment	 company	 and	 a	 Chinese	 power	 plant.	 The	 disputed	 patented	
technology	is	for	reducing	sulphur-dioxide	emissions	in	electrical	power	generation.279	
In	more	extreme	circumstances,	a	patent	can	be	used	as	a	weapon	in	competition.	Technology	
owners	can	file	applications	maliciously.	Such	actions	could	harm	another	competitor	or	even	
harm	the	innovative	environment	for	the	whole	industry.	Some	studies	show	that	more	than	
50	 per	 cent	 of	 foreign	 innovators	 with	 patents	 filed	 with	 China	 State	 IPO	 have	 the	 sole	
intention	 of	 suing	 their	 Chinese	 competitors	 for	 patent	 infringement.280	 Some	 industry	
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leaders	 with	 large	 patent	 portfolios	 particularly	 enjoy	 employing	 this	 kind	 of	 legal	 but	
aggressive	 patent	 strategy.	GE,	 the	 largest	 turbine	maker	 in	 the	US,	 holding	 36	 per	 cent	 of	
high-relevance	US	wind	patents	and	which	has	filed	more	than	900	wind	patents	globally	“is	
adept	 at	 ‘bracketing	 off’	 key	 technology	 by	 developing	 multi-patent	 ‘fences’	 around	 those	
technologies.” 281 	 This	 approach	 can	 prevent	 competitors	 from	 developing	 their	 own	
technologies	 in	order	 to	protect	 the	 core	 status	held	by	GE	with	 its	exclusively	advanced	 IP	
and	 technologies.	 For	 example,	 GE	 intentionally	 bought	 a	 broad	 and	 costly	 technology	 to	
circumvent	a	patent	–	the	039	variable-speed	patent282	 covering	vital	technology	needed	for	
wind	 turbine	 manufacturing,	 to	 serve	 its	 patent	 strategy.	 It	 was	 actually	 used	 to	 sue	
Mitsubishi	Heavy	Industries	(MHI)	in	2008	for	alleged	infringement	by	MHI’s	flagship	2.4	MW	
turbine.	 Such	 a	 “blocking	 patent”	 clearly	 consolidated	 GE’s	 share	 of	 the	 wind	 market	 and	
could	be	 crucial	 in	 reshaping	 the	US	or	even	 the	 international	wind	 industry.283	 With	other	
less	 important	 technologies,	 it	 is	 still	 worth	 filing	 according	 to	 the	 above	 patent	 strategy.	
Especially	 in	 China,	 given	 the	 cheaper	 and	 easier	 procedure	 available	 for	 utility	 models	
application	than	invention	patents,	it	is	even	more	convenient	for	foreign	technology	holders	
to	apply	for	these	types	of	patents	when	they	intend	to	conduct	malicious	prosecution	actions	
in	China’s	renewable	energy	market.284	
In	 fact,	 the	 trump	 card	 of	 pursuing	 patent	 litigation	 is	 less	 used	 in	 practice.	 From	 a	
manufacturer’s	 perspective,	 in	 recent	 years,	 a	 complaint	 to	 the	 suspect	 company	 or	 the	
relevant	administrative	authorities	followed	by	reaching	a	settlement	through	negotiations	is	
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usually	more	efficient	in	business,	avoiding	the	expense	and	burden	of	a	trial	and	the	risks	to	
future	cooperation	opportunities	with	Chinese	companies.285	 The	judicial	path	usually	takes	a	
longer	period	of	approximately	two	years	and	results	in	unsatisfactory	compensation	rates	as	
discussed	earlier.	The	whole	process	is	very	complex	and	requires	careful	planning	under	the	
assistance	 of	 a	 patent	 lawyer	 and	 local	 agents.286	 Moreover,	 pursuit	 of	 the	 payment	 of	
royalties	or	 IP	 infringement	compensation	through	litigation	requires	careful	 investigation	to	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 technology	 at	 stake	 is	 covered	 by	 a	 registered	 patent	 owned	 by	
another.	In	practice,	it	is	often	difficult,	as	many	infringers	and	imitators	will	not	declare	that	
their	equipment	contains	patented	technologies.	For	example,	according	to	the	interviewees,	
a	 Chinese	 biomass	 boiler	 manufacturer	 has	 been	 in	 production	 using	 technology	
reverse-engineered	from	an	imported	BWE	boiler.	Products	made	by	this	company	were	also	
presented	 in	 tenders	 for	biomass	energy	projects	established	 in	Shandong.	One	of	 the	most	
critical	 technologies	 employed	 by	 BWE	 is	 a	 specialized	 “mechanical	 grating	 furnace	 grate”	
technology	which	was	not	acquired	by	the	Chinese	at	the	time.	As	this	technology	was	already	
in	 the	public	domain,	 getting	 the	 technology	by	 reverse	engineering	does	not	 constitute	 an	
infringement.	Also	there	is	a	“seal	technology”	and	an	“exhaust	purification	technology”	that	
are	still	protected	by	patents.287	 Technically,	as	long	as	the	Chinese	boiler	is	proven	to	meet	
certain	exhaust	standards,	and	its	combustion	efficiency	reaches	the	level	equal	to	that	of	the	
patented	 technology,	 the	 existence	 of	 infringement	 is	 suspected.	 However,	 this	 Chinese	
manufacturer	never	disclosed	 these	 test	 result	during	 tender	or	 in	all	of	 its	advertisements.	
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Therefore,	it	is	difficult	for	BWE	to	provide	definite	proof	to	support	the	claim.	Consequently,	
many	cases	are	settled	 through	negotiation	and	mediation.	And	the	owners	are	 less	able	 to	
recoup	their	 investment.288	 Therefore,	when	litigation	 is	not	absolutely	necessary,	a	valid	 IP	
holder	is	not	inclined	to	resort	to	courts	in	order	to	enforce	his	IP	rights.	Instead,	a	threat	to	
sue	could	work	better	in	reaching	a	settlement	between	parties	in	a	conflict.	 	
All	 in	all,	while	 the	dispute	settlement	measures	 in	China	are	 tailored	 to	 fit	TRIPS	standards	
and	 the	 litigation	 route	 is	 more	 available	 for	 foreign	 technology	 owners	 to	 protect	 their	
intellectual	possessions,	the	judicial	method	itself	is	still	deterring	IP	holders	in	pursuing	it	in	
practice.	Less	formal	steps,	such	as	negotiation	and	mediation	are	considered	to	be	the	first	
choice	to	the	technology	owners	because	these	are	a	part	of	Chinese	business	conventions.	In	
fact,	“not	all	infringement	is	deliberate,	and	not	all	infringers	are	aware	of	the	gravity	of	what	
they	 are	 doing.” 289	 It	 might	 be	 due	 to	 a	 cultural	 misunderstanding	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 correct	
knowledge	 about	 IPRs	 in	 China.	 Without	 proper	 consideration	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 China,	
many	 IPR	cases	are	actually	solved	through	 informal	dispute	resolution	after	 finally	going	to	
court.	 	
6.5.6 IP understanding and education 
Another	 factor	 that	 indirectly	 determines	 the	 law	 in	 action	 is	 how	 people	 understand	 and	
respect	 knowledge-based	 rights.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 impact	 will	 take	 years	
because	the	digestion	of	IP	obligations	is	to	be	phased	in	over	time.	In	that	case,	the	long-term	
effect	of	IP	law	in	China	will	depend	on	the	level	of	“IP	education”	in	the	country.	 	
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It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 China’s	 IPR	 standards	 have	 improved	 to	 an	 international	 level	 despite	
some	 defects	 in	 the	 reformed	 IP	 laws.	 Meanwhile,	 a	 change	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 China	
becomes	 evident	 in	 results	 of	 surveys	 such	 as	 the	 2010	 survey	 by	 the	 US-China	 Business	
Council,	in	which	a	majority	of	participants	felt	an	improvement	in	China’s	IP	enforcement.290	
But	the	degree	to	which	Chinese	practitioners	understand	IPRs	and	the	way	they	handle	IP	has	
lagged	 behind	 those	 improvements,	 with	 many	 people	 still	 regarding	 IP	 theft	 and	 staff	
poaching	as	 inevitable.291	 A	disagreement	between	developed	countries	and	China	over	 IPR	
protections	 is	basically	focused	on	the	enforcement	of	TRIPS	standardized	IP	 laws.	However,	
such	a	 seemingly	 simple	 issue	 is	differentiated	by	multiple	 cultural	aspects	 such	as	political,	
economic,	and	historical	incompatibilities,	which	have	acquiesced	in	the	underlying	incentives	
for	 IP	 infringement. 292 	 For	 example,	 the	 Chinese	 understand	 IP	 under	 a	 culture	 of	
collectivism,	 and	 by	 instinct	 put	 more	 value	 on	 dedication	 than	 individual	 rights.	 This	
cultural/social	 background	 has	 resulted	 in	 legal	 challenges	 for	 a	 foreign	 company	 doing	
business	with	 China.	 China’s	 accession	 to	 the	WTO	has	 resulted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 amendments	
made	 to	 the	 IP	 law	 and	 relative	 law	 regarding	 trade,	 “but	 even	 today	 it	 is	 common	 to	 see	
technology	 being	 stolen	 either	 by	 the	 employees	 of	 the	 outsourced	 firm	 in	 China	 or	 by	 a	
Chinese	competitor	 in	the	country.”293	 To	Chinese	entities,	market	place	 is	a	 field	to	battle.	
Therefore	 in	 general,	 the	 copycat	 culture	 is	 a	 weak	 legal	 pitfall	 but	 considered	 in	 Chinese	
society	as	an	acceptable	or	tacit	business	strategy.	To	some	extent,	the	Confucian	philosophy	
is	 adopted	 predominately	 in	 China’s	 society	 and	 such	 cultural	 background	 encourages	
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individuals	to	dedicate	any	invention	to	the	society	with	respect	to	the	community’s	harmony	
and	development.	Consequently,	such	culture	has	made	China	the	world’s	biggest	counterfeit	
products	maker	 in	 the	 world.294	 The	 vague	 wordings	 of	 the	 Chinese	 laws,	 which	may	 also	
attribute	 to	 the	 Confucius	 way	 of	 understanding	 IP,	 leave	 plenty	 of	 room	 to	 interpret	
provisions	 with	 Chinese	 characteristics. 295 	 Thus	 there	 is	 a	 fear	 that	 this	 will	 allow	
manipulation	 of	 the	 law	 by	 lawyers	 against	 foreign	 companies.296	 The	 Confucian	 ideology	
values	 the	 “rule	 of	 man”	 more	 than	 the	 “rule	 of	 law.”	 Hence	 some	 patent	 infringers	 see	
patent	 violations	 as	 “part	 of	 the	 greater	 good	 for	 the	 country	 as	 they	 copy	 Western	
[technologies]	 and	 sell	 them	 at	 affordable	 prices	 to	 Chinese	 [companies].”297 	 Foreign	
companies	 are	 normally	 aware	 of	 the	 situation	 in	 China	 when	 they	 decide	 to	 outsource	
manufacturing	 or	 investing	 in	 the	 country,	 especially	 when	 there	 is	 a	 costly	 developed	
technology	 at	 stake.	 One	 way	 of	 preventing	 these	 legal	 challenges	 is	 to	 have	 a	 strong	
connection	 with	 the	 local	 social	 society,	 even	 so	 avoid	 outsourcing	 critical	 technologies	 to	
China	 might	 be	 the	 approach	 of	 lowest	 risk.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 Chinese	 way	 of	
conditioning	business	is	victimizing	its	own	market	by	deterring	foreign	business	partners.298	
On	the	other	hand,	“the	economic	argument	for	IPR	is	not	cut	and	dried.	A	balance	is	always	
required	 between	 the	 motivated	 entrepreneur	 and	 his	 access	 to	 public	 information.	
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Reasonable	people	can	disagree	as	to	where	exactly	the	line	should	be	drawn.”299	 Therefore,	
judgement	 cannot	 be	 made	 on	 a	 developed	 country	 standard	 condemning	 failure	 in	 IP	
enforcement	 in	 China.	 One	 country	 should	 have	 its	 own	 standard	 valuing	 IP	 and	 its	
enforcement.	Moreover,	China,	as	a	latecomer	in	the	technology	development	ranks,	has	seen	
the	 history	 of	 how	 other	 precedent	 countries	 have	 behaved	 during	 their	 developing	 stage.	
Virtually	 all	 developing	 countries	and	developed	countries	when	 they	were	 in	 their	 growing	
phase,	 tended	 to	 be	 IPR	 violators.	 As	well	 as	 the	US,	more	 recent	 cases	 such	 as	 in	 Taiwan,	
Singapore,	 and	 South	 Korea	 have	 demonstrated	 a	 “grey	 technology	 development”	 in	
history,300 	 where	 infringements	 of	 different	 degrees	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 common	
phenomenon.	 And	 now	 in	 China,	 according	 to	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 interviewees,	
“infringement	 is	 unavoidable	 and	 necessary	 in	 getting	 new	 techs.”301	 Such	 behaviour	 is	
especially	 common	 among	 Chinese	 renewable	 energy	 generator	manufacturers.	 One	 of	my	
interviewees	 even	 indicates	 that	 some	 biomass	 boiler	 companies	 have	 been	 using	
technologies	 without	 a	 licence	 from	 the	 owners	 of	 the	 IP	 for	 the	 first	 few	 years	 of	
production.302	 Some	interviewees303	 believe	that	developing	countries	will	never	be	able	to	
compete	 with	 the	 developed	 nation	 competitors	 in	 most	 areas	 of	 IP	 if	 they	 follow	 such	
unaccommodating	 international	 accords	 created	 by	 developed	 countries	 in	 the	 first	 place.	
Conversely,	 in	 this	 research,	most	 interviewees	 also	 showed	 respect	 for	 the	 importance	 of	
IPRs	 as	 a	 general	 legal	 concept,	 especially	 the	 lawyers.	 The	managers,	 when	 asked	 directly	
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about	their	opinion	towards	IPR	also	provided	positive	answers	by	trying	to	demonstrate	that	
they	are	not	associated	with	 IP	 infringement,	which	I	assume	is	true	because	no	IP	 litigation	
was	discovered	regarding	these	companies.	Such	contradictions	indicate	a	double-standard	in	
the	understanding	of	IPRs	among	businessman,	depending	on	the	role	they	are	looking	at	for	
themselves:	transferor	or	transferee.	 	
Nevertheless,	 as	 the	 companies	 visited	 are	 in	 fact	 end-consumers	 of	 renewable	 energy	
technology,	they	are	discharged	from	paying	royalties.	Thus	they	are	less	at	risk	of	being	sued	
by	the	transferor	through	IP	litigation.	But	except	for	the	less	possible	infringing	behaviour	by	
reverse-engineering,	a	more	frequently	mentioned	act	that	is	suspected	to	be	an	infringement	
is	 staff	 poaching.	 Interviewees 304 	 indicate	 that	 poaching	 staff	 from	 more	
technology-advanced	 companies	 happens	 not	 only	 with	 equipment	manufacturers	 but	 also	
end-users.	Those	employees	specialized	 in	 the	most	 in-demand	areas	are	often	attracted	by	
competitors	promising	vastly	inflated	salaries	to	lure	them	away.	An	interviewee305	 talked	of	
such	 rife	 and	 unscrupulous	 recruitment	 in	 a	 dispassionate	 manner,	 reflecting	 how	 regular	
such	 headhunting	 and	 poaching	 is	 in	 everyday	 practice.	 For	 example,	 in	 AMSC	 vs.	 Sinovel	
technology	 Ltd.	 ("Sinovel")	 case,306	 there	 was	 enough	 evidence	 found	 to	 confirm	 that	 the	
former	 employees	 of	 AMSC	 have	 been	 revealing	 confidential	 information	 to	 Sinovel	 which	
constituted	 the	 crime	 of	 commercial	 espionage	 and	 the	 misuse	 of	 data.	 There	 were	 even	
illegal	 contracts	 signed	 between	 Sinovel	 and	 employees	 of	 AMSC	 along	 with	 relevant	 chat	
records	and	e-mails	disclosing	IP	information	given	to	Sinovel	which	was	applied	to	a	turbine	
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designed	by	the	company	later	on.	A	more	straightforward	example	is	found	in	this	thesis.307	
At	 the	 initial	 stage	 of	 wind	 power	 development	 in	 China,	 most	 turbines	 installed	 were	
imported.	 In	 those	years,	wind	farms	were	not	only	burdened	by	equipment	purchasing	but	
also	spending	a	lot	on	maintaining	the	equipment.	As	the	imported	replacements	were	priced	
excessively	 high,	wind	 farms	would	 consider	 staff	 poaching	when	 the	warranties	 expired	 as	
the	 easiest	 way	 to	 discover	 authentic	 channels	 for	 getting	 cheaper	 components	 is	 from	
information	 revealed	 by	 former	 employees	 of	 the	 leading	 turbine	makers.	 As	 buyers,	 these	
wind	farms	were	acting	fearlessly	when	threatened	by	IP	litigation	raised	by	sellers	regarding	
staff	poaching,	because	they	could	use	a	refusal	to	purchase	 in	the	future	as	a	tool	to	deter	
turbine	 sellers	 from	 suing	 them.	 Emerging	 domestic	 turbine	manufacturers	were	 doing	 the	
same	more	discreetly	and	secretly	at	the	time.	Gradually,	as	larger	Chinese	companies	such	as	
Goldwind	became	more	mature,	the	smaller	start-up	manufacturers	in	China	began	to	recruit	
staff	from	these	Chinese	domestic	turbine	makers.	Such	a	problem	results	from	many	factors	
combined,	such	as	the	absence	of	a	non-competition	clause	in	the	employment	contract	and	a	
disadvantageous	 position	 occupied	 by	 turbine	 manufacturers	 in	 the	 “buyer’s	 market”	 in	
recent	 years.	 Even	 so,	 none	 of	 the	 interviewed	 power	 stations	 have	 an	 independent	 legal	
department	or	an	in-house	lawyer.	Legal	issues	including	IP-relevant	factors	are	dealt	with	by	
their	parent	companies,	and	minor	disputes	such	as	conflicts	between	the	company	and	local	
residents	during	construction	are	resolved	under	the	guidance	of	external	 law	firms.308	 This	
indicates	 that	 legal	 issues	 regarding	 IP	 infringement	 are	 rarely	 faced	 by	 power	 generation	
																																								 																				
307 evidence provided by manager and technician interviewees recruited from the three wind projects. In order to protect the 
interviewee for releasing such sensitive information, I will not give the project name to indicate any particular interviewee. 
308 For example, when one of the biomass project was under construction, residents nearby claimed compensation on potential 
effect of the local environment. Agreements were signed between the company and more than 1000 residents with approximately 
500,000 Yuan paid in total to settle the dispute. Interviews with participants from the Animal Manure Management System 
(AMMS) GHG Mitigation Project. 
	 310	
plants,	and	behaviours	 in	 terms	of	 staff	poaching	are	not	 taken	seriously	as	 they	are	 in	 fact	
offending	 legitimate	 interests	 of	 others.	 This	 might	 be	 subtle	 at	 this	 stage	 where	 China’s	
technology	absorptive	capability	and	 independent	technology	development	ability	 is	 limited,	
but	 it	could	be	a	hidden	peril	 to	China’s	 future	 technology	 improvements	when	the	country	
becomes	 more	 of	 a	 technology	 provider,	 if	 it	 does	 not	 evolve	 a	 better	 culturally	 adapted	
regime	to	deal	with	the	issue.	 	
More	 than	 this,	 none	 of	 the	 interviewed	 companies	 knew	much	 about	 TRIPS	 requirements	
and	 they	 know	 less	 about	 TRIPS	 flexibilities,	 such	 as	 compulsory	 licences.	 Even	 when	
explanations	were	provided	about	what	a	compulsory	licence	is,	they	showed	little	interest	in	
it.	 Instead,	 some	 interviewee	 indicated	 their	 worries	 that	 such	 a	 method	 could	 break	 the	
“pleasant	 relationship	 between	 Chinese	 and	 foreign	 investors/transferors	 and	 may	 in	 turn	
harm	 future	 cooperation	 with	 them.”309	 Such	 a	 fogeyish	 attitude	 is	 possibly	 ingrained	 in	
Chinese	culture	and	therefore	deep-seated	in	their	way	of	thinking.	The	deeper	reason	maybe	
to	do	with	issues	of	trying	to	see	relationships	with	foreign	firms	simply	in	terms	of	traditional	
(non-government	 influenced)	commercial	arrangements;	or	there	may	simply	not	have	been	
much	 time	 to	understand	 the	benefits	 of	 these	provisions	 to	 the	 company	or	 to	China.	 But	
whatever	 the	 reason,	 it	 seems	a	bottom-up	way	of	 initiating	 compulsory	 licences	 is	 not	 yet	
suitable	for	Chinese	firms,	at	least	in	the	renewable	energy	equipment	manufacturing	sector.	
6.6 Market factors versus IP protection 
A	 subtle	 conclusion	 seems	 to	 be	 drawn	 from	 this	 discussion:	 with	 China	 having	 a	 set	 of	
world-class	laws	for	IP	protection	on	the	books,	IP	holders	were	still	concerned	about	its	high	
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IP-infringement	 rates.310	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 TT	 to	 China	 was	 insufficient	 to	 meet	 the	
increasing	need	for	emission	reduction	technology	in	the	country.	Indeed,	the	reputation	of	IP	
protection	 in	China	was	abominable.	According	 to	a	 report	 released	by	 the	US	 International	
Trade	 Commission,311	 China's	 piracy	 of	 American	 products	 cost	 the	US	 over	 $300	 billion	 in	
business.	Moreover,	the	number	could	be	even	higher	since	the	available	data	is	 inadequate	
in	 volume	 or	 scope.	 Developed	 countries	 such	 as	 the	 US	 censure	 how	 China	 fell	 short	 to	
ensure	 that	 IPR	 protection	 would	 produce	 real	 consequences	 because	 many	 technology	
owners	might	have	lost	faith	and	lost	interest	in	investing	in	the	country.312	 This	indisputable	
failure	of	enforcement	in	China	is	a	result	of	a	fear	of	slowing	economic	growth	by	the	Chinese	
government	 as	 well	 as	 the	 weak	 administrative	 and	 judicial	 systems	 in	 the	 country.313	
However,	 the	 majority	 of	 these	 infringements	 relate	 to	 consumer	 products	 and	 minor	 to	
business-to-business	 products.	 The	 complexity	 of	 the	 latter	 may	 make	 breaches	 of	 IP	 less	
significant.	“Those	wishing	to	encourage	Chinese	adherence	to	international	standards	and	its	
own	 laws	 must	 come	 armed	 not	 only	 with	 institutional	 suggestions	 but	 also	 economic	
arguments”314	 based	on	evidence	available	in	each	specific	sector.	
It	 is	 unquestionable	 that	 IP	 is	 currently	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 today's	 renewables	 industry.	
Innovations	are	obviously	neither	freely	shared	publically	nor	easy	to	access.	For	example,	in	
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the	wind	 industry	 the	 “major	 players	 like	 GE,	 Siemens	 and	 Vestas	 are	 spending	millions	 of	
dollars	 building	 and	 maintaining	 IP	 portfolios	 to	 drive	 profit	 and	 gain	 the	 strategic	 upper	
hand.”315	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 TT	 is	 no	 longer	 an	 act	 of	 charity	 from	 the	 IP	 owners	 but	 an	
investment	decision	made	on	 risk	and	 return	calculations.316	 However,	 factors	 linked	 to	 the	
terms	of	return	on	investment	in	the	Chinese	renewable	energy	market	are	considered	prior	
to	TT,	with	equal	or	perhaps	more	importance,	as	changes	in	China's	IP	laws	and	enforcement	
occur.	 The	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 domestic	 market	 also	 matters	 because	 it	 determines	 the	
possible	extent	of	revenue	and	therefore	the	possible	extent	of	investment	in	R	&	D.317	 With	
a	large	population	of	1.3	billion318	 and	one	of	the	world’s	highest	economic	growth	rates,319	
the	expansion	of	China’s	domestic	market	with	high	demand	of	goods	and	services	should	be	
ideal	for	any	investor.320	 Also	because	of	the	growing	need	for	sustainable	technologies	and	
the	 energy	 consumption	 required	 in	 China	 to	 produce	 the	 required	 volume	 of	 goods,	 big	
market	 opportunities	 are	 provided	 to	 foreign	 suppliers	 (especially	 renewable	 energy	
technology	 IP	 owners).	 In	 fact,	 the	 country	 is	 now	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 largest	 recipients	 of	
FDI.321	 China’s	focus	on	encouraging	the	growth	in	renewable	energy	sector	provides	a	clear	
incentive	 for	 the	 pooling	 of	 related	 patents	 and	 follow-on	 innovations.	 For	 example,	 the	
country	aims	at	installing	thirty	gig	watts	of	wind	power	capacity	by	2020,	supplying	thirteen	
to	 thirty	 million	 homes,	 necessitates	 equipment	 and	 facilitating	 infrastructure	 with	 larger	
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generating	 capacities.322	 Therefore,	 among	 wind	 farm	 projects,	 the	 landscape	 is	 going	 to	
feature	 large-scale	 turbines	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 more	 than	 1,000	 MW	 of	 electricity	 per	
project	which	will	 be	 sold	 to	 the	grid.323	 Such	a	 great	business	opportunity,	 created	by	 the	
considerable	amount	of	installation	needed,	reflects	that	the	development	model	adopted	by	
China	is	currently	based	on	its	economic	scale	rather	than	its	technological	advances.	 	
The	examination	of	 anecdotal	 evidence	and	qualitative	 interviews	 in	 this	 research	 led	us	 to	
conclude	that	concerns	over	IPR	are	not	a	significant	barrier	to	renewable	energy	TT	to	China.	
As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 IP	 holders	 ignored	 the	 undesirable	 IP	 environment,	 and	 insisted	 on	
business	with	the	country.	This	suggests	that	profits	from	turnover	will	overcome	IPR	holders’	
fear	 of	 allowing	 Chinese	 companies	 to	 use	 their	wares.	 Empirical	 evidence	 has	 also	 proved	
that	the	size	of	a	domestic	market	determines	the	development	of	manufacturers	from	that	
country	 to	 a	 certain	 level,324	 which	 explains	 China’s	 case	 well.	 High	 growth	 potentiality	 in	
China's	 renewable	 energy	 market	 and	 possible	 profit	 incentives	 for	 developed	 country	
companies	to	partner	with	Chinese	companies	could	overcome	potential	barriers	that	poor	IP	
protection	can	possibly	created.	Then	again,	one	might	ask:	 if	access	to	 IP	 is	available	under	
measures	other	than	promising	IP	protection,	i.e.	generous	market	returns	and	the	potential	
opportunities	it	generates,	and	inventors	are	paid	accordingly	sufficient,	what	is	the	point	to	
abide	 by	 the	 onerous	 IP	 rules?	 Such	 question	 reflects	 that	 IP	 law	 improvement	 is	 not	
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functioning	as	a	positive	and	effective	TT	facility	as	well	as	expected.	As	a	result,	ceaselessly	
complying	with	 international	 IP	standards	would	be	devalued	gradually	and	out	of	accord	 in	
the	context	of	the	climate	change	crisis.	
China	has	been	an	exception	in	the	generally	proportionate	relationship	between	the	level	of	
IP	 protection	 and	 the	 number	 of	 technologies	 transferred.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 a	 US	
International	 Trade	 Commission	 survey,325	 many	US	 firms	 reported	 “losses	 associated	with	
IPR	 infringement	 in	 China,	 including	 losses	 in	 sales,	 profits,	 and	 licence	 and	 royalty	 fees,	 as	
well	as	damage	to	brand	names	and	product	reputation.”326	 However,	with	protection	of	IPRs	
remaining	difficult	 for	companies	entering	the	Chinese	market,	where	access	to	government	
approvals	can	affect	the	patent	 licence	and	other	forms	of	TT;	where	joint	ventures	are	also	
common	 and	 often	 required,327	 China’s	 growing	 demand	 for	 energy	 with	 the	 need	 for	 an	
increased	share	of	renewable	energy	in	recent	decades,	has	become	an	irresistible	temptation	
even	so.	As	a	result,	a	considerable	amount	of	renewable	energy	TTs	came	into	the	Chinese	
market	 despite	 the	 above	 restrictions,	 and	emissions	 in	 China	declined	 in	 2014	 for	 the	 first	
time	since	1999,	registering	a	drop	of	around	130	Mt	(1.5	per	cent).328	 The	promise	of	billions	
of	 customers	 and	 end-users	 has	 been	 a	 strong	 attraction	 for	 foreign	 business	 to	 invest	 in	
China,	which	inevitably	involves	some	innovation-related	information	being	transferred	at	the	
same	 time.	 There	 are	 high-tech	 transfers	 from	 foreign	 companies	 to	 Chinese	 firms	 as	well,	
even	though	these	are	largely	not	the	most	ground-breaking	types	of	technology,329	 neither	
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are	 the	majority	of	 them	TTs	 to	China.	But	with	 the	 large	 scale	of	application	and	potential	
experimentation	with	new	renewable	energy	technologies	that	they	have	developed,	foreign	
IP	 holders	 are	 likely	 to	 increase	 patent	 filings	 in	 China.	 The	 expansion	 of	 China’s	 energy	
industry	sells	itself	to	investors	and	raises	their	propensity	to	file	patents	in	the	country.	The	
defaults	on	strong	IP	protection	as	the	only	incentive	to	TT	may,	therefore,	“be	offset	by	the	
market	 power	 of	 the	 industry	 to	 encourage	 [companies]	 introducing	 new	 technologies	 to	
China.”330	 The	 weak	 impact	 of	 IP	 protection	 on	 promoting	 TT	 becomes	 apparent	 when	
compared	with	irresistible	benefits	from	the	Chinese	market;	 it	 is	seen	as	self-abnegation	by	
developed	countries	 such	as	 the	US	government.	While	 it	 is	 thought	 that	China’s	 laws	have	
“not	produced	meaningful	protection	for	American	 IP,	nor	 is	there	evidence	that	substantial	
improvement	is	imminent,”331	 American	government	responses	to	Chinese	IPR	violations	are	
restrained	because	 it	gains	considerably	from	occupying	a	share	of	the	Chinese	market.	This	
explains	 the	silent	 tendency	among	developed	country	executives	on	 IP	 issues	 in	China.	The	
fear	of	losing	access	to	China’s	booming	market	necessitates	them	putting	up	with	IP	risks.332	
On	 the	 contrary,	 excessive	 IP	 protection	 may	 abet	 the	 laziness	 of	 potential	 innovators	 to	
pursue	 more	 advanced	 technologies	 in	 a	 shorter	 period.	 According	 to	 an	 interviewee,333	
although	a	 longer	monopoly	period	 is	comforting,	20	years	(the	 length	of	patent	protection)	
without	 significant	 technology	 breakthrough	 would	 be	 a	 sign	 of	 waning	 in	 the	 relevant	
																																								 																				
330 A. G. Hu, ‘Propensity to Patent, Competition, and China’s Foreign Patenting Surge’ (European Policy for Intellectual Property 
Conference, Bern, Switzerland) p.34. Hu provides evidence that “Chinese firms are more likely to imitate the technology of 
Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese firms more so than German and US technology.” This could be partly due to “Chinese firms are 
more of direct competitors with the aforementioned Asian countries, and at large one might suggest their technology is 
comparatively less advanced and fundamental in nature.” (p.23) As a result it is easier for Chinese companies to fully absorb such 
technology if transferred to them. 
331 The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property (n 311). 
332 Feldman (n 292). 
333 Interview with R & D staff of a world leading wind turbine maker. 
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company	 or	 even	 the	 industry.	 Thus,	 a	modest	 slackening	 of	 IP	 protection	might	 put	 some	
pressure	 on	 the	 innovators,	 stimulating	 technology	 development	 and	 shortening	
commercialization	 cycles.	However,	 an	 alternative	 argument	 is	 that	 innovation	would	 occur	
regardless.	 If	 there	 were	 lengthy	 IP	 protections,	 competitors	 would	 seek	 to	 make	 a	 more	
efficient	 version	 as	 this	 could	 take	more	market	 share	 in	 the	 future.	 Companies	 that	 sit	 on	
their	 patents	 tend	 not	 to	 survive	 in	 a	 world	 where	 innovation	 continues	 apace.	 This	 issue	
regarding	the	proper	duration	of	IP	protection	should	be	looked	at	by	future	researchers	from	
the	perspective	of	both	the	transferor	and	the	transferee,	with	supporting	empirical	evidence.	
Other	 than	 the	 profit	 inducement,	 there	 naturally	 exists	 the	 growing	 need	 for	 low-cost	
manufacturing	from	the	developed	countries,	which	drives	businesses	to	seek	cheaper	labour	
as	 well	 as	 raw	materials	 from	 developing	 countries.	 This	 outsourcing	 of	 energy	 and	 labour	
leads	to	the	hardship	of	Chinese	workers	looking	for	better	paying	jobs	in	large	manufacturing	
companies.	 In	 return	 for	work	 carried	 out	 in	 a	 tough	environment	with	 long	working	hours	
and	 few	 company	 benefits	 by	 the	 developing	 country’s	 employees,	 people	 and	 firms	 in	
developed	 countries	 enjoy	 continuously	 falling	 prices	 of	 goods	 and	 products.	 From	 this	
perspective,	the	risk	of	IPR	infringement	that	harms	technology	owners	is	less	considered,	for	
they	 too	benefit	 from	a	 less	 regulated	market.334	 This	dilemma	 is	 a	 good	example	 showing	
the	 complex	 relationship	 between	 China	 and	many	 other	 developed	 countries	 intending	 to	
invest	 in	the	country,	as	the	market	provides	both	positive	and	negative	outcomes.335	 Thus,	
contradictory	 actions	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 developed	 countries’	 responses.	 For	 example,	
																																								 																				
334 By introducing technology legally or illegal from abroad, the Chinese and other developing countries were able to incorporate 
these technologies to their indigenously produced products, which is with lower quality but a lot cheaper than the ones made in 
developed countries. 
335 Feldman (n 292). 
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although	listed	by	the	US	Special	301	Report,	China	also	received	American	support	to	join	the	
WTO.336	 By	joining	the	WTO,	China	is	enjoying	the	most-favoured-nation	treatment	and	other	
benefits	 required	 by	 the	 WTO	 from	 all	 member	 states,	 including	 the	 US.	 Reasonable	
precautions	taken	before	entering	the	Chinese	market	are	of	course	needed	as	they	are	with	
any	market.	Some	developed	country	companies	even	indicate	satisfaction	with	the	current	IP	
situation	 in	China,	 claiming	 that	 the	arrangements	are	 sufficient.	 For	example,	 in	December	
2012	 Siemens	 established	 two	 joint	 ventures	 with	 Shanghai	 Electric	 Group	 and	 the	
representatives	 of	 the	 company	 stated	 that	 they	 felt	well	 protected	 by	 the	 Chinese	 patent	
system.337	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 having	 compared	 the	 significant	 return	 on	 investment	 and	 the	
effect	of	IP	law	reform,	it	becomes	evident	to	the	investors	that	the	former	clearly	outweighs	
the	later.	
The	 renewable	 energy	market	 growth	 in	 China	 is	 also	 providing	 a	 breeding	 ground	 for	 the	
emerging	climate	change	technology	industry	because	it	is	a	capacious	environment	in	which	
to	 test	 and	 improve	 newly	 invented	 technologies	 and	 to	 accelerate	 the	 product	
commercialization	 cycle. 338 	 A	 more	 intensive	 competition	 for	 market	 share	 between	
indigenous	and	foreign	companies	will	prevail	over	the	negative	effect	of	poor	IPR	protection	
and	 encourage	 manufacturers	 to	 innovate	 under	 increasing	 pressures,	 which	 will	 have	 a	
positive	 impact	 on	 the	 global	 expansion	 of	 climate-friendly	 technologies.339	 For	 example,	
many	former	monopoly	 foreign	turbine	enterprises	 like	Vestas	have	to	confront	the	crisis	of	
																																								 																				
336 Ibid. 
337 Davidson (n 201). 
338 Beise and Rennings (n 324); Jan Fagerberg, ‘User-Producer Interaction, Learning and Comparative Advantage’ (1995) 19 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 243; Michael E. Porter, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Nations’ Free Press, Macmillan, New 
York 564. 
339 Interview with Provincial Power Grid technical director. And also indicated by the R & D staff from a world leading wind 
turbine manufacturer. 
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losing	 a	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	 Chinese	 market.	 This	 is	 generally	 due	 to	 huge	 price	
differences	between	imported	turbines	and	the	domestic	ones.340	 A	wind	farm	equipped	with	
turbines	 all	 imported	 from	 overseas	 companies	 may	 need	 more	 than	 1	 billion	 Yuan	 (116	
million	Pounds)	of	investment	flowing	into	the	project.	Such	a	difference	is	so	palpable	that	it	
cannot	 be	 ignored	 by	 any	 investor.	 Before	 2010,	 the	 Chinese	 wind	 turbine	 manufacturing	
industry	was	still	 in	 its	 infancy	regarding	quality,	compared	to	 the	 foreign	 leaders.	 Imported	
equipment	 had	 the	 great	 advantage	 of	 lower	 failure	 rates	 and	 higher	 full-load	 hour	
availability.	 However,	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 domestic	wind	 industry	 and	 improvements	 in	 its	
own	technology,	the	gap	has	narrowed.	The	advantages	of	imported	turbines	are	attenuating	
gradually	and	are	obscured	by	the	price	advantage	of	domestic	turbines	over	time.	According	
to	 an	 interviewee,341	 back	 in	 2008	 the	 wind	 market	 was	 virtually	 a	 seller's	 market.	 Wind	
farms	sometimes	were	not	able	to	purchase	from	Vestas	even	when	they	had	enough	fund.	
This	is	because	the	annual	production	target	of	Vestas	allows	it	to	sell	very	limited	number	of	
turbines	 globally.	Whenever	 they	 completed	 this	 sales	 target,	 the	 company	 refused	 to	 sell	
more,	 no	 matter	 how	 much	 money	 was	 offered	 by	 the	 buyers.342	 Also,	 Chinese	 energy	
companies	were	forced	to	accept	many	onerous	and	harsh	clauses	at	that	time	because	they	
were	 so	 keen	 to	 quickly	 establish	 a	 wind	 project	 supported	 by	 Chinese	 policies.	 Contracts	
included	very	specific	terms	describing	working	conditions	that	shall	be	provided	for	workers	
sent	by	Vestas.343	 While	these	conditions	might	seem	onerous	by	Chinese	standards	they	are	
																																								 																				
340 Information gathered from interviews with managers, CDM project managers from all three wind projects studied. 
341 Interview with manager from the Shandong Haiyang Qiuershan Wind Power Project. 
342 Interview with manager from the Shandong Haiyang Qiuershan Wind Power Project. 
343 Such as “employees sent by Vestas to the Chinese wind farms providing technical guidance on equipment installation, must be 
provided with well-conditioned accommodation (the best local hotel) with specific room temperature and high-speed broadband. A 
route between the hotel and the wind farm had to be selected according to a certain comfort level requested by the foreign 
employee and agreed in written forms. In addition, hourly wage was 800 Yuan (about 100 pounds) which was more than ten times 
higher than local technicians. Working daily hours was fixed for 10 hours, with a maximum two-hour extra shift paid at 1600 Yuan 
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not	 as	 burdening	 to	 European	 or	 US	 companies,	 and	 any	 staff	 employed	 from	 outside	 the	
country	would	expect	 limits	on	working	hours	and	 their	accommodation	 to	be	paid	 for.	But	
such	 terms	 were	 inconceivable	 to	 Chinese	 investors	 and	 were	 very	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	
comply	with.	 	
In	 contrast,	 a	 significant	 growth	 in	 the	maturity	 of	 domestic	 equipment	 had	made	 a	 great	
change,	converting	the	entire	renewable	energy	market	into	a	buyer's	market	after	2010.	For	
example,	now	whenever	a	component	fails	(even	off-work	times)	these	foreign	manufacturers	
are	 willing	 to	 send	 maintenance	 personnel	 to	 quickly	 restore	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 wind	
farm.344	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 promoting	 competition	 among	 upstream	 enterprises	 (turbine	
manufacturing)	 is	 significantly	 beneficial	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 downstream	 green	 production	
(energy	generation	plants)	 for	 it	has	released	the	new	clean-energy	project	developers	from	
difficulties	 caused	 by	 suppliers.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 with	 more	 investors	 encouraged	 to	
develop	the	renewable	energy	market,	China	will	be	able	to	provide	a	rather	 large	domestic	
market	 with	 more	 advanced	 technology	 for	 end-users.	 These	 manufacturers	 and	 investors	
could	improve	the	adaptability	of	both	imported	and	independently	developed	technologies.	
Moreover,	 innovation	 may	 be	 induced	 by	 demand	 conditions,	 i.e.	 when	 domestic	 users	
sufficiently	scrutinize	the	technological	quality	of	different	(turbine)	suppliers	and	select	their	
supplier	 accordingly. 345 	 When	 IP	 holders	 are	 under	 continuous	 pressure	 to	 develop	
technology	with	a	better	cost/performance	rate,	with	healthy	rivalry,	the	whole	industry	will	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
per hour. Overtime work cannot be arranged on Sundays in any occasion.” Interview with manager from the Shandong Haiyang 
Qiuershan Wind Power Project. 
344 Interview with manager from the Shandong Haiyang Qiuershan Wind Power Project and with manager from Shandong Weihai 
69 MW Wind Power Project 
345 Fagerberg (n 338); Porter (n 338). 
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evolve	faster	and	foreign	manufacturers	could	also	benefit	from	the	global	knowledge	growth.	
Therefore,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 mutually	 benefitting	 relationship	 established	 between	
developed	 countries	 and	 China,	 an	 unchangeable	 one-fits-all	 international	 standard	 of	 IP	
protection	 is	 lopsided,	 especially	 in	 the	embryonic	 stage	of	 renewable	energy	 conversion	 in	
China.	 As	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	 much	 rights	 protection	 is	 actually	 needed	 to	 encourage	
innovation	and	how	to	value	the	innovator’s	rights	against	community	rights,	one	should	give	
full	 respect	 to	 the	 legitimate	cultural	and	economic	differences	between	countries,	because	
“it	is	clear	that	the	ethics	of	Chinese	IPR	infringement	is	a	complex	and	multifaceted	issue.”346	
Indeed,	even	if	the	Chinese	government	is	committed	to	curtailing	infringement,	it	may	not	be	
able	to	fulfil	the	pledge	without	accepting	certain	harms	to	the	country.	The	price	could	be	a	
reduction	 in	 both	 employment	 and	 economic	 growth,	 and	 more	 perilous	 effects	 on	 the	
stability	and	sound	development	of	the	country.	 	
6.7 Price of green technology 
Based	 on	 the	 discussion	 above,	 the	 suspicion	 that	 unsatisfactory	 IP	 protection	 deters	
investment	 to	 China	 seems	 untenable.	 As	 a	 matter	 a	 fact,	 although	 foreign	 suppliers	 have	
little	 faith	 in	Chinese	 IP	protection,	they	are	somehow	used	to	such	situations	and	prepared	
for	its	impact.	In	other	words,	China	has	not	been	seriously	threatened	by	foreign	companies	
refusing	 to	 give	 their	 technology	 to	 local	 firms	 due	 to	 low	 IP-implementation	 levels	 in	 the	
country.	In	this	case,	it	is	an	even	weaker	argument	that	IP	enforcement	according	to	Western	
standards	 is	 necessary	 for	 facilitating	 green	 TT	 in	 comparison	 with	 the	 strong	 market	
																																								 																				
346 Feldman (n 292). 
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incentives	 available	 in	 today’s	 China.	 It	 seems	 that	 local	 manufacturers347	 are	 therefore	
enjoying	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 the	 fruits	 of	 non-legitimate	 duplications348	 based	 on	 technologies	
transferred	to	 local	suppliers.349	 Unfortunately,	 from	a	technology	receiving	and	application	
perspective,	current	end-users	of	renewable	energy	technologies	would	simply	switch	back	to	
fossil	 fuel	 energy/contaminating	 production	 where	 it	 is	 easier	 and	 much	 less	
time/capital-consuming	than	the	greener	way	of	production.	With	the	significant	cost	of	green	
technology	 (including	 buying,	 maintaining,	 applying,	 facilitating	 and	 administrative	 costs),	
should	the	focus	still	be	placed	on	enforcing	strong	IP	protection	in	the	context	of	 imminent	
climate	change?	 	
6.7.1 Price of renewable energy technology and power generation equipment purchase and 
maintenance  
Historically,	the	price	of	green	TT	to	China	was	considerably	expensive.	This	is	because,	in	the	
infant	 stage	 of	 environmental	 technology	 development	 in	 China,	 most	 equipment	 and	
components	needed	to	be	imported	from	abroad.	This	was	due	to	the	immaturity	of	domestic	
renewable	energy	technology.	The	average	price	for	an	imported	biomass	furnace	was	65	to	
70	million	Yuan,	which	is	1.5	times	higher	than	domestically	manufactured	equipment	in	that	
infant	 stage.350	 Compatible	 components	 for	 such	 imported	 furnaces	 cost	 four	 times	 more	
than	indigenous	mechanical	parts.	In	the	wind	sector,	imported	equipment	constitutes	up	to	
																																								 																				
347 Especially companies that supplies consumable parts to renewable energy equipment. See Interviews with all three manager 
from the wind projects. 
348 With technology owners charging considerably that is too high for developing countries to afford, companies in China tend to 
acquire them by imitation or reverse-engineering (which are non-legitimate) acquisition (which is legitimate), bypassing IP 
limitations, and gradually taking over market share that used to be dominated by the original company. 
349 Companies that design and produce the main body of the equipment. 
350 Roughly from 2005 to 2010. Interview with manager from Shandong Gaotang 30MW Biomass Power Generation Project 
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70	per	cent	of	the	construction	expenses	of	a	wind	farm.351	 Cost	per	kilowatt	of	the	imported	
turbines	is	around	10,000	Yuan	while	domestic	turbines’	power	generation	costs	30	per	cent	
less	at	about	7,000	Yuan	per	kilowatt.352	 Foreign	 turbine	manufacturers	normally	provide	a	
5-year	warranty	but	when	the	warranty	has	expired	a	large	wind	farm	will	have	to	pay	30–50	
million	 Yuan	 per	 year	 to	 maintain	 this	 equipment.353	 This	 is	 due	 to	 compatible	 accessory	
parts	 and	 consumables	 costing	 more	 than	 ten	 times	 higher	 for	 imported	 ones	 than	 those	
available	at	home.	 	
As	 a	 result,	 if	 operated	well	 without	 interruption,	 on	 average	 it	 is	 estimated	 to	 take	 10-15	
years	 to	 recoup	 the	 full	 amount	of	 investment	paid	 for	 equipment	purchased	 from	abroad,	
the	related	construction	and	pre-project	works.	Such	term	is,	according	to	the	 interviewees,	
not	short	but	acceptable	to	firms	that	have	financial	assistance	from	the	national	policies.354	
Soon	 after,	with	 the	 localization	 rate	 required	by	 the	 government,	more	 foreign	 companies	
entered	 into	 the	 market	 by	 investing	 in	 factory	 construction	 in	 China.	 Moreover,	 the	
technology	capacity	of	Chinese	suppliers	also	increased	promptly	to	meet	the	increasing	local	
demand.	This	 led	to	a	second	stage	of	renewable	energy	technology	development	when	the	
cost	 of	 green-tech	 equipment	 declined,	 premiums	 on	 IP	 were	 been	 reduced	 to	 affordable	
levels,	and	end-users	could	expect	reasonable	returns	under	current	market	conditions.	This	
																																								 																				
351 In the wind sector the price drop from the level at the infant stage to now has not been so significantly as in the biomass sector. 
Interview with technical director from the Provincial Power Grid. 
352 The national average: “The pricing of foreign brand turbines range from 8000 to 10000 RMB per KW in the foreign developed 
market, but only cost 5000 to 8000 RMB per KW in the Chinese market. This is due to that Chinese indigenous manufacturers have 
been able to offer turbines at even lower prices than their foreign competitors, range from 3800 to 6000 RMB per KW.” European 
Wind Energy Association, Pure Power: Wind Energy Scenarios up to 2030 (March 2008); International Energy Agency, IEA Wind 
TCP 2015 Annual Report (Executive Committee of the Implementing Agreement for Co-operation in the Research, Development, 
and Deployment of Wind Energy Systems of the International Energy Agency, August 2016); Joanna I. Lewis, Green Innovation in 
China: China's Wind Power Industry and the Global Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy (Columbia University Press 2013). 
353 Interview with manager and CDM manager from Shandong Wulian Dongfeng Phase I Wind Power Project. 
354 Interview with managers from the Shandong Gaotang 30 MW Biomass Power Generation Project and the Shandong Kenli 
Biomass Generation Project. 
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was	mainly	due	to	the	effort	by	the	Chinese	government	to	encourage	 international	TT	 into	
the	 domestic	 renewable	 energy	 industry.	 For	 example,	 China’s	 earliest	 wind	 turbine	
manufacturers	 were	 two	 joint	 ventures	 between	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 manufacturers,	
created	as	part	of	a	government	programme.355	 “Between	2003	and	2009,	TT	was	promoted	
by	making	wind	 farm	development	permits	 conditional	on	a	minimum	percentage	of	 locally	
manufactured	 content.”356	 The	National	 DRC	 and	 international	 environment	 funds,	 such	 as	
the	 GEF,	 were	 also	 providing	 financial	 support	 for	 indigenous	 manufacturers	 to	 develop	
independent	 multi-MW	 wind	 turbines.357	 Domestic	 turbines	 also	 have	 the	 advantages	 of	
being	 better	 adapted	 to	 China’s	 local	 circumstances,	 having	 short	 delivery	 terms	 and	
convenient,	 cheaper	 costumer	 service. Therefore,	 according	 to	 the	 International	 Trade	
Administration	 data,	 “there	 were	 over	 80	 wind	 turbine	 generator	 manufacturers	 and	 200	
wind	[energy	project]	developers"	by	2008	with	domestic	 firms	occupying	more	than	75	per	
cent	of	the	market	share.358	
However,	 the	achievement	of	a	 relatively	 short	diffusion	and	duplication	period	 (only	a	 few	
years)	 cost	 greatly	 according	 to	 the	 interviewees.359	 In	 the	 biomass	 furnace	manufacturing	
industry,	 although	 “royalty	 costs	 for	 energy	 patents	 [represent]	 a	 small	 percentage	 of	 the	
total	 investment	cost,”360	 more	 than	50	per	cent	of	profit	gained	 from	biomass	boiler	 sales	
were	paid	to	the	foreign	 licenser	before	the	Chinese	manufacturer	accomplished	acquisition	
																																								 																				
355 See the ‘Ride the Wind’ program of 1997 and the State Planning Commission 1997. Gosens and Lu, supra note 86  
356 NRSC: Cancellation of Requirements Concerning Localization Rates of Wind Power Project Equipment Purchases. 
357 World Bank, China - Renewable Energy Scale-up Program (Implementation Completion and Results Report, 24 June 2012). 
358 Energy and Security Group, Clean Energy: An Exporter's Guide to China (US Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, 2008).  
359 Interview with manager from the Shandong Weihai 69 MW Wind Power Project and technical director from the Provincial 
Power Grid. 
360 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, ‘Towards a Low-Carbon Economy: a Business Contribution to the 
International Energy & Climate Debate’ WBCSD, March 2009 
<http://www.wbcsd.org/Clusters/Climate-Energy/Resources/A-business-contribution-to-the-international-energy-climate-debate> 
accessed Feburary 2017. 
	 324	
of	 a	 technology	 owner’s	 company.361	 These	 core	 technologies	 include	 automatic	 loading	
system,	vibrating	grate	technology	and	desulphurization	technology.	The	limited	profit	margin	
is,	 in	 fact,	 restraining	 further	 independent	 development	 of	 domestic	 manufacturers.	 In	
comparison,	 in	 the	 wind	 turbine	 manufacturing	 industry,	 all	 Chinese	 wind	 turbine	
manufacturers	started	operations	under	licensing	from	abroad	or	based	on	partnership	with	a	
mature	 foreign	 turbine	designer	 from	the	outset.362	 And	soon	after	many	of	 them	declared	
that	they	had	independent	wind	turbine	designs	and	they	started	to	be	called	“leaders”	in	the	
international	 market.	 Take	 Sinovel	 and	 Goldwind,	 the	 top	 two	 Chinese	 wind	 turbine	
manufacturers	 as	 examples.	 Sinovel	 imported	 technology	 from	 the	 German	 company	
Fuhrlander	under	licence	in	2005	and	established	a	cooperative	development	with	American	
firm	 Windtec	 two	 years	 later.	 In	 2009,	 it	 released	 its	 own	 independently	 developed	 wind	
turbine.	 In	 1998	 Goldwind	 got	 a	 licence	 from	 a	 US	 company,	 Jacobs	 Wind	 Electric,	 and	
exploited	independent	technology	on	the	gearless	Vensys	wind	turbine	in	2008.363	 However,	
despite	a	number	of	domestic	manufacturers	claiming	that	they	are	capable	of	designing	wind	
turbines	 independently,	 my	 interviewees	 were	 sceptical.	 All	 of	 the	 interviewees	 recruited	
from	wind	farms	indicated	that	most	of	domestic	wind	turbine	manufacturers	are	assembling	
components	 purchased	 from	 abroad	 rather	 than	 designing	 and	 producing	 turbines.	 This	
indicates	 that	 a	 large	 share	 of	 income	 made	 by	 the	 domestic	 turbine	 makers	 are	 paid	 to	
foreign	companies	from	whom	chemical	parts	are	imported.	Nevertheless,	a	demand	for	core	
																																								 																				
361 interview with technical director from the Provincial Power Grid and CDM manager from Shandong Shanxian 1*25MW 
Biomass Power Plant Project. 
362 Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
363 Xujuan Chen, ‘Patent Analysis on Manufacturing Technology of Wind Power Generation Equipment’ (2009) 9 Inner Mongolia 
Technology and Economy 43. 
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technologies	 and	 components 364 	 from	 overseas,	 such	 as	 the	 highly	 specialized	 steel	
components	 used	 in	 axle	 and	 yaw	 bearings	 remains	 high.365	 Many	 core	 technologies,	 like	
frequency	 converting	 technology366	 are	 still	 owned	 by	 old	 firms	 like	 Vestas	 until	 now.	 The	
independent	technologies	claimed	by	these	Chinese	wind	turbine	suppliers	are	mostly	guides	
to	 the	 techniques	of	 assembling	 components.	 This	 is	 confirmed	by	 the	 fact	 that	no	Chinese	
manufacturer	has	been	able	to	license	its	independent	turbine	design	technology	to	a	foreign	
company.	Without	independent	core	technologies	domestic	companies	are	not	able	to	profit	
well	 from	 production.	 Not	 to	 mention	 that	 prices	 paid	 for	 turbines	 produced	 by	 the	 local	
Chinese	companies	have	been	much	lower	than	those	for	imported	ones.367	
A	 better	 TT	 example	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 biomass	 energy	 sector	where	 the	 technology	 producing	
main	 parts	 and	 essential	 auxiliary	 equipment	 of	 biomass	 furnaces	 is	 obtained	 through	
acquisition	after	being	under	licence	for	years	and	has	helped	the	market	reach	a	satisfactory	
localization	 rate.	 Yet	 the	 knowledge	 needed	 for	 production	 and	 improvement	 of	 the	
pre-treatment	device	and	feeding	system	is	still	falling	behind	most	advanced	foreign	leaders.	
																																								 																				
364 LI Junfeng et. al (n 204); Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
365 Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
366 “The wind turbine generator system requires a power conditioning circuit called power converter that is capable of adjusting the 
generator frequency and voltage to the grid.” Md Rabiul Islam, Y. G. Guo and J. G. Zhu, ‘Power converters for wind turbines: 
Current and future development’ in A.  Méndez-Vilas (ed), Materials and Processes for Energy: Communicating Current Research 
and Technological Developments (Formatex Research Center 2013). 
367 Interviews with managers and CDM managers from all three wind projects. 
But lower price indicates that comparatively low technology is used in China’s wind energy installations. According to my 
interviewees, there is clearly a large gap in quality between Chinese manufacturers and the world leading companies, as discussed 
in a former section. So if buyers are able to make choices freely (without government influence and the institutional defects of HR 
in China), wind farms prefer to use more expensive imported turbines that promise steady performance over domestic brands. In 
recent years, many Chinese manufacturers faced an overcapacity issue but the resultant price competition could not offset their 
disadvantages in producing low-quality products with high maintenance costs against the more costly imports with lower 
maintenance costs. Let’s go back in time to when the Chinese wind turbine industry was emerging. In comparison with the 
significant expenditure needed for developing and designing the turbines independently, licensing was a much cheaper and easier 
way for a start-up business to get off the ground. In order to enter the market as quickly as possible and take over market share, 
there was little time for the less- or zero-experienced companies to craft their technology to perfection. This tradition has continued 
and grown through development of the Chinese renewable energy industry and possibly will expand to further influences. An 
increase in the use of domestically produced equipment can reduce the construction costs of power stations due significantly to “the 
reduction in purchasing price, transportation costs, and custom tariffs.” (Jingyi Han et.al, n 204) After all, domestic wind turbines 
are about 30 per cent cheaper than imported turbines. However, the abolishment of the 70 per cent localization rate policy suggests 
that the future potential for additional cost reductions in this respect is limited. (ibid n 204) In the long term, a large amount of 
installation of immature domestic renewable energy equipment will have higher maintenance fees. And the cost will be even more 
when the warranty expires and replacement of core parts is needed. 
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This	 has	 subsequently	 affected	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 equipment’s	 operation,	 and	 directly	
influences	the	production	of	biomass	power	plants.	However,	Chinese	companies	must	solve	
these	 problems	 independently	 as	 straw	 material	 in	 China	 is	 very	 different	 in	 variety	 from	
those	 available	 in	 foreign	 countries.	 Plenty	 of	 finance	 was	 spent	 on	 innovation	 with	 the	
imported	 furnaces	 to	 adapt	 them	 to	 the	 Chinese	 fuel	 available	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	
equipment	 performance	 in	 the	 first	 two	 or	 three	 years	 (which	 is	 the	 so-called	 “running-in	
period”).	Such	cost	is	inherently	attached	to	almost	every	TT	to	China	adding	to	the	price	that	
is	already	high.	
In	addition,	from	the	second	to	the	fifth	year,	equipment	is	performing	at	its	best	because	it	is	
still	new,	has	high	stability	and	personnel	are	proficient	in	its	operation.	Therefore,	yield	rate	
during	this	period	of	time	is	relatively	good.	After	five	years,	all	equipment	enters	a	period	of	
fatigue.	 Devices	 start	 to	 wear	 down	 and	 demand	 regular	 maintenance	 and	 this	 causes	
downtime.	A	conglomerate	company,	which	develops	several	projects	in	different	places,	will	
receive	reports	of	component	failure	from	projects	established	contemporaneously	and	it	will	
be	 able	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 requests	 for	 supply/import	 of	 replacements	 in	 the	 same	 period.	
Therefore,	 it	will	 take	 immense	expense	and	 intense	work	 cumulatively.	 In	 the	wind	 sector,	
some	wind	farms	saved	on	costs	during	initial	investment	because	they	installed	domestically	
supplied	 turbines.	 Still,	 they	 eventually	 need	 to	 spend	 more	 time	 and	 money	 to	 maintain	
these	 turbines	 than	 imported	ones.	 This	 is	due	 to	 the	 immature	domestic	wind	 technology,	
which	 has	 resulted	 in	 more	 frequent	 breakdowns	 during	 operation.	 According	 to	 Han’s	
research,	 the	“average	 full-load	hours	per	year	of	wind	turbines	 in	China	 (1787	h)	are	much	
lower	than	in	Western	countries	such	as	the	United	Kingdom	(2628	h),	Australia	(2500	h)	and	
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the	 United	 States	 (2300	 h).”368	 He	 provides	 an	 extreme	 case	 of	 Huarui	 having	 three	 wind	
turbines	installed	in	Boligenshan	Wind	Farm	in	2003.	And	these	turbines	designed	with	2000	
full-load	 hours	 can	 operate	 merely	 300	 hours	 a	 year.369	 A	 similar	 situation	 has	 been	
discovered	 in	 the	 interviewed	 projects,	 as	 domestic	 turbines	 require	 replacement	 of	 “large	
components”	more	 often,	 which	will	 stop	 production	 of	 the	wind	 farm	 from	 time	 to	 time.	
Large	components	 include	 the	engine	 room	and	 the	gearbox,	which	need	 to	be	 installed	by	
Caterpillar	 crane.	 Such	 a	 crane	 is	 assembled	 from	 a	 number	 of	 lorries	 and	 equipment,	
requiring	convoys	to	be	hired	and	a	huge	amount	of	transportation	fees	to	be	paid	on	top	of	
the	cost	of	 the	component	 (300	thousand	Yuan	on	average).	Furthermore,	 in	the	 long	term,	
power	 plants	 installed	 with	 immature	 equipment	 will	 have	 to	 pay	 conversion	 expenses370	
when	 the	 maintenance	 fee	 exceeds	 the	 small	 profit.	 To	 keep	 their	 means	 of	 production	
updated	 (and	 possibly	 to	 comply	 with	 newly	 promulgated	 policies),371	 power	 companies	
might	 be	 forced	 to	 switch	 to	more	 advanced	 and	 stable	 equipment.	While	 production	 cost	
reductions	achieved	by	 the	 instalment	of	new	 facilities	are	not	always	enough	 to	offset	 the	
initial	upfront	conversion	costs.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 noted	 that	 “China	 has	 been	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	
technology	 at	 a	 lower	 cost	 than	others.”372	 Because	 of	 the	 size	 of	 the	Chinese	market	 and	
significant	 prices	 differences	 between	 domestic	 and	 imported	 technologies,	 the	 cost	 of	
																																								 																				
368 Ibid (n 204). 
369 Ibid. 
370 Chris Joseph, ‘The Disadvantages of Going Green for a Corporation’ (www.Chron.com)  
<http://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantages-going-green-corporation-3318.html> accessed Feburary 2017. 
371 For example, the SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) used to require a 8% rate of return 
has been increased to 12% from 2014. 
372 Copenhagen Economics and The IPR Company (n 158).  
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renewable	 equipment	 is	 being	 driven	 down.373	 Accordingly,	 the	 disadvantaged	 situation	 of	
Chinese	end-users	with	weaker	bargaining	power	in	relation	to	developed	suppliers	has	been	
changed.	 Interviewees	 indicate	 that	 they	 are	 now	 in	 a	 better	 position	 in	 negotiations	 and	
provided	with	more	reasonable	deals	and	services	from	the	leading	manufacturers	who	used	
to	 “play	 hard.”	 It	 is	 true	 that	 “in	 an	 environment	 of	 the	 mania	 for	 investment	 in	 China's	
renewable	energy	market,	competition	and	diversity	will	make	it	impossible	for	monopolistic	
pricing.”374	 But	again,	certain	types	of	technologies,	especially	the	core	ones	and	most	recent	
ones,	are	still	and	will	be	for	a	long	time	controlled	by	developed	leading	manufacturers.	For	
example,	 although	China’s	wind	 turbine	 rotor	blade	production	 accounts	 for	 25	per	 cent	of	
the	world’s	total,375	 access	to	turbines	with	a	capacity	over	1.5	MW	is	mainly	dependent	on	
imports.	 	
In	 theory,	 the	excessive	expense	 involved	with	expanding	the	usage	of	 renewables	could	be	
offset	from	more	profitable	sectors	through	macro-control	of	the	economy.	For	example,	with	
a	 large	capacity	of	Chinese	solar	power	companies,376	 revenue	 income	from	exporting	solar	
panels	 could	 be	 used	 to	 subsidize	 wind	 and	 biomass	 power	 stations	 when	 importing	
equipment.377 	 However,	 such	 a	 strategy	 may	 be barred	 by	 counterproductive	 policies	
adopted	by	developed	countries	that	profess	environmentalism	and	international	cooperation	
on	 climate	 change.	Actions	 such	as	 increasing	 trade	 tariffs	 on	photovoltaic	 panels	 imported	
from	 China	 by	 the	 US	 and	 the	 EU	 are	 hindering	 China’s	 exportation	 of	 renewable	 energy	
																																								 																				
373 Downey (n 50). 
374 Ibid. 
375 Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
376 Energy and Security Group (n 358). 
377 In fact, most large energy companies re engaged with more than one type of renewable energy projects. Interview with manager 
and CDM manager from Shandong Wulian Dongfeng Phase I Wind Power Project regarding the China Resources (Holdings) Co. 
Ltd.
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equipment.378	 This	 “will	 only	 slow	 the	 rate	at	which	 costs	decrease	and	will	 decelerate	 the	
world's	 retreat	 from	fossil	 fuels.”379	 As	a	 result,	 the	decrease	 in	 the	cost	of	 renewables	was	
delayed	and	the	carbon	reduction	targets	ascertained	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	were	not	fulfilled	
after	the	first	commitment	period	(2008–2012).380	 According	to	the	interviewees,381	 even	in	
China	 where	 favourable	 policies	 are	 available,	 renewable	 energy	 technologies	 are	 only	
affordable	 to	 companies	 that	 are	 getting	 financial	 support	 from	 abroad	 or	 from	 the	 state	
government.	However,	with	the	first	implementation	period	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	expiring	in	
2012,382	 a	 lot	of	CER	buyers	 ceased	 their	 contracts	with	Chinese	 companies.	Many	Chinese	
entrepreneurs	 have	 lost	 interest	 in	 utilizing	 green	 tech	 and	 stopped	 applying	 for	 CDM	
projects,	 as	both	are	 time-	and	money-consuming.	Only	a	 few	demonstration	CDM	projects	
still	have	the	intention	of	running	renewable	energy	plants	because	financial	support	provided	
for	such	projects	are	guaranteed	and	sufficient.	In	2012,	when	the	Chinese	government	issued	
the	 Interim	 Measures	 for	 the	 Administration	 of	 Voluntary	 Greenhouse	 Gas	 Emission	
Reduction	 Transactions,	 there	 was	 a	 minor	 rebound	 in	 green-tech	 applications	 within	 the	
Chinese	domestic	market.	But	in	general	the	enthusiasm	in	applying	renewables	has	declined	
																																								 																				
378 “Europe’s solar industry has condemned an EU vote to impose another round of duties on Chinese imports, just weeks before a 
US trade panel is due to rule on similar tariffs.” Arthur  Neslen, ‘Solar industry says EU tariffs on Chinese imports will raise panel 
prices’ (The guardian, 8 September 2017)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/08/solar-industry-says-eu-tariffs-chinese-imports-will-raise-panel-prices> 
accessed July 2017. 
379 John A. Mathews and Hao Tan, ‘Economics: Manufacture Renewables to Build Energy Security’ Nature: International Weekly 
Journal of Sience (2014) <http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.15847!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/513166a.pdf> 
accessed Feburary 2017. 
380 Ibid. 
381 manager interviewees from all wind and biomass projects. 
382 First commitment period: 2008-2012; “In Doha, Qatar, on 8 December 2012, the ‘Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol’ was 
adopted. The amendment includes: New commitments for Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol who agreed to take on 
commitments in a second commitment period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020; During the first commitment period, 37 
industrialized countries and the European Community committed to reduce GHG emissions to an average of five percent against 
1990 levels. During the second commitment period, Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 
levels in the eight-year period from 2013 to 2020; however, the composition of Parties in the second commitment period is 
different from the first.”  Quoted from Metro-link Express for Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad (MEGA), Environmental Impact 
Assessment Study for Ahmedabad Metro Rail Project (Phase-1) (Urban Engineering, Oct 2014). 
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out	 of	 a	 fear	 of	 costly	 IP	 and	 follow-on	 expenses.	 The	 narrative	 around	 IP	 in	 relation	 to	
renewable	energy	technology	needs	to	change.	
6.7.2 Cost to maintain patents 
Although	the	cost	of	equipment	and	service	is	much	higher	with	imported	technologies,383	 it	
still	 seems	 almost	 affordable	 to	 large	 Chinese	 companies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 such	 capital	
resource	outflow	comes	at	the	price	of	leaving	less	capital	domestically	needed	for	patenting	
and	maintaining	 renewable	energy	 technologies.	And	as	China	 is	 in	a	 transition	period	 from	
technology	receiver	to	provider,	it	could	result	in	fatigue	in	connection	with	increasing	green	
production	and	R	&	D	development	in	the	foreseeable	future.	In	fact,	keeping	and	maintaining	
a	valid	patent	portfolio	is	proven	to	be	expensive	enterprise	in	itself.	Entities	that	are	already	
major	 players	 in	 the	 wind	 industry,	 like	 Vestas,	 GE,	 Siemens	 and	 Gamesa	 are	 allocating	
considerable	 amount	of	 capitals	 in	 building	 and	maintaining	 IP	 portfolios.384	 It	 is	 estimated	
that	for	every	megawatt	installed,	GE	will	have	to	spend	$25,000	licensing	wind	patent	suits	in	
the	US.	And	by	2020	the	cost	of	GE	maintaining	just	its	US	wind	IP	portfolio	will	be	as	much	as	
$31	million.385	 Such	a	whopping	price	could	be	even	higher	for	IP	successors,	as	the	current	
industry	 leaders	will	only	compromise	 their	 competitiveness	 in	exchange	 for	an	outstanding	
profit.	 Most	 Chinese	 companies	 are	 virtual	 latecomers	 in	 the	 global	 renewable	 energy	
business.	How	IP	fits	into	the	overall	business	strategy	for	an	emerging	firm	is	depends	on	its	
start-up	or	developing	position	in	the	market.386	 	
																																								 																				
383 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
384 Davidson (n 201). 
385 Ibid. 
386 The Development Solutions and the European Chamber (n 163). 
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Factors	regarding	the	maturity	of	the	independent	technology	capacity	of	a	company	are	also	
important	in	maintaining	patents.	The	old	industry	leaders	are	the	key	players	in	investing	in	
exploring	new	and	untested	 technologies,	 as	 they	own	many	mature	 core	 technologies	 and	
are	experienced	with	applying	off-patent	ones	already.	Such	companies	are	keen	to	increase	
opportunities	to	 license	and	cross-licensing	to	other	companies	by	barring	new	players	from	
entering	 the	 market.	 Interviewees387	 have	 indicated	 that	 only	 these	 world	 leaders	 are	
capable	of	protecting	technologies	with	trade	secrets	because	they	are	sophisticated	enough	
to	conceal	the	key	parts	required	to	unblock	the	technology	within	a	“black	box.”	“This	could	
be	 done	 by	 supplying	 specialized	 equipment	 or	 by	 having	 a	 trusted	 contractor	 perform	 the	
installation	because	the	technology	will	need	to	be	taught	and	practiced	by	the	licensee.”388	
In	 contrast,	 Chinese	businesses	 are	not	 yet	 able	 to	use	 IP	 to	achieve	 these	objectives.	 They	
would	 be	 more	 interested	 in	 maximizing	 revenue	 and	 extending	 their	 IP	 portfolio	 through	
licensing	and	other	forms	of	imitation,	which	are	sometimes	out	of	their	control.	At	this	stage,	
a	 considerable	 share	 of	 profits	 is	 taken	 by	 foreign	 licensers/exporters.	 Therefore,	 Chinese	
manufacturers	may	be	even	struggling	to	budget	sufficiently	to	actively	detect	counterfeiters	
and	pursue	compensation	through	litigation.389	
Moreover,	 to	 survive	 the	 competition	 and	 become	 so-called	 “industry	 leaders”	 globally,	
companies	will	have	to	look	at	anything	they	can	do	to	get	ahead,	filing	cutting-edge	patents	
broad	enough	to	exclude	competitors’	 inventions	or	through	the	acquisition	of	 IP	developed	
by	 competitors.	 For	 example,	 the	 Chinese	 energy	 technology	 company	 LoonG	 acquired	
																																								 																				
387 Interviews with R & D director from Shandong Dongyue HFC23 Decomposition Project and the R & D staff from a world 
leading Turbine maker. 
388 The Development Solutions and the European Chamber (n 163). 
389 According to technicians from all three wind projects and one biomass projects, detecting patent infringement is actually a very 
technical and difficult job requires a team of knowledgeable experts and funding. 
	 332	
Bioener	-	one	of	the	top	two	Denmark	biomass	boiler	manufacturers.	However,	possessing	a	
single	 patent	 does	 not	 automatically	 allow	 a	manufacturer	 to	 commercialize	 technology.	 In	
fact,	 it	 requires	 the	 acquisition	 of	 “a	 particular	 variant	 of	 a	 broader	 technology,	 already	
patented”390	 and	latent	capacity	regarding	both	financial	and	intellectual	abilities	to	explore,	
innovate	 and	 renew	 this	 invention.	 In	 that	 case,	 LoonG	 taking	 over	 Bioener	 is	 an	 entirely	
different	 case	 from	 a	 stronger	 merging	 between	 technology	 leaders,	 both	 from	 developed	
countries.	 For	example,	GE	purchased	Converteam	 to	enhance	 its	 technology	 for	 full-power	
conversion	and	permanent-magnet	generators.	Also	the	039	patent,	later	acquired	by	GE	and	
originally	 filed	 by	 a	 US	 firm	-	 Enertech	Windpower,	 has	 enabled	 GE	 to	 block	 Enercon	 (the	
innovative	German	 turbine	maker)	 from	applying	 it	own	 technology	 in	 the	US	until	2010.391	
Such	 wind	 power-related	 IP	 clashes	 of	 the	 1990s	 even	 included	 “allegations	 of	 industrial	
espionage	involving	the	US	National	Security	Agency.”392	 	
Therefore,	 for	upcoming	Chinese	manufacturers,	 it	will	be	costly	to	keep	and	 innovate	upon	
imported	 technologies.	 Harsh	 terms	 and	 potential	 litigation	 coming	 from	 the	 original	
technology	 owners	 would	 hinder	 the	 fast,	 independent	 development	 of	 renewable	 energy	
technologies	 by	 Chinese	 companies.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 AMSC	 vs.	 Sinovel	
case,393	 when	the	two	parties	started	to	develop	wind	turbines	cooperatively,	a	declaration	
of	ownership	of	independent	IPRs	by	Sinovel	was	included	in	the	agreement.	But	in	exchange,	
Sinovel	agreed	to	use	core	components	of	the	electronic	control	system	provided	by	AMSC	in	
all	of	 its	 turbines,	which	 secured	great	 sales	 for	AMSC	 for	 several	 years.	Data	 shows	 that	 in	
																																								 																				
390 Delegation of the European Union to China and Euraxess Links China (n 286). 
391 The patent expired in February 2011. Davidson (n 201). 
392 Ibid. 
393 See Section 6.5.4 
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2010	 alone,	 purchases	 by	 Sinovel	 from	 AMSC	 reached	 20	 billion	 Yuan	 (about	 2.2	 billion	
Pounds).	 Since	2011,	with	 the	 increasing	proportion	of	wind	power	 in	 the	national	grid,	 the	
grid	 required	 wind	 turbines	 to	 introduce	 low-voltage	 ride-through	 technology	 (LVRT).	 The	
LVRT	capability	is	the	ability	to	deal	with	grid	faults.	It	has	a	great	impact	on	the	power	system	
stability	 of	 wind	 farms	 and	 therefore	 became	 an	 important	 indicator	 used	 by	 the	 grid	
connection	test.394	 Sinovel	thus	developed	its	own	technology	to	improve	the	PM	transducer	
in	order	 to	pass	 the	 LVRT	 testing	 required	by	 the	national	 grid,	 and	 ceased	purchases	 from	
AMSC.	This	led	to	the	subsequent	dispute	between	AMSC	and	Sinovel,	and	IP	litigations	were	
launched	as	a	result.395	
The	AMSC-Sinovel	dispute	reflects	the	increasing	competition	between	domestic	wind	power	
enterprises	 and	 foreign	 companies.	 This	 is	 a	 tough	 transition	 phase	 for	 Chinese	
former-licensees	who	are	becoming	competitors	in	the	international	market	because	of	many	
hidden	problems	they	encounter	when	they	first	start	to	cooperate	with	foreign	licensors.	In	
Sinovel’s	 case,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 cooperation	with	 AMSC,	 Sinovel	 entered	 into	 a	 contract	
specifying	 AMSC	 as	 its	 sole	 frequency-converter	 supplier.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 vicious	 circle,	 with	
Sinovel’s	overreliance	on	AMSC	products,	 and	without	 competitive	pressure	 it	established	a	
"lazy"	psychology	of	slow	technological	upgrades	 in	AMSC	and	more	import	reliance	of	their	
Chinese	partners.	In	order	to	continuously	use	the	imported	technologies	and	innovate	upon	
																																								 																				
394 “The grid connection test is conducted to verify the safety of the electrical grid when an inverter performs the conversion of the 
variable DC output of the Photovoltaic (PV) modules or wind turbines into a utility frequency AC current that can be fed into the 
commercial electrical grid. Because each country has its own specifications for rated voltages, the grid connection test is an 
important measure to ensure that the inverter can meet the all requirements of the targeted markets.”Grid Connection Testing’ 
(Bureau Veritas)  <http://www.bureauveritas.com/home/about-us/our-business/cps/our-services/testing/grid-connection> accessed 
May 2017. 
395 See Section 6.5.4 
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them	 to	 adapt	 to	 local	 situations	 in	 China,	 Chinese	 renewable	 energy	 equipment	
manufacturers	and	end-users	will	have	to	seek	means	that	proactively	break	this	vicious	circle.	 	
At	present,	the	Chinese	wind	turbine	companies’	independent	R	&	D	capability	is	still	low	for	
they	are	unable	to	produce	or	design	an	integrated	multi-megawatt	wind	turbine396	 without	
procurement	 from	 foreign	 suppliers.	 For	 example,	 the	 direct-drive	 technology	 employed	 by	
Goldwind	 is	originally	 from	the	Germany	company	Vensys;	XEMC’s	production	 is	dependent	
on	 technology	 from	 the	 Netherlands	 company	 Zephyros;	 Dongfang	 Electric	 and	 Zhejiang	
Windey	 imported	 their	 technologies	 from	 Repower	 (Swiss).	 Some	 Chinese	 enterprises	 have	
been	authorized	by	the	original	technology	owners	to	incorporate	these	technologies	in	later	
developed	 wind	 turbine	 manufacturing	 but	 often	 there	 were	 conditions	 required	 by	 the	
foreign	technology	owners	to	protect	their	potential	market	share	 in	China	(e.g.	a	 long-term	
sales	contract	signed).	Currently,	the	global	wind	power	giants	have	control	over	the	majority	
of	 China’s	 domestic	 wind	 power	 technologies	 and	 industry	 chain.	 In	 these	 cases,	 it	 is	
necessary	 for	 the	Chinese	renewable	energy	 facility	designers	and	manufacturers	 to	 identify	
foreign	companies’	patent	strategies	and	have	a	clear	understanding	of	their	IPRs	to	avoid	the	
risk	 of	 patent	 infringement	 and	 to	 establish	 a	 local	 advantage.	 However,	 this	 would	 be	
redundant	 if	 the	 contract	 between	 foreign	 company	 and	 the	 Chinese	 company	 ties	 the	
Chinese	 company	 to	 the	 foreign	 companies’	 products.	 Currently,	 the	 patented	 technologies	
employed	 by	 China’s	 domestic	 renewable	 energy	 manufacturers	 are	 mainly	 from	 three	
sources:	 indigenous	 independent	 technology,	 technologies	developed	by	R	&	D	 cooperation	
																																								 																				
396 The machine consists of host, blower, analyzer, powder and filter components. 
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with	 foreign	 companies,	 and	 licensed	 technology	 owned	 by	 foreign	 companies.397	 At	 first,	
when	 domestic	 firms	 were	 not	 able	 to	 compete	 with	 foreign	 enterprises,	 there	 were	 no	
obvious	 differences	 between	 the	 three	 sources,	 but	 once	 the	 Chinese	 companies	 became	
more	 capable,	 the	 latter	 two	 sources	 of	 technology	 become	 problematic	 areas	with	 a	 high	
incidence	 of	 patent	 disputes.	 Chinese	 firms’	 lack	 of	 independent	 IPRs	 can	 easily	 lead	 to	 IP	
litigation.	 The	 monopoly	 rights	 of	 patents	 are	 therefore	 putting	 burdens	 on	 China’s	
independent	renewable	power	technology	development	and	innovation.	In	the	meantime,	as	
discussed	 earlier,	 the	 industry	 leaders	 are	 not	willing	 to	 sell	 products	 containing	 their	most	
advanced	wind	power	technology	to	China,	requiring	Chinese	firms	to	spend	more	money	to	
renew	 and	 replace	 equipment	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 their	 technologies	 updated.	 Also,	 they	 will	
need	to	employ	a	more	sophisticated	technology	strategy	to	secure	sales	in	the	future.	 	
Other	 than	 the	 above	 difficulties,	 the	 sustainable	 development	 of	 renewable	 technology	 in	
the	 long	 term	 requires	 related	 human	 resources	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 the	 area.	 To	 facilitate	
technology	 innovation,	 government,	 universities,	 and	 enterprises	will	 have	 to	make	 greater	
efforts	to	promote	education,	so	as	to	train	and	equip	qualified	personnel.	This	will	result	 in	
even	more	expense	 in	 cultivating	 talents	across	 society.	As	 the	history	of	 renewable	energy	
industry	 development	 has	 been	 short,	 experienced	 and	 skilled	workers	 and	 researchers	 are	
scarce.	 It	will	 take	 a	 lot	more	 time	and	 resources	 for	 them	 to	 grow	 to	maturity	 in	 order	 to	
have	domestic	capability	to	adapt	to	China’s	special	natural	environment,	develop	techniques,	
and	establish	industry	standards.	
																																								 																				
397 Technicians and managers from all three wind power projects. 
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6.7.3 Cost to apply - facilitating the appliance of new technology (smart grid) 
For	companies	in	the	downstream	of	the	renewable	energy	industry,	such	as	those	related	to	
energy	 generation	 plants,	 there	 is	 less	 need	 for	 storing	 up	 patents.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	
information	required	to	produce	electricity-generating	machinery	is	not	necessary,	while	the	
knowledge	required	to	use	the	machinery	effectively	is	rather	important. For	example,	during	
a	 wind	 farm	 construction	 period,	 know-how	 to	 do	 with	 anemometry	 and	 installation	
techniques	is	of	vital	importance	for	the	eventual	performance	of	the	turbine.	Subsequently,	
in	wind	 power	 generating,	 “power	 companies	 need	 not	 only	 physical	 assets	 like	 rotors	 and	
generators,	but	also	intangible	assets,	such	as	the	knowledge	of	how	to	maintain,	repair,	and	
improve	 upon	 those	 physical	 assets.”398	 On	 top	 of	 equipment	 purchase,	 software	 for	 data	
collection	 systems	 and	 knowledge	on	how	 to	 effectively	 interpret	 and	 analyze	 the	 data	 are	
vital.	A	smart	electricity	grid	connecting	consumers	and	generating	plants	is	also	essential,	and	
that	means	extra	cost	on	infrastructure	and	knowledge-based	assets.399	 For	a	power	plant,	in	
particular,	 three	elements	are	of	the	highest	 importance	-	 the	aforementioned	components	
and	service	purchase	price;	fuel	resources	and	feed-in	tariff;	and	access	to	public	facilities	(i.e.	
the	 power	 grid).	 Development	 of	 above	 aspects	 requires	 considerable	 investment	 and	
expensive	maintenance	as	well.	
6.7.3.1 Fuel resources and feed-in tariff 
In	 China,	 most	 power	 plants	 are	 subsided	 by	 large	 state-owned/invested	 power	
conglomerate/consortiums	 (State	 Owned	 enterprise-	 SOE)400	 that	 are	 mainly	 in	 charge	 of	
																																								 																				
398 Downey (n 50). 
399 See Arnulf Grübler, Technology and Global Change (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
400 “Historically, the most important developer has been Longyuan. This state-owned enterprise (SOE) was established in 1993 
with a mission to develop renewable energy. In 2002, Longyuan was incorporated as a subsidiary of Guodian, one of the so-called 
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project	construction	and	running.	At	the	same	time	all	power	plants	are	directly	controlled	by	
the	government	-	in	particular	through	the	provincial/national	DRC.	For	example,	in	the	wind	
sector,	collectively,	the	top	five	power	enterprises	(Guodian,	China	Power	Investment,	Datang,	
Huadian,	 and	Huaneng)	 “operate	58%	of	China’s	wind	 farms	 (as	of	 the	end	of	 2011).	Other	
SOEs,	mostly	utilities	under	central	or	provincial	government	control,	operate	the	remaining	
further	 32%.”401	 One	 of	 the	most	 powerful	measure	 is	 the	 pricing	 of	 renewable	 electricity	
that	government	can	employ	to	control	the	industry.	 	
Before	 2007,	 all	 large-scale	 renewable	 energy	 projects	 were	 settled	 through	 concession	
tenders	 to	 reduce	 the	 purchase	 price	 of	 the	 renewables.402	 Projects	 established	 under	
concession	 bidding	 are	 required	 to	 provide	 electricity	 at	 the	 price	 offered	 at	 auction.	 The	
company	 that	 offers	 the	 best	 price	 per	 kWh	on	 the	 terms	 provided	would	win	 the	 right	 to	
proceed	with	the	project	and	thus	 is	entitled	to	every	benefits	provided	for	the	company	to	
produce	electricity	on	the	site;	developers	are	subsequently	tied	up	by	the	small	profit	margin	
restricted	 by	 the	 price	 offered	 to	 win	 in	 the	 project/concession	 tender. However,	 some	
manufacturers	reduce	their	offered	price	merely	to	overbid	others	for	ancillary	rights	attached	
to	 the	 tender.	 This	 happens	even	when,	 in	 actual	 routine	operation,	 it	 proves	 economically	
impossible	to	run	the	power	plant	appropriately	at	this	offered	price.403 On	the	surface,	this	
concession	model	is	an	equal	platform	for	suitable	developers	that	are	capable	of	generating	
renewable	power	at	different	prices,	with	all	 the	power	companies	allowed	to	participate	 in	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
‘Big 5’ power companies (the others being China Power Investment (CPI), Datang, Huadian and Huaneng). These are state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) under the control of the central government.” Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
401 Ibid (n 86). 
402 from 2003 
403 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
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the	 renewable	 energy	 industry	 by	 bidding	 for	 projects.404	 However,	 in	 fact,	 small	 private	
companies	 have	 insufficient	 financial	 resources	 to	 compete	 with	 large	 state-owned	 power	
companies.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 SOEs	 in	 China	 are	 required	 by	 the	 national	 DRC	 to	 have	 a	
certain	 amount	 of	 energy	 generated	 from	 renewable	 energy	 resources.405	 In	 order	 to	 fulfil	
such	requirement,	SOEs	are	under	very	ambitious	as	they	are	enormous	pressure	to	win	their	
bids	regardless	the	low-price	offered	was	not	going	to	cover	real	costs	required	for	a	project.	 	
To	overcome	the	shortcomings	of	the	concession	approach,	from	2007	onwards	a	uniformed	
benchmark	 tariff406	 was	 applied	 to	 all	 large-scale	 renewable	 energy	 projects.	 China’s	 2006	
Renewable	 Energy	 Law	 becomes	 the	 main	 resource	 for	 the	 renewable	 energy	 pricing	
standards,407	 and	it	endeavours	to	increase	the	renewable	energy	share	in	the	Chinese	energy	
market.408	 The	 law’s	 renewable	 energy	 pricing	 mechanisms	 are	 based	 on	 “feed-in”	 tariff	
																																								 																				
404 Ibid. 
405 “In the Mid-Long Term Plan of Renewable Energy Development, NDRC announced Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
mandates in power generation sector. For the whole sector, the share of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable energy 
resources should reach 1% of total electricity generation by 2010 and 3% by 2020. For any power producer with installed capacity 
greater than 5 GW, the mandatory share is raised to 3% by 2010 and 8% by 2020.” Ibid (n 204); Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
406 Current wind power and biomass power on-grid price: In the end of July 2009, the National Development and Reform 
Commission issued the "Notice on improvement of wind power on-gird tariff policy " (Development and Reform Price [2009] No. 
1906), refined the policy on wind power tariff. The document stipulates that according to the different quality of wind energy 
resources and local constructive conditions, wind resources are divided into four kinds, and the on-grid prices are set 
correspondingly. The on-grid benchmark price for the four types of wind power are 0.51 yuan / kWh, 0.54 yuan / kWh, 0.58 yuan / 
kWh and 0.61 yuan / kWh. Projects that are approved since August 1, 2009 -based wind power projects will be applying this 
unified benchmark price depending on their location and wind resource type. 
In 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Electricity Regulatory Commission issued the "Interim 
Measures for Renewable energy generated electricity on-grid price and cost sharing management" ([2006] Document No. 7). 
Electricity from Biomass power generation project are priced by the State Council department in charge of electricity pricing, price 
are ascertained differently based on benchmark price suggested by provincial governments. Since 2005, the benchmark on-grid 
price for renewable energy generated electricity is the sum of price for desulphurization coal generated electricity and the 
renewable energy electricity subsidy price. Standard subsidy price is 0.25 yuan / kWh. Such subsidy price will be enjoyed by the 
power generation projects for 15 since the date of commissioning. After 15 years of running, the subsidy price will terminate. 
Biomass power generation projects conducted through tender, enjoys an on-grid price determined during tender, but the winning 
price shall not exceed the benchmark price of biomass power in that region. From the beginning of 2007, straw combustion projects 
are given a temporary subsidy price of 0.1 yuan / kWh.  
In order to encourage technology innovation, the "Interim Measures for Renewable energy generated electricity on-grid price and 
cost sharing management" also made it clear that "since 2010, the subsidy price enjoyed by newly approved power generation 
projects will be reduced by 2% compare with price enjoyed by projects approved in the previous year." In addition, in July 2010, 
the "National Development and Reform Commission notice on the improvement of agricultural and forestry biomass power price 
policy" (development price [2010] 1579) stipulates that benchmark price for biomass projects are unified as 0.75 yuan / kWh 
(before tax). 
407 See Renewable Energy Law of P.R.C. (promulgated by the Standing Commission. National People’s Congress, Feb. 28, 2005, 
effective Jan. 1, 2006); See also Caprotti (n 322). 
408 See e.g. Chinese Renewable Energy Law 2006 (n 407) Article 14 
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models,409	 but	 the	 link	 it	 has	 established	 between	 pricing	 at	 source410	 and	 grid	 in-taking	
obligations	is	problematic.411	 According	to	the	National	Energy	Administration,	the	State	DRC	
and	 the	 State	 Electricity	 Regulatory	 Commission:	 “after	 power	 generators	 are	 put	 into	
commercial	 operation,	 the	 on-grid	 tariffs	 set	 by	 the	 competent	 price	 department	 of	 the	
government	 shall	 uniformly	 apply	 to	 the	 amounts	 of	 on-grid	 electricity	 of	 the	 power	
generators.”412	 The	 electricity	 benchmark	 price	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	
generation	cost	and	reasonable	profit	margin	decided	by	the	DRC,413	 and	in	turn	a	designated	
profit	 margin	 is	 included	 for	 electricity	 purchased	 from	 the	 power	 plant.	 Therefore,	 any	
purchasing	agreement	signed	between	the	power	grid	and	power	companies	 is	manipulated	
by	the	government’s	attitude	towards	each	energy	sector.	In	practice,	the	price	offered	by	the	
winning	bid	before	2007	is	still	to	be	executed	today.	But	the	local	government	has	to	make	
sure	 that	 the	 price	 is	 no	 higher	 than	 the	 benchmark	 price	 stipulated	 by	 the	 state,	 which	
according	to	my	interviewees	only	guarantees	low	profits	for	renewable	power	plants.414	 For	
																																								 																				
409 Zijun Li, ‘China’s Renewable Energy Law Takes Effect; Pricing and Fee-Sharing Rules Issued’ 18 Worldwatch Institute; see 
also ‘China Passes Renewable Energy Law’ (Renewable Energy World, March 9, 2005)  
<http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2005/03/china-passes-renewable-energy-law-23531.html> accessed Feb 2017. 
Quoted by Caprotti (n 322). 
410 Chinese Renewable Energy Law 2006 (n 407) Article 19: The on-grid electricity prices for projects of electricity generation by 
using renewable energies shall be determined by the administrative department of price of the State Council in light of the 
conditions of different areas and the characteristics of electricity generation by using renewable energies of different types, and 
according to the principle of helping promote the development and utilization of renewable energies and the principles of economy 
and rationality, and be adjusted in a timely manner by the same department in light of the development of the renewable energy 
resource utilization technology. On-grid electricity prices shall be published. 
The on-grid electricity price for a project of electricity generation by using renewable energies for which public bidding is held 
under Paragraph 3 of Article 13 hereof shall be the price as fixed through bidding, provided that the price may not be higher than 
the that as set under the preceding paragraph for a project of the same type. 
411 Junfeng li et. al, ‘A Study on the Pricing Policy of Wind Power in China’ Published by Chinese Rnewable Energy Industries 
Association, Greenpeace and the Global Wind Energy Council 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/Global/eastasia/publications/reports/climate-energy/2006/study-pricing-policy-of-wind-power
-in-china.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017. 
412 Chinese Renewable Energy Law 2006 (n 407). 
413 To advance the development of the renewable energy industry and ensure the rational distribution of renewable energy power 
price surcharges, and, based on the ibid (n 407). and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992), 
this Commission has formulated, upon research, the UNFCCC, ‘Decision 7/CP.7 Funding under the Convention’ in PART TWO: 
ACTION TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 7th 
session, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002 2002). 
414 interview with managers from Shandong Gaotang 30MW Biomass Power Generation Project and Shandong Kenli Biomass 
Generation Project. 
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example,	 currently	 the	average	construction	cost	of	wind	 farms	 is	about	10,000	Yuan/kW415	
and	 a	 biomass	 power	 plant	 is	 constructed	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 10,000	 to	 15,000	 Yuan/kW	 for	 the	
generators,	 and	 other	 devices	 are	 expensive.416	 In	 operation,	 it	 costs	 about	 0.60-0.64	
Yuan/kWh	 for	 wind	 projects	 and	 around	 0.70-0.79	 Yuan/kWh417	 depending	 on	 the	 straw	
purchase	price	of	 the	 year	 for	biomass	projects.	 In	 comparison	with	 the	benchmark	 feed-in	
tariff	 at	 0.4469	 Yuan/kWh,	 the	 grid	 is	 purchasing	 from	 wind	 and	 biomass	 projects	 at	 0.7	
Yuan/kWh	 and	 0.75	 Yuan/kWh,	 which	 are	 significantly	 higher	 than	 those	 for	 fossil	 fuel	
generated	 energy	 but	 insufficiently	 to	 cover	 all	 the	 costs	 borne	 by	 these	 renewable	 energy	
plants.	 	
All	biomass	projects	are	pursuing	better	thermal	conversion	efficiency	in	operation	in	order	to	
reduce	production	costs	and	increase	profit	at	the	current	tariff.	As	a	result,	some	projects	are	
running	well	as	 long	as	CDM	funding	and	government	subsidies	are	 in	place.	However,	as	 it	
takes	up	 to	 0.8	 kilograms	of	 straw	 for	 one-kilowatt	 generation,	 power	plants	 need	 to	 stock	
150	 thousand	 tons	or	more	 to	ensure	 the	proper	operation	of	 the	plants	 in	 the	 tax	year.	 In	
fact,	 the	 cost	 of	 straw	 fuel	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 type	 of	 crops	 (wheat,	 maize	 or	 cotton)	 it	
comes	 from	and	 the	agricultural	output	of	 the	 season/year.	When	 the	 straw	market	 is	 fine,	
straw	is	available	at	150-280	Yuan	per	ton	plus	expenses	for	setting	up	purchase	stations	and	
transportation.418	 As	straw	production	 is	 seasonal,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	purchase	 in	winter.	So	
when	 harvest	 time	 comes,	 power	 plants	 must	 make	 time	 to	 collect	 straw.	 Usually,	 if	 the	
acquisition	happens	a	month	or	even	 two	weeks	 later	 than	harvest	 time,	all	 straw	 is	out	of	
																																								 																				
415 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
416Jiamin Xie, ‘Discussion on the Development of Biomass Power Generation in China (in Chinese)’ (2012) china-nengyuancom 
<http://www.china-nengyuan.com/tech/china-nengyuan_tech_94301.pdf> accessed Feubrary 2017. 
417 Adding the fuel cost at 0.40 - 0.49 Yuan/kWh plus operation costs at 0.3 Yuan/kWh. 
418 Interview with manager from Shandong Gaotang 30MW Biomass Power Generation Project. 
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stock.	 Therefore,	 the	 purchase	 task	 is	 critical	 because	 it	 has	 to	 be	 done	 in	 a	 short	 period,	
which	 requires	 the	 recruitment	of	 a	 large	 crew	of	 temporary	workers	 collecting	 straw	 from	
different	 locations	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 In	 addition,	 after	 the	 acquisition,	 straw	 must	 be	
immediately	pre-treated	for	later	storage	properly,	because	if	the	water	inside	the	straw	has	
not	been	 treated,	 the	high	moisture	will	 lead	 to	 spontaneous	combustion	afterwards.	More	
than	 that,	 the	 transportation	 for	 straw	can	be	burdensome	as	well.	Straw	that	 is	 commonly	
available	in	the	market	is	divided	into	two	categories:	grey	straw	and	yellow	straw.	Grey	straw	
(cotton	 straw)	 is	 easier	 to	 transport,	 for	 it	 requires	 simple	 loading	 to	 a	 lorry.	 Yellow	 straw	
(wheat	 straw)	 is	 harder	 to	 transport	 for	 it	 could	 be	 blown	 away	 during	 transportation.	
Therefore,	 a	 briquette	 machine	 is	 used	 during	 yellow	 straw	 collection,	 and	 some	 biomass	
power	plants	use	it	for	material	handling	as	well.	The	straw	will	be	pressed	into	blocks	by	the	
briquette	machine,	making	 it	easier	to	transport.	Some	plants	argue	that	they	are	unable	to	
afford	 this	 technology,	 as	 it	 will	 raise	 the	 cost	 of	 production.	 Sometimes,	 straw	 stocks	 fall	
short	of	market	demands	because	 they	 can	also	be	 sold	 to	 racecourses	 and	horse	 farms	 to	
make	fodder.	In	such	a	tight	market,	straw	prices	could	rise	to	very	high	at	400	to	600	Yuan	a	
ton.	 To	 power	 plants,	 straw	 is	 only	 fuel,	 but	 to	 the	 farms,	 it	 is	 fine	 grain.	 Briquettes	 are	
therefore	used	because	they	can	afford	the	cost	and	also	because	it	will	be	transported	over	
long	 distances.	 However,	 for	 power	 plants,	 the	 extra	 cost	 of	 briquetting	 is	 too	 much	 of	 a	
burden.	 Also,	 the	 transportation	 distance	 is	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	 budget.	 If	 the	 location	 of	
collection	is	too	far	away	from	the	power	plant,	then	the	cost	of	transport	may	be	too	high.	As	
a	 result,	 according	 to	 the	 data	 of	 the	 year	 when	 interviews	 were	 conducted,419	 the	 straw	
																																								 																				
419 Interviews in 2013 with manager from the Shandong Gaotang 30MW Biomass Power Generation Project and manager from the 
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purchase	price	once	reached	as	high	as	700-800	Yuan	per	ton.420	 Therefore,	projects	without	
government	 support	 (financial	 and	 political)	 often	 struggle	 to	 operate	 and	 to	make	 profits.	
While	the	national	subsidy	is	still	available	at	present,	biomass	energy	plants	can	expect	only	
15	 years	 of	 support	 from	 the	 date	 the	 project	 is	 commissioned;	 after	 15	 years,	 the	
government	 will	 remove	 subsidies	 and	 the	 feed-in	 tariff	 will	 be	 the	 same	 as	 for	 fossil	 fuel	
powers.	 Since	 2010,	 the	 Trial	 Measures	 for	 Management	 of	 Prices	 and	 Cost-Sharing	 for	
Renewable	Energy	Power	Generation421	 further	stipulates	that	the	subsidy	tariff	for	projects	
approved	each	year	will	be	2	per	cent	less	than	those	approved	in	the	previous	year.422	 Such	
mechanisms	 have	 left	 the	 renewable	 energy	 companies	 with	 very	 little	 time	 to	 get	 the	
necessary	returns.	 	
A	similar	situation	is	seen	in	the	wind	power	industry.	None	of	the	wind	project	studied	in	this	
research	claim	to	have	achieved	satisfying	profits	at	the	moment.423	 The	cost	of	wind	power	
is	 much	 higher	 than	 fossil	 fuel	 generation,	 due	 to	 considerable	 construction	 costs,	
maintenance	costs,	loan	interest,	labour	costs,	and	taxes.424	 The	0.7	Yuan/kWh	feed-in	tariff	
for	 wind	 projects	 comprises	 a	 national	 standardized	 feed-in	 tariff	 at	 0.61	 Yuan	 and	 a	
subsidiary	0.09	Yuan,	available	only	in	Shandong	Province.	However,	the	provincial	subsidiary	
officially	 ceased	 from	 2012,	 and	 interviewees425	 even	 claimed	 that	 some	 projects	 stopped	
receiving	this	0.09	Yuan	from	as	early	as	2010.	This	is	to	say	that	they	have	hardly	made	any	
profits	since	then.	Han	et	al.	have	provided	detailed	data	on	operation	costs	in	wind	projects.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
Shandong Kenli Biomass Generation Project. 
420 In the year of 2012. 
421 Convention on Biological Diversity (n 413). 
422 Ibid, (n 413). 
423 Interviews with all three managers of the wind projects. 
424 Debra Lew and Jeffrey Logan, ‘Energizing China’s Wind Power Sector’ (2001) National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 
425 Manager interviewees from Shandong Weihai 69 MW Wind Power Project and Shandong Wulian Dongfeng Phase I Wind 
Power Project. 
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They	pointed	out	that	“to	maintain	equipment,	a	wind	farm	needs	to	pay	about	0.15	Yuan	for	
every	kWh	of	electricity	 it	generates.	The	average	rate	of	 interest	on	loans	for	wind	farms	is	
about	9	per	cent	of	the	total	costs.	The	salaries	of	employees	are	estimated	to	be	about	0.07	
Yuan/kWh.	Another	0.03	Yuan/kWh	relates	to	other	issues	in	wind	farm	management.	Taxes	
imposed	on	wind	farms	include	a	value-added	tax	(VAT)426	 and	income	tax.427	 Import	tariffs	
and	VAT	on	 imported	goods	are	refunded.428	 On	average,	wind	farms	pay	0.17	Yuan	merely	
on	taxes	for	every	kWh	of	electricity.”429	 Such	high	generation	costs	make	wind	electricity	far	
less	 competitive	 in	 comparison	 with	 fossil-fuelled	 electricity.	 In	 fact,	 the	 subtotal	 costs	 for	
wind	power	generation	in	Shandong	can	be	up	to	0.65	Yuan/	kWh	while	the	cost	of	coal-fired	
electricity	is	only	0.30	Yuan/kWh.430	 With	abundant	fossil	fuel	resources	available	at	a	much	
lower	 cost,	 no	 power	 company	 is	 willing	 to	 take	 on	 economic	 losses	 to	 develop	 wind	
power.431	 And	the	current	practitioners	 in	other	renewable	energy	sectors	are	 likely	to	 lose	
enthusiasm	 in	 wind	 renewable	 power	 development	 as	 well.	 Bonded	 by	 renewable	 energy	
quotas	for	power	and	grid	companies,	a	number	of	our	interviewees432	 indicated	that	these	
large	SOEs	have	been	inviting	powerful	lobbies	to	canvass	the	government	to	avoid	high	costs	
incurred	by	more	renewable	energy	installation.	 	
																																								 																				
426 “Wind farms enjoy a preferential VAT rate of 8.5%, half of the rate normal enterprises are experiencing.” Jingyi Han, 
‘Renewable Energy Development in China: Policies, practices and performance’ (PnD Thesis, Wageningen University, 
Wageningen, NL 2009). 
427 “Refunded completely in the first 2 years, refunded for 50% in the next 3 years (which means a tax rate of 16.5%), and 
experiencing the full rate (33%) afterward.” Ibid. 
428 Source: Notice on Adjusting Import Tax Policies for High Capacity Wind Turbines, Key Components and Raw Materials, 14th 
April 2008, Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council  [2008] 36‘‘Policy on adjusting import taxof wind turbine 
components’’. 
429 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
430 Ibid. 
431 This may be a short-sighted strategy as the UK this year saw the costs of renewals fall well below those of fossil fuels. China 
may be different because the abundance of coal in situ means that transportation costs are low. However, as globally the price of 
renewables reduces even in markets where there is an abundance of fossil fuels renewables become much more competitive and 
indeed within a relatively short time span much cheaper. See Adnan Z. Amin, ‘The Falling Costs of Renewable Energy: No More 
Excuses’ (Huffpost The Blog, Nov 30 2015)  <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adnan-z-amin/post_10557_b_8600240.html> 
accessed Feb 2017. 
432 As governmental officer interviewees requested anonymity to the highest degree, I will not mention the cities from which they 
come.  
	 344	
With	the	intense	competition	among	renewable	power	developers	and	the	small	profit	margin	
offered	 by	 the	 power	 grid,	 renewable	 energy	 companies	 in	 China	 are	 desperate	 for	
international	 financial	 resources.	 Among	 them,	 CDM	 is	 a	 significant	 channel	 for	 accessing	
foreign	funding.433	 For	example,	in	smaller	companies	such	as	the	Minhe	Livestock	Co.	Ltd.,434	
carbon	 trading	 incomes	 make	 up	 80%-90%	 of	 its	 annual	 revenue.	 For	 larger	 energy	
cooperation,	such	as	wind	energy	companies,	CDM	used	to	provide	10	per	cent	of	profits	for	a	
5	 MW	 wind	 farm.	 In	 2008,	 the	 first	 CDM	 contract	 on	 wind	 project	 between	 Spain	 and	
Shandong	was	 signed.	 According	 to	 this	 contract,	 the	 Spanish	 Endesa	Generacion	 S.A.	 buys	
CERs	 from	 Huaneng	 Zhongdian	 Changdao	 Wind	 Power	 Co.	 Ltd.	 through	 the	 Shandong	
Changdao	 27.2	MW	Wind	 Power	 Project	 at	 a	 price	 of	 8	 Euro/t	 of	 CO2	 reduction	 (about	 58	
Yuan/t	of	CO2	 reduction).	Within	 the	 contract	period,	58,705	 tons	CO2	equivalent	emissions	
would	be	reduced	annually,	which	provided	Huaneng	with	34	million	Yuan	of	Spanish	funding.	
However,	 according	 to	 the	 interviewee	 from	 that	 project,435	 they	 could	 profit	 four	 million	
Yuan	after	applying	cost	deductions.	Another	wind	project	funded	by	Spain	and	established	in	
the	 same	 year	 concerned	 a	 larger	 wind	 farm436	 and	 was	 receiving	 10–12	 million	 Yuan	
annually	from	CDM	buyers.	Because	Chinese	wind	farms	hardly	make	any	profit	themselves,	
such	extra	 income	 is	 a	 vital	 incentive	 for	 them	 to	 continue	and	 survive.	However,	 since	 the	
first	 implementation	 period	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 expired	 in	 2012,437	 many	 CER	 buyers	
																																								 																				
433 Asmerom M. Gilau, Robert Van Buskirk and Mitchell J. Small, ‘Enabling Optimal Energy Options under the Clean 
Development Mechanism’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 5526. 
434 Animal Manure Management System (AMMS) GHG Mitigation Project, Penglai, Shandong Province, P.R. of China 
435 which is also the manager interviewee from Shandong Weihai 69 MW Wind Power Project. 
436 Located in Weihai as well. 
437 First commitment period: 2008-2012; In Doha, Qatar, on 8 December 2012, the "Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol" was 
adopted. The amendment includes: New commitments for Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol who agreed to take on 
commitments in a second commitment period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020; during the first commitment period, 37 
industrialized countries and the European Community committed to reduce GHG emissions to an average of five percent against 
1990 levels. During the second commitment period, Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 
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ceased	 their	 contracts	 with	 Chinese	 companies.	 Since	 June	 2011,	 the	 international	 carbon	
trading	 market	 has	 experienced	 a	 steep	 fall	 in	 prices	 from	 its	 highest	 at	 14	 Euro/t	 of	 CO2	
reduction	 to	 as	 low	 as	 0.12	 Euro/t	 of	 CO2	 reduction.	 The	 2012-approved	 Shandong	Wulian	
Dongfeng	 Phase	 I	 Wind	 Power	 Project	 was	 able	 to	 sell	 its	 CER	 at	 only	 0.5	 Euro/t.	 As	 this	
project	is	providing	the	equivalent	of	88,464	tons	of	CO2	per	annum	it	can	earn	only	about	0.3	
million	 Yuan	 from	 the	 project,	 which	 almost	 fails	 to	 cover	 the	 expenses	 for	 CDM	 project	
application	 as	well	 as	 applications	 for	 approval	 from	 government.	 From	 the	 second	 half	 of	
2010,	CER	was	sold	even	lower	at	0.12	euro	per	ton.	And	the	UNFCCC	request	of	an	issue	fee	
for	reduction	verification	at	1.5	dollar/ton	(about	1.4	Euro/ton)	 is	 leaving	applicants	with	no	
profit	at	all	with	which	to	develop	CDM	projects.	Many	Chinese	enterprises	have	ceased	work	
related	 to	 CDM	applications	 and	have	hence	 lost	 interest	 in	 utilizing	 green	 technologies,	 as	
both	 are	 time-	 and	 money-consuming.	 Only	 a	 few	 demonstration	 projects	 still	 have	 the	
intention	of	running	renewable	energy	plants	because	all	financial	support	provided	for	such	
projects	is	guaranteed	and	sufficient.	
From	a	national	level,	the	utilization	of	renewable	energy	technology	is	a	considerable	burden	
to	 national	 revenue.	 On	 December	 30th,	 2015,	 the	 National	 DRC	 promulgated	 Notice	 on	
coal-fired	 electricity	 feed-in	 tariff	 reduction	 of	 and	 general	 commercial	 and	 industrial	
electricity	price	reduction,	and	decided	to	levy	an	increased	renewable	energy	surcharge	from	
0.015	to	0.019	Yuan	per	kilowatt	hour.	This	surcharge	will	raise	a	19	billion	Yuan	fund	annually	
for	 renewable	 energy	 development.	 However,	 data	 provided	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	
demonstrates	 that	 expenses	 needed	 for	 renewable	 energy	 tariff	 subsidiaries	 in	 2014	 are	
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49.138	billion	Yuan,	within	which	27.5	billion	and	7.407	billion	Yuan	is	used	to	subsidize	wind	
power	and	biomass	power	projects.	Therefore,	after	deducting	 the	19	billion	revenues	 from	
the	 renewable	energy	 surcharge	 there	 remains	a	30	billion	Yuan	deficit	 unfulfilled	 from	 the	
previous	year.	The	current	surcharge	 is	much	 lower	 than	 the	expected	0.025–0.03	Yuan	per	
kilowatt-hour	 enough	 to	 pay	 the	 arrears	 of	 subsidiaries	 promised	 to	 the	 renewable	 energy	
companies.	Moreover,	with	the	increased	renewable	energy	proportion	targeted	by	the	13th	
Five-Year	Plan,	 the	gap	will	be	enlarged	every	year.	 In	China’s	 renewable	energy	 industry,	a	
serious	 delay	 of	 subsidies	 reaching	 the	 power	 companies	 is	 common,	 and	 the	 subtotal	 has	
exceeded	70	billion	Yuan	in	arrears.	A	postponement	of	two	to	three	years	for	the	companies’	
accounts	to	be	credited	is	typical.	My	interviewees438	 believe	that	despite	a	secured	feed-in	
tariff,	a	timely	payment	of	subsidies	is	equally	important	to	the	survival	of	a	renewable	energy	
company.	Recently,	there	have	been	rumours	that	the	Ministry	of	Finance	is	making	an	effort	
to	fix	the	arrears	but	the	specific	operating	schedule	is	not	yet	clear.	China	has	formulated	a	
goal	to	increase	its	use	of	non-fossil	energy	accounting	for	15	per	cent	of	the	national	energy	
consumption	 by	 2020.	 Yet	 the	 path	 to	 achieve	 such	 a	 goal	 has	 to	 be	 assisted	 financially	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 additional	 cost	 of	 renewable	 energy	 generation.	 Up	 until	 now,	 funds	
have	 not	 matched	 the	 growing	 size	 of	 the	 market;	 the	 domestic	 development	 of	 the	
renewable	energy	industry	still	has	a	long	way	to	go.	
6.7.3.2 Access to public facilities (power grid) 
A	 suitable	 location	 for	 a	 power	 plant	 influences	 its	 productivity	 and	 technological	
performance	directly.	For	example,	an	ideal	site	for	a	wind	farm	would	be	one	with	rich	wind	
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resources.	Similarly,	a	biomass	power	plant	would	be	ideally	located	at	a	place	close	to	straw	
resources,	 such	as	 cornfields,	 in	order	 to	have	a	 sufficient	 fuel	 supply.	A	 feasibility	 report	 is	
required	from	all	approved	projects	by	the	DRC.	Such	reports	 include	resource	detection	for	
power	 generation.	 As	 the	 construction	 of	 power	 plants	 falls	 into	 this	 “approval	 project”	
category,	 enterprises	 must	 provide	 a	 feasibility	 report	 before	 proceeding.	 For	 example,	 as	
with	wind	farm	projects,	experts	will	test	the	wind	speed	at	the	site,	which	also	depends	on	
air	 temperature,	 barometric	 pressure,	 and	 altitude. 439 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 convenient	
transportation	 is	 important	 for	 reducing	 operational	 costs	 of	 a	 biomass	 power	 plant.	 Close	
proximity	to	railways	or	motorways	helps	in	lowering	transportation	costs	during	the	running	
of	 the	plant.	More	 importantly,	a	good	 location	means	good	 infrastructure	conditions	and	a	
reasonable	distance	to	the	power	grid.440	 	
The	 fact	 that	 connection	 to	 the	 power	 grid	 becomes	 a	 bottleneck	 for	 growth	 of	 renewable	
energy	 in	 China	 is	 probably	 caused	 by	 two	 main	 reasons.441	 Fisrt,	 a	 big	 challenge	 like	 the	
instability	of	wind	power	for	grid	management	is	associated	with	renewable	energy.442	 Of	the	
three	wind	farms	the	author	visited,	none	has	had	a	convenient	and	barrier-free	access	to	the	
power	 grid.	 Such	 difficulty	 in	 getting	 connected	 to	 the	 power	 grid	 is	 partly	 due	 to	 a	
constrained	 level	 of	 smart-grid	 technology	 available	 in	 China.	 This	 technology	 directly	
determines	the	grid’s	capacity	to	withstand	sudden	changes	in	voltage	loads.	For	example,	a	
wind	farm	could	generate	fifty	thousand	volts	in	a	flash,	which	requires	that	its	corresponding	
converting	station	being	designed	to	carry	this	much	 load,	so	that	the	stability	of	the	power	
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grid	as	a	whole	will	not	be	affected.	However,	due	to	the	low	power-dispatching	ability	of	the	
current	grid,	wind	power	 is	considered	to	be	“trash	power”	because	 it	 is	neither	predictable	
nor	controllable.	Thus,	in	practice	the	proportion	of	wind	energy	connected	to	the	grid	is	kept	
below	20	per	cent.	To	upgrade	power	grid	to	accommodate	power	fluctuations	and	properly	
distribute	 in-taking	 capacity	 for	 intermittent	 energy	 sources,	 China	 has	 been	 making	
significant	investment	in	the	area.	In	the	State	Grid	Corporation	of	China	project,	the	Chinese	
government	 put	 9.4	 billion	 Yuan	 on	 this	 demonstrating	 project	 to	 integrate	wind	 and	 solar	
photovoltaic	generation	and	storage	devices	into	the	state	power	grid.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	
the	grid	needs	to	establish	a	number	of	thermal	power	units	for	energy	emergencies	in	order	
to	facilitate	wind	energy.	While	in	low	power-consumption	periods,	such	as	during	the	Spring	
Festival	and	other	holidays,	or	when	there	 is	a	 failure	of	 in-taking	capacity	of	 the	grid,	wind	
farms	will	be	requested	to	"abandon	wind."	Nevertheless,	the	power	grid	will	have	to	spend	
more	to	accept	 intermittent	wind	power	than	energy	generated	from	more	stable	resources	
like	hydropower	or	thermal	power.	Some	have	suggested	the	solution	of	using	energy	storage	
technology	to	offset	the	uncertain	character	of	wind	power.	However,	the	cost	is	too	high	(5	
Yuan/kWh)	making	this	option	unfeasible	in	practice.	 	
Secondly,	the	high	feed-in	tariffs	(in	comparison	with	fossil	fuel	power)	stipulated	by	the	DRC	
led	to	reluctance	in	the	national	grid	to	purchase	renewable	energy.	From	the	power	grid	side,	
the	 price	 difference	 between	 the	 feed-in	 tariff	 for	 electricity	 generated	 from	desulphurized	
coal	and	the	tariff	for	renewables	is	paid	by	the	national	government,	levied	from	renewable	
energy	 tariff	 surcharges.443	 Renewable	 energy-power	 price	 surcharges	 are	 collected	 by	
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provincial	 power	 grid.	 Although	 they	 are	 used	 for	 payment	 of	 some	 province	 (autonomous	
region,	municipality)	subsidies	for	renewable	energy	power	prices,	and	the	remaining	amount	
is	 designed	 to	 be	 used	 for	 quota	 trading	 and	 national	 balancing,	 they	 are	 favoured	 by	 the	
power	 grid	 companies	 because	 they	 are	 accounted	 for	 as	 company	 income	 and	 taxed	
accordingly.444	 On	 the	other	hand,	 the	power	gird	companies445	 are	obliged	 to	purchase	all	
electricity	generated	by	the	approved	power	plants,	and	to	provide	transmission	and	supply	
to	end-users.	However,	when	the	approved	purchasing	price	is	higher	than	the	price	of	fossil	
fuel	 power,	 the	 extra	 cost	 is	 apportioned	 within	 the	 whole	 power	 grid.446	 In	 addition,	
currently	 China's	 power	 grid	 must	 require	 fossil	 fuel	 power	 plants	 to	 limit	 their	 output	 at	
times	 to	 allow	 renewable	 energy	 in-taking	 because	 the	 renewables	 like	 wind	 power	 have	
fluctuating	or	unstable	voltage	characteristics.447	 Such	ancillary	services	needed	to	promote	
renewables	lead	to	a	conflict	between	fossil	fuel	power	plants	and	renewable	energy	plants.	
This	 is	 because	 the	 uniformed	 tariff	 mechanism	 determines	 a	 proportional	 relationship	
between	 the	 operation	 hours	 of	 generator	 and	 company	 profit.	 Therefore,	 none	 of	 the	
companies	are	willing	to	 lower	their	generator	utilization	hours,	which	will	also	 increase	the	
cost	 for	 the	 power	 enterprises	 and	 cannot	 be	 compensated	 under	 the	 existing	 pricing	
mechanism.	Most	of	the	time,	the	grid	and	the	local	government	would	prefer	not	to	reduce	
fossil	 fuel	power	plants’	output	rather	than	avoid	wind	abandon,	as	 they	benefit	more	from	
thermal	 power	 enterprises	 from	 a	 lower	 energy	 price	 and	 higher	 tax	 revenue.	 As	 a	 result,	
																																								 																				
444 To advance the development of the renewable energy industry and ensure the rational distribution of renewable energy power 
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harsher	requirement	is	put	on	renewable	firms.	For	example,	while	the	effective	tax	rate	for	
conventional	 thermal	 power	 plants	 is	 about	 6	 per	 cent	 to	 8	 per	 cent,	 the	 government	 tax	
biomass	power	plant	at	11	per	cent.448	 Due	to	 the	 low	energy	density,	and	the	high	cost	of	
biomass	 fuel,	 pre-processing,	 transportation	 and	 energy	 storage,	 biomass	 power	 plants	
struggle	to	profit	under	such	tax	rate.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	as	traditional	power	plants	are	
reluctant	 to	provide	such	ancillary	 services,	 the	 local	government	has	 to	 force	 them	to	 take	
turns	 cutting	 down	on	production.	 Therefore	 it	 becomes	 an	 administrational	 burden	 to	 the	
local	authority	as	well.449	
In	addition,	although	the	DRC	stipulates	that	for	concession/approval	projects	it	is	the	power	
grid’s	 responsibility	 to	 construct	 a	 transmission	 line	 to	 the	 power	 plants,450	 “there	 is	 no	
obligation	 regarding	 the	 time	 the	 construction	 should	 be	 finished	 or	 the	 standard	 of	
transmission	 line.”451	 Many	 renewable	 power	 plants	 thus	 need	 to	 build	 an	 additional	
transmission	 line	 to	 the	 distant	 grid	 at	 extra	 cost	 to	 its	 construction	 expenses	 in	 order	 to	
secure	 early	 completion.	 However,	 grid	 expansion	 is	 too	 costly	 for	 power	 plants,	 with	 an	
average	 cost	of	 350	million	Yuan	 to	 construct	100	km	of	 transmission	 line.452	 Power	plants	
such	 as	wind	 farms	 and	 biomass	 power	 stations	 are	 normally	 built	 in	 remote	 areas	 due	 to	
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their	possible	effect	on	the	local	environment.	In	such	cases,	power	plants	will	have	to	pay	for	
a	considerable	amount	of	construction	to	get	access	to	the	main	power	grid;	not	to	mention	a	
much	 more	 expensive	 grid	 upgrade,	 with	 better	 transformers	 suitable	 for	 the	 nature	 of	
renewable	 power	 or	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 electricity	 transportation.453	 In	 practice,	
application	 for	 grid	 connection	 has	 become	 a	 barrier	 to	 access	 for	 public	 grid	 facilities.	 In	
order	to	avoid	instability	and	trivial	issues,	the	power	grid	has	no	inclination	towards	in-taking	
renewable	 energy	 and	 smaller	 power	 generation	 enterprises.	 According	 to	 the	
interviewees,454	 most	 of	 the	 pre-project	 constructions	 and	 applicable	 procedures	 were	
conducted	 by	 the	 power	 plants.	 In	 getting	 approval	 for	 grid	 connection,	 one	 of	 the	
interviewed	power	plant	representatives	claimed	that	they	acquired	many	costly	documents,	
such	as	project	feasibility	reports	and	scientific	research	to	finally	get	an	approval.	It	required	
more	 than	 100	 stamps	 from	 different	 departments	 and	 took	 one	 and	 a	 half	 years	 to	 go	
through	all	the	procedures	including	seeking	approval	from	the	provincial	Power	Construction	
Corporation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 provincial	 DRC’s	 project	 approval.455	 Finally,	 while	 accepting	
applications	 from	 any	 qualified	 power	 plants,	 the	 power	 grid	 sets	 up	 difficulties	 during	 the	
processing	 of	 connection	 approval.	 Except	 for	 the	 pre-connection	works	 including	 acquiring	
approvals	 from	 different	 government	 departments	 and	 institutions,	 the	 power	 grid	will	 ask	
power	plants	to	provide	a	feasibility	survey	for	connection,	grid	connection	designs,	as	well	as	
most	 of	 the	 infrastructure	 needed	 for	 connection	 (partial	 power	 grid	 construction,	
transmission	 line	 construction,	 relay	 construction	 and	 converting	 station	 construction).	 If	 a	
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power	plant	 refuses	 to	develop	 these	 infrastructures,	 the	grid	will	 find	excuses	 to	postpone	
their	application	for	connection,	which	means	significant	deficits	each	day	because	they	have	
to	pay	off	 the	 interest	and	 loan	principals	needed	 to	build	 the	projects	 in	 the	 first	place.	 In	
fact,	 the	 national	 government	 clearly	 required	 the	 grid	 to	 complete	 such	 facilitating	 jobs456	
and	 provided	 special	 funds	 to	 support	 the	 grid	 for	 construction	 and	 maintenance	 of	
transmission	 facilities.	 Unfortunately	 these	 works	 that	 ought	 to	 be	 undertaken	 by	 the	 grid	
have	 virtually	 all	 been	 completed	 by	 power	 plants.	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 companies	 have	
renounced	 the	 use	 of	 renewable	 energy,	 and	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 electricity	 generated	 from	
already	 established	wind	 farms	 is	 rejected	 by	 the	 grid	 and	 so	wasted.	 This	 so-called	 “wind	
abandon,”	 is	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	ability	 to	absorb	 fluctuant	wind	power	by	 the	 local	grid	and	
causes	operational	downtime	among	wind	 farms.	 “Therefore,	 the	current	 renewable	energy	
landscape	 in	 China,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 wind	 power,	 features	 a	 backlog	 of	 completed	
projects	which	are	not	actually	connected	to	 the	grid.”457	 Behind	the	booming	construction	
of	renewable	energy	projects,	the	expense	required	to	sustain	long-term	development	of	the	
industry	remains	high	in	China.	 	
With	high	generation	costs,	renewables	in	China	are	sold	at	relatively	low	on-grid	prices.	This	
has	 brought	 a	 great	 economic	 burden	 onto	 the	 renewable	 energy	 investors	 and	 postpones	
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many	 power	 companies	 from	 getting	 involved	 in	 renewables	 in	 China,	 as	 they	wait	 for	 the	
market	 to	 reach	 maturity	 and	 become	 profitable.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 development	 of	
renewable	energy	is	also	a	large	expense	for	the	Chinese	government,	as	it	requires	hundreds	
of	billions	to	subsidize	the	sector.	To	break	through	the	vicious	circle	of	“high	costs/low	price	–	
insufficient	 investment	 –	 high	 costs,”458	 an	 improvement	 in	 renewable	 energy	 technology	
commercialization	and	reduction	in	price	of	such	technologies	are	crucial.	 	
6.7.4 Renewable energy project application cost  
The	 cost	 of	 starting-up	 a	 green-energy	 project	 is	 high.	 As	 well	 as	 investment	 on	 plant	
construction	 itself,	 the	 cost	 includes	 the	 approval	 of	 application	 expenses,	 the	 price	 of	
established	 managerial	 experience,	 and	 building	 up	 and	 maintaining	 public	 relations.	
Moreover,	 the	 process	 usually	 takes	 a	 long	 time,	 absorbing	 lots	 of	 human	 resources,	 and	
adequate	social	network.	During	subsequent	operation,	power	plants	need	to	overcome	the	
difficulties	derived	from	overlapping	government	authorities	while	making	small	profits	from	
the	meagre	feed-in	tariffs.	
Renewable	 power	 plant	 establishments	 are	 categorized	 as	 approval	 projects	 (some	 refer	 to	
them	as	“concession	projects” 459)	that	need	approval	from	the	DRC.460	 For	example,	power	
companies	that	 intend	to	construct	wind	farm	projects	 larger	than	50	MW	were	required	to	
get	approval	from	the	national	DRC	before	2013,	and	smaller	projects	had	to	be	approved	by	
the	provincial	and	lower-level	government.461	 Since	May	15th,	2013,	according	to	the	Plan	for	
																																								 																				
458 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
459 Ibid. 
460 The Catalogue of Investment Projects Subject to the Approval of Government (Issued by the State Council, effective 2013; 
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Institutional	Reform	and	Functional	Transformation	of	 the	State	Council	and	 the	Decision	of	
the	State	Council	on	Matters	Concerning	Administrative	Approval	 Items	to	be	Cancelled	and	
Delegated	to	Lower	Levels,	the	National	Energy	Board	decentralized	its	authority	to	provincial	
governments	in	regard	to	wind	power	project	approvals.	So	from	2013	approving	renewable	
wind	and	biomass	projects	 is	at	the	discretion	of	each	province.	But	the	central	government	
still	 has	 significant	 influence	 on	 business	 decisions	 of	 the	 power	 companies	 by	 holding	 the	
right	 of	 approval,	 mainly	 executed	 through	 the	 provincial	 DRCs.	 For	 example,	 the	 National	
DRC	 selects	 several	 locations	 for	 wind	 farm	 concession	 (project-bidding),	 according	 to	 the	
wind	 resource	 report	 provided	 by	 the	 China	 Meteorological	 Administration.	 “Power	
companies	 who	 are	 interested	 in	 generating	 electricity	 from	 wind	 energy,	 and	 provide	
investment	facilities	like	the	establishment	of	access	roads	and	power	grid” are	only	invited	to	
bid	 for	 the	 development	 rights	 from	 the	 selected	 locations	 and	 a	 limited	 number	 of	
projects.462	 Moreover,	since	the	renewable	industry	is	virtually	dependent	on	state	subsidies,	
the	national	energy	authorities	remain	responsible	for	quantity	control,	feed-in	tariff	setting,	
and	subsidy	budget	management.	 	
Application	for	approval	of	renewable	energy	generation	projects	requires	renewable	energy	
companies	to	hand	in	project	proposals	and	relevant	application	documents.	According	to	our	
interviewees,463	 the	approval	process	usually	starts	with	a	decision	from	headquarters	based	
on	 a	 review	 of	 the	 project	 distribution	 plan	 designated	 by	 the	 current	 national	 five-year	
plan.464	 Then	 the	 power	 company	 conglomerate	 will	 try	 to	 acquire	 government	 project	
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approval,	 followed	 by	 plant	 construction.	 During	 construction,	 application	 for	 power	 grid	
connection	and	the	establishment	of	peripheral	infrastructure	needed	for	the	connection	will	
be	 conducted	at	 the	 same	 time.	After	 the	 completion	of	 construction,	or	 sometimes	during	
construction,	operation	staff	will	then	become	involved	in	the	project.	During	the	process	of	
application	 for	 the	 approval,	 companies	 need	 to	 provide	many	 documents	 required	 by	 the	
DRC.	 According	 to	 the	 Administrative	 Measures	 for	 the Investment	 Projects	 Subject	 to	 the	
Approval	of	Government	(2014)465	 Article	12,	project	applicants	need	to	submit	the	following	
documents	in	accordance	with	national	laws	and	regulations:	(a)	the	site	suggestion	issued	by	
local-government	 planning	 administrative	 department	 (for	 projects	 required	 to	 use	
state-owned	 land);	 (b)	 preliminaries	 of	 land-allocation	 opinions	 issued	 by	 the	 land	 and	
resources	administrative	department;	(c)	the	environmental	impact	assessment	issued	by	the	
environmental	protection	department;	(d)	an	energy	conservation	review;	and	(f)	certification	
for	 urban	planning,	 land	use,	 resource	utilization,	 public	 safety	 production,	 public	 interests,	
production	licence,	equipment	imports,	tax	exception	confirmation,	and	so	on.	Among	them,	
project	 filing,	 the	 feasibility	 report,	 environmental	 impact	 assessment,	 the	 land-use	 report,	
proof	of	funds,	preliminary	government	planning	approvals,	the	safety	assessment	with	safety	
evaluations	 before	 and	 after	 the	 construction,	 are	 the	 most	 important	 documents,	 each	
incurring	 a	 cost	 ranging	 from	 ten	 thousand	 to	 200	 thousand	 Yuan.	 Therefore,	 on	 average,	
expenses	to	get	domestic	approval	are	at	least	one	million	Yuan	per	project.	For	the	projects	
that	 are	 applying	 for	 CDM-certified	 CO2	 reductions,	 power	 companies	 will	 have	 to	 pay	 for	
audit	and	administration	fees	required	by	the	CDM,	which	are	approximately	50-70	thousand	
																																								 																				
465 The Catalogue (n 460). 
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Yuan.	 Also,	 project	 developers	 will	 need	 a	 consulting	 agency	 to	 prepare	 documents	 and	
manage	the	project	application,	which	will	cost	about	30–40	thousand	Yuan.	Moreover,	CDM	
will	 charge	an	 issue	 fee	based	on	 the	amount	of	CER	 issued.	Thus,	 for	a	project	 issued	with	
100	 thousand	 tons	 of	 CO2	 reduction,	 it	 will	 be	 charged	 15	 thousand	 dollars	 (about	 100	
thousand	Yuan).	This	adds	up	to	more	than	200	thousand	Yuan	per	CDM	project	to	be	spent	
on	application.	 	
Because	renewable	energy	projects	are	“approval	projects”,	they	have	to	go	through	the	most	
demanding	 project	 approval	 procedures.	 Project	 developers	 need	 to	 get	 approvals	 and	
authorization	from	dozens	of	government	departments	including	the	DRC,	the	Environmental	
Protection	Bureau,	the	Department	Of	Water	Resources,	the	Department	of	Land	Resources,	
Provincial	and	City	Planning	Bureau,	the	Provincial	Bureau	of	Public	Construction,	and	so	on.	
In	recent	years,	some	projects	with	plants	to	be	built	in	mining	areas	also	needed	to	provide	a	
report	of	the	mineral	richness	and	underground	water	of	the	located	area.	For	off-shore	wind	
farm	 projects,	 applicants	 need	 to	 get	 approval	 from	 departments	 like	 the	 State	 Oceanic	
Administration	 and	 the	 Fishery	Bureau.	Not	 only	 do	 these	procedures	 cost	money	but	 they	
also	require	plenty	of	time	to	be	spent	on	preparing	documents	and	waiting	for	decisions.	For	
example,	 a	 wind	 power	 project	 calls	 for	 1–2	 years	 to	 conduct	 anemometry,	 and	 then	 a	
qualified	 Electric	 Power	 Design	 Institute	 will	 be	 commissioned	 to	 finish	 a	 feasibility	 study	
report,	which	will	normally	 take	six	months	 to	a	year.	Afterwards,	 the	pre-project	 feasibility	
study	will	 be	 submitted	 to	 the	DRC	and	 they	will	 review	 the	 supporting	documents	 for	 two	
years.	 Some	 have	 to	 go	 through	 an	 even	 longer	 period	 because	 they	 have	 to	 start	 from	 a	
township-level	DRC	and	proceed	to	the	province	level.	When	all	application	documents	have	
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been	reviewed	by	the	provincial	DRC,	the	commission	will	put	the	project	onto	a	waiting	list	
before	 a	 national	 planning	 is	 completed	 and	 made	 known	 at	 the	 provincial	 level.	 Having	
received	 approval	 from	 the	 DRC,	 power	 companies	 then	 need	 to	 get	 in	 contact	 with	 the	
provincial	power	grid	and	wait	for	the	grid	connection	approval	application	to	be	reported	to	
the	 national	 grid;	 and	 this	 usually	 takes	 another	 year	 to	 receive	 a	 final	 decision.	 These	
procedures	add	up	to	at	least	a	four	to	five-year	period,	which	is	a	considerable	cost	in	time	
and	 an	 increase	 in	 risk.	 Another	 commonly	 cited	 project	 category	 is	 that	 of	 “recorded	
projects,”	which	are	generally	small-scale	and	domestic	utility	projects	 for	which	criteria	are	
relatively	 low	 that	only	 require	 reports	 for	 recordation.	But	projects	 that	 involve	 large-scale	
energy	 generation,	 especially	 those	 employing	 advanced	 renewable	 energy	 technologies,	
ought	 to	 go	 through	more	 stringent	 procedures	 which	 require	 a	minimum	 of	 770	 days	 for	
processing.466	 Thus,	even	before	construction,	large	sums	of	money,	time	and	expertise	have	
been	invested	in	the	application	process.	In	more	complex	cases	where	inter-province	power	
grid	constructions	are	needed,	 the	grid	establishment	 itself	 is	subject	 to	the	approval	of	 the	
investment	administrative	department	of	the	State	Council.467	 	
6.8 Difficulties in decision-making and management 
While	provided	with	meagre	profits	due	to	the	current	feed-in	tariff,	 large	SOEs	in	China	are	
obligated	 to	 develop	 renewable	 energy	 projects.	 In	 fact,	 they	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 have	 the	
finance	 and	 the	 capability	 to	 improve	 green	 technologies	 to	 adapt	 to	 local	 situations.	
																																								 																				
466 interview with CDM manager from the Shandong Wulian Dongfeng Phase I Wind Power Project 
467 Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Catalogue of Investment Projects Subject to the Approval of Government (2014): 
Power grid project that is: 
1) ± 500 kV and above DC project conducted cross-border, inter-provincial (district, city); 
2) 500 kV, 750 kV, 1000 kV AC project conducted cross-border, inter-provincial (district, city), shall be approved by the State 
Council Investment Director Departmental. Among them, ± 800 kV and above DC projects and 1000 kV AC projects are to be 
reported to the State Council for record. The rest of the projects will be approved by local governments, of which ± 800 kV and 
above DC project and 1000 kV AC project should be approved in accordance with national planning. 
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However,	these	companies	are	not	able	to	make	 investment	decisions	freely	and	entirely	by	
themselves	due	to	the	interdependency	of	power	and	grid	companies	in	meeting	government	
planning	 rules	 and	 requirements.468	 Decision-making	 in	 the	 power	 companies	 is	 strongly	
influenced	and	constrained	by	local	and	national	government.	This	is	particularly	true	because	
the	directors	of	these	companies	are	under	the	supervision	of	the	Communist	Party	secretary	
of	the	company,	or	serve	in	Party	posts	at	the	same	time.	Therefore,	the	system	may	result	in	
power	enterprises	lacking	the	capacity	to	act	fully	autonomously	in	their	own	interests.	 	
The	underlying	problem	with	the	ruling	party	 in	China	 itself	has	a	 long	history.	With	definite	
power	over	 the	minority	of	 issues	 in	China,	 the	Party	had	 it’s	 ruling	become	more	effective	
regulating	the	country	than	the	enforcement	of	Laws.	And	it	had	been	a	frequently	resorted	
aid	 to	 pursue	 social	 goals	 of	 the	 people.469 	 Therefore,	 the	 decision-making	 of	 power	
companies	does	not	depend	on	the	company	board	and	managing	team	solely,	but	“depends	
on	 the	 fluid	 and	 conflicting	 interests”470 	 of	 different	 authorities	 under	 the	 country’s	
leadership.	For	example,	management	teams of	 the	state-invested/controlled	companies	are	
“are	 evaluated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 adherence	 to	 government	 objectives,	 with	 possible	
consequences	 for	 their	 future	 careers.”471	 In	 terms	 of	 technology	 import	 and	 innovation,	
business	 behaviour	 has	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 political	 preference.	 According	 to	 the	
interviewees,472	 even	though	a	developed	country’s	transferor	is	willing	to	provide	help	by	all	
means	 (equipment,	 blueprints,	 know-how,	 training,	 etc.),	 there	 is	 still	 a	 risk	 of	 technology	
																																								 																				
468 Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
469 Feldman (n 292). 
470 Ibid. 
471 Hongbin Li and others, ‘Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms’ (2008) 
87 Journal of development economics 283; Chenggang Xu, ‘The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development’ 
(2011) [American Economic Association] 49 Journal of economic literature 1076. 
472 R&D staff from a world leading turbine manufacturer and the technical director of the provincial power gird. 
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failure.	 This	 might	 be	 due	 to	 a	 change	 of	 environment	 and	 material	 resources	 during	
production.	 And	 it	 requires	 bold	 investment	 without	 specific	 expectations	 in	 return	 by	 the	
receiver.	 But	 the	 leader	 election	 system	 in	 these	 large	Chinese	 state-owned	 companies	 is	 a	
hindrance	to	technology	import	and	innovation.	A	leadership	team	only	last	for	3–5	years	and	
most	decision-makers	would	want	a	good	record	of	achievements	during	this	period.	This	 is	
why	a	lot	of	companies	are	focused	on	making	quick	money	and	only	take	a	minimum	level	of	
risk	when	investing.	As	renewable	energy	projects	are	low	in	profits,	they	are	not	much	liked	
by	 most	 executives.	 Thus,	 the	 slow	 improvement	 of	 China’s	 independent	 technology	 is	
exacerbated	by	the	persistence	of	such	conservative	attitudes.	 	
Even	among	private-owned	companies,	those	that	have	a	close	relationship	with	the	Party	will	
be	 clearly	 favoured	 during	 competition.	 “China’s	 indigenous	 innovation	 policy	 included	 a	
mandate	to	consolidate	industry	so	that	one	or	a	few	Chinese	companies	would	dominate	key	
sectors.”473	 “After	decades	of	reforms,	SOEs	today	produce	an	estimated	half	of	China’s	total	
manufacturing	 and	 services	 output	 and	 they	 dominate	 such	 sectors	 as	 energy,	
telecommunications,	 and	 transportation.” 474 	 Interviewees 475 	 indicate	 that	 at	 present	
renewable	 technologies	 are	 only	 affordable	 by	 large	 state-owned/state-invested	 companies	
as	 the	 cost	 of	 construction	 and	 operation	 is	 substantial,	 and	 government	 subsidies	 and	
preferential	 loan	systems	are	easier	 for	SOEs	to	get	access	to.	These	companies	have	better	
																																								 																				
473 The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property. 
474 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China (2011). 
475 interviews with managers from the Shandong Shanxian 1*25MW Biomass Power Plant Project, the Shandong Gaotang 30 MW 
Biomass Power Generation Project and the Shandong Haiyang Qiuershan Wind Power Project 
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guanxi476	 with	the	government	and	are	thus	well	 informed	regarding	government	resources	
and	planning	which	will	allow	them	to	start	preparation	earlier	than	private	companies.	 	
At	the	same	time,	the	small	profit	margin	is	not	attractive	enough	to	involve	massive	private	
sources	in	the	renewable	energy	industry,477	 while	the	increased	cost	of	fundraising	currently	
deters	investors	from	entering	the	renewable	energy	industry.	The	interest	rate	available	for	
SOEs	is	six	per	cent	annually,	and	coupled	with	the	financing	expenses	the	interest	rate	will	be	
raised	to	seven	per	cent	to	eight	per	cent.	For	private	companies,	the	cost	will	be	even	higher.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	feed-in	tariff	is	coming	down	while	operational	expenses	in	renewable	
energy	 power	 plants	 are	 growing	 as	 discussed	 in	 previous	 sections.	 It	 is	 getting	 more	 and	
more	 unrealistic	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 return	 rate	 requirements	 of	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	
Supervision	and	Administration	Commission	of	the	State	Council478	 (i.e.	wind	power	projects	
shall	 have	 a	 12	 per	 cent	 rate	 of	 return).	 And	 “uncertainty	 over	 power	 prices	 (depends	 on	
government	 approval)	 further	 hinders	 the	 inflow	 of	 capital	 focused	 on	 renewable	 energy	
projects.”479	 Such	a	market	is	considered	unhealthy	because	“private	investment	has	become	
the	 predominant	 force	 in	 wind	 farm	 construction	 in	 other	 more	 established	 markets.	 For	
example,	 around	 ninety-five	 per	 cent	 of	 investment	 in	 wind	 farms	 was	 contributed	 by	 the	
																																								 																				
476 It is based on personal networks and actually has great influence on social/political relationship in Chinese society. 
477 Power companies used to have plenty of capital available, but this too has changed in recent years. Coal prices have risen, while 
electricity prices remain fixed at low, government-determined levels. See Chi-Jen Yang, Xiaowei Xuan and Robert B. Jackson, 
‘China's Coal Price Disturbances: Observations, Explanations, and Implications for Global Energy Economies’ (2012) 51 Energy 
Policy 720. The weaker financial performance of the utilities’ core businesses may now hamper wind farm investment. See Liming 
Qiao and others, China Wind Energy Development Update 2012 (2012)  
478 The SASAC is a crucial department of the Chinese government, which is entrusted with formal ownership and management of 
all non-financial state enterprise assets. It plays an investor in the SOEs for the government to have a better control of 
decision-making of these companies. See Chi Lo, Understanding China's growth: forces that drive China's economic future 
(Springer 2007). 
479 Caprotti (n 322). 
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private	sector	 in	 India.”480	 Moreover,	 the	 future	of	 the	Chinese	renewable	energy	market	 is	
worrying.	 	
Similarly,	 from	 the	 renewable	 energy	 IP	 protection	 aspect,	 the	 aforementioned	 localization	
policy	has	 intervened	in	the	market	and	created	an	unexpected	need	for	domestically	made	
renewable	power	generators.	The	intended	promotion	of	the	local	manufacturing	capacity	of	
wind	 turbines	 and	 boilers	 is	 enticing	 companies	 to	 invest	 in	 acquiring	 manufacturing	
processes	 and	 technologies.	 Indeed,	 “The	mandatory	 localization	 rate	 policy	 has	 shown	 its	
function	 in	 expanding	 domestic	 supply	 markets	 and	 reducing	 costs.”481	 However,	 the	 gap	
between	 capability	 and	 production	 aims	 of	 the	 local	 manufacturers	 drives	 them	 to	 either	
provide	 low-quality482	 equipment	 or	 to	 steal	 technologies	 from	 the	 exporters.	 Therefore,	
although	the	average	cost	of	renewable	energy	equipment	has	declined,	the	overall	cost	from	
a	 power	 plant’s	 operation	 and	 maintenance	 has	 not	 been	 substantially	 reduced.	 The	
obsession	with	the	percentage	of	localized	production	ultimately	resulted	in	unsatisfactory	IP	
development	in	China	for	infringement	is	seemed	inevitable	as	it	is	rooted	in	any	developing	
country’s	instinct	and	acquiesced	to	pursue	the	country’s	interest.	“Just	as	the	government	is	
intimately	involved	in	businesses	of	all	types	and	government	officials	are	privately	involved	in	
private	businesses,	the	government	is	involved	in	infringement.”483	
Government	 control	 over	 the	 price	 of	 electricity	 and	 project	 approval	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	
uncertainty	in	the	energy	market,	making	investors	hesitant	to	participate	in	the	market.	For	
example,	establishing	a	wind	farm	requires	a	land	lease	permitted	by	the	government.	
																																								 																				
480 Ibid. 
481 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
482 Quality criteria can relate to individual turbine scales, annual full load hours, lifetime of turbines, etc. 
483 Feldman (n 292). 
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Leases	for	industrial	purposes	last	for	50	years,	but	development	permits	typically	require	
the	developer	 to	 construct	 a	 farm	within	 two	years	or	 lose	 the	development	 rights.	 To	
safeguard	 long-term	 renewable	 energy	 strategies,	 power	 companies	 are	 competing	 to	
secure	sufficient	land	with	prime	wind	resources.484	
With	 the	 growth	of	wind	 resource	 exploration,	 the	 best	 locations	 that	 have	 access	 to	 good	
quality	wind	 resources	have	become	 fewer	and	 fewer.	The	costs	of	acquiring	approvals	and	
the	costs	of	constructing	wind	farms	are	increasing	accordingly,	especially	with	regard	to	the	
development	 of	 off-shore	 wind	 powers.	 For	 instance,	 between	 2000	 and	 2005	 when	
development	of	wind	power	was	strongly	encouraged	in	some	places,	land	usage	was	easy	to	
get	approved	and	assigned	with	zero	rental	costs.	Lately	land	costs	have	become	increasingly	
high	 and	 it	 is	 rather	 difficult	 and	 expensive	 to	 apply	 for	 plots.485	 As	 a	 result,	 although	 the	
price	 of	wind	 turbines	 has	 decreased,	with	 increasing	 project	 development	 costs	 there	 has	
been	no	substantial	decrease	in	construction	costs	per	kWh.	Consequently,	the	development	
of	wind	power	 in	China	 is	restrained.	Such	recession	would	not	be	discovered	from	a	macro	
perspective	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 but	 is	 evident	 in	 local-government	 behaviour.	 Our	
interviewees	 implied	 that	 a	 lot	 of	 projects	 that	were	 approved	 have	 now	been	 required	 to	
withdraw.486	 A	 few	 plants	 were	 shut	 down	 and	 become	 non-performing	 assets	 to	 the	
conglomerate.487	 	
The	 recent	 slowdown	was	 seen	 in	 the	biomass	 sector	 as	well.	 Permit	 authority	 for	biomass	
power	plants	 is	 in	 the	hands	of	provincial	governments.	The	stricter	control	over	permits	of	
																																								 																				
484 Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
485 Interviews with government officers recruited from Weihai, Yantai and Rizhao.  
486 Ibid.  
487 Turbine suppliers such as Tianjin Vestas are being acquired because the business prospects are gloomy. 
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the	 government	 is	 actualized	 through	 site-selection	 limitation	 determined	 by	 the	 provincial	
Power	Design	 Institute,	which	 is	 virtually	 a	 government	 agency.	A	 site-selection	decision	by	
the	 Power	 Design	 Institute	 is	 one	 of	 the	 first	 documents	 needed	 for	 the	 approval	 of	 an	
application.	Therefore,	the	Institute	has	absolute	power	over	the	assignment	of	lands	for	the	
development	of	renewable	energy	power	plants.	It	provides	a	fuel	resource	survey,	according	
to	which	a	site	is	considered	suitable	for	biomass	power	plant	construction.	The	institute	will	
delimit	a	radius,	and	within	it	only	one	biomass	plant	will	be	approved	for	construction.	As	far	
back	 as	 2005,	 the	 radius	 was	 30	 km,	 which	 was	 changed	 to	 50	 km	 later,	 and	 to	 80	 km	
subsequently	 and	 is	 now	 delimited	 to	 100	 km.488	 As	 the	 radius	 becomes	 wider,	 fewer	
biomass	 power	 plant	 projects	 are	 approved.	 Malicious	 speculation	 in	 the	 biomass	 energy	
industry	has	led	to	this	restriction	as	well.	Interviewees489	 claim	that	an	enclosure	of	project	
resources	by	 some	 investment	 companies	has	been	 saturating	of	 the	market.	Opportunistic	
project	 applicants	 were	 grabbing	 land	 leases	 not	 to	 develop	 renewable	 power	 plants	
themselves	 but	 in	 order	 to	wait	 for	 good-faith	 developers	who	 intend	 to,	 or	 are	 forced	 to,	
invest	 in	 power	 plants	 and	 may	 have	 to	 buy	 out/take	 over	 the	 development	 permission.	
Indeed,	such	speculative	activity	is	able	to	bring	faster	and	greater	profits	than	developing	and	
operating	a	renewable	energy	power	plant.	Even	for	a	real	developer,	“the	financial	benefits	
of	being	able	to	exploit	these	resources	for	the	next	50	years”490	 outweigh	the	less	productive	
power	plant,	which	requires	 ten	to	twenty	years	 to	get	 investment	returns.	Therefore,	 from	
2010,	the	national	DRC	has	partially	withdrawn	the	install	capacity	approval	authority	in	order	
																																								 																				
488 Interviews with manager interviewees from Shandong Kenli Biomass Generation Project and Shandong Gaotang 30MW 
Biomass Power Generation Project and government officer interviewees from Gaotang and Shanxian. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Gosens and Lu (n 86). 
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to	 control	 such	 irresponsible	project	 enclosures.	As	 a	 result,	 no	biomass	power	project	was	
approved	between	2010	and	2012.	 	
The	economic	concern	of	the	local	government	is	another	factor	that	could	result	in	hardship	
in	developing	renewable	energy	projects.	Especially	from	the	recession	in	2008	onwards,	the	
government	has	been	desperate	to	stimulate	domestic	demand	to	keep	up	economic	growth	
that	 can	 be	 reflected	 in	 GDP,	 which	 is	 the	 key	 criterion	 for	 the	 evaluation	 of	 government	
performance.	 Yet	 renewable	 energy	 projects	 enjoy	 a	 three-year	 tax	 exception	 and	 a	
three-year	50	per	cent	tax	deduction	to	follow.491	 Such	a	preferential	tax	policy	can	act	as	an	
opportunity	 for	 the	 power	 companies	 to	 hide	 other	 business	 activities	 under	 the	 approved	
projects	so	that	they	can	profit	more	than	they	should	have	by	enjoy	low	tax	rates.492	 Even	if	
the	 businesses	were	 carefully	monitored	 to	 avoid	 such	 tax-evading	 behaviour,	 none	 of	 the	
renewable	 energy	 power	 plants	 are	 profiting	 sufficiently	 to	 be	 counted	 as	major	 taxpayers.	
Thus,	 the	more	 renewable	 projects	 are	 constructed	 in	 the	 province,	 the	more	 likely	 is	 the	
government’s	 revenue	 to	 decline.	 Accordingly,	 local	 government	 is	 encouraging	 renewable	
energy	 industry	 with	 a	 flagging	 interest.	 Unless	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	 political	 change	 in	
China	with	more	business-friendly	channels	opening	up,	a	new	pattern	of	business	behaviour	
will	 not	 be	 seen.493	 Likewise,	 only	 when	 and	 if	 the	 availability	 and	 access	 of	 the	 most	
advanced	 renewable	 energy	 technologies	 become	economical	will	 all	 doubts	 and	hesitation	
about	the	wide	appliance	of	such	technologies	be	dismissed	and	lead	to	the	growth	of	more	
commercial	and	affordable	equipment.	 	
																																								 																				
491 Interview with officer interviewees recruited from all visited regions where projects are located. 
492 Jingyi Han et.al (n 204). 
493 Wen-Qiang Liu, Lin Gan and Xi-Liang Zhang, ‘Cost-Competitive Incentives for Wind Energy Development in China: 
Institutional Dynamics and Policy Changes’ (2002) 30 Energy Policy 753 p.761. 
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6.9 Summary  
This	 chapter	 has	 clearly	 identified	 the	 current	 energy	 needs	 and	 environmental	 problems	
derive	from	such	growing	needs	in	China.	Therefore	attempts	have	been	made	by	the	Chinese	
government	 to	 pursue	 a	 balance	 in	 between.	 Measures	 in	 terms	 of	 IP	 law	 reform	 and	
encouraging	 policy	 are	 made	 available	 to	 renewable	 energy	 developers	 to	 improve	 legal	
environment	 and	 technology	 absorptive	 capacity	 in	 the	 country	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 and	
attract	 TT	 in	developing.	Among	 these	efforts,	 a	 variety	of	 favourable	policy	 created	by	 the	
Chinese	government	has	played	a	critical	role	in	promoting	TT	much	more	effectively	than	the	
IP	 law	amendments	required	by	TRIPS	and	forced	under	pressure	from	developed	countries.	
However,	there	still	exist	the	considerable	costs	regarding	almost	every	aspect	of	introducing	
ESTs.	 And	 plenty	 of	 difficulties	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 political	 status	 are	 challenging	 the	 future	 of	
China’s	sustainable	development.	Thus,	wise	reforms	to	change	the	situation	should	be	made	
with	respect	to	the	culture	and	interest	of	people	in	the	country.	 	
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Chapter	VII:	Conclusion	
7.1 IP Solutions at international and national level 
Based	on	 the	observations	and	analysis	 set	out	 in	 the	previous	chapters,	 some	sensible	and	
potentially	 workable	 reforms	 are	 to	 be	 pursued	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 solutions	 to	 current	
barriers	and	difficulties.	 	
7.1.1 Preparatory stage 
Given	the	fact	 that	there	are	significant	differences	 in	circumstances	between	each	country,	
nations	 need	 the	 freedom,	 to	 the	 maximum	 extent,	 to	 experiment	 and	 decide	 upon	
commitments	 to	 international	obligations.1	 Thus,	at	a	primary	 stage	of	 intended	 reforms	 to	
the	 current	 international	 IP	 law	 system,	 before	 any	 substantial	 amendments	 are	 made	 to	
TRIPS	provisions,	proper	mechanisms	should	be	made	available	to	member	states	under	the	
Agreement,	 which	 should	make	 it	 easier	 for	 adaptations	 and	will	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	
climate	 change	 TT	 on	 an	 international	 level.	 For	 example,	 “multilateral	 monitoring	 and	
information	exchange	mechanisms	can	play	a	useful	role	in	helping	[countries]	to	learn	what	
constitutes	effective	[TT]”2	 and	when	adjusting	standards	for	green	technology	IP	protection	
enforcement.	 In	practice,	 it	 is	a	problem	for	developing	countries	that	have	 little	knowledge	
about	 the	 availability	 of	 the	 most	 advanced	 technologies	 and	 the	 detailed	 methods	 of	
international	TTs.	To	reduce	the	problems	of	such	asymmetric	information,	TRIPS	could	serve	
transitionally	 “as	 an	 intermediary	 conduit	 for	 knowledge	 about	 successful	 technology	
																																								 																				
1 Gerald K. Helleiner, ‘Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?’ (2001) 2 Journal of Human 
Development 27; J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round (ERD Working Paper 
Series 21, 2002); Charles Sabel and Sanjay Reddy, ‘Learning to Learn: Undoing the Gordian Knot of Development Today’ (2007) 
50 Challenge 73. 
2 Bernard Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus and Kamal Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and 
Multilateral Policy Options’ Research Program on Political and Economic Change Working Paper PEC2004-0003 
<http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/pubs/pec/pec2004-0003.pdf> accessed Feburary 2017 
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acquisition	programs	that	have	been	undertaken	by	national	and	sub-national	governments	in	
the	 past.”3	 It	 could	 also	 provide	 information	 such	 as	 a	 list	 of	 suggested	 royalty	 rates,	
conditions	and	contract	clauses	that	will	make	it	a	high	possibility	for	both	parties	in	the	TT	to	
reach	 an	 agreement.	 Of	 course,	 such	 services	 would	 require	 extra	 efforts	 in	 multilateral	
monitoring	 and	private/public	 cooperation	 from	both	developed	 and	developing	 countries.4	
But	it	would	be	beneficial	as	a	mild	reform	of	the	current	system,	moving	towards	the	goals	of	
the	Agreement.	
7.1.2 Introductory stage 
A	second	stage	of	the	transition	period	could	allow	a	soft	landing	for	all	member	states	before	
any	fundamental	amendments	made	to	the	Agreement.	Fostering	the	TT	of	climate	mitigation	
technologies,	which	 is	“logically	viewed	as	an	essential	element	of	the	global	solution	to	the	
climate	 change	 problem”5	 could	 be	 achieved	with	 a	more	 specified	 approach	 but	 in	 a	 less	
binding	manner	 at	 this	 stage.	 For	 example,	 private	 collaboration	 between	 companies	 from	
developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 on	 “sector-speciﬁc	 training	 programs,	 technological	
cooperation	projects,	pilot	plants	 involving	technology	leaders	and	laggards”6	 are	confirmed	
to	be	very	effective	ways	for	technology	dissemination.	These	can	be	actively	promoted	within	
the	TRIPS	Council	and	 indicated	 in	 the	reports	of	 the	Panel	and	Appellate	Body,	which	have	
great	influence	over	the	interpretation	of	current	articles.	Ambiguity	in	the	relevant	provisions	
																																								 																				
3 “Thus, it is well documented that the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI) played an active role in encouraging ITT. 
However, practical details about the policies adopted are not readily available.” Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus and Kamal 
Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’ (2005) 33 World 
Development 1587 (n 2). 
4 Sabel and Reddy. 
5 Matthieu Glachant and Jean Philippe Nicolai, ‘The Incentives to North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with 
Trade in Polluting Goods’ (2016) Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Working Paper 16/242. 
6 Ibid. 
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could	be	utilized	through	favourable	guidance	towards	more	active	measures	that	are	needed	
for	increasing	ITT.	 	
7.1.3 Sound stage 
“Another	hotly	debated	solution	is	to	differentiate	IPRs	for	speciﬁc	green	technologies.”7	 This	
could	 be	 done	 at	 a	 later	 stage	 than	 practical	 mechanisms	 established	 at	 the	 international	
level.	 By	 introducing	 amended	 patent	 terms,	 compulsory	 licensing,	 fast-track	 patent	
application	programmes8	 or	voluntary	patent	pools9	 only	in	the	green	technology	field,	the	IP	
system	could	be	altered	for	the	specific	needs	of	climate	change	mitigation	without	affecting	
the	 entire	 structure	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement.10	 Some	 have	 furthered	 this	 approach	 of	
expanding	 the	global	 commons	 for	knowledge	 that	will	eventually	 lead	 to	negotiations	over	
agreements	on	access	 to	 technologies	 (in	 the	climate	change	context,	green	 technologies	 in	
particular).11	 These	 agreements	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 applied	 by	 all	 WTO	 member	 states	
parallel	to	or	under	TRIPS.	Such	an	approach	would	have	the	result	of	placing	inventions	and	
innovations	of	publicly	funded	research	into	the	public	domain.	“The	idea	is	to	preserve	and	
enhance	 the	 global	 commons	 in	 science	 and	 technology	 without	 unduly	 restricting	 private	
rights	 in	 commercial	 technologies.”12	 Countries,	 according	 to	 their	 technology	development	
																																								 																				
7 Matthew Littleton, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate-Change-Related Technologies to Developing Countries’ 
(2009) 33 Natural Resources Forum 233. 
8 Eric L. Lane, ‘Building the Global Green Patent Highway: A Proposal for International Harmonization of Green Technology Fast 
Track Programs’ (2012) 37 Berkeley Technology Law Journal. 
9 see Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi (n 2); David G. Ockwell and others, ‘Key Policy Considerations for Facilitating Low Carbon 
Technology Transfer to Developing Countries’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy 4104; Keith Maskus, ‘Differentiated Intellectual Property 
Regimes for Environmental and Climate Technologies’ (2010) OECD Environment Working Papers No 17; Glachant and Nicolai 
(n 5). 
10 Lane (n 8). It has been noticed that China, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. have launched the accelerated patent examination for 
green-energy technologies. 
11 John H. Barton and Keith E. Maskus, ‘Economic Perspectives on A Multilateral Agreement on Open Access to Basic Science 
and Technology’ in Simon J. Evenett and Bernard M. Hoekman (eds), Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation 
(The World Bank 2006) 
12 “The agreement could cover either ‘input liberalization’ under which researchers from other countries could participate in, or 
compete with, local research teams for grants and subsidies, possibly combined with increased opportunities for temporary 
migration of scientific personnel and additional student visas; ‘output Liberalization’ under which researchers in other countries 
would have access to nationally generated science and data, including scientific databases, thus ensuring that IPRs not limit access 
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capacity	and	needs	should	be	allocated	with	different	obligations.	Obviously,	bold	proposals	
like	 these	 will	 have	 to	 provide	 “safeguards	 for	 security-related	 regulation,”13	 and	 allow	
member	states	“to	reserve	sensitive	areas	of	technology	and	to	designate	different	 levels	of	
commitment	to	open	access,”	in	order	to	encourage	ratification.14	 	
At	 the	 same	 stage,	 modifications	 made	 to	 the	 TRIPS	 provisions	 could	 be	 introduced.	 For	
example,	 as	 discussed	 earlier,	 a	 more	 practical	 provision	 requiring	 patent	 applications	 to	
disclose	 know-how	 used	 in	 inventions	 could	 be	 added	 to	 the	 Agreement.	 Moreover,	
favourable	terms	could	be	offered	to	member	states	when	dealing	with	IP	in	order	to	make	a	
national	political	effort	on	climate	change	and	renewables,	including	setting	up	a	meaningful	
carbon	price	and	encouraging	renewable	energy	literacy	among	different	types	of	companies.	
This	could	be	actualized	through	developed	country	members’	duties	where	they	are	required	
to	provide	 “technical	 and	 financial	 cooperation”	 for	 TRIPS	 implementation	 to	 all	 developing	
countries.15	 Alternatively,	 by	 expending	 the	 scope	 of	 article	 66.216	 from	 the	 LDCs	 to	 all	
developing	countries	on	the	basis	of	the	common	interest	of	the	planet	(for	example,	climate	
change	mitigation	goals),	governments	(especially	those	of	developed	nations)	will	endeavour	
to	find	means	of	increasing	international	TT	to	meet	their	legal	obligations.	“One	option	would	
be	for	governments	 in	developed	countries	to	 increase	technical	and	financial	assistance	for	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																
to basic scientific knowledge; or, ‘full liberalization’. The latter would combine the first two, both expanding international flows of 
research contracts and personnel and increasing global access to outcomes.” Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi (n 2).  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The TRIPS Agreement. 
16 Article 66.2: “Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the 
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base.” See Suerie Moon, ‘Does TRIPS Art. 66.2 Encourage Technology Transfer to LDCs?: An 
Analysis of Country Submissions to the TRIPS Council (1999-2007)’ UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, policy brief No 2 December 2008 
<https://iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/New%202009/Policy%20Briefs/policy-brief-2.pdf>  
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improving	 the	 ability	 of	 poor	 countries	 to	 absorb	 technology	 and	 engage	 in	 trade.”17	 As	 a	
result,	financial	mechanisms	under	TRIPS	would	target	“capacity	building	in	IPRs	and	technical	
regulations	 and	 standards,	 establishing	 public	 and	 public-private	 research	 facilities,	 and	
facilitating	 trade	 in	 technology-related	 services.” 18 	 Given	 the	 different	 interests,	
environmental	needs	and	 technology	capability	of	developing	countries,	efforts	 towards	 the	
harmonization	of	criteria	regarding	factors	such	as	patentability,	term	of	patent,	compulsory	
licensing,	and	national	emergency	within	TRIPS	should	be	tested	at	first	in	a	limited	way	at	the	
regional	level	through,	for	example	regional	IP	offices	that	apply	regional	standards.19	 In	this	
way,	it	would	avoid	upheaval	in	all	member	states	simultaneously	and	therefore	cushion	the	
blow.	These	could	be	possible	options	towards	a	balanced	approach	that	takes	 into	account	
the	interests	of	both	producers	and	users	of	technological	knowledge	included	by	TRIPS	in	its	
objectives.	 With	 a	 common	 understanding	 about	 the	 issues	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 a	
minimized	impact	upon	innovation	and	patent	application	rates,	such	a	differentiation	would	
have	a	better	chance	of	being	agreed	by	most	member	states	of	TRIPS.	 	 	
7.2 IP protection, policy-making and business strategy for the future Chinese renewable 
energy market 
Despite	 the	 difficulties	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 VI	 and	 the	 high	 cost	 of	 receiving	
renewable	 energy	 technologies	 for	 developing	 countries	 like	 China	 so	 far,	 importing	 and	
absorbing	 such	 technologies	 could	 be	 crucial	 to	 the	 objective	 of	 protecting	 the	 global	
environment.	Recognizing	this,	the	Chinese	government	has	played	a	critical	role	in	promoting	
																																								 																				
17 Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi (n 2). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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TT	much	more	effectively	 than	 the	 IP	 law	amendments	 required	by	TRIPS	and	 forced	under	
pressure	from	developed	countries.	This	is	actualized	through	preferential	policies	granted	to	
clean-energy	 industries,	 subsidies,	 technology	 localization	 requirements,	 and	 mandatory	
renewable	 energy	 quotas	 among	 big	 power	 enterprises.	Worryingly,	 due	 to	 some	 subsidies	
already	ceasing,	 the	use	of	green	tech	 is	 in	decline.	As	a	 result,	 reforms	to	 facilitate	climate	
change	TT	 should	be	made	as	early	as	possible	 in	 the	current	 transition	 stage	because	 they	
could	ease	the	burden	of	climate	change	technology	use	and	innovation	in	the	future.	In	this	
global	climate	change	crisis,	society	must	be	awakened	to	the	peril	before	 it	 is	too	 late.	Any	
investment	that	is	meaningful	for	the	mitigation	of	climate	change	must	be	seen	as	a	source	
of	environmental	security	 in	the	long	term,	not	seen	exclusively	as	something	to	protect	the	
financial	 interests	 of	 companies.	 The	 need	 for	 collaborative	 regulation	 and	 global	 policy	
incentives	 to	 foster	 the	 creation	 of	markets	 for	 environmental	 TT	 should	 be	 highlighted	 in	
future	international	negotiations.  
Governments	 in	 the	 developed	 and	 developing	 world	 should	 put	 effort	 into	 establishing	 a	
financially	practical	framework	to	facilitate	TT	beyond	expediency.20	 To	some	extent,	such	an	
establishment	 should	 enable	 developing	 countries	 like	 China	 to	 address	 their	 need	 for	
environmental	 technologies	 and	 start	 to	 play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 TT	 as	 transferors.	 Failure	 to	
facilitate	 IP	 law	 reforms	 tailored	 to	 cope	 with	 environmental	 problems	 and	 the	 efficient	
enforcement	of	such	reforms	have	the	potential	to	limit	China's	ability	to	maintain	its	current	
position	 in	 the	 global	 renewable	 energy	 industry,	 and	may	 hamper	 international	 efforts	 on	
climate	 change	mitigation.	However,	we	 should	 keep	 seeking	 a	 healthier	 pattern	 of	 growth	
																																								 																				
20 Including significant donation from all government and encouraging national policies to facilitate TT. 
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that	must	be	established	in	China	with	only	necessary	and	sufficient	respect	to	IPRs	because	it	
will	affect	the	country’s	economy	when	it	has	gone	through	the	current	transition	period	and	
reaches	higher	levels	of	technological	advancement.21	 	
Constant	 attention	 to	 IP	 protection	 and	 IP	 law	 enforcement	 is	 unquestionably	 needed.	
Although	 there	 is	 hesitation	 about	 transferring	 the	most	 advanced	 technologies	 to	 China,	 a	
considerable	 proportion	 of	 China's	 economic	 growth	 still	 depends	 on	 TT	 from	 abroad.22	
Incentivized	by	the	size	and	policy	of	the	domestic	market,	it	seems	that	IP	protection	has	not	
hindered	 TT	 to	 China.	 However,	 with	 the	 growing	 need	 for	 climate	 change	 technologies	 in	
China,	 it	 was	 and	 will	 be	 even	 harder	 to	 get	 cutting-edge	 technologies	 from	 foreign	
enterprises	 or	 multinational	 corporations	 if	 they	 are	 wary	 of	 the	 poor	 IP	 environment.23	
Therefore,	from	the	pull-side	of	TT,	China	has	to	shift	focus	away	from	growth	that	“leads	to	a	
continued	 focus	 on	 a	 carbon-fueled	 economy,”24	 and	 promote	 “areas	 in	 which	 China’s	
renewables	 market	 is	 exhibiting	 clear	 signs	 of	 innovation	 and	 leadership,	 as	 opposed	 to	
reaction	to	market	conditions.”25	 China	 is	now	developing	a	remarkable	number	“of	 its	own	
energy	 technology	 that	 it	 has	 a	 home-grown	 incentive	 to	 increase	 the	protection	of	 energy	
technology	 IPR	 in	 its	market.”26	 Thus,	consolidating	 IP	protection	and	education	 is	a	benefit	
for	China’s	long-term	development	as	well.	
																																								 																				
21 See Louis S. Sorell, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United States’ (2002) 11 Pac 
Rim L & Pol'y J 319. 
22 Vikram Nehru, Aart Kraay and Xiaoqing Yu, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century (World Bank: PREM 
Sector Department (EASPR), 1997) p.11. 
23 See Edwin Mansfield and Banco Mundial, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology 
Transfer (1994) 
24 Federico Caprotti, ‘China's Cleantech Landscape: The Renewable Energy Technology Paradox’ (2008) 9 Sustainable Dev L & 
Pol'y 6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Kiel Downey, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Renewable Energy Technology Transfer in China’ (2012) 9 SCJ Int'l L & Bus 
89, supra note 50 
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Traditionally,	 China	 was	 described	 as	 “a	 net	 importer	 of	 renewable	 energy	 technology,	
technical	know-how,	and	project	development	capabilities.	This	 is	especially	 the	case	where	
established	 technologies—developed	mostly	 outside	 China—are	 concerned.”27	 However,	 as	
we	 have	 discussed	 in	 this	 research,	 from	 2005	 onwards,	 after	 a	 generation	 of	 absorbing	
foreign	 capital	 and	 technology,	 China	 is	 now	 beginning	 to	 export	 them	 and	 becoming	 a	
manufacturer	of	other	 renewable	energy	generation	equipment.	 In	 the	case	of	wind	power,	
many	 foreign	 manufacturers	 are	 facing	 increasing	 pressure	 to	 market	 themselves	 in	 China	
now,	in	contrast	to	the	time	when	the	supply	of	the	vast	majority	of	turbines	and	components	
depended	 on	 imported	 technology.28	 In	 the	 biomass	 energy	 sector,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	
Danish	 biomass	 technology	 company	 Bioener	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis	 in	 2009	 brought	
Chinese	 biomass	 energy	 generator-manufacturing	 to	 a	 better	 position.	 Before	 this,	 each	
biomass	power	plant	established	by	Guoneng	(National	Bio	Energy	Co.	Ltd.)	had	to	pay	huge	
royalties	to	Bioener	while	at	risk	of	the	unpredictable	cancellation	of	technology	supply	by	the	
foreign	 licensor.	 However,	 by	 taking	 the	 opportunity	 created	 by	 the	 global	 finance	 crisis	 in	
2008,	 Guoneng	 (National	 Bio	 Energy	 Co.	 Ltd.)	 acquired	 its	 former	 licensor	 Bioener	 and	 the	
BWE	(Burmeister	and	Wain	Energy	A/S),	and	actualized	technology	localization	with	all	of	 its	
biomass	energy	projects.	In	recent	years,	Guoneng	(National	Bio	Energy	Co.	Ltd.)	has	begun	to	
export	its	equipment,	know-how,	and	experiences	to	other	countries	as	well.	According	to	my	
interviewees,29	 foreign	clients	such	as	the	Philippines	have	been	in	contact	with	the	Guoneng	
(National	Bio	Energy	Co.	Ltd.)	head	office	about	biomass	power	generation.	The	delegations	
																																								 																				
27 Caprotti (n 24). 
28 See Wen-Qiang Liu, Lin Gan and Xi-Liang Zhang, ‘Cost-Competitive Incentives for Wind Energy Development in China: 
Institutional Dynamics and Policy Changes’ (2002) 30 Energy Policy 753. 
29 manager interviewees from Shandong Gaotang 30MW Biomass Power Generation Project and Shandong Shanxian 1*25MW 
Biomass Power Plant Project. 
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are	 forwarded	 to	 Guoneng	 (National	 Bio	 Energy	 Co.	 Ltd.)	 funded	 plants	 in	 Shandong	 to	
conduct	on-site	tours,	investigations,	and	to	discussion	cooperation.	In	the	foreseeable	future,	
as	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 and	 diffuse	 its	 own	 indigenous	 technology	 among	 other	 countries	
grows,	 weak	 IP	 protection	 could	 become	 a	 handicap	 to	 Chinese	 renewable	 technology	
development.	 Indeed,	 moderately	 strong	 IP	 protection	 is	 helpful	 for	 securing	 returns	 for	
foreign	 investors	 as	well	 as	 for	 up-	 and-coming	 domestic	 technology	 benefiters	 of	 TTs,	 and	
more	importantly,	it	is	absolutely	vital	for	encouraging	investment	in	R	&	D	that	is	meaningful	
for	the	long-term	growth	of	the	renewables	industry.30	 From	this	perspective,	China	needs	to	
take	 enforcing	 IPRs	 more	 seriously	 in	 order	 to	 build	 a	 solid	 foundation	 for	 healthy	
development	in	the	future.31	 	
At	the	same	time,	a	more	effective	IP	system,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	climate	change	
crisis,	 is	needed.	Chapter	VI	 shows	that	 in	promoting	 renewable	energy	TT	and	encouraging	
technology	 innovation,	 the	 role	 that	 IP	 protection	 plays	 is	minor	 and	 perhaps	 dispensable.	
Rather,	 IP	 protection	 enhancement	 is	 dependent	 on	 several	 conditions	 such	 as	 “increasing	
human	 capital,	 particularly	 in	 technical	 skills,	 expanding	 technical	 infrastructure,	 developing	
efficient	 managerial	 techniques,	 encouraging	 international	 trade	 and	 investment	 from	
abroad,”32	 and	sufficient	and	timely	support	from	government	for	the	financial	and	political	
aspects.	All	of	the	listed	factors	demand	huge	investment	and	sacrifice	from	public	and	private	
sources.	Meanwhile,	in	China	the	beneficial	effects	of	enforcing	climate	change	or	renewable	
energy	IPRs	is	subtle,	because	renewable	energy	technology	utilization	and	innovation	takes	a	
																																								 																				
30 Robert M Sherwood, ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries’ 37 IEDA 491 p.504. 
31 Mikhaelle Schiappacasse, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in China: Technology Transfers and Economic Development’ (2003) 2 
Buff Intell Pro LJ 164. 
32 Keith E. Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective’ (2001) U Ill L Rev 
457. 
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relatively	small	share	of	the	energy	market.	Moreover,	the	earnings	of	the	renewable	energy	
industry	 currently	 depend	 on	 government	 planning	 and	 subsidies,	 which	 means	 relying	 on	
more	factors	such	as	“the	country's	gross	domestic	product	(GDP),	the	share	of	the	GDP	that	
government	is	willing	to	spend	on	research	and	development	(R	&	D).”33	 Therefore,	in	order	
to	 allow	 market	 forces	 to	 work	 freely,	 helping	 the	 renewable	 energy	 industry	 to	 find	 its	
position	 and	 future,	 a	 trend	of	 decentralization	of	 approval	 is	 needed.	Government	policies	
should	 increase	 the	 weight	 of	 market	 factors	 and	 encourage	 more	 private	 companies	 to	
participate	in	the	renewable	energy	industry.	 	
Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 imprudent	to	advise	developing	countries,	especially	the	 large	mid-income	
ones	like	China,	to	become	servile	to	Western	standards,	because,	“it	may	actually	be	in	the	
best	 interest	 of	 the	 developing	 countries	 not	 to	 encourage	 strong	 IPRs	 because	 piracy,	 or	
learning	by	copying,	are	more	economically	 feasible”34	 at	 this	 stage	of	development	and	of	
the	maximizing	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 currently	 available	 climate	 change	 technologies.	 On	
one	hand,	renewable	energy	technologies	are	too	complex	to	fully	absorb	and	commercialize	
simply	by	reverse-engineering	or	piracy	without	the	relevant	know-how	and	other	assistance	
from	 the	 technology	 holder.35	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 needs	 considerable	 investment	 from	
private	 and	 public	 sources	 of	 the	 TT	 receiving	 country	 to	 deliver	wide	 application.	 This	 has	
been	discussed	in	detail	in	the	sections	on	climate	change	technology	development	status	and	
the	cost	of	such	technologies.	Thus,	carefully	loosened	IP	protection	or	moderately	amended	
IP	 laws	would	have	 secured	 reasonable	 returns	 for	 technology	 inventors	 as	well.	 Instead	of	
																																								 																				
33 Keith E Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development’ (2000) 32 Case W Res J Int'l L 471 p.277 
34 See Keith E. Maskus, ‘Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2000) 53 Vand L 
Rev 2219 p.2222; Sherwood (n 30) p.503 (arguing that extremely poor countries have less to lose in pursuing strong IP protection).  
35 Sherwood (n 30) p.503. 
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being	panicked	about	IP	theft	(which	usually	thieves	are	unable	to	learn	from	efficiently)	and	
to	boost	economic	development,	countries	could	be	 looking	for	a	more	functional	 IP	system	
that	 can	 play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 accelerating	 a	 technological	 innovation	 cycle	 and	 expanding	
climate	change	TT.	To	reduce	the	cost	of	climate	change	technologies	by	narrowing	the	range	
of	 IP	 protection,36	 the	 curtailment	 should	 push	 technology	 holders	 and	 developers	 to	 a	
position	where	they	are	spurred	on	to	innovate	for	financial	reasons.	Actions	such	as:	tacitly	
consenting	 to	 a	 shorter	 green-patent	 protection	 period	 articulated	 by	 national	 IP	 laws	 of	 a	
TRIPS	 member	 state;	 an	 easier	 way	 to	 acquire	 compulsory	 licensing	 on	 renewable	 energy	
technologies;	 or	 a	 lower	 compensation	 level	 of	 climate	 change	 IP	 infringement	 for	
environmental	protection	purpose;	would	have	had	a	better	effect	on	stimulating	technology	
innovation,	 for	 they	 might	 have	 facilitated	 the	 maturing	 of	 a	 new	 technology	 to	 realize	 a	
commercialized	and	widely	affordable	price.37	 The	fast	tracks	for	green	patents,	which	exist	
in	the	US	and	the	EU,38	 can	be	used	as	a	reference	for	such	reforms	and	to	distinguish	climate	
change	 technology	 from	 irrelevant	 technology.	 As	 the	 filling	 process	 is	 shortened	 for	
green-patent	 applications,	 the	 protection	 period	 could	 be	 reduced	 accordingly.	 Generally	
speaking,	 a	 developing	 country	which	 focuses	 on	 strictly	 protecting	 and	 enforcing	 IPRs	 that	
are	 actually	 trimmed	 according	 to	 the	 need	 of	 climate	 change	 mitigation,	 as	 well	 as	
																																								 																				
36 for example, some ESTs that cost less in R & D or so crucially important to climate change mitigation can be excluded from 
patentability. This should be based on a case-by-case bisis. 
37 Jorrit Gosens and Yonglong Lu, ‘Prospects for Global Market Expansion of China’s Wind Turbine Manufacturing Industry’ 
(2014) 67 Energy Policy 301. 
38 Antoine Dechezleprêtre, ‘Fast-tracking “Green” Patent Applications: An Empirical Analysis’ Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy Working Paper No 127, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working 
Paper No 107 (2013) 
 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP107-fast-tracking-green-patent-applications.pdf> 
accessed Feburary 2017; “The EPO has an online searchable global database of green patents, and the US Patent Office online 
database covers US patents only.” Ros Davidson, ‘Wind Manufacturers Act to Defend Intellectual Property Rights’ (Wind Power 
Monthly, 26 January 2012)  
<http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1114292/wind-manufacturers-act-defend-intellectual-property-rights> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
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incentivizing	technology	development,	should	be	able	to	consolidate	the	 legitimate	 interests	
of	IP	holders	while	enhancing	sustainable	economic	growth	in	developing	countries.	
If	 IP	 is	made	more	accessible	 for	an	exchange	of	better	 trade	conditions	and	more	efficient	
climate	 change	mitigation	 in	 a	 developing	 country,	 correspondingly,	 the	 fairness,	 openness	
and	 transparency	 of	 China’s	 domestic	 market,	 or	 of	 any	 other	 TT-	 receiving	 countries,	 will	
become	 equally	 important.	 Successful	 TTs	 cannot	 be	 disconnected	 from	national	 treatment	
provided	 for	 foreign	 companies.	 An	 open	 economy	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 attract	 the	 FDI	 that	
involves	TT	while	benefitting	domestic	businesses	as	well	by	absorbing	and	profiting	from	the	
technology	received.39	 Removal	or	revision	of	protectionism	articles	 in	the	Chinese	contract	
law,	patent	 law,	and	anti-monopoly	 law	 is	more	applicable	across	current	renewable	energy	
markets	 as	 the	 need	 for	 a	 transparent,	 consistent,	 predictable,	 precisely	 monitored	 and	
evaluated	 renewable	 energy	 sector	 grows.40	 The	 adoption	 of	 a	 more	 market-oriented,	
decentralized	 and	 less	 erratic	 government	 intervening	 over	 project	 planning	 and	 electricity	
pricing	is	needed	to	facilitate	the	industry.41	 Through	an	effective	monitoring	and	evaluation	
system,	 the	government	can	 still	have	macroscopic	 control	over	 the	 industry	while	avoiding	
the	issue	of	lacking	connections	from	renewable	projects	to	the	grid.	In	practice,	“monitoring	
and	 evaluating	 programs	 can	 be	 constructed	 around	 a	 set	 of	 key	 indicators—	 such	 as	 the	
number	 of	 projects	 connected	 to	 the	 grid,	 or	 a	 series	 of	 connections	 over	 a	 specific	 time	
span—which	 clearly	 track	 progress.”42	 Regarding	 policy-making,	 government	 should	 ensure	
fair	 competition	 in	 the	 renewable	 energy	market,	 as	 “pressure	 to	 innovate	will	 only	 exist	 if	
																																								 																				
39 Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective’ (n 32) p.471. 
40 Wendy Annecke, ‘Monitoring and Evaluation of Energy for Development: The Good, The bad and The Questionable in M&E 
Practice’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy 2839. 
41 Liu, Gan and Zhang (n 28). 
42 See details in Caprotti (n 24). 
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manufacturers	compete	on	equal	terms	in	tenders.”43	 It	is,	therefore,	important	to	provide	a	
fair	 and	 accessible	 platform	 for	 fund	 raising,	 to	 revise	 the	 localization	 percentage	
requirement,44	 and	 to	 push	 domestic	 developers	 to	 upgrade	 their	 technology	 to	 a	 good	
quality	standard	regardless	of	the	cost.	This	will	help	rectifying	warped	growth	among	Chinese	
domestic	manufacturers	and	release	decision-making	from	non-market	interference.	
Any	policy	adjustment	pursuing	the	above	objectives	will	take	a	considerable	amount	of	time	
and	capital45	 before	it	noticeably	affects	society.	Therefore,	experimental	reforms	to	IP	laws	
and	bold	attempts	 at	 environmental	 policies	need	 to	be	put	 into	practice	 right	now.	At	 the	
current	 cost,	 to	 develop	 and	 apply	 renewable	 energy	 is	 still	 high	 and	 burdensome	 to	most	
Chinese	power	companies.	Renewable	energy	equipment	manufacturers,	on	the	other	hand,	
do	 not	 yet	 appear	 to	 have	 the	 “strength	 to	 compete	 with	 global	 leaders	 in	 the	 most	
established	 export	markets	 in	 the	 near	 future.”46	 Therefore,	 Chinese	 power	 companies	 are	
more	 accepting	 of	 lower	 cost,	 lower-quality,	 domestically	 manufactured	 equipment.	 This	
could	 become	 a	 potential	 issue	 when	 the	 economic	 downturn	 passes	 and	 high-quality	
facilities	are	needed,	as	 it	will	cost	even	more	to	dismantle	and	replace	these	cheaper	ones.	
Therefore,	while	awaiting	for	changes	in	IP	protection	and	improved	environmental	policy	to	
take	 effect,	 developing	 countries	 like	 China	 should	 continue	 trying	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	
financial	aids	from	international	sources	(such	as	the	CDM),	and	use	them	as	a	springboard	to	
establish	a	high	starting	point	within	its	domestic	market	and	to	be	equipped	to	reach	out	to	
the	global	market.	 	
																																								 																				
43 Gosens and Lu (n 28). 
44 Accomplished by introducing percentage quotas for installations with equipment from domestic suppliers. GWEC, 2012 Global 
Wind Report (Annual Market Update 2012, Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), Belgium, 2013). 
45 Gosens and Lu (n 28)  
46 Ibid. 
	 379	
	
	 380	
Appendix	I:	Semi-structured	interviewing	questions	
In	this	research	four	different	categories	of	people	will	be	interviewed	from	the	Chinese	firms’	
technology	department,	managerial	 department	 (including	plant	manager,	 in-house	 lawyers	
and	manager	 in	charge	of	CDM	project)	and	local	government	department	 in	relation	to	the	
energy	 industry.	 Each	 person	 will	 be	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 interviews.	 Employees	 from	
technology	department	will	be	expert	in	assessing,	implementing	and	replicating	in	particular,	
and	 well-knowledge	 with	 information	 that	 is	 directly	 based	 on	 technical	 abilities.	 Plant	
managers,	lawyers	and	CDM	managers	will	have	an	understanding	of	the	difficulties	in	getting	
agreement	and	the	 legal/administrative	procedures	necessary	 for	TT.	And	their	opinions	are	
also	 crucial	 for	 starting	 a	 project,	 selecting	 appropriate	 technology	 and	 replication	 of	 the	
technology	 absorbed	 afterwards.	 Regional	 government	 officers	 have	 a	 broader	 view	 of	 the	
development	 of	 the	 local	 energy	 industry	 and	 changes	 in	 policies.	 Analysis	 of	 the	 views	 of	
different	 type	of	practitioners	will	 create	a	 comprehensive	understanding	of	 the	TT	process	
and	what	role	has	IP	law	plays	at	the	firm	level.	As	according	to	the	down-top	operating	model	
of	 CDM	and	GEF,	most	 projects	 are	 initiated	 by	 private	 sector,	 thus	 any	 factors	 that	would	
influence	individual	firms’	in	their	TT	action	will	ultimately	result	in	TT	failure.	
What	is	their	understanding	of	IP	law?	What	difficulties	have	they	experienced	with	IP	issues?	
What	 expectation	 do	 they	 have	 on	 the	 current	 IP	 protection?	 And	 how	 efficient	 has	 the	
national	law	system	and	CDM	been	in	facilitating	TT	in	China?	These	questions	are	designed	to	
find	out	 enterprises’	willingness	 and	 actual	motivation	 to	participate	 in	 TT,1	 the	 impression	
they	have	of	IP	law,	their	view	of	the	current	approaches	available	for	them	to	get	access	to	
																																								 																				
1 Is it because they share environmental protection zealousness or is it because that the projects provide profitable opportunities? 
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technology	that	is	needed,	and	difficulties	they	have	faced	in	receiving	and	innovating	green	
technology.	
Common	questions	as	warm-up:	
1. Name;	position	in	the	firm;	what	project	have	you	been	involved.	 	
2. What	is	your	understanding	of	climate	change	TT	(technology	pool,	import	equipment,	
licences,	 know-hows,	 future	 innovation)?	Do	you	 think	 it	 is	worth	 importing	 climate	
change	technologies	and	for	what	reason	you	think	that	way?	 	
3. Do	 you	 consider	 climate	 change/or	 environmental	 protection	 an	 urgent	 issue	 to	 be	
dealt	with?	Give	a	number	out	of	10	to	describe	the	urgency,	and	give	an	example	to	
both	“1”	and	“10”.	
4. What	 do	 you	 know	 about	 the	 Chinese	 IP	 system?	 (laws,	 policies,	 institutions,	
government	departments,	courts…)	Did	you	have	any	experience	working	with	them?	
How’s	your	feeling	about	it?	
5. What	 preparation	 do	 you	 have	 to	make	 for	 the	 last	 TT	 project	 and	 how	 long	 did	 it	
take?	 	
6. From	what	platform	do	you	always	be	 informed	of	new	technologies	that	are	useful	
for	 your	 project/company?	 Do	 you	 feel	 that	 there	 is	 enough	 information	 about	
climate-related	technology	accessible	from	commercial	pathway?	
7. What	do	you	think	are	the	most	important	means	of	financing	environmentally	sound	
technology	transfer	projects?	Are	you	getting	enough	funding	and	facilitates	to	foster	
efficient	 technology	 transfer	 in	 your	 project	 and	 afterwards?	 	 If	 not,	 what	 is	 the	
	 382	
reason	 for	 the	 lacking	and	 in	what	 sectors	do	you	 think	 should	be	given	more	 focal	
support?	 	
8. Could	you	please	name	the	key	organizations	in	your	country	which	you	consider	the	
most	important	in	policy-making	for	adoption	of	climate-relevant	technologies	and/or	
for	the	selection	and	implementation	of	climate-relevant	technologies?	 	
9. Could	you	please	provide	a	list	of	legal	and	technical	assistance	bodies	in	your	region	
that	you	would	turn	to	if	you	have	any	relevant	difficulty	during	technology	transfer?	
What	kind	of	assistance	and	consultant	do	you	think	 is	necessary	during	and	after	a	
cooperative	 project?	 (for	 example	 inventory	 of	 technology	 agency	 or	 suppliers,	
inventory	of	specialized	law	firms,	comparative	assessment	of	technology	platform…)	
Except	 for	 the	 known	 assistance,	 what	 other	 aids	 would	 you	 like	 to	 see	 the	
government	provide	for	you	in	attracting	and	complementing	TT?	
10. If	the	green-techs	are	no	longer	patentable	will	you	be	more	willing	to	employ	them	in	
your	 company	 activities?	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 will	 you	 develop	 on	 top	 on	 current	
available	techs	to	improve	the	area?	
Questions	for	legal	department:	 	
1. Did	 you	 ever	 come	 across	 with	 any	 difficulty	 that	 is	 due	 to	 patentability/strong	 or	
weak	 IP	Rights	 protection?	Any	example	 in	 the	 last	 project	 you	have	 attended?	Did	
you	benefit	 from	exception	 to	 IP	 rights	according	 to	national	policies	and	objectives	
(and	techs	that	 is	acquired	through	compulsory	 licence	or	waiver	by	the	owner)?	Do	
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you	have	faith	in	compulsory	licensing	and	why?	Do	you	think	that	IP	protection	level	
will	influence	price	of	technology?	
2. What	disadvantages	 as	 a	 Chinese	 company	 in	negotiating	 cooperation	 contracts?	 In	
what	 aspects	do	 you	 feel	 that	 is	 not	 as	 good/proficient	 as	 foreign	 contractor?	Dose	
any	of	these	relevant	to	IP	issues?	
3. What	procedures	do	your	company	have	 to	go	 through	during	 the	 last	 international	
TT?	 	 Is	the	national	IP	system	friendly	enough	for	international	TT	practice?	How	long	
did	it	take	to	finish	legal	procedures	last	time	and	what	was	the	cost?	Which	steps	do	
you	think	are	unnecessary/repetitive/excess	and	why?	
4. Please	 include	 as	 many	 key	 decision	 makers	 as	 you	 consider	 relevant,	 and	 list	 the	
contacts	 by	 various	 sectors,	 including	 energy,	 agriculture,	 transportation,	 forestry,	
industry,	 waste	 management,	 health,	 infrastructure	 and	 fishery	 sectors.	 Has	 your	
country	set	priorities	for	climate-relevant	technology	transfer	in	the	various	sectors?	:	
If	 so,	 could	 you	 summarize	 your	 experience	 of	 the	 priority	 on	 mitigation	 and	
adaptation	 technologies	 by	 sector?	 In	 case	 your	 region	 has	 set	 priorities	 for	 one	 or	
more	sectors,	could	you	summarize	key	features	of	 the	planning	and	priority-setting	
processes	that	led	to	these	priorities?	
Questions	for	technology/technician	department:	 	
1. Could	you	please	provide	a	list	of	institutes	(with	addresses)	in	your	region	that	collect	
and	 disseminate	 technology-related	 information	 on	 sectors	 such	 as	 energy	 and	
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transportation?	 What	 information	 sources	 does	 your	 organization	 consult	 in	 the	
preparation	of	climate-relevant	technology	transfer	initiatives?	 	
2. In	 what	 form	 did	 the	 last	 imported	 technology	 transferred	 to	 your	 company	
(equipment,	 staff	 training)?	 Do	 you	 consider	 the	 technology	 you	 have	 received	
included	core/basic	IPs?	Are	those	foreign	technologies	provided	in	a	high/affordable	
price?	 Are	 there	 any	 domestic	 companies	 providing	 like	 products/service?	Why	 did	
you	choose	 to	get	 techs	 from	foreign	sources?	 Is	 there	any	cost	difference	between	
domestic	TT	and	international	TT?	
3. What	 do	 you	 consider	 as	 a	 reasonable	 time	 period	 for	 R&D,	 innovation	 and	
commercialisation	of	a	new	technology	in	the	climate	change	technology	industry?	
4. What	 benefit	 did	 your	 department	 get	 from	 the	 project?	 Do	 you	 think	 you	 have	
further	 innovation	 capability	 now	 to	 develop	 new	 techs	 on	 your	 own	or	with	 other	
domestic	firms	after	the	TT?	Will	you	do	it	and	why?	What	will	cost	you	in	doing	this	
(money,	time,	admin	works)?	
Questions	managerial	department:	 	
1. What	stimulus	interested	you	to	initiate	the	projects?	What	aid,	grants	and	subsidies	
have	been	provided	to	you	for	implementing	the	project?	What	are	the	most	feasible	
sources	for	financing	climate-relevant	technology	transfer	in	your	region?	 	
2. Did	 you	 ever	 come	 across	 with	 any	 difficulty	 that	 is	 due	 to	 patentability/strong	 or	
weak	IP	Rights	protection	during	the	projects	and	after(any	owner	refuses	to	transfer	
or	reveal	information)?	 	 Why	did	those	difficulties	happen	(are	the	transferor	fear	of	
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low	protection	 in	China	or	China’s	competence?)?	How	did	you	dealt	with	them	and	
what	did	you	compromise?	Did	you	benefit	 from	exception	 to	 IP	 rights	according	 to	
national	policies	and	objectives?	Have	you	ever	managed	to	make	applications	to	gain	
any	technology	by	compulsory	licensing	permission	granted	by	the	government?	
3. Do	 you	 think	 the	 national	 IP	 system	 friendly	 enough	 for	 international	 TT	 practice?	
What	is	the	percentage	of	fund	is	taken	to	operate	IP	related	issues	in	the	project	that	
you	have	experienced?	In	what	forms	do	you	prefer	to	import	technology	(equipment,	
licence,	 know-hows)	 and	 what	 difficulties	 do	 they	 bring?	 Is	 current	 level	 of	 IPR	
protection	deters	you	from	making	decision	of	further	technology	imports?	In	general	
how	much	did	 it	cost	to	complete	a	TT?	Are	there	any	other	cost	does	 it	 take	 if	you	
plan	to	develop	the	technology	imported?	
4. Are	 you	 looking	 forward	 to	 join	 another	project	 like	 this	 again	or	 import	 new	 techs	
from	abroad	in	the	future	and	why?	Which	sector	in	particular	deters/encourage	you	
from	doing	so?	
5. Please	 include	 as	 many	 key	 decision	 makers	 as	 you	 consider	 relevant,	 and	 list	 the	
contacts	 by	 various	 sectors,	 including	 energy,	 agriculture,	 transportation,	 forestry,	
industry,	 waste	 management,	 health,	 infrastructure	 and	 fishery	 sectors.	 Has	 your	
country	set	priorities	for	climate-relevant	technology	transfer	in	the	various	sectors?	If	
so,	could	you	summarize	your	experience	of	the	priority	on	mitigation	and	adaptation	
technologies	by	sector?	In	case	your	region	has	set	priorities	for	one	or	more	sectors,	
could	you	summarize	key	features	of	the	planning	and	priority-setting	processes	that	
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led	to	these	priorities?	What	has	your	government	done	to	facilitate	the	transfer	and	
implementation	of	climate	relevant	technologies	in	different	sectors	in	your	country?	 	
Questions	for	government	officers	in	relation	to	the	local	energy	industry	
1. What	 are	 the	 favourable	 policies	 available	 for	 renewable	 energy	 project	 from	 the	
national	 level?	What	aid,	grants	and	subsidies	have	been	provided	to	the	companies	
for	implementing	the	project?	 	
2. What	 are	 the	 favourable	 policies	 available	 for	 renewable	 energy	 project	 from	 the	
national	level,	including	tax-deduction	and	land	lease	discount?	
3. What	 have	 the	 local	 government	 done	 for	 financing	 and	 assisting	 climate-relevant	
technology	transfer	to	your	region?	
4. What	 procedures	 are	 required	 to	 get	 a	 renewable	 energy	 project	 approved?	Under	
what	grounds	will	the	government	decline	a	proposed	renewable	energy	project?	
These	 questions	 are	 designed	 to	 find	 out	 enterprises’	 willingness	 and	 actual	 motivation	 to	
climate	 change	 mitigation, 2 	 difficulties	 they	 have	 faced	 in	 receiving	 and	 innovating	
technology	 and	 their	 impression	 about	 the	 current	 approaches	 available	 for	 them	 to	 get	
access	to	technology	that	is	needed.	And	the	interviewer	will	ask	pilot	questions	prior	to	the	
formal	 interviews	 to	 test	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 semi-structured	 interviews	 adopted.	 Some	
people	 at	 certain	 positions,3	 especially	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 may	 not	 provide	 neutral	
opinions.	The	questions	can	be	categorised	with	different	themes	for	coding	in	Nvivo:	
																																								 																				
2 Is it because they share environmental protection zealousness or is it because that the projects provide profitable opportunities? 
3 E.g. Party Secretary 
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Themes:	
	Access	 to	 and	 choice	 of	 technologies:	 Strong	 IP	 protection	 increase	 technology	 price,	
therefore	 cripple	 the	 companies	 from	buying,	 keeping	 and	 innovate	 these	 green-techs;	 and	
also	 strong	 IP	 protection	 enables	 technology	 owner	 with	 primary	 control	 over	 TT	 and	
receivers	could	do	very	 less	about	 it.	This	theme	relates	to	questions	about	opinion	towards	
current	 IP	 system:	 e.g.	 Did	 you	 ever	 come	 across	 with	 any	 difficulty	 that	 is	 due	 to	
patentability/strong	or	weak	IP	Rights	protection?	Did	you	benefit	from	exception	to	IP	rights	
according	to	national	policies	and	objectives?	Dose	the	national	IP	system	friendly	enough	for	
international	 TT	 practice?	 Have	 you	 ever	 managed	 to	 make	 applications	 to	 gain	 any	
technology	by	compulsory	licensing	permission	granted	by	the	government?	
	Difficulties	 caused	 by	 national	 and/or	 local	 government.	 This	 theme	 relates	 to	 questions	
about	opinion	towards	Chinese	government:	Could	you	please	name	the	key	organizations	in	
your	 country,	 which	 you	 consider	 the	 most	 important	 in	 policy-making	 for	 adoption	 of	
climate-relevant	 technologies	 and/or	 for	 the	 selection	 and	 implementation	 of	
climate-relevant	 technologies?	 Please	 include	 as	many	 key	decision	makers	 as	 you	 consider	
relevant,	and	list	the	contacts	by	various	sectors,	including	energy,	agriculture,	transportation,	
forestry,	 industry,	 waste	 management,	 health,	 infrastructure	 and	 fishery	 sectors.	 Has	 your	
country	 set	 priorities	 for	 climate-relevant	 technology	 transfer	 in	 the	 various	 sectors?	 If	 so,	
could	 you	 summarize	 your	 experience	 of	 the	 priority	 on	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation	
technologies	by	sector?	 In	case	your	region	has	set	priorities	 for	one	or	more	sectors,	could	
you	summarize	key	 features	of	 the	planning	and	priority-setting	processes	 that	 led	 to	 these	
priorities?	 Could	 you	 please	 provide	 a	 list	 of	 institutes	 (with	 addresses)	 in	 your	 region	 that	
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collect	 and	 disseminate	 technology-related	 information	 on	 sectors	 such	 as	 energy	 and	
transportation?	 What	 has	 your	 government	 done	 to	 facilitate	 the	 transfer	 and	
implementation	of	climate	relevant	technologies	in	different	sectors	in	your	country?	 	
	Assess	need	and	possibility/feasibility	to	give	exceptions	to	green-tech	IP	protections	under	
TRIPS	 as	 it	 is	 urgent	 to	 deal	with	 climate	 change.	 This	 theme	 relates	 to	 past	 experience	 of	
environmental	 international	mechanisms:	What	aid,	grants	and	subsidies	has	been	provided	
to	 you	 for	 implementing	 the	project?	What	 do	 you	 think	 are	 the	most	 important	means	of	
financing	 environmentally	 sound	 technology	 transfer	 projects?	 Do	 you	 feel	 that	 there	 is	
enough	 information	about	climate-related	technology	accessible	 from	commercial	pathway?	
Are	you	getting	enough	funding	and	facilitates	to	foster	efficient	technology	transfer	 in	your	
project	and	afterwards?	If	not,	what	is	the	reason	for	the	lacking	and	in	what	sectors	do	you	
think	should	be	given	more	 focal	 support?	What	are	 the	most	 feasible	sources	 for	 financing	
climate-relevant	technology	transfer	in	your	region?	
	In	applying	TRIPS,	has	Chinese	national	IP	law	and	governmental	administration	put	heavy	
burden	 on	 enterprisers	 and	 deters	 them	 from	 importing	 and	 innovating	 upon	 foreign	
technology?	 This	 theme	 relates	 to	 questions	 about	 opinion	 towards	 launching	 and	
implementation	of	a	project:	What	information	sources	does	your	organization	consult	in	the	
preparation	of	climate-relevant	technology	transfer	initiatives?	Could	you	please	provide	a	list	
of	legal	and	technical	assistance	bodies	in	your	region	that	you	would	turn	to	if	you	have	any	
relevant	difficulty	during	technology	transfer?	What	kind	of	assistance	and	consultant	do	you	
think	 is	 necessary	 during	 and	 after	 a	 cooperative	 project?	 (for	 example	 inventory	 of	
technology	agency	or	suppliers,	inventory	of	specialized	law	firms,	comparative	assessment	of	
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technology	platform…)	What	is	the	percentage	of	fund	is	taken	to	operate	IP	related	issues	in	
the	project	that	you	have	experienced?	
Codes	such	as:	
• State-owned	company;	
• price/cost/time;	
• assistant/funding/information/know-hows;	
• procedure/administration;	
• remedies;	
• subsidies;	
• future	profits,	
• understanding	of	IP	law	provisions,	
• perception	over	IP	related	procedures,	
• opinions	on	the	particularity	of	climate	change	TT	and	its	urgency	
• motivations	to	benefit	from	innovation	up	on	adopted	technologies	
will	be	put	into	analysis	is	to	make	sense	of	the	massive	amounts	of	data,	reduce	the	volume	
of	information,	identify	significant	patterns	and	construct	a	framework	for	communicating	the	
essence	of	what	 the	data	reveal.	The	research	will	 try	 to	find	out	enterprises’	willingness	
and	actual	motivation	 to	 climate	change	mitigation,4	 identify	what	 factors	 significantly	
																																								 																				
4 Is it because they share environmental protection zealousness or is it because that the projects provide profitable opportunities? 
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affects	 TT	 decision-making	 and	 what	 difficulties	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 excessive	 and	
unbearable.	 	
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Appendix	II:	TT	definition	across	disciplines	
From	 an	 economist’s	 perspective,	 technology	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 of	 economic	
development.	They	have	long	recognized	that	TT	is	“at	the	heart	of	the	process	of	economic	
growth,	 and	 that	 the	 progress	 of	 different	 regions,	 in	 both	 developed	 and	 developing	
countries	depends	on	the	extent	and	efficiency	of	such	transfer.”1	 This	 is	 indicating	that	the	
economic	goals	weigh	much	when	using	economic	discipline	to	define	TT.2	 The	limitation	of	
an	 economist’s	 lens	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 give	 much	 weight	 to	 the	 external	 factors,	 such	 as	
political	 factors,	which	have	 great	 impact	on	TT	efficiency.	 In	 fact,	 political	 factors	 could	be	
more	influential	in	the	context	of	climate	change	technology	application.	In	contrast,	sociology	
scholars	often	use	 innovation	and	technology	as	synonyms.3	 Sociologists	consider	the	social	
effect	of	TT	more	than	the	economic	input.	TT	is	seen	as	a	critical	vehicle	to	help	develop	“the	
capacity	 for	 individuals	 and	 societies	 to	 cope	with	modernization	 and	 the	 constant	 change	
that	accompanies	it.”4	 Such	a	perspective	is	highly	valuable	in	the	context	of	climate	change	
mitigation,	 but	 it	 is	 limited	when	 TT	 take	 place	 in-between	 countries	 in	which	 one	 has	 less	
interest	in	capacity	growth	or	living-standards	improvement	than	the	other.5	 This	requires	an	
international	perspective	 that	 respects	 the	benefits	of	all	participating	 countries	 to	 increase	
ratification	and	cooperation.	
																																								 																				
1 Edwin Mansfield and others, ‘New Findings in Technology Transfer, Productivity and Economic Policy’ (1983) 26 Research 
Management 11. 
2 Giovanni Dosi, ‘The Nature of the Innovation Process’ in Giovanni Dosi and others (eds), Technical Change and Economic 
Theory, vol 988 (Pinter London 1988). 
3 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (4 edn, The Free Press, New York 2010). 
4 Pranab Chatterjee and Henry Ireyes, ‘Technology transfer: Implications for social work practice and social work education’ 
(1981) 24 International Social Work pp. 14-22. 
5 Surely some improvement in living standards in developing nations is wanted by the developed world (e.g. so that they can sell 
manufactured products etc. there). But such interest plays a minor role in motivating them taking actions to assist developing 
countries. 
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Anthropologists’	 work	 focuses	 on	 cultural	 evolution. 6 	 They	 do	 not	 study	 technology	
completely	detached	from	the	social	environment;	they	study	specific,	individual	technologies	
through	particular	 cases.	And	 they	are	 “generally	 less	 concerned	with	 the	economic	 cost	of	
technology	 but	 view	 technologies	 as	 existing	 and	 available.”7	 Technology	 is	 considered	 as	
closely	 tied	 to	 other	 social	 phenomena,	 such	 as	 the	 economic	 development	 level	 of	 a	
country.8	 TT	under	this	lens	is	seen	as	a	tool	to	actualize	the	spreading	of	knowledge	needed	
by	the	society.	 	
From	a	management	scholarship,	TT	is	viewed	as	“a	vehicle	to	either	gain	or	sustain	a	firm’s	
competitive	 advantages,	 or	 to	 bring	 financial	 and	 other	 benefits	 to	 collaborating	 firms.”9	
Management	 theorists	 conceive	 of	 technology	 as	 “firm-specific	 information	 concerning	 the	
characteristics	 and	 performance	 properties	 of	 the	 production	 process	 and	 of	 product	
design.”10	 	
 
 
																																								 																				
6 George M. Foster, Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technological Change (New York & Evanston: Harper & Row. 
1962); Elman R. Service, Cultural Evolutionism: Theory in Practice (Holt,Rinehart & Winston of Canada Ltd; First Printing 
edition 1971): “Technology is inert and passive. By itself it does nothing. Only when people use a technology in some way does it 
have an impact on human life. Therefore, they argue that we cannot say anything about the actual effects connected with a 
particular technology until we understand why and what people do with it.” 
7 L. Zhao and A. Reisman, ‘Toward Meta Research on Technology Transfer’ (1992) 39 IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 13 
8 Philippe Geslin, ‘Anthropology, Ergonomics, and Technology Transfers: Some Methodological Perspectives in Light of a 
Guinean Project’ (2001) 23 Practicing anthropology 23. 
9 J. Ketteringham and J. White, ‘Making Technology Work for Business’ in Robert Lamb (ed), Competitive Strategic Management 
(Prentice-Hall 1984); J. M. Harris, R. M. Shaw and W. P. Sommers, ‘The Strategic Management of Technology’ in Robert Lamb 
(ed), Competitive Strategic Management (Prentice-Hall 1984); Chris Pappas, ‘Strategic Management of Technology’ (1984) 1 
Journal of Product Innovation Management 30; Michael E. Porter, ‘Technology and Competitive Advantage’ in Competitive 
Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (The Free Press 2008). 
10 Richard E. Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge university press 1996); John H. Dunning, 
International Production and the Multinational Enterprise (RLE International Business) (Routledge 2012); K. Pavitt, ‘Technology 
Transfer Among the Industrially Advanced Countries: An Overview’ in Nathan Rosenberg and Claudio Frischtak (eds), 
International Technology Transfer: Concepts, Measures, and Comparisons (New York (USA) Praeger 1985). 
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Appendix	III:	Absorptive	capability	in	China	
In	many	industries,	like	the	wind	sector,	cooperation	with	foreign	companies	results	in	a	form	
of	 equipment	 transfer	 through	 imports	 and	 assembly/factory	 setup	 in	 China	 rather	 than	 in	
transferring	 core	 technologies	 to	 local	 enterprises.1	 This	 might	 be	 due	 to	 a	 need	 to	 meet	
localization	 requirements2	 in	 the	 short	 term,	while	 it	 is	 the	 transfer	of	 knowledge	and	core	
technology	that	plays	a	crucial	role	 in	the	establishment	of	a	successful	domestic	renewable	
energy	 industry	 in	 the	 long	 term.3	 Despite	 a	 growth	 in	 capital	 strength	 to	 acquire	 foreign	
firms,	 the	 improvement	of	China’s	domestic	absorptive	capacity	 is	another	 important	 factor	
facilitating	 TT.4	 In	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sector,	 sufficient	 support	 to	 fully	 absorb	 the	most	
advanced	 technologies	 has	 not	 been	 developed.	 “Capability”	 includes	 the	 ability	 to	 absorb	
technology	that	was	lawfully	acquired	as	well	as	any	given	form	of	pirated	IP,	either	from	theft	
or	from	reverse-engineering	of	foreign	renewable	energy	IP;	and	capability	is	considered	to	be	
low.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 complex	 and	 interdependent	nature	of	most	 core	 renewable-energy	
technologies,	and	“many	Chinese	firms	do	not	have	the	complementary	technology	necessary	
to	turn	individual	renewable	energy	IP	into	marketable	products	and	services.”5	 On	the	bright	
side,	 the	risk	of	 infringement	due	to	unsatisfactory	 IP	enforcement	can	be	offset	by	the	 low	
absorptive	capacity	of	the	receiving	market,	therefore	dismissing	all	the	doubts	on	this	score	
of	the	technology	owners	of	TT	to	China. 	
																																								 																				
1 Interviews with technical group from all three wind projects. 
2 The 70% localization requirement by the DRC. 
3 Jingyi Han et.al, ‘Onshore Wind Power Development in China: Challenges Behind a Successful Story’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 
2941. 
4 Ivan Haščič and Nick Johnstone, ‘CDM and International Technology Transfer: Empirical Evidence on Wind Power’ (2011) 11 
Climate Policy 1303. 
5 Kiel Downey, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Renewable Energy Technology Transfer in China’ (2012) 9 SCJ Int'l L & Bus 
89. 
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Absorptive	 capacity	 is	 "the	 ability	 of	 a	 firm	 to	 recognize	 the	 value	 of	 new	 information,	
assimilate	it,	and	apply	it	to	commercial	ends."6	 It	seems	that	China	held	significant	shares	of	
patents,	 globally,	 in	 renewable	 energy	 technologies,	 as	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 the	 chapter.	 In	
particular,	 in	 2009,	 China	 owned	 over	 10	 per	 cent	 of	 patents	 in	wind	 power,	 biomass,	 and	
concentrating	solar	power	all	over	the	world.7	 Moreover,	approximately	half	of	these	patents	
originated	 in	 China.8	 However,	 when	 considering	 the	 number	 together	 with	 the	 scale	 of	
China's	economy,	which	 is	 larger	than	most	developed	countries,9	 the	 innovation	density	of	
the	market	is	low.10	 This	is	particularly	so	in	the	renewable	energy	market,	where	supporting	
technology	accumulation	is	still	low	and	a	facilitating	grid	has	not	been	established.	From	this	
perspective,	 the	most	 important	 reason	 that	 convinces	 foreign	 firms	 to	 transfer	 renewable	
energy	 technology	 to	 China	 is	 not	 the	 law	 reform	 but	 the	 low	 absorptive	 capacity	 and	
potential	returns	from	the	scale	effect	of	the	market.	In	the	wind	turbine	generator	industry	
more	than	30	per	cent	of	the	leading	manufacturers	providing	core	components	are	foreign.11	
None	 of	 the	 domestic	 companies	 occupy	 unshakeable	 positions	 in	 the	 upstream	 market.	
Moreover,	 countries	 that	 already	 have	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 climate	 change	 technologies	 are	
expanding	their	IP	possessions	constantly.	For	example,	according	to	the	Clean	Energy	Patent	
Growth	 Index,	 new	 US	 green	 patents	 increased	 more	 than	 threefold	 since	 January	 2010.	
“Trends	 include	 patents	 for	 power	 factor	 control	 and	 VAR	 support;	 sensor-system	 accuracy	
																																								 																				
6 Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, ‘Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation’ (1990) 
Administrative science quarterly 128. 
7 Bernice Lee et. al, Who Owns Our Low Carbon Future? (Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies: A Chatham House 
Report, 2009) p.15 figure 2.7. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Resident patent applications per 100 billion USD GDP is in fact growing in China since 2014. This is indicating that although 
Chinese companies were lack of capability of turning acquired IP into marketable products and services, they are becoming more 
and more capable of doing so. 
11 Energy and Security Group, Clean Energy: An Exporter's Guide to China (US Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, 2008) p.45. 
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and	 availability;	 and	 reliability,	 including	 of	 towers.”12	 This	 is	 saying	 that	 China	 is	 not	 as	
technologically	 advanced	 as	 industrialized	 countries,	 and	 the	 gap	 could	 be	 widened	 if	 no	
effective	measures	are	taken	immediately.	“But	IP	will	be	increasingly	crucial	as	more	patents	
are	 filed,	 technology	 is	 transferred	 to	developing	nations	and	 the	 financial	 stakes	 grow	 in	 a	
larger	industry.”13	
The	 absorptive	 capacity	 can	 be	 assessed	 by	 looking	 at	 a	 country’s	 level	 of	 dependence	 on	
foreign	 technology.	 Use	 of	 licences	 from	 abroad	 largely	 reflects	 a	 weak	 capability	 and	 less	
technological	competence	among	domestic	entities.14	 From	this	perspective,	 low	absorptive	
ability	 is	very	evident	in	the	wind	energy	sector	in	China.	For	example,	although	the	Chinese	
government	began	to	make	efforts	in	attracting	international	TT	soon	after	it	installed	the	first	
utility-scale	wind	turbines	in	1997,15	 and	in	the	following	year,	especially	between	2003	and	
200916,	 it	 continued	 to	encourage	 the	development	of	 indigenous	wind	 technology	 through	
protectionist	 policies.	 Until	 now,	many	 Chinese	wind	 turbine	manufacturers	 rely	 heavily	 on	
foreign	 licences,	with	most	of	 these	 firms	assembling	rather	 than	manufacting	turbines.	The	
interviewees	 mentioned 17 	 that	 although	 many	 turbine	 suppliers	 now	 claim	 to	 have	
independent	 designs,	 as	 buyers	 they	 understand	 this	 to	 mean	 being	 “more	 mature	 in	
																																								 																				
12 Ros Davidson, ‘Wind Manufacturers Act to Defend Intellectual Property Rights’ (Wind Power Monthly, 26 January 2012)  
<http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1114292/wind-manufacturers-act-defend-intellectual-property-rights> accessed 
Feburary 2017. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Joanna I. Lewis, ‘Technology Acquisition and Innovation in the Developing World: Wind Turbine Development in China 
and India’ (2007) 42 Studies in comparative international development 208; Rasmus Lema and Adrian Lema, ‘Technology 
Transfer? The Rise of China and India in Green Technology Sectors’ (2012) 2 Innovation and Development 23; Joanna Lewis and 
Ryan Wiser, ‘Fostering a Renewable Energy Technology Industry: An International Comparison of Wind Industry Policy Support 
Mechanisms’ (2005) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1844 
15 “China’s earliest manufacturers were two joint ventures between foreign and domestic manufacturers, created as part of a 
government program (the ‘Ride the Wind’ program of 1997) (State Planning Commission (SPC), 1997)” Jorrit Gosens and 
Yonglong Lu, ‘Prospects for Global Market Expansion of China’s Wind Turbine Manufacturing Industry’ (2014) 67 Energy Policy 
301. 
16 “Making wind farm development permits conditional on a minimum percentage of locally manufactured content (stated by the 
NDRC in 2003 and 2009)” ibid. 
17 A common perception of all three manager and technical group interviewees from wind projects. 
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assembling	 components	 sourced	 from	 suppliers.” 18 	 The	 situation	 is	 a	 lot	 better	 in	
lower-capacity	 turbine	manufacturing	 since	 2010	 because	 a	 number	 of	manufacturers	 have	
been	 inspired	to	cooperate	with	foreign	partners	to	design	turbines,	 incentivized	by	 internal	
and	external	assistance	from	both	financial	and	technological	angles.19	 The	reputable	Chinese	
independent	 innovation	 institution	 –	 the	 Wind	 Energy	 Technology	 Institute	 of	 Shenyang	
University	of	Technology	–	is	able	to	license	to	well-known	domestic	companies	such	as	Sany,	
New	United,	Sharpower,	and	many	other	smaller	 suppliers	 in	China	 to	develop	750	KW	and	
lower	 capacity	 turbines.20	 However,	 no	 Chinese	 entities	 have	 yet	managed	 to	 license	wind	
energy	technology	to	a	foreign	partner.	And	the	smaller	firms	are	not	able	to	file	any	patents	
related	to	turbine	manufacturing.21	
As	a	result,	although	China's	cumulative	wind	power	installed	capacity	continues	to	rank	first	
in	the	world,	most	wind	turbines	installed	in	2014	are	mainly	2	MW	and	less,	accounting	for	
87	per	cent	of	newly	installed	capacity,	while	3	MW	and	above	turbines	account	for	only	4	per	
cent	 of	 total	 installations.22	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 better	 localization	 rate	 in	
lower-capacity	 turbine	 manufacturing	 in	 the	 Chinese	 market.	 Moreover,	 these	 indigenous	
turbines	 tend	 to	 be	 licence-free,	 use	 fewer	 core	 component	 imports,	 and	 are	 thus	 a	 lot	
cheaper	 than	 equipment	 purchased	 from	 overseas.	 According	 to	 interviewees	 from	Gosens	
and	Lu’s	study,	such	a	large	proportion	of	lower-capacity	turbine	installation	resulted	from	a	
																																								 																				
18 Interview with technical director from the Shandong Weihai 69 MW Wind Power Project. 
19 “As recently as the period between 2006 and 2011, a number of manufacturers received financial assistance from the Global 
Environment Fund and the NDRC to develop multi-MW wind turbines, in cooperation with foreign technology partners (under the 
China ‘Renewable Energy Scale-up Program’; CRESP, 2012).” Gosens and Lu (n 15). 
20 China Wind Energy Association (CWEA), The 2012 China Wind Power Installed Capacity Statistics (http://wwwcweaorgcn, 
2013) (In Chinese). 
21 Gosens and Lu (n 15). 
22 For analysis of annual installation capacity increase and a study of Chinese wind turbine cooperations, see Beijixing Power, 
‘Analysis of Installation Capacity in 2010-2014 (in Chinese)’ (http://fd.bjx.com.cn/, 2014)  
<http://fd.bjx.com.cn/zhuanti/2014zjrl/> accessed Feburary 2017. 
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preference	 for	 a	more	 economical	way	 of	 coupling	 lower-capacity,	 lower-cost	 turbines,	 e.g.	
two	 1.5	 MW	 turbines	 cost	 less	 than	 one	 3	 MW	 turbine.23	 Such	 statistics	 reflect	 a	 lack	 of	
ability	and	motivation	to	fulfil	market	demand	for	large-capacity	turbines	in	the	short	term.	 	
A	vicious	circle	can	be	found	in	the	turbine	manufacturing	industry.	At	present	most	Chinese	
turbine	makers	 still	 depend	 on	 core	 component	 imports	 with	 only	 the	 supporting	 systems	
being	produced	domestically.	As	a	result,	a	larger	proportion	of	the	total	profit	of	the	sales	is	
enjoyed	by	the	foreign	suppliers.	Consequently,	fewer	funds	are	available	for	domestic	R	&	D	
activities	 because	 the	 Chinese	 companies	 are	 not	 making	 enough	 profit	 to	 invest	 in	
innovation.	With	manufacturers	being	unable	 to	upgrade	 indigenous	 turbines,	 short-sighted	
wind	farms	seeking	cheap	equipment	suffer	by	paying	more	money	and	spending	more	time	
to	maintain	 domestic	 turbines	 than	 imported	 ones.	 According	 to	my	 interviewees,	 turbines	
produced	by	Goldwind	and	Sinovel,	although	known	as	sales	champions	in	China	(even	in	Asia)	
are	reported	to	have	the	highest	 failure	rate	during	operation.	 Interestingly,	wind	farms	use	
an	intuitive	criterion	to	assess	the	performance	of	a	turbine	brand:	the	number	of	customer	
service	personnel	sent	from	the	manufacturer.	Companies	like	Vestas	or	XEMG,	send	only	5	or	
6	people	to	 look	after	 the	wind	farm	 installed	with	their	equipment.	A	small	crew	 is	able	 to	
take	care	of	the	whole	farm.	In	contrast,	maintenance	staff	that	Sinovel	hired	to	look	after	a	
wind	 farm	 usually	 added	 up	 to	 dozens	 of	 people.	 This	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 higher	 failure	 rate.	
Some	 turbines	 produced	 by	 even	 smaller	 enterprises	 are	 more	 problematic	 because	 these	
private	 investors	are	 in	pursuit	of	profit	alone.	Therefore	 they	 tend	 to	employ	 the	cheapest	
components,	 regardless	 of	 quality	 and	 suitability.	 Maintenance	 costs	 of	 these	 turbines	 are	
																																								 																				
23 Gosens and Lu (n 15).  
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significantly	 higher	 and	 they	 need	 to	 be	 overhauled	 on	 a	monthly	 basis.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	
shutdown	times,	some	 irresponsible	wind	farms	even	abandon	regular	overhauls,	 leading	to	
an	 increase	 in	safety	risks.	 In	comparison,	 imported	turbines	have	 low	failure	rates	and	high	
full-load	hour	capability.	According	to	Han	and	Lu,	the	average	full-load	hours	of	wind	turbines	
in	 China	 (1,787h)	 is	 “much	 lower	 than	 that	 in	 Western	 countries	 such	 as	 United	 Kingdom	
(2,628h),	 Australia	 (2,500h)	 and	 United	 States	 (2,300h).” 24	 They	 also	 investigated	 cases	
where	“a	wind	turbine	with	2000	designed	full	load	hours	can	actually	be	in	operation	for	only	
300h	a	year.”25	
The	notorious	IP	problems	in	China’s	market	are	known	to	many	developed	countries,26	 but	
such	 an	 impression	 is	 based	 on	many	 products	 with	most	 of	 them	 being	 very	 different	 to	
renewable	energy	technology.27	 Infringements	of	IP	mostly	appear	in	the	entertainment	and	
apparel	 industries28	 where	pirate	 activities	 can	be	 carried	out	with	 simpler	 technology	 at	 a	
low	 cost.	 Simple	 consumer	 products	 refer	 to,	 end-use	 consumer	 products	 that	 can	 be	 sold	
directly	to	customers	without	any	intermediate	steps,	such	as	books,	software,	movies,	music,	
and	 video	 games.29 	 In	 contrast,	 to	 utilize	 stolen	 information	 about	 renewable	 energy	
technology,	such	as	the	chemical	composition	of	a	biofuel	requires	“a	very	specialized	set	of	
complementary	 skills,	 know-how,	 and	 equipment.” 30 	 The	 generation,	 connection,	
transmission	 and	 sale	 of	 electricity	 from	 biofuel	 also	 require	 “a	 vast,	 complex	 network	 of	
																																								 																				
24 Jingyi Han et.al (n 3) 
25 As was the case for three Huarui wind turbines installed in Boligenshan Wind Farm in 2003, quoted by ibid (n 3). 
26 See Office of the US Trade Representatives, 2016 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets (Executive Office of the President, 
at wwwustrgov, December 2016). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Kristina Sepetys and Alan Cox, ‘Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic Damages’ 
NERA EcoNoMIc CONSULTING (2009) <http://www.nera.com/extimage /PUB IPR ProtectionChina_0109_final.pdf.>  p.9. 
29 As of September 6, 2012, the black markets for these goods in China equalled $52 million (books), $565 million (movies), 
$466.3 million (music), $8.9 billion (software), and $589.9 million (video games). Havoscope, ‘Black Market Crime in China’ 
(Global Black Market Information, 2012)  <http://www.havocscope.com/tag/china/> accessed Feburary, 2017. 
30 Downey (n 5). 
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products,	 processes,	 trade	 secrets,	 and	 know-how.” 31 	 Without	 assistance	 from	 the	
experienced	 and	 specialized	 technology	 owner,	 lacking	 a	 strong	 base	 in	 its	 own	 ancillary	
technology,	 “a	 Chinese	 renewable	 energy	 firm	 that	 gains	 access	 to	 one	 piece	 of	 foreign	
technology	cannot	necessarily	integrate	that	piece	of	technology	into	its	operations.” 32	 As	a	
result,	 successfully	pirated	 renewable	energy	 IP	 is	 actually	hardly	ever	 found	 in	 the	Chinese	
market,	 reflecting	 the	 fact	 that	 Chinese	 firms	 are	 unable	 to	 integrate	 foreign	 IP	 into	 their	
operations	fluidly.33	
	
																																								 																				
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See Office of the US Trade Representatives (n 26), See also Chpater V for detals. 
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